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A grant-in-aid from the State Foundation on Culture and the 
Arts made possible the research and much of the writing for 
this book, particularly regarding urban design and environ­
mental planning in Hawaii. The writer is most grateful for 
this assistance. Any study of Hawaii’s recent past depends 
largely on material which is available in the several excellent 
libraries and depositories in Honolulu and the informed as­
sistance of their librarians and staffs. This writer is especially 
thankful for information gained in the Archives of Hawaii, 
the Hawaiian Mission Children’s Society and the Hawaiian 
Historical Society libraries (now housed in the same mission 
building), and the Hawaiian and Pacific Collections in Sin­
clair Library of the University of Hawaii.
Great thanks are due historian-writer Gavan Daws for 
reading the manuscript and suggesting many improvements. 
Alfred Preis, director of the State Foundation on Culture 
and the Arts, was most helpful with advice, particularly on 
urban design and land planning. Notwithstanding this coun­
sel, interpretation of events and opinions on their significance
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are, of course, the writer’s own responsibility, as are any 
faults in fact, disregard of salient data, and slips in style.
Hawaiian Words
Hawaii’s native Polynesian language is all but lost to com­
mon usage. Some older, proud Hawaiians, fewer in number 
each year, know their forebears’ mellifluent tongue, but for 
most of the population of the islands individual words are all 
that remain of the Hawaiian language. Many of these words 
have become substitutes which the English-speaking newcom­
ers have adopted to use along with the haole kam a’ainas and 
the locals. No one who has lived for any time in Hawaii 
speaks of having difficulty; the trouble is pilikia.' One no 
longer refers to a hole in something; the cavity is a puka. 
Assistance is kokua; gratitude for it is expressed as mahalo. 
Few of these words have the precise meanings that their 
translations into English imply; when the missionaries tried 
to express the poetic, allusive Hawaiian language in more 
familiar terms and reduce it to a written medium they faced 
a difficult task. The Hawaiiana scholar Martha Beckwith 
recognized “ the fondness for indirect speech in the everyday 
language of the people” and found half a dozen possible 
translations of the preface to a chant.
Yet to understand the early Hawaiians’ concern for and 
use of their land, one must try to learn the meanings, or the 
implications, of the terms they used. Some words are direct 
and descriptive: the ahupua'a, a major land division that 
usually extended from the uplands to the ocean, was so 
named, apparently, because its boundaries were marked by a 
heap (ahu) of stones and tax for its use was paid by a pig 
(puaa) laid upon an altar. Others, more figurative, have in­
ferential shifts in meaning. Kuleana, word for the small piece 
of land on which the Hawaiian commoner lived and farmed, 
also meant any right or title, jurisdiction or authority, func­
tion or responsibility. “ That’s not my kuleana,” have dis­
claimed many developers when they were asked to preserve
PREFACE XI
the environment. Following is a brief glossary of words used 
in this book whose primary, generally understood meanings 
must be known to appreciate certain passages in the history 
of land in Hawaii. To indicate their pronunciation the 
accepted phonetic clues are given: hyphens (-) separating 
word/syllables; macrons (a) showing where stress occurs 
and vowels are long; and glottal stops (‘), almost consonants 
in themselves, with a sound like that between the oh 's in 
oh-oh. (Remember too that most vowels are pronounced 
individually—in their unstressed state with a as in above, e as 
in bet, i as in city, o as in sole, and u like oo in moon.)
‘a ‘a brittle, rough lava
ahupua'a basic land division
ali’i chief
aloha love, kindness, greeting, farewell
haole white person




•Hi land division within ahupua'a
kahuna priest, sorcerer, expert
kama ‘aina native-born
kanaka human being, subject
kane man, husband
kapu taboo, prohibition
konohiki headman, landlord, agent
kuhina premier, regent
kuleana small land division commonly for individual 
livelihood
lau hala pandanus leaf
mahele division, share
maka 'ainana commoner
makai toward the ocean
malihini stranger, newcomer
mauka inland, toward the mountain
mele song, chant
moku major land district
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land division within ahupua'a 
long, loose gown 
great, important 
smooth, hard lava 
a grass used for thatching 
trouble
game with small stone 
woman, wife
Place Names
Hawaiian place names are meaningful, and very often an 
understanding of the meaning adds tremendously to apprecia­
tion of the place.2 Knowing the proper phonation of a place 
name is essential to understanding its meaning, but even 
kamaainas in Hawaii today, even those with native back­
grounds, are inclined to be careless about the way they 
pronounce them and heedless of their meanings. The most 
blatant instance must be the distortion of Kamehameha 
when the word is used to identify a territory. Hawaii’s first 
islands-wide ruler was called Ka-mehameha, The Lonely One, 
with the article ka (“ the” ) followed by the adjective meha- 
meha, meaning lonely or solitary. The Kamehameha High­
way, however, is generally known as Kam Highway—with the 
a flat as in fat.
This writer had hoped at one time to write all Hawaiian 
words used in this book, including place names, with their 
phonetic signals. That is really the only way to distinguish, 
for instance, between the first letters in the written word 
Ka-imu-ki (a neighborhood mauka of Diamond Head), which 
means the (that ka sound again) underground cooking oven, 
or imu, and Kai-mu (a village on the island of Hawaii), 
where kai means sea and mu is a gathering together, so that 
Kai-mu was a place where people gathered to watch surfing. 
The result of such conscientiousness, however, would have 
been a clumsy-looking page to the reader of English, interfer­
ing with the intended course of the writing. Following is a 
listing of names of some of the places mentioned most often
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village on Kaua‘i (crescent bay)
city on O'ahu, capital o f state (protected bay)
village on Hawai'i (to satisfy thirst)
point o f land on O'ahu (the heat)
town on Maui (the winning)
town on O'ahu, also Hawai'i, also Maui (two
sea currents)
town on O'ahu (bamboo-sharp—cruel—husband) 
village, and bay on Hawai'i (pathway o f  the 
god)
leeward districts on most islands (leeward)
town on Maui (cruel sun)
city on Kaua'i (cold chill)
village, valley, bay on O'ahu (fierce)
town, beach, on Kaua'i (crashing, as waves)
town on O'ahu (place o f  noise)
beach, tourist area, on O'ahu (spouting water)
city, on Maui (destructive water)
I
Prologue: Hawaii’s Green Heritage
ON the leeward coast of the island of Oahu there lies a 
stretch of land at the entrance to a beautiful valley that the 
Hawaiians called Makaha. The ocean shore at Makaha arcs 
to form a fine sandy beach, and a close-in reef breaks the 
waves high, ideal for surfing. Mauka, inland from the 
sea, the land rises slowly at first to enter a wide, lush valley 
between rugged ridges, steepening as it leads upward toward 
the peak of the Waianae mountain range.
Several hundred years ago there was a quiet Hawaiian 
village in Makaha Valley, and a rough boulder trail came 
down toward it from the highlands above, dotted with houses 
along the way. One branch of the path led to a heiau, a tem­
ple, in the foothills; another went past the cluster of homes 
in the valley mouth and the lands on which the people grew 
taro and yam, later joining the coastal trail that circled the 
island. There, on the shore, a fleet of outrigger fishing 
canoes berthed on the sandy circle. The traveler could go on: 
east toward Puuloa (long hill), where the body of water that 
would later be Pearl Harbor fingered in from the coast, or 
west toward the end point called Kaena, after a brother of 
fire-goddess Pele, and then around to Oahu’s north shore.
A native historian who was twenty years old when the first 
missionaries arrived in Hawaii described the beauties and the
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hazards of the area.1 When he was young, the upper valley 
was always cool; along the coast the mornings were com­
fortable but the afternoons became warm enough to tempt a 
walker to stop, to rest, or to try for the bright-colored fish 
that could be caught on the reef. But in a cave near Makaha 
(which means fierce or ferocious) there lurked a band of rob­
bers who profited from lone travelers, although they wisely 
let larger companies pass untroubled.
On a lazy Sunday in the early 1970s a haole (Caucasian) 
resident of Hawaii and his wife relaxed beside the swimming 
pool in a complex of comfortable cottagelike buildings that 
formed a hotel in the center of Makaha Valley. They were 
there for a needed local vacation away from the urban 
excitements of Honolulu. They had driven out past Pearl 
Harbor on an absurdly six-laned mainland-type freeway that 
covered the old trail and, for the time being, led nowhere but 
to a narrow road on the Waianae coast and the quiet towns, 
including Makaha, that lay along it.
At one side of the hotel pool was a separate building 
intended as a conference hall but until now unused on the 
Sunday afternoon. Then there came an incongruous intrusion 
on the vacation atmosphere: across the pool terrace and up 
the broad steps leading to the meeting room walked a 
number of portly, dignified Hawaiian women, dressed in the 
tasteful long muumuus that missionaries had taught their 
great-grandmothers to wear, their hair coiled neatly beneath 
handwoven straw hats banded with woven flower leis. Others 
followed, and a magnificent procession of dark-skinned, 
pleasant-faced, strong-featured women, large, proud, 
straight, walked slowly to the building where they were 
obviously gathering in some numbers. When the haoles asked 
a pool attendant, a local part-Hawaiian, what the group 
was, they were told with pride that it was a branch of the 
Hawaiian Civic Club, an organization defensively formed by 
Hawaiian Prince Kuhio in the early years of this century 
after the Hawaiian monarchy had been overthrown.
It was a remarkable sight, these stately people holding to
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their history, coming to meet in foreign quarters on the land 
where their ancestors’ village had stood. One could not help 
being moved, but with what emotions? Admiration that they 
maintained their pride and what was left of their traditions? 
Sadness that they had lost their own powers and their true 
culture, so that they were willing to meet among M akaha’s 
tourist guests in quarters where a mainland salesmen’s con­
ference would convene tomorrow? Anger at the forces that 
were moving Makaha’s people and their beach and their 
valley ever further from their natural ways, their natural 
setting, their natural beauty?
The story of Makaha’s lands and others like them is the 
subject of this book. The changes in their quality and their 
use began immediately when new groups of people came to 
Hawaii after explorers found the islands in the late eigh­
teenth century. As time went on, scattered towns replaced the 
Hawaiian villages along the Waianae coast, as they did in 
other parts of the islands—built by imported techniques for 
strange uses by new inhabitants. Makaha, for one, became a 
community of new inhabitants with mixed origins—Japan, 
China, Samoa, the Philippine Islands, Portugal, Puerto 
Rico—together with a goodly proportion of descendants of 
the original Hawaiians who remained. Since that stretch of 
coast is quite far removed from the plantations that had 
brought most of the immigrants to Hawaii, those who lived 
there raised hogs and some chickens, grew vegetables, and 
found other ways to make the land support them, as the ear­
ly Hawaiians had.2 But Makaha and its sister towns along 
the coast never became affluent; Farrington “ Highway” is 
still a narrow road skirting the shore, and the homes along it 
shelter people who value their rural, tropical environment 
but, by mainland haole standards, are poor and under­
privileged.
Many others who came to Hawaii did prosper, however, 
and no method of gaining wealth—and power along with 
it—surpassed that of finding profitable uses for the land. 
Makaha Valley was too tempting a stretch of real estate to be
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ignored; one of Hawaii’s most ambitious local entrepreneurs, 
Chinn Ho (born in Waikiki in 1902), acquired most of the 
buildable land between the ridges and, in the late 1960s, 
began developing it. A cluster of high-rise apartment houses 
rose to flank the west valley wall, a low quite pleasant hotel 
surrounded by golf courses appeared in the center of the 
slope, and a master plan was prepared that would gradually 
add dwelling and resort places of various kinds and shapes 
across the valley floor. The heiau in the lower hills was kept 
in the plan, of course, as a sightseeing attraction.
Chinn H o’s architect made sure that in the beginning his 
incursion into the valley was not too destructive.3 The shore­
line was less fortunate. An obtrusive wall of condominium 
apartments was permitted along the coast by Honolulu’s city 
council and its mayor, who made an unequal swap; for 
the city, some waterfront land for a small park; for the 
developer, a change in zoning to permit a large stretch to be 
developed.
What the next chapter in the history of Makaha may be is 
anyone’s guess. Chinn Ho has sold most of the already-built- 
upon valley property to interests in Japan. The freeway that 
goes nowhere, built with federal “ interstate” highway funds, 
is obviously intended to serve a highly developed Waianae 
coast and bring many more tourists and golf players to 
Makaha—although that will require additional land-use 
zoning changes.
To the haole couple who had watched the Civic Club ladies 
with mixed emotions, a part-Hawaiian waiter recruited local­
ly said: “ We like the hotel—it brings work to us out here— 
but we don’t like what happens to our land.” The Hawaiians 
have had “ their” land taken away from them in gradual 
stages—not slowly, because the process has been rapid, but in 
increments almost imperceptible at each step. Now they live 
along the Waianae coast and watch its changing uses and 
adapt to them, as Hawaiians do throughout the islands.
Some of them have benefited from homestead laws to feel 
again, to some extent, that they are at home on their own
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land, and increasingly aggressive groups of them are moving 
to get more of that land back in Hawaiian hands. In the 
meantime they and their mixed-heritage neighbors and rela­
tives work in the hotel as porters and maids. Those with the 
most pride in their Hawaiian background form into societies 
and clubs to plan ways to preserve what remains of their 
culture and their political entity—and go back up to Chinn 
Ho’s development to hold their meetings among the tourists.
Such contrasts are common in Hawaii. The change has 
been violently rapid from sensitive, respectful living on the 
land to exploitative development of the land, from a love of 
the land itself to a love of what monetary gain the land 
might bring. If that speedy shift in values does not seem 
unique—there are, after all, other places in other parts of tfK 
world that have also suffered the trauma of sudden entry in- 
to modern society (certainly in Australia and New Zealand 
the contrasts are still sharp, and in Africa and many parts of 
Asia the transformation is still in process)—then it must be 
considered that Hawaii, having made a violent leap from the 
past, is about to vault into a future where expansion on its 
land will be so intense as to make mainland America seem 
underdeveloped. Hawaii, a kingdom ruled by brown-skinned 
monarchs eighty years ago, now an odd mix of verdant 
mountains and valleys, fertile plains and sandy beaches along 
with sprawling tracts and haphazard high rises, faces the 
likelihood of overextended and overloaded urbanism and 
depletion of its natural resources—including its lands—before 
most of the rest of the world meets such blunt threats so 
directly. From primitivism to futurism—from stone age to 
postindustrial age—in two hundred years.
In historical perspective it may still seem that the only dif­
ference between Hawaii’s present plight and that of other 
rapidly developing areas is that the changes have happened 
and are still happening so fast. But there is another aspect of 
Hawaii’s position, uniquely touching and especially tragic, 
that moves those who are concerned about people, respect 
land, and are sensitive to people-land relationships. A par-
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ticular poignancy results from the intense love the early 
Hawaiian people had for the land of their islands, the land 
that now grew their food, now threatened to spew lava across 
their villages, was always the obvious generator, the recog­
nized source of life. In losing their land they lost the very 
foundation of their being. The transformation, then, has not 
only been hasty. It has also been harrowing.
While the people of Hawaii were fierce in many ways, in 
the time before Captain James Cook chanced on the islands 
in 1778 and used them as resting place on his way to further 
exploration, they were gentle and sensitive in other ways. 
Their wars were vicious, their games were violent, and, as 
Cook discovered when he overstayed his welcome, their reac­
tions could be direct and elemental. But their greeting was 
generous, their devotion deep, and their affection genuine 
(that is what aloha meant before it became a tourist greet­
ing). And in no way was that compassion more clear than in 
their love of the land.
The Polynesian Hawaiians, like all primitive people, were 
innate ecologists. They took full advantage of the natural 
systems that formed the life of the islands: for food (picking 
the growing things, pounding the root of the taro to produce 
the nutritious staple they called poi), for shelter (weaving and 
thatching plant strands around wooden poles became a 
skilled building art), and even for recreation (riding above a 
wave on a shaped board and sliding down a steep hill on 
carefully chosen ti leaves were games as close to nature as a 
sportsman could get). And along with enjoyment and respect, 
a deep devotion to nature had developed.
Their dances were eloquent, their songs and chants lyric, 
their unwritten tales and legends creative, their theology 
imaginative. And in all these expressions there was ever 
evident a sensitive feeling for the qualities of the physical 
environment—the sea that surrounded them, the sky suspend­
ed above them, and, primarily, the land on which they lived.
They had a perceptive appreciation of the individual 
characters of the separate islands—a difference that is still
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apparent even though the developments on them now may be 
distressingly similar. The difference in ages is apparent on 
the islands’ surfaces: Kauai and Niihau the oldest; Hawaii, 
still being formed by the lava of active volcanoes, the 
youngest.4 The windward coasts are wet, lined with steep sea 
cliffs cut by the northeast trade winds. The leeward sides of 
the islands show coastal plains, watered by runoffs from the 
volcanic mountains. The soils vary: where liquid pahoehoe 
lava ran down, where the flow broke into cindery ‘a ‘a, where 
earth slowly covered the porous slopes. The Hawaiians 
respected these differences, enjoyed each for its particular 
quality, sang to their beauties, and knew how to make use of 
their virtues.
“ Beautiful is Kauai beyond compare . . . for none other 
do I yearn; she is all that is good,” began a mele kua, a song 
of praise. And on the land of each island special places were 
eulogized for their particular natural qualities. “ Hanalei . . . 
like a green fern, spangled with dew . . .  the land where the 
clouds hover” is indeed a beautiful coast on Kauai’s north 
shore, even today.5 So tempting has it been to so many later 
admirers that successive groups of newcomers used it early as 
a settlement, then for a sugarcane plantation, later as site for 
a luxurious hotel built around the plantation manager’s man­
sion. Now a tour club for affluent travelers enjoys the shore 
as a Japanese investment; and nearby is under way a massive 
second-home-vacation-retreat condominium project financed 
with mainland American capital. The people of Polynesian 
Hawaiian ancestry who have stayed in Hanalei have watched 
the spangling of their beloved land with much more than 
dew.
Changes of that magnitude in a comparatively short time 
have inevitably taken their toll both from the land itself and 
from the people who so lately occupied it. The world has 
recently become concerned with the future. Some scholars 
predict what may come, others plan what would be best, and 
most agree that inevitable change will bring serious social 
and psychological trauma. In that regard the Hawaiian peo-
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pie of Polynesian ancestry can be looked on as the proto­
typical sufferers from future shock.
In actual numbers, Cook found a population of about
250,000 people in Hawaii in 1778. Forty years later there 
were less than 150,000 people on the islands; in another forty 
years, by 1860, the number of native Hawaiians had dropped 
to 70,000. Early in the twentieth century, about 1920, there 
were only 24,000 pure-blooded Hawaiians in Hawaii, al­
though marriages with other groups were bringing up the size 
of the part-Hawaiian population. Today the number of those 
with some Hawaiian blood has again approached 150,000 
(which is now only 17 percent of the population of the state), 
while pure-blooded Hawaiians compose only 1 percent of the 
residents of “ their” islands.6
The disintegration of the Hawaiian people lay in more 
than numbers, however. In the first eighty years after “ dis­
covery,” the death by waves of thousands came not only 
from obvious physical causes, such as imported illnesses for 
which they had neither immunity nor cure and overindul­
gence in tempting foods and liquors to which they were not 
accustomed. There was an unwillingness to face the modern 
world that had been thrust upon them, a reluctance to make 
the sudden leap from primitive simplicity to strange moral 
and material complexity. Their early confusion soon became 
a hopelessness that was close to loss of the will to live. And 
adding to their social demoralization, it was noted, was a 
deep sadness from seeing the land they loved transformed in 
nature and quality by the novel new ways it was being used: 
from buildings being put upon it and unfamiliar animals 
brought to graze it to trees and vegetation stripped from it.
They had to learn that, according to the new values the 
visitors were introducing, their pleasures in pursuit of an un­
fettered life were shiftless, unambitious laziness; their happy 
freedom in social, marital, sexual relations was shocking im­
morality;'their preservation of land’s natural qualities for the 
common good was inefficient use of a valuable commodity.
Changes in land values and land uses illustrate both the
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rapidity and the scope of the social shifts that the Hawaiian 
people suffered. At the time of Cook’s visits the Hawaiian 
islands were not the lush landscapes that later imported 
plantings made them. In many more areas than now, recent 
lava flows lay bare, not yet covered with even the beginnings 
of new vegetation; forests, more dense than those of today, 
opened to dry, barren stretches and to other large areas used 
for growing foodstuffs.7 The early explorers noted that all 
the arable land appeared planted; it seemed hardly possible 
for the country to be cultivated to greater advantage for the 
purpose of the inhabitants. They tilled, plowed, and even 
irrigated carefully their principal crops: taro, sweet potato, 
yam. Many of the first visitors commented on the neat 
villages and well-constructed homes.8
Villages were formed from kinship or fellowship and for 
closeness to fishing and farming places, not from the neces­
sities of commerce or government, yet they grew to consider­
able size. Cook’s men found several hundred houses clustered 
together at their first landing place on the shores of Kauai— 
and even more on the two flat areas either side of the cliffs 
rising from Kealakekua Bay on the island of Hawaii when 
they anchored there the following year.9
Some of these gatherings of homes grew up around the 
chiefs’ houses and those of their relatives and retainers—not 
only could these personages command work allegiance from 
the common people but, most important, they controlled the 
land and its uses. Land and politics were interwoven then as 
they always have been everywhere, to a large extent, and 
probably will continue to be no matter how much the nature 
of political controls may change.
In Polynesian Hawaii all land belonged to the principal 
chief (ali'i nui) of an island, and he distributed it to those 
other chiefs who supported him—in a political sense to secure 
their continued allegiance, in a practical sense to be sure the 
land was used well. These alii in turn divided their holdings 
into slices, called ahupua'a, devised in the most intelligent 
way possible. These holdings ran usually from the mountain
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to the sea, and thus each contained grazing land above, agri­
cultural land below, and land bordering the sea at the foot, 
with plenty of building sites of various kinds at any level. An 
ahupuaa might be in the charge of a konohiki, landlord or 
manager for the chief. There might be smaller divisions: ‘ili, 
sometimes separately “ owned” ; m o‘o, pauka, and koele, 
parcels for cultivation (farmlands in a sense); and the sites 
occupied by the tenant farmers, or commoners, called 
kuleanas. l0
The low man in this hierarchy of land tenure and land use 
was the commoner. Apparently in most cases he could move 
if he wanted to for any reason—whim, weather, malcontent, 
or mistreatment (much of the land was held by absentee alii, 
and their konohiki could be cruel caretakers)—and in this 
respect the old Hawaiian land ownership pattern differed 
from European feudalism, to which it is often compared. (In 
various ways the Hawaiian land system was different, also, 
from that of other Polynesian island groups.)11 Nevertheless, 
there seems to have been a sense of responsibility as well as 
fondness in the common man’s regard for his own patch of 
land, his kuleana.
The key to land tenure was central ownership by the alii 
nui: allocations were revocable, and land returned for redis­
tribution when an alii died or was replaced. This acceptance 
of central ownership of land, as a principle, and the under­
standing that nature should be altered only as sustenance 
required it, as a corollary, have seemed naive and wasteful 
to immigrants to the islands from Cook’s visits through last 
week’s sale of development rights to prime agricultural land. 
And to a major extent they have been replaced with different 
values.
Consider the rapidity of that change. A period of some 
eighty years (from Cook’s arrival in 1778 to the death of 
Kamehameha III in 1854) saw a radical shift in values from 
a Polynesian stone-age sense of what was worthy to an 
industrial-age commercial ranking of what was desirable and 
Puritan missionary standards of what was good and bad. By
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1860 the change had been quite fully effected: in the precepts 
that had been taught to the Hawaiian people and in the laws 
they had been persuaded to adopt.
By then the Hawaiian principles of commonality, sharing, 
and aloha had been replaced by canons of privacy, personal 
ownership, and aggrandizement. The land that had been 
held in fief and used for common sustenance and respected 
for its natural qualities was largely held in fee-simple allodial 
ownership (much of it by non-Hawaiians)—free to be 
bought, sold, and used for private purposes, held in respect 
mostly for its monetary value.
Then consider another eighty-year change, this one at 
our end of the time spectrum. As the first eighty years of 
Hawaii’s modern life marked abrupt change in the social 
value structure, the last eighty years have seen an equally 
sharp change in governmental structure. Between 1900 and 
now the people of Hawaii have had to adjust to the transfor­
mation from life under a Polynesian monarchy to member­
ship in a modern democratic government. Granted that the 
monarchy was unique—colorful, fanciful, headed by a king 
(or a queen it was, at the end) who wore when it seemed ap­
propriate a cloak and a helmet woven of small bright bird 
feathers—and that it was shaky and unsure, bolstered by all 
sorts of imported constitutional provisions, dependent on a 
legislature whose upper house was composed of the noble 
alii, chiefs still jealous of their hereditary rights. Nonetheless 
it was a monarchy. In fact, one has to grant equally that the 
present governmental structure is also a peculiar one, based 
as it is on the identification of eight islands and numerous 
islets in the center of the Pacific Ocean as a constituent state 
owing allegiance to a continental nation three thousand miles 
away with which it quite obviously has neither physical nor 
historical ties. But odd as the situations at the beginning and 
end of that eighty-year span seem, the more remarkable thing 
is that that great change also took place so quickly.
Rapidity of change, then, is not the only notable aspect of 
the metamorphosis of a Polynesian culture into a modern ur­
i  i
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ban community; the degree of change is also a key part of 
the story. Singling out one other place on Oahu for a quick 
comparison of old and new uses may reinforce the Makaha 
story. In the Ewa district, also west of Honolulu but not so 
far out as the Waianae coast, there is a land area that the 
Hawaiians named Halawa (curve, bend), where the trail 
coming down from the hills at that point turned toward the 
coast.12 It was considered good land, and Kamehameha the 
Great gave portions of it to two of his earliest and most 
valued haole advisers early in the white man’s visitations. 
Later a town grew there, again by no means an affluent one, 
but a place where a number of people with Hawaiian ances­
try lived. Still later, in the 1960s, when the need for a major 
league, mainland-type athletic stadium for complicated 
reasons became a pressing political issue, Halawa was chosen 
as the proper place for it. The federally sponsored freeway 
complex spawned one of its typical spaghettilike tangles of 
interchanges and on-and-off ramps at that point, spewing 
automobiles toward Pearl Harbor. By modern transportation 
criteria, that made the location accessible from many direc­
tions.
There was one difficulty, however, which the stadium 
planners ignored: the community of local people at Halawa 
would be displaced by the stadium. It was not a new problem 
by mainland standards, certainly; the need to relocate the 
poor, because highway and public works construction nor­
mally points toward them, has become an accepted part of 
American redevelopment activity. But in Hawaii the results 
were unique. The Halawa residents resisted moving. When 
the rector of history-laden Kawaiahao Church, a contem­
porary Christian counterpart of the kahuna, or priest, was 
called on to bless the land before construction began, as he 
typically is for any major event in Honolulu, a local part- 
Hawaiian woman rose in anger and denounced the ceremony 
—put a curse on the land, as some termed it. Abashed, the 
Reverend Abraham Akaka contented himself and the offi­
cials present by spilling sacred water on the site from the
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calabash he uses for such occasions, but he refrained from 
the blessing that had been requested.13
When the stadium construction was quite far along, two 
workers fell from scaffolding and were killed. Under the 
circumstances these mishaps were not looked on as typical 
big-building casualties but as a direct result of the kupua’s 
(witch’s) curse. The construction workers refused to go on 
with the job until the problem was met and the land made 
safe to work on. In time, the Reverend Akaka was prevailed 
on to complete the blessing ceremony, the angry wahine, 
by then rehoused, was persuaded to remain silent, and the 
stadium went on toward completion. Hawaiian traditions had 
fused with Christian customs to allow development to pro­
ceed. Hawaiian trails had been covered with concrete freeway 
tangles; Hawaiian lands had passed from monarch to friend­
ly haoles to professional sports promoters; Hawaiian people 
had been pushed from there to elsewhere with no land of 





The Story of Hawaii’s Lands
PART 1
THE story of the Hawaiian islands is a story of land: land 
rising from the sea, land supporting life, land discovered by 
people from other places, land valued variously by those liv­
ing on it, land changing its own qualities as it was treated in 
different ways. The many parts of that story of land need to 
be brought together and told here as a tale with a beginning, 
a middle, and at least a speculative end. Otherwise it would 
be presumptuous even to review Hawaii’s history, because it 
has been written so many times. There is no lack of well-told 
narrative about the tremendously interesting people of the 
islands and the fascinating events they took part in, from 
remembered legends to recent scholarly research. Some are 
about dark-skinned people, some about light; some telling of 
warriors, some of businessmen; some concerned with reli­
gion, some with government, some with industry, some with 
sports. What holds all these accounts together is land—the 
lands of Hawaii. Those small volcanic islands in the middle 
of the Pacific Ocean have supported many dissimilar peoples 
and have been the scene of many divergent activities. The 
story that the first part of this book wants to tell briefly is 
what really happened to those lands during those times.
I
chapter
The Loss of the Past
THE Pacific island group called Hawaii has for some years 
now been an unlikely partner with the otherwise continental 
areas joined in the United States of America. There are many 
chapters in the sad story of the destruction of the Polynesian 
society that enjoyed those volcanic isles until they were found 
by English explorers, occupied by aliens from many lands, 
and finally absorbed by America. None, surely, is more dis­
tressing than the capsule chronicle it offers of how people 
can first love, then ignore, and finally ravage the land they 
live on.
History can be written largely as a record of the ways we 
have successively treated the land surface on which we are 
destined to spend our lives. People have found existence on 
this crust of the planet sustainable and even enjoyable, so 
long as they have respected it and the community of other 
living things it supports.1 That, of course, is what ecology is 
all about.
On the other hand, people find life unpleasant, sometimes 
almost unbearable, when they ignore their relationship with 
the earth on which they and other organisms depend.2 Then 
famines come, and pestilence, and floods and avalanches and
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other instances of nature’s angry response. It is this result 
that the environmentalists try to warn about.
Now we are learning that life may actually become im­
possible if we carry contempt for the land further, cover over 
its nourishing green, poison its soils, and use it as dump for 
our wastes.3 Pollution is the word we have given to that stage 
—as though the threat to life on the earth’s surface is just a 
kind of dirtiness.
This tale of the worsening relationship between people and 
land began as soon as homo rose erectus, grew sapiens, and 
began to scratch the earth to cultivate plants for food and 
fix poles for shelter. Its development can be traced in many 
lands in all parts of the world, but there are few places other 
than Hawaii where the whole history is shown so clearly in 
so small a spot, ready to be read by anyone standing on it or 
tramping across it. Land unspoiled since stone-age aborigines 
used it lovingly and sang of its charm lies but a few miles 
from land stripped of all its tropic quality, land built upon 
so badly that its only future can be some manner of physical 
renewal. And these two extremes are no distance at all from 
land that has neither been preserved nor developed but sim­
ply shuffled and bartered as speculative merchandise until its 
high cost has made it useless.
The histories and fictions of the lands of Hawaii common­
ly start with awed speculation on the volcanic actions at the 
ocean floor that finally, perhaps fifteen million years later, 
began pushing the tips of rocky masses above the surface of 
the sea.4 It is indeed a remarkable movement to ponder: that 
roiling upward thrust through aeons of time, producing the 
Hawaiian archipelago of volcanic islands, shoals, and subsid­
ed volcanoes, stretching 1,600 miles along the center of the 
Pacific Ocean. It was this great upheaval that formed the 
land found by Polynesian peoples from islands farther south 
when they sailed forth in search of a new homeland.
That search, the Polynesian exploration across the Pacific, 
is also a remarkable story, going back as it does at least a 
thousand years before Christ to the time when migrants from
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the east, whose origins historians and anthropologists still 
debate, moved out into the South Pacific island groupings. 
The daring and the skill of further travels, first short trips to 
visible landmarks, then voyages to distant, imagined destina­
tions, are alluring legend well documented as fact.5
Those who settled Hawaii seem to have come first from 
the Marquesas, then from Tahiti and other Society Islands. 
By a .d . 1000 they had occupied all of Hawaii. Those Polyne­
sian pioneers took with them some small animals—pigs, 
dogs, chickens—and some seeds and plants, probably in­
cluding the fruits and vegetables that became staple foods in 
the islands: yams, sweet potatoes, taro, sugarcane, coconuts. 
These importations had radical impact on indigenous species 
and produced Hawaii’s first great ecological alteration.
The history of the Polynesian Hawaiians is known only 
from anthropological and other deductive studies and from 
word-of-mouth accounts passed down through the genera­
tions. With “ discovery” of the islands by Captain James 
Cook in 1778, recorded history begins, and that modern 
documented period from Cook’s arrival until today divides 
itself conveniently into segments of approximately forty-year 
lengths. It was during the first two of these divisions that the 
mores and customs of the Hawaiian people suffered their 
sharpest change. Of that stretch of time, the first forty years, 
from about 1780 to about 1820, is marked by the ascendancy 
and rule of Hawaii’s first islands-wide monarch, Kameha­
meha I, known as The Great, and is terminated by two 
almost simultaneous events: Kamehameha’s death and the 
arrival of the first shipload of New England missionaries.
The following forty years, from 1820 to just before 1860, 
comprise the reigns of the two next members of the Kameha­
meha dynasty, ending at the time of the death of Kameha­
meha III.6
Described in a different way, the first period was a time 
of introduction of the values of the foreigners who were 
arriving; it was the time when Polynesian Hawaii began to 
disintegrate in the face of strange new ways, even as the
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consolidated monarchy was being founded. The second 
period was the time of establishment of the new values; alien 
control over the government increased, and foreign, primar­
ily American, concepts of property, including land tenure 
and land use privileges, were established by law.
The third period in Hawaii’s modern history—approxi­
mately from 1860 to 1900—was the time of consolidation of 
the imported value systems and the influences won by their 
importers. Jockeying for control by outsiders weakened the 
reigns of the last five monarchs (Kamehameha IV, Kameha­
meha V, Lunalilo, Kalakaua, and Liliuokalani) to a point of 
final dissolution of the monarchy and then annexation by the 
United States of America.
The course of the fourth period, from annexation until the 
beginning of World War II, more or less from 1900 to 1940, 
can be described as exploitation of the powers that had now 
been well established by white foreigners. Those who had 
legalized their own ways on the islands were now the abso­
lute colonial rulers, masters of the way their land was used 
(primarily for raising sugarcane and pineapple) and masters 
of the way their workers (Hawaiians, part-Hawaiians, and 
successive waves of immigrants recruited from other places) 
should live on that land. The attack on Pearl Harbor ended 
that sovereignty.
The most recent period in Hawaii’s history, from the 
beginning of World War II until the present, has been a time 
of intense, rapid Americanization of the islands and their 
inhabitants.7 Not only the haole power elite but also the 
descendants of the earlier Hawaiians and the many other 
groups with varied ethnic backgrounds who comprised the 
plantation laborers have learned American democratic 
principles and American political methods—along with the 
collateral American compulsion to grow, to expand, to 
continue increasing everything from activity to possessions 
to affluence. Particularly they have learned how to make 
more profitable use of their lands, just as the American 
mainland was doing.
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Introduction, establishment, consolidation, exploitation 
of American societal and commercial tenets—and then out­
right imitation of the continental society and economy these 
values had produced. Five forty-year time intervals forming 
Hawaii’s history since its modern discovery. Five stages of 
change, from disintegration of the old to absorption of the 
new. For the lands of the islands, five steps in the transition 
from respected resource to coveted commodity.
The First Step: Land Grants
That transition began, then, when the Polynesian Hawaiians 
were still singing of the land’s variable gentleness and vio­
lence, and one of them grew ambitious, as he matured, to 
rule all of that land. Kamehameha (“ the lonely one” ) was 
the strong figure who succeeded in bringing together in one 
monarchy the governments and the lands of the scattered 
islands that had been ruled, during his youth, by four 
separate kings and numerous chiefs under them.
There are a number of noteworthy things about Kameha- 
meha’s rise in power and his successful consolidation of com­
mand. The most significant is the fact that his rule coincided 
with the coming of the white man. His military and political 
successes began just at the time the haoles first found the 
islands; his reign stretched over the period when the early 
influx of newcomers, often transients, began arriving in 
numbers; and his death occurred the year before the first of 
the next wave of arrivals, the New England missionaries, 
came to impose their strong permanent influence.
The importance of this historical coincidence to the story 
of Hawaii’s lands cannot be exaggerated: a radical local 
governmental change was taking place at the same time as 
the western powers discovered exploitable new territories in 
the mid Pacific. While the two events occurred simultaneous­
ly, neither bringing about the other, subsequent relationships 
came quickly: the new government needed help and advice, 
and the haoles could furnish ships and firearms to assist
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Kamehameha in his moves toward consolidation, as well as 
counsel in the more sophisticated social and political situa­
tions that were developing; the king on his part, controlling 
all of the islands’ lands, could provide a reasonably stable 
government, much easier to deal with than a divided, warring 
group of separated kingdoms and chiefdoms would have 
been, as commerce and industry expanded.
Kamehameha, great-nephew to a local king on the Big 
Island of Hawaii, was about twenty years old when Captain 
James Cook’s ships the Resolution and the Discovery first 
appeared as strange, brief visitors off the Waimea coast of 
the island of Kauai. And when they returned a year later, to 
anchor at Kealakekua Bay on the leeward, Kona coast of the 
Big Island (less than a hundred miles from Kamehameha’s 
birthplace), the young man was there.
Cook’s expedition remained for several months that second 
time, and it became clear toward the end of the visit that 
they had overstayed their welcome. They set sail from 
Kealakekua Bay in February 1779 with much aloha, however, 
and it was a nasty trick of fate that a mast broke before they 
were far out, forcing their return. During that uncomfortable 
berth for repairs tempers frayed, and the disastrous upshot 
was the killing of Captain Cook.8
Very shortly after that tragedy Kamehameha made his first 
military moves, in his home territory, and in 1782 won an 
important victory just south of Kealakekua Bay to clinch it. 
He went on to increase his power in other parts of the Big 
Island, then moved to occupy Maui, Lanai, Molokai, and 
then, a few years later, Oahu. Only the island of Kauai, to 
the west of Oahu, remained under the rule of a local king for 
some time.9
Kamehameha’s successes were followed by twenty-four 
years of quite stable rule. Yet it was during that rule that the 
Hawaiian society lost its strength under alien incursions. By 
the time the missionaries arrived to convert the heathen 
savages, as they were inevitably called by their new mentors, 
those native people were no longer the naive, unspoiled bar­
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barians that Cook had found and Kamehameha had brought 
together into one kingdom. The strength of their old religion 
had been broken as the kapus—sacred privileges, rights, pro­
hibitions, directions—had lost their meaning and force in new 
situations. They were no longer described by visiting writers 
as vigorous and strong; now they were called apathetic, lazy, 
and sick: they had acquired western diseases, from measles to 
syphilis. While they might still sing of the natural things 
around them, they were now selling off their precious san­
dalwood, as fast as it could be leveled, to gain a new kind of 
valuation called profit.
As newcomers arrived in Hawaii following Cook’s visits, 
they were generally welcomed. Soon they were arriving in 
numbers. For some time the fur trade, based on America’s 
northwest coast, brought visitors, and at first Hawaii was 
simply a stopping-off place on the way to China, the sales 
point. Two English ships and two French vessels came in 
1786, and then many others followed. Involvement in 
Kamehameha’s wars of consolidation was inevitable—the 
explorer George Vancouver helped the king build a ship, for 
instance, and others gave aid from time to time either to 
him or to his adversaries.10 The nature of native wars was 
completely changed as the foreigners introduced cannon and 
other firearms on both sides.
Soon more permanent newcomers began to arrive and the 
desirability of Hawaii as a place to stay, not just a jumping- 
off place or a layover point for commercial activities further 
on, dawned on individual explorers and entrepreneurs and 
also, in time, on their home governments. The number of 
foreigners in permanent residence on the islands increased 
steadily. From a dozen or so aliens who were with Kameha­
meha during his battles, the number grew to perhaps several 
hundred at the turn of the century and continued to swell. 
Among other results, inevitably, was intermarriage. A new 
ethnic category appeared: the part-Hawaiian or, to put the 
mixture in reverse, the half-white or hapa-haole."
Hawaii’s land underwent its first change in character as the
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social adjustments took place. While ownership of all land 
remained in the king’s name, some of the haoles who 
achieved respected advisory posts in the island government 
were “ given” or “ granted” tracts of land to use as they 
wished during their tenure. One early visitor noted that the 
king “ rewards liberally with grants of land” those in his 
employ as artisans,12 and for the more respected who had 
been drawn into advisory positions even larger properties 
were turned over. A rugged English seaman named John 
Young (who went ashore sightseeing and was persuaded by 
Kamehameha to remain) became a valued adviser to the king 
and was rewarded with many bounties, including a good deal 
of land. A sister ship of the one Young had deserted was 
attacked by a vindictive Hawaiian chief, and its boatswain, 
Isaac Davis, survived to become also a friend and adviser to 
Kamehameha. (These two were granted, among other hold­
ings, tracts of land at Halawa on Oahu, where the stadium 
was built much later.)13 A Spaniard, Francisco de Paula 
Marin, made himself useful to the king in numerous ways 
and was repaid with land in several locations, including a 
piece near the new town of Honolulu, just off the main traf­
fic artery in what is now the heart of the city. John Parker, 
an American who aided the king with help and advice, was 
given a large area on the Big Island which formed the basis 
of what became the Parker Ranch, now one of the largest 
cattle ranches in the world.14
In addition to these sizable grants to newcomers who be­
came prominent personages in the islands, there were many 
other lesser ones for sometimes minor services. As one in­
stance, a ship’s tailor named Robert Kilday was persuaded to 
leave his vessel, where he was seen by a curious Hawaiian 
making a jacket for the chief mate, to become personal tailor 
to Kamehameha’s son Kauikeaouli. The king was pleased 
with Kilday’s job of making “ coats and pantaloons” for the 
prince and clothing for the native soldiers, so pleased that he 
rewarded him with land.15
These early acquisitions of land by aliens could not be con­
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sidered grasping or selfish. For some decades the property 
thus gained was used for essential, functional purposes, 
primarily as homesites or small farms. The harm, if it was 
that in the early stages of transformation, lay in the disturb­
ing nature of change itself. Marin’s interests, for instance, 
were mainly in new kinds of agricultural production. Other 
newcomers were anxious to add to the islands’ flora and 
fauna specimens that would improve the local diet or would 
in time have commercial potential. Captain Cook had in­
troduced goats to Hawaii on his last trip, and Vancouver 
brought cattle and plants, which the haoles who had land 
were anxious to propagate. This was the second great 
ecological change in the islands, made without recognition 
that the importations would upset the natural balance and 
result, ultimately, in loss of thousands of the endemic species 
that had developed over many centuries to give Hawaii its 
unique character.16
If new things were put into the ground and strange crea­
tures allowed to graze its surface, unfamiliar structures were 
also built upon it. Thatched and laced buildings supported 
by poles were too primitive to suit the new residents, and 
tools and materials for more familiar construction began to 
arrive, along with furniture and household utensils, as addi­
tional ships came. Around the various homes that the ruler 
had built for himself—in Waikiki, in the growing town of 
Honolulu, in Kailua on the Big Island, and elsewhere—the 
foreigners who were in some way useful to the court were 
allowed land on which to build along with the native alii.17
Not only were new buildings built. In keeping with their 
new uses—selling and storing of merchandise as well as 
“ civilized” residential needs—their groupings also had to be 
changed. The scattered, casual Hawaiian villages gave way in 
key places on the larger islands (primarily where ships could 
berth) to tighter towns more conveniently arranged for the 
new activities. Waikiki, a pleasant place with a fine surfing 
beach, where Kamehameha at first followed the custom of 
Oahu’s earlier alii nui and built a royal village, soon was
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replaced as the center of activity by Honolulu, where a 
usable protected harbor made possible access by ships from 
abroad. An English ship captain named William Brown 
discovered the harbor’s possibilities in the 1790s,18 and at 
first just a few shacks and shanties were put up there, fron­
tier waterfront fashion. Soon, however, some simple stores 
were built back of the shore and before long a bustling har­
bor town appeared. In 1810 Kamehameha moved the court to 
Honolulu and built a residence group for himself there. By 
1812 there were perhaps a hundred houses in the town, with 
Kamehameha’s cluster of buildings dominant. Back of the 
waterfront, where both native and foreign ships berthed, 
were homes for the chiefs and for several of the king’s haole 
advisers. Davis and Marin had rather prominent places. Ad­
jacent to a gun-drilling field, where Kamehameha’s soldiers 
learned to use the new weapons, an area was set aside for the 
Hawaiian martial exercise of spear throwing. Behind the 
town lay an extensive yam field, and as in all native villages 
a good deal of space was reserved for sports, including a 
foot-racing field and courts for ulu maika, a bowling game 
with several variations. John Papa Ii watched all this with 
fascination as a small boy, and he described later how 
“ crowds of chiefs and commoners gathered on all sides and 
Kamehameha joined them.” 19 
All, this activity—-a new kind of “ urbanism” for the 
islands—was certain to affect the attitudes of both new­
comers and natives toward the land. When haoles were 
granted land parcels, there was always the proviso that these 
would return in time to the king.20 The chiefs were accus­
tomed to the revocability of land grants, but the new resi­
dents were not. Within a very short time dissatisfaction with 
the tenure system appeared. The chiefs began to worry, too. 
Now that government seemed more stabilized than it once 
had been, questions of inheritance arose, and the privilege of 
passing one’s land on to heirs seemed a reasonable right to 
ask. To Kamehameha and the son who succeeded him to the 
throne this privilege began to seem sensible too, and they
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were inclined to allow lands to pass on in a chief’s family by 
hereditary succession. The Act of 1825, adopted by the 
Council of Chiefs when twelve-year-old Kamehameha III 
ascended the throne, gave the process of land inheritance a 
kind of legal basis.
These changes in tenure and use of land in the first forty- 
year period of recent Hawaiian history epitomized what was 
happening to almost every aspect of the older Polynesian life 
on the islands. Convictions and customs that had evolved 
over the centuries quickly dissolved in the excitement of new 
ideas and new activities. The society which the old conven­
tions and dictates had bound together then began to disin­
tegrate, and the Hawaiian people and their land were ready 
for transformation into something different.
The next group of arrivals set out at once to achieve that 
metamorphosis.
The Next Step: A Wish to Own
Twelve companies of missionaries arrived at Honolulu 
between 1820 and 1848, sent by the American Board of Com­
missioners for Foreign Missions of the Congregationalist 
Church. Largely, the arrivals on the mission ships were or­
dained ministers of the gospel and, often, their wives, but the 
band included physicians and teachers, secular agents, print­
ers, a bookbinder, and a farmer. Their functions were not 
only preaching and teaching Christian tenets but included 
such activities as translating the Hawaiian language into a 
written, printable form, giving secular as well as religious ad­
vice to the local people, assisting in the formation of a stable 
government, and ultimately activity by some in professional, 
commercial, and agricultural development.21
The two rulers following Kamehameha I were his sons: 
Liholiho, crowned as Kamehameha II; then Kauikeaouli, 
who became Kamehameha III. However, during much of this 
time an able, powerful woman—Kaahumanu, Kamehameha 
I’s most respected wife—shared the rule with her stepsons as
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kuhina nui, a title which originally meant something like 
prime minister but which Kaahumanu made into a position 
more like that of regent.
During this period the monarchy was increasingly depen­
dent on haole advice—strongly tinged with missionary influ­
ence but tending also to favor foreign business interests. 
(There were differences in principles between the two 
groups, but the alien entrepreneurs were after all Christian 
and the missionaries became increasingly involved in entre- 
preneurism.) The Reverend William Richards, an ordained 
minister, resigned from the mission in 1838 and became of­
ficially an adviser to Kamehameha III. In 1842 Dr. Gerrit P. 
Judd, a medical missionary, made a similar decision and, for 
a decade, was the most powerful individual in the govern­
ment. It was under their influence that a basic set of laws 
was developed to replace the old kapus (Kamehameha II had 
dramatically abolished the kapu system soon after his acces­
sion, recognizing that it had lost its meaning), a constitution­
al form of government was adopted, and new concepts of 
land ownership were formulated.
The kings tried to resist pressure for too rapid change that 
came from within Hawaii, as the growing business communi­
ty pushed for more freedom to act—and more land to act 
on—and also from sovereign powers abroad. England,
France, and the United States, particularly, jockeyed for con­
trol of the islands just short of takeover. On one occasion 
officials from England and on another a French naval officer 
did indeed move, without authority, for physical possession. 
The French incident was more annoying than frightening: a 
troublesome consul commissioner named Guillaume Patrice 
Dillon, pressing a number of trumped-up claims, was backed 
by a French admiral whose flagship called at Honolulu at 
just that time, and for several weeks in 1849 French sailors 
occupied the fort in Honolulu and vandalized the city. The 
French government disavowed the acts of its officers and 
later sacked Dillon.
The earlier British incident was much more serious in im­
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plication and in fact. It was rooted in the problem of land 
ownership, which, during the reign of Kamehameha III, 
became the most troublesome of the conflicts between haoles 
and natives. A British consul general, Richard Charlton, had 
acquired parcels of land in a number of places in the islands 
and now laid claim to one in particular which he said had 
been granted to him fifteen years before, a claim which the 
king disputed. Nursing this grievance, among others, Charl­
ton sailed for England in September 1842 to argue against a 
treaty which was being negotiated and, incidentally, to try to 
get the English government to back him in his personal dis­
pute. While he was away, his surrogate, one Alexander Simp­
son, pursued Charlton’s land claim and, as in the case of the 
later Dillon trouble, was able to call on the support of a war­
ship which arrived at a crucial point in the controversy. Lord 
George Paulet, commander of the frigate Carysfort, backed 
Simpson to such an extent that he forced cession of Hawaii 
to England under threat of naval attack upon the town of 
Honolulu.
When the true facts of the seizure became known in 
England, the British government repudiated the acquisition 
of the islands, but Kamehameha III and his subjects had a 
very unhappy five months. The white residents of Honolulu 
suffered an uneasy time too, but in a sense they were still 
guests, not home folks. At the cession ceremony the king 
spoke in moving terms only to the Hawaiians. “ I am in 
perplexity,” he said. ‘‘I have given away the life of our 
land. . . . But my rule over you, my people, and your privi­
leges, will continue, for I have hope that the life of our land 
will be restored.” And indeed it was, for another fifty years: 
British Rear Admiral Richard Thomas arrived in Honolulu in 
July 1843 and returned the islands to their native govern­
ment. An impressive ceremony was held as the Hawaiian flag 
was again raised, on a plain in Honolulu later dedicated 
gratefully as Thomas Square.22
So confused was land ownership by that time, however, 
that Charlton’s claim continued to be a controversial matter
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through 1847, an issue discussed endlessly in meetings of the 
Privy Council as well as in sessions of a land commission 
that was appointed in 1846.23 Despite insistence of the king 
and the chiefs that Charlton’s supposed proof of ownership 
was a fake, the British government insisted that the claim be 
respected. The Hawaiian government finally gave in.
The Charlton-Paulet case was the most angry ado over 
land ownership during that time, but there were many others. 
By then the question of the chiefs’ ownership of their lands 
seemed to be fairly well settled; the Act of 1825 had estab­
lished even their hereditary rights, they believed. But confu­
sion was increasing about the claims of foreigners to the 
lands they had acquired through gift or grant or lease or 
some kind of transfer of rights that they called a “ sale.” The 
practice of Kamehameha I to grant land in return for services 
rendered was continued by his sons, by Kaahumanu, and 
even by the governors of the individual islands. The story of 
the tailor Kilday was repeated many times. One Charles 
Cockett was given a parcel on Maui by the governor of that 
island after four years of faithful work at various tasks.
When the chief died, his daughter wanted Cockett to con­
tinue working for her; and when he demurred, she moved to 
take the land away from him.24 Was she right? Did the old 
precepts of reversion of land ownership to the king or to the 
chiefs, on death or disloyalty, still prevail? Or were new poli­
cies in order now?
By that time the wish to own property was not entirely 
artless; land was clearly becoming a valuable commodity. 
Kaahumanu, in acknowledging a claim of one George Pelly 
to a parcel in Nuuanu, admonished him about his greediness. 
“ I give to you this land,” she wrote him, “ but of your idea 
to take to yourself land in this place and that without my be­
ing informed, this is not right.” 23 Yet there was reason for 
honest indecision about the question of ownership among the 
Hawaiian rulers and understandable confusion among the 
foreigners. Kamehameha III issued a proclamation in 1841 
allowing fifty-year leases but advising that “ all those who are
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in possession of building lots or farms would do well to go 
to the governors . . . and obtain a written title.” 26 The for­
eigners resented this order, and the king was further dis­
turbed by their reaction, which seemed to him unreasonable. 
He complained that “ we did indeed wish to give foreigners 
lands the same as natives and so they were granted, but to 
the natives they are revertible and the foreigners would insist 
that they had them forever.” 27
The government itself admitted its ambiguous attitude 
toward ownership—by deeds if not by words. An American 
named Stephen Reynolds proposed to sell his rather extensive 
properties back to the government, in early 1846, for 
$40,000. The ministers and the king were upset, but they 
agreed to Reynolds’ proposition “ without admitting the full 
validity of his title.” 28 The chiefs were as uncertain about 
questions of ownership as any other members of the com­
munity. By an act of 1841 the alii were permitted to lease 
out their land, and many haoles took advantage of this 
opportunity to negotiate leases for set terms. After they had 
paid taxes on the land for some years, as though they owned 
it, they felt a sense of actual possession.
Land changed hands by bills of sale, and land was passed 
on to the original owners’ heirs—always, of course, with the 
caveat that such transfers were subject to any claims the gov­
ernment might impose. Thus it soon became possible to make 
money by selling land, even with the tacit understanding that 
title was “ revertible” to the kingdom. Later, when the early 
land grants were legally recognized, many “ sales” of the 
right to use land, live on it, farm it, or pasture it were pro­
duced to substantiate claims.29 One James Robinson had 
been early granted property for a home in Honolulu “ on the 
street leading to the sugar mill,” which in 1830 he sold to 
Richard Ridley, carpenter, who in turn sold it in 1835 to the 
acquisitive George Pelly. Each made a profit. Harriet Blan­
chard claimed a plot “ on the street leading to the printing 
office” by inheritance, after it had changed hands several 
times.30
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Among the foreigners holding land—and sometimes selling 
it—there were a number of missionaries. Contrary to the gen­
erally held belief, however, they were no more grasping than 
any other newcomers and were just as confused about the 
ownership rights to their individual holdings—even to the 
mission properties—as any other haoles. In many cases, if 
not most, the land they held was reward for long and ar­
duous service to the rulers, the chiefs, and their families: as 
teachers, accountants, attorneys, doctors, personal counsel­
ors. Records of landholdings and land transfers by the 
original mission bands show no speculative dealings; at the 
most there were small margins of profit as some properties 
were traded about.31 It was the more secular-minded among 
the mission group, a number of whom left the church and 
joined the business community, who in time became land 
manipulators. And it was the second- and third-generation 
“mission boys,” a number of whom became influential 
members of the plantation-centered economic elite, who 
acquired large land blocks.
If house lots and small farms had remained the only items 
of contention, the ambiguous land-ownership situation might 
not have been so troublesome, but it was not long before 
some newcomers became more ambitious. Most aspiring of 
the venturers in the early decades of the century were three 
partners who formed an enterprise called Ladd & Co.
William Ladd, Peter Brinsmade, and William Hooper arrived 
from Boston in 1833 and, after establishing a successful mer­
cantile venture in Honolulu, leased from the government a 
thousand acres of land on Kauai (for $300 a year). There, at 
Koloa, they began the first large-scale venture into plantation 
agriculture on the islands, so successfully in the beginning 
that they soon began to dicker for more land. Even though 
the partners overextended themselves at Koloa and ran into 
financial difficulties, they remained ambitious and opti­
mistic—and were able to wangle a further contract with 
Kamehameha III which gave them the right to farm “ any 
now unoccupied and unimproved localities on the several 
islands of the Sandwich Islands.”
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After vain attempts to form a corporation with foreign 
capital, Ladd & Co. tried to recoup its fortunes by suing the 
Kingdom of Hawaii for $378,000, claiming that their troubles 
were caused by the government’s noncooperation and even 
interference. As a settlement, they proposed setting up a joint 
stock company with the Hawaiian government, the govern­
ment to subscribe four hundred shares of stock for $200,000, 
with this sum paid in cash to the partners of Ladd & Co. The 
king and chiefs were merely amused at that point; it is a pro­
posal, said Land Commissioner John Ii, “ that might deceive 
a drunken man but would not deceive any man in his sober 
senses.” 32
Eventually, however, the sober-minded advisers of King 
Kamehameha III saw that the whole disorder would have to 
be straightened out. Two pressures finally forced legislation 
intended to reform land tenure: one came from the foreign­
ers, who wanted full rights to what they held; the other came 
from the Hawaiian people, who wanted full rights to the 
kuleanas they were occupying and using.
Pressure was strongest from the haoles—the beginnings of 
commercial agriculture in the islands provided a strong im­
petus to the movement. The difficulties of Ladd & Co. did 
not deter other potential plantation entrepreneurs, and sugar 
mills began to appear in various places on several of the 
islands, some operated by missionaries to bolster the finances 
of the church. Coffee, cotton, and other products were 
grown with some success, but it quickly became clear that 
production of sugar would be the most profitable enter­
prise.33 The English missionary William Ellis wrote in 1822 
that “ large tracts of fertile land lie waste in the islands,” and 
he foresaw the day “ when the natives become more industri­
ous and civilized.” 34 It was not native industry that ended 
“ waste” of the land, however; it was Yankee business 
acumen. Land was necessary for the growing areas and mill­
ing operations, and in one way or another land was acquired. 
One observer noted that in the mid-1840s Americans alone 
held over a million dollars worth of real property, much of it 
under cultivation.35
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The Hawaiian government was more moved by the plight 
of the commoners, and its haole advisers were sympathetic 
also. Judd fought ownership of land by foreigners to the 
end, and the king gave way unhappily;36 the principle of the 
people’s right to their land was not openly disputed, although 
some of the older alii agreed reluctantly. The indecisive 
policy of the government resulted in a petition, sent to Kame­
hameha III in 1845, signed by over 1,600 natives—they 
objected, first, to foreigners being accepted as Hawaiian 
subjects and, second, to the sale of land to foreigners. The 
king’s council replied in troubled tones that foreigners set­
tling permanently had a right to “ a proper sovereign,” and 
although ‘‘it is by no means proper to sell land to aliens,” 
when foreigners became citizens they were entitled to have 
land “ that they may have a home.”
Some natives were not satisfied (among them, David Malo) 
and nineteen of them responded in writing: “ Foreigners come 
on shore with cash, ready to purchase land, but we have not 
the means to purchase lands . . .  we have been subject to the 
ancient laws, till within these few years.” They argued that 
without a change in the situation, they could foresee “ the 
land with the life of the land passing into possession of for­
eigners.” Everyone seemed to agree, then, that a change, a 
reform in the policy of land tenure, was necessary, even 
though there was no unanimity on the nature of that 
change.37
End of the Ancient System
During the 1840s and 1850s decisions were made by king, 
council, and legislature that marked the end of Hawaii’s 
ancient land ownership and land use system. The first move 
would seem an obvious statement of fact to a landowner 
today, but it was a radical admission in 1839: a simple state­
ment that real property, with other possessions, actually 
belonged to a person to whom it had been granted, sold, 
or otherwise put in his possession. A bill of rights adopted 
that year, sometimes referred to as Hawaii’s Magna Charta,
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stated: “ Protection is hereby secured to the persons of all the 
people, together with their lands, their building lots and all 
their property, and nothing whatsoever shall be taken from 
any individual except by express provisions of the law.” 38 
Not a chief, not even a king, but the law. The act also said 
that a “ landlord cannot causelessly dispossess his tenants.” 
Modern rights of ownership were thus established, replacing 
custom and taboo. In 1840 the monarchy adopted its first 
constitution, which established a bicameral legislature (allow­
ing election of commoners to the house), set up a supreme 
court, and otherwise provided a constitutional base for the 
kingdom. The constitution attempted to explain the old 
Hawaiian land tenure system in modern terms by recalling 
that although Kamehameha I had owned “ all the land from 
one end of the islands to the other,” it had not been his 
private property but really belonged “ to the chiefs and peo­
ple in common, of whom Kamehameha I was the head, and 
had the management of the landed property.” 39 This still left 
rights of tenure rather vague. Then, with pressure increasing 
for further clarification of rights and titles, on 10 December 
1845 a body with the descriptive title “ Board of Commis­
sioners to Quiet Land Titles” was appointed.
The task of the Land Commission, as it became known, 
was at first intended to be “ investigation and final ascertain­
ment or rejection of all claims of private individuals, whether 
natives or foreigners, to any landed property acquired an­
terior to the passage” of the act.40 The work the commission 
did went much further, however, and it remained active for 
ten years. In the set of principles the commission adopted, 
the problem and its background were well stated: during 
Kamehameha I ’s time each person had rights in the land 
to some degree—“ not very clearly defined, but nevertheless 
universally acknowledged.” Now, however, what had been 
simple had become legally tangled—some “ may have ac­
quired allodial ownership of landed property” while many 
others retain “ a freehold less than allodial.” It was not an 
easy tangle to unsnarl.
After considering the overall question for some time, the
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Land Commission decided that the basic problem was a clear 
division of property rights between king and chiefs. This 
division, or mahele, was accomplished with the help of a 
special committee appointed by the legislature. All the agree­
ments that the king reached with some 240 chiefs and their 
konohikis were recorded in the Mahele Book, the king’s 
lands described on one page and the chief’s on the facing 
page.41 Descriptions were sometimes vague, and a huge task 
of surveying and clarifying borders followed (with much of 
the work done by missionaries).
The next step in the “ quieting” of titles was a distinction 
made by the king, immediately after the last mahele had been 
signed, between lands that he retained as his own and lands 
that he turned over to the kingdom as its property (govern­
ment lands, so called). Chiefs were required to pay a “ com­
mutation” before their titles were secured; most supplied 
them in kind, turning back portions of their awarded proper­
ties, which were then added to the government lands the king 
had established.
The work of the Land Commission in investigating per­
sonal claims by foreigners and natives continued for some 
years. There were recorded fifty handwritten volumes of 
testimony before the commission, with its supporting docu­
mentation, and ten volumes describing awards the commis­
sion made.42 Its work assumed greater importance as two 
additional pieces of legislation were passed. The first act 
was passage of a law on 10 July 1850 that allowed alien resi­
dents in Hawaii to acquire and hold land in fee-simple title, 
as citizen residents could, and to dispose of it as they wished 
to anyone living in Hawaii, subject or alien.43 The foreigners 
had finally won their way. As a leader in the haole communi­
ty wrote in a paper for the Hawaiian Historical Society later 
in the century: “ A brief ten years had been sufficient for the 
Hawaiian nation to break down the hoary traditions and 
venerable customs of the past, and to climb the difficult path 
from a selfish [sic] feudalism to equal rights.” 44 The second 
was an act, adopted by the legislature on 6 August 1850,
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known as the Kuleana Grant.45 The mahele between king and 
alii had promised protection of tenants’ rights, but did not 
allow for fee-simple land ownership by commoners. The new 
law did, for anyone who was occupying and cultivating his 
own kuleana on government, king’s, or chiefs’ lands.
At the end of the Land Commission’s work about a 
million acres had been set aside for the king, nearly a million 
and a half acres declared to be government land, and another 
million and a half awarded to the chiefs as their personal 
property. Although less than thirty thousand acres had been 
granted to the commoners as kuleanas, this move was a 
remarkable gesture toward common land ownership, far in 
advance of its time. As we shall see, during the next period 
in Hawaii’s modern history these figures changed quite 
radically; the new ability of the haole population to acquire 
lands legally, in fee simple as well as by lease, was utilized to 
the full.
Although a number of plantations and fairly large farms 
were put in operation toward the middle of the century and 
land was desirable primarily for agricultural purposes, urban 
land ownership was also growing in importance, and in 
value, through the activities of the trader-settlers who were 
arriving in greater numbers. The missions established by the 
successive bands of churchly arrivals—at Kailua and Waimea 
on the Big Island, at Lahaina on Maui, in several places on 
Kauai, and principally in Honolulu—contributed to the 
townlike character these places were assuming.
The change in Honolulu between 1820 and the 1840s and 
1850s was the most remarkable of these developments. When 
the first groups of missionaries came, the town was still a 
rather scrabbly stretch of flatland behind the harbor inlet. 
Streets connecting the nondescript buildings were “ narrow, 
irregular, and dirty,” not much more than paths, as one 
disappointed arrival noted. Busy as the town was becoming, 
the several hundred buildings in which the activity took place 
were mostly adobe-covered thatched huts. The missionary 
William Ellis noted the appearance of several wood and
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stone structures, however, and within a short time both the 
physical quality of buildings and the orderliness and self- 
respect of the foreign community using them had improved.46
By the 1840s perhaps eight thousand people lived in Hono­
lulu, about six hundred of them Caucasians, according to an 
estimate made by Polynesian, a haole-oriented newspaper 
that was started that year by an ambitious young man named 
James Jackson Jarves.47 There were twenty families from the 
United States, the editor counted, amounting to seventy-six 
individuals, and five from England totaling seventeen per­
sons. Bragging of growth and progress, the paper inventoried 
twenty retail shops and four wholesale stores. (Ladd & Co. 
in their advertisements indicated the variety of products 
available: everything from sugar and molasses to paint and 
cordage, glassware for the table, comestibles for the kitchen, 
prints for dressmaking, and coral, lava, and limestone for 
construction.) Although the partners of Ladd & Co. became 
involved in other enterprises, a number of mercantile ven­
tures which were building themselves working space in the 
1840s remained to become part of the later commercial 
establishment headed by the sugar production factors known 
as the Big Five. C. Brewer & Co., for instance, were begin­
ning their ship chandling offices; two missionaries left the 
fold to found the firm of Castle & Cooke.
There were two hotels in Plonolulu by 1840. There were, 
moreover, twelve hostels described by Jarves as “ sailors’ 
boarding houses, alias grog shops,” at least three churches, 
four schools, and two hospitals. These were inclined to be 
makeshift buildings, but the Rev. Hiram Bingham, who had 
been one of the earliest missionaries to arrive, was building a 
new church for the Kawaiahao parish: “ an imposing struc­
ture of one hundred and ten feet in length and seventy in 
breadth, with columns in front,” constructed of timber 
brought from the American northwest and coral stone from 
the islands. John Dominis, a beached merchant seaman from 
New York, was constructing for himself an ambitious house. 
It was to be finished later by his widow, occupied for a time
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by Hawaii’s last monarch, Queen Liliuokalani, and ultimate­
ly remain, extensively remodeled, as the official home of the 
State of Hawaii’s governors.
The town was already beginning to spread beyond the im­
mediate harbor area. A Mr. Skinner was finishing a rather 
“ elegant structure” for himself a bit outside the town center, 
and a large home was being completed in Nuuanu Valley, 
mauka of the downtown area, where Kamehameha I had 
fought his decisive battle for Oahu. Shortly, Jarves pre­
dicted, “ we shall see the surface [of the valley] dotted with 
neat cottages.” And he added, editorially: “ This is as it 
should be.” Polynesian essayed other bits of critical ap­
praisal: Skinner’s ambitious house was “ an ornament to the 
town” ; Kawaiahao Church was in a style “ somewhat anti­
quated for our day, but [with] the merit of convenience” ; a 
new retail store downtown, built for Sam & Mow, Bakers, 
“ looks much like a retired post office for some flourishing 
village in the United States.”
By then the character of the town was totally different 
from what it had been in the time of the first Kamehameha. 
The drilling fields, playing fields, and even the heiaus had 
fallen into disrepair and been abandoned or torn down to 
make way for new “ changes and improvements.” True 
streets were replacing the trails and byways. Properties, now 
secured, were being surveyed and carefully defined. There 
was a crowded neighborhood of native thatched huts along 
the water, pushed aside by the new commercial and residen­
tial construction and the beginnings of a public works pro­
gram (at first modest: a bridge across the Nuuanu stream, 
leading toward the plantation lands at Ewa, cost $1,200 in 
the 1840s).48 There was sufficient road construction outside 
of Honolulu (even on the other islands) so that a law was 
enacted in 1840 “ respecting the making of roads and recom­
pense for land taken.” 49 Government business, domestic and 
foreign, required the construction of a “ government house” 
and three consulates.
Crudities persisted in the new life in the towns. “ Thieves
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and vandals are becoming as plentiful as swine in the 
streets,” Polynesian noted toward the end of 1840.50 There 
were the beginnings of a mannered social life for the haoles 
that extended to the royalty and some of the chiefdom; but 
the ordinary Hawaiians, attracted to the towns by the ad­
vantages that were apparently offered, were outsiders in 
their own country, unable to find work once they left their 
kuleanas.51 The king and his advisers recognized the problem: 
they saw that the commoners who had left the land could not 
even pay the commutation fees for the kuleanas that had 
been granted them. The Privy Council proposed in 1847 that 
‘‘in order to encourage the people who live in towns to 
return to the country to farm,” their kuleana commutation 
costs be forgiven. This was the first of many homesteading 
efforts designed to return native Hawaiians to the land. It 
was no more successful than any have proved to be.
After the 1840s “ the outlines of a town committed to west­
ern property laws became visible,” writes historian Gavan 
Daws. In 1850 Honolulu was declared by the king to be a 
city; the new metropolis had a population of about fourteen 
thousand. During the 1850s regular mail service was insti­
tuted. A board of health was appointed. A school tax of $2 a 
year was levied. In 1859 the tax load was increased by im­
position of real and personal property taxes, and by then an 
elementary water system and some other basic utilities were 
undertaken. In fact, capital public improvements amounted 
to more than a million dollars spent between the mid-1850s 
and the mid-1870s. Observers noted that the streets were still 
poor, however, and the town grew haphazardly. Despite the 
“ improvements,” there was no plan and no structure of true 
architectural merit.
Yet by 1860 Honolulu must have been a very colorful 
place. It was, after all, capital of a Polynesian island king­
dom. Its resident population enjoyed band concerts on the 
palace lawn, did business in sturdy (if not handsome) struc­
tures, and found professional services ranging from legal 
advice to dentistry. Many lived in sprouting suburban neigh­
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borhoods where, as Mark Twain and others described them, 
neat white cottages sat surrounded by green grass and bright 
flowers brought from home. Amenities and luxuries were not 
lacking. A merchant, in his journal, noted that he filled a 
request from a good customer for “ a pen for a young lady, 
either gold or ebony with gold bands—not more than 
$5.00.” 52
The leap from the past had been made. Hawaiian culture 
had been replaced by a new society. The Polynesian way of 
life, indigenous to Hawaii, had been supplanted by a nostal­
gia for other manners—by a mid-Pacific enactment of a 
European-cum-New England living style, on the part of the 
haoles, and by a willing wish to emulate what they saw per­
formed, on the part of the Hawaiian royalty and alii. The 
Hawaiian commoners were confused. As they had explained 
to their king: “ We have lived under the chiefs, thinking to 
do whatever they desired, but not according as we thought; 
hence we are not prepared to compete with foreigners.” 53 
That their trouble was real, not imagined, is attested by their 
biological vulnerability to the new life. By 1860 the popula­
tion that Cook had found had already dwindled to some 
70,000.
chapter
Paths to the Present
HAWAII’S roots in a Polynesian past withered quickly under 
the impact of exotic importations, social and physical, but it 
took longer for the islands to implant themselves in the pres­
ent. From the middle of the nineteenth century on, the origi­
nal Hawaiians had even less control over their land. More 
and more residents of Hawaii were Hawaiians by location 
only: their origins reached from east to far west.
To the new Hawaiians the past meant anything from a 
stiff New England town to a simple oriental village, and their 
pictures of a desirable present were as varied. What sort of 
modern world should Hawaii join? In what seemed a wide 
set of alternatives, in what could have been a time of utter 
confusion, Hawaii’s development pointed in a fairly straight 
direction for one impelling reason: the social, political, and 
economic controls soon were concentrated in the hands of a 
single group, the predominantly American white business­
men.' There were periodic attempts by the missionaries to 
interfere, but the Hawaiians had less and less to say about 
life on their islands, and the other, growing groups, at first 
primarily Chinese and then increasingly Japanese, remained 
powerless for a long while.
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The period from about 1860 to 1900, or more accurately 
from Kamehameha I l l ’s death in 1854 to annexation of 
Hawaii by the United States in 1898, saw a gradual weaken­
ing of the monarchy as the non-Hawaiians consolidated the 
rights they had won and pressed harder for the end of 
Hawaii’s sovereign independence.
The last five monarchs were Alexander Liholiho, a grand­
son of Kamehameha the Great, crowned as Kamehameha IV 
in 1854; his brother Lot, who became the fifth and last of 
the Kamehameha dynasty in 1863; William Charles Lunalilo, 
who was elected king by the legislative assembly in 1873 and 
died of pulmonary tuberculosis thirteen months later; David 
Kalakaua, elected by the legislature to the royal position in 
1874; and finally Kalakaua’s sister Lydia Kamakaeha Paki 
(Mrs. John O. Dominis), who was elected to the throne as 
Queen Liliuokalani.
Each of these last five Hawaiian monarchs ruled briefly— 
Kalakaua’s reign for seventeen years was the longest; Luna­
lilo and Liliuokalani had two-year or less royal tenancies. 
Their health, generally, was not hearty; most of them drank 
much;2 the tensions produced by pressures on the kingdom 
simply weighed too heavily on these handsome alii nuis with 
such recent primal antecedents.
The haole business community in the islands (along with 
those non-Hawaiians in government and the remaining band 
of missionaries) moved efficiently to consolidate the controls 
that had been legalized during Kamehameha I l l ’s reign.3 
Politically, they pressed for additional constitutional reform, 
while the royalty, through most of the period, leaned toward 
absolutism in government. The question was further compli­
cated by the Hawaiians’ desire for the right to vote and 
the haoles’ fear of the results of universal suffrage. The 
foreigners made strong invasions into the government itself: 
Kamehameha IV appointed three non-Hawaiian cabinet 
members; the proportion increased until, under Kalakaua, 
the entire cabinet was at times Caucasian.
With more land available for the growing of sugarcane,
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the next needs of the planters were for a profitable market 
and a satisfactory work force. Two political activities re­
sulted from the wish to assure advantageous sales: lobbying 
in Washington for a reciprocity treaty that would eliminate 
tariffs on sugar shipped to mainland America, and working 
both in Hawaii and in the United States toward annexation 
of the island kingdom to that nation.
The fight for reciprocity was won through a treaty signed 
in 1875 and renewed in 1887 (one clause giving the United 
States rights to Pearl Harbor). The push toward annexation 
was more complicated and took longer to succeed. Most 
American residents wanted the islands to be annexed, believ­
ing that their interests would be better served under Ameri­
can control. Others feared annexation, preferring to maintain 
the holds they had achieved over local politics, economics, 
and land tenure, by means that American democracy might 
frown on.4
The end of the kingdom came when the polarity between 
royalists (most Hawaiians and some whites who wanted 
above all to maintain a monarchy strong enough to assure in­
dependence) and annexationists (most haoles, who wanted an 
American takeover to end what remained of native Hawaiian 
sovereignty) reached an impossible point of tension.5 An 
outright revolution was engineered by a band of haole 
business and professional men in January 1893, and a revolu­
tionary government was formed.6 It was followed by a self- 
proclaimed republic headed by a moderate named Sanford 
Ballard Dole, son of a missionary family and a unique char­
acter with odd and unexpected principles—altogether an 
unlikely person to be a revolutionary, as indeed were other 
dignified, frock-coated conservative gentlemen among those 
who took part.
The life of the republic was a shaky one, and the United 
States felt that it had no choice, ultimately, but to solve the 
sorry mess by annexation, which was ordained by a majority 
but by no means unanimous vote of Congress in 1898.
The other need of the plantation owners—for labor of a
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sufficient quantity, at low enough wages, and with satisfac­
torily docile dispositions—was resolved during the last half 
of the nineteenth century and for some time afterward by 
wholesale importation of contracted laborers from other 
lands.7 The Hawaiians had proved to have no taste for such 
work, and in any event they retained too much independence 
to become compliant field hands (though a number of them 
were trained for supervisory jobs).8 Three hundred Chinese 
coolies were brought to Hawaii in 1851—the planters having 
taken immediate advantage of an act passed by the legisla­
ture which permitted contract labor—and then, as the im­
ported Chinese workers showed signs of restiveness under 
the miserable plantation conditions and extremely low pay, 
increasingly large groups were brought from Japan.9 In the 
years just before annexation some forty thousand Japanese 
arrived, and toward the end of the century more than half 
the population of the islands was Japanese, other Orientals 
constituting another fifth. By that time workers from other 
countries were being brought in—the Portugese in quite large 
numbers.
The fate of Hawaii’s lands during this period of consolida­
tion of foreign control was closely related to agricultural and 
other commercial developments. Land acquisition by aliens 
continued on a large scale: by the end of the century close to 
70 percent of Hawaii’s surface was owned by non-Hawaiians. 
As an instance of the search for land, Claus Spreckels, San 
Francisco’s insatiable sugar magnate, came to Hawaii deter­
mined to dominate the industry in the islands.10 From a Ha­
waiian princess, Ruth Keelikolani, he “ bought” for $10,000 
the crown lands of Hawaii—which she did not own and 
could not sell—and later actually did gain extensive acreage 
on Maui by influencing legislation.
The use of land for producing commodities other than 
sugar continued, but not to an impressive extent, during this 
period.11 Rice and a few other agricultural staples and even a 
usable fiber formed from the fern tree were grown and, for a 
time, found markets. Some products did catch on permanent­
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ly and are profitable items even today: bananas, guava (espe­
cially as a jelly), and coffee (which seemed always to suffer 
from one production difficulty or another). The most impor­
tant of these successes was, of course, pineapple, grown in 
some quantity during the last decades of the century, im­
proved in quality through importation of new varieties, but 
held back as exportable merchandise because of transporta­
tion problems and the price penalties of heavy American 
tariffs.
Several societies were formed to foster local agricultural 
and botanical businesses, and both of the last two Kameha- 
mehas supported these movements enthusiastically. Once 
more, however, little thought was given to protection of 
indigenous species. As growers found that they had to fight 
pests, insectivorous birds were introduced, such as the 
obtrusive myna bird, and became destructive nuisances in 
their own turn.
Raising cattle and, to a lesser extent, goats and sheep 
became successful enterprises and in some places even began 
to compete with the sugar interests in the need for land. In 
the 1860s and 1870s a number of large ranches were estab­
lished, some of them remaining as viable enterprises.
Mercantile activity was increasing in the towns, and the ur­
ban locations themselves were thus expanding and requiring 
more land on which to continue growing. At first the outly­
ing built-up locations were satisfied with a kind of frontier 
construction (like Carson City in the 1850s or Helena, Mon­
tana, in the 1870s, as one architectural historian has put it). 
But soon, especially in Honolulu, there came a more ostenta­
tious importation of mannerisms from Europe and America, 
and toward the end of the century there was a strong 
dominance of styles brought directly from America in its 
Victorian period.12 This bosomy, corseted, double-breasted 
architecture seemed quite appropriate to the dress that the 
haole gentlemen and their fair ladies wore, emulated as they 
were by the nobles of the Hawaiian court. A new Iolani
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Palace, built in 1882, combined in an engaging architectural 
fantasy many of these imported tastes.
The urbanized areas began to spread, and as they grew 
they demanded more urban amenities. Honolulu developed 
eastward, as far as was reasonable along the coast, and 
westward as well, reaching toward the plantation lands. Hilo 
on the island of Hawaii, Lahaina and Wailuku on Maui, and 
Lihue on Kauai, all early settlements, grew to be the urban 
centers of those islands.
Transportation rapidly became a problem.13 Horse and 
buggy traffic was soon so dense in downtown Honolulu that 
residents and businessmen complained. Horse-drawn hacks 
provided public transport for some time, and in the 1880s 
mule-powered carriages, moving on rails laid along the devel­
oping urban corridor, were introduced. Railroads appeared 
to many to be a necessary adjunct to public transportation, 
and several small stretches of track were laid on Oahu and 
on Maui before the largest and most successful, reaching 
from Honolulu to the plantations of Ewa, was opened in 
1890. Further railroad construction followed, some of 
remarkable engineering skill. A triple-spurred road reaching 
out from Hilo on Hawaii spanned the Laupahoehoe Gulch 
on a 568-foot-high trestle, and Benjamin F. Dillingham’s 
Oahu Railway and Land Company extended its tracks past 
Ewa, around the rocky point of Kaena, to Kahuku on the 
northeast corner of the island. The economics of railroading 
did not, in the end, work out in Hawaii, but before the lines 
were discontinued they provided weekend travel experiences 
for the residents as well as cartage for the plantations.
The utility services essential to a modern community were 
begun in this period before annexation: artesian water supply 
was found feasible, and pipes were laid to reservoirs in sever­
al of the upper valleys; electric light was at first an exciting 
display in a few places, but by 1891 the Hawaiian Electric 
Company was providing lighting for those who wanted it and 
could afford it; the telephone went through a similar stage of
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display and ostentation, but as early as 1880 the furnishing 
of telephone service had become a competitive business.14
The Land Changes Hands
The land which was being acquired by western venturers in 
ever greater quantities, either in full ownership or through 
leases, came from several sources. Some was sold or leased 
by the aliis, or by the king, from the lands that had been set 
aside for them at the time of the Great Mahele. A primary 
source was the stock of government land that had been 
formed. And in a lesser but still important quantity the ac­
quisition came from the kuleanas which the Hawaiian com­
moners had received.
The shrinking of the kuleanas is a sad story.15 While the 
total of thirty thousand acres distributed was small, it repre­
sented in principle an important move toward a democratic, 
freeholding society. There were 11,300 individual grants, and 
one historian has noted that the Hawaiian native population 
at that time was only 80,000 persons, which probably 
represented not more than some 16,000 families. Thus the 
kuleana grants must have been awarded to almost two out of 
three Hawaiian families—a record of fee-simple ownership 
among natives unique in the early nineteenth century.
There were mixed emotions among the haoles about this 
gain for the local people. An editorial writer in The Maile 
Quarterly in the 1860s saw the natives “ with a taro patch, a 
garden plot, a good suit of clothes and four horses” becom­
ing “ independent, lazy and vicious.” An angry response 
from one of his readers argued that the Hawaiians were in­
dustrious people, who valued and used their kuleanas and 
“with almost religious zeal . . . hoard their title deeds and 
landmarks.” 16 Neither comment was really correct. While 
some Hawaiians hung onto their home-farm plots, many let 
them go. Most of the kuleanas were good growing land, but 
some were not; many of them were inaccessible, a number
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had tangled, fractionated ownership claims, and some were 
sketchily surveyed (so that remembered “ landmarks” were 
important and sometimes arguable). Often their owners were 
tempted away by plantation work or drawn by the attractions 
of the towns. For whatever reason, large numbers of the 
kuleanas were abandoned, to be absorbed by neighboring 
plantations and never recovered. Others were mortgaged, 
leased, or sold. By one calculation, on the island of Kauai 
only about a third of the kuleana grants remained in their 
owners’ hands soon after the end of the century.17
The alii were not always good farmers or land managers 
either, and many of them lost their lands, often through 
accumulated debts or unsustainable mortgages.18 At times 
cooperative ventures were tried: chiefs and commoners would 
pool their lands to make a try at larger-scale farming. These 
efforts were seldom successful, although at times they 
worried the large plantation owners. A hui (business associa­
tion) of this sort at Makalupu, near the Koloa plantation 
on Kauai, bolstered by land deeded to its members by the 
ubiquitous Princess Ruth Keelikolani, became sufficiently 
bothersome that the Koloa Sugar Company gradually bought 
up the shares of individual members.19
The greatest sources of plantation acreage, however, were 
lands held by the monarch and government lands. Rights to 
the use of the king’s personal properties, the crown lands, 
and the government lands became confused as time went on, 
despite attempts to clarify the legal distinctions. But by one 
means or another new haole owners dipped into all three 
resources.
Fundamentally, the Great Mahele had first separated the 
king’s lands and the chiefs’ lands, and then from each source 
the government’s lands were formed. This seemed clear 
enough. One difficulty developed, however: some of the 
king’s holdings remained his personal property, which he 
handled as he wished (the Kamehameha lands, in time, be­
came a tremendous estate), and some became his property
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only as ruler, as wearer of the crown.20 Status of these 
“crown” lands and the king’s right to dispose of them 
became a difficult issue during the later nineteenth century, 
even though a commission was set up in 1865 to govern their 
use.21
By the time Kamehameha V ascended to the throne, so 
much of this crown property had been sold or tied up with 
long leases or mortgages that the legislature recognized a 
crisis. In 1864 the Hawaiian Supreme Court ruled that crown 
meant crown, not king, and that the crown lands were “ in­
alienable” —that is, they could not be taken away from the 
crown to be broken up or disposed of. This seemed to the 
legislature a sensible ruling, and on 3 January 1865 a law 
was passed that said “ Crown Lands shall remain henceforth 
inalienable and shall descend to the heirs and successors of 
the Hawaiian throne forever.”
Again legal words would seem to have settled the problem, 
but they did not. The government managed to pay off most 
of the mortgages and terminate many of the leases, but the 
manipulation by Claus Spreckels in 1880 indicated that rights 
and titles were still confused. Later monarchs continued to 
gain considerable income from leasing crown lands, and one 
of the blows to Queen Liliuokalani when the throne was 
taken from her was loss of that income.22 In the end, of 
course, the crown lands along with the government lands 
were assumed by the provisional government, then by the re­
public, and finally, at the time of annexation, by the United 
States government.23
The government lands, the true public domain, were both 
sold and leased during the later years of the monarchy. Be­
tween the end of the Great Mahele activities and the over­
throw of the monarchy, over 600,000 acres of government 
land, including the best agricultural acreage in the islands, 
were sold.24 Much more was leased. Most of the sales took 
place in the twenty-year period from 1846 to 1865; prices 
averaged $1.11 an acre and in one instance went as low as 
four cents.25
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The Whites Take Charge
In the roughly four decades between annexation of Hawaii 
by the United States and the bombing of Pearl Harbor, that 
American property in the Hawaiian Islands, the resident 
Caucasian businessmen and professionals made full capital 
of the controls they had already established. The Americans 
especially found themselves no longer “ foreigners” ; they 
were now the most powerful native group in this territory 
of the United States. It was about this time that the word 
kama'aina, which meant to the Hawaiians “ familiar,” 
“ accustomed,” and hence “ native-born,” came to be applied 
by the second and third generation of white natives only to 
themselves—using the term kanaka (person) for the Hawaiian 
descendants—so that today the select kamaaina group in the 
islands is composed of scions of the early white settlers, like 
the Dillinghams and the Alexanders and the Cookes, in some 
instances with a touch of Hawaiian blood but in more cases 
pure haole.
Hawaiian royal titles became a badge of local prestige 
without power. The Hawaiian people struggled vainly to es­
tablish a new potency for themselves within the democratic 
framework that now enclosed them, but they failed just as 
miserably as wards of the United States as they had as sub­
jects of their monarchy. The visitors who had come from 
abroad, seen great resources to exploit, and stayed on to 
become kamaainas were too ruthless and too clever for a 
decimated population of simple and friendly islanders to 
cope with. In competition with the Orientals who were being 
brought in, the Hawaiians did not do too well either. Some 
natives retired to pockets of village life, often in isolated 
valleys. Others tried, without much success, to find their way 
in the towns.26
During Hawaii’s term as a territory it was governed under 
the Organic Act, adopted by the U.S. Congress, with a gov­
ernor appointed by the president of the United States, a vote­
less delegate to Congress in Washington, a bicameral local
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legislature, and, for the first time, universal suffrage for all 
who had held citizen status under the republic.27 Since the 
Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian population constituted a major­
ity of the electorate (Orientals, making up more than half the 
resident population, were not regarded as citizens and for 
some time could not vote), it seemed as though they were in 
a position to control the legislature and have one of their 
own become delegate to Congress, the most important elec­
tive post.
The allegiance of the white community was almost com­
pletely to the Republican party. From time to time a local 
Democratic party made attempts to surface but, although it 
attracted some colorful and competent figures, it remained 
deep in the minority until after World War II. Only three of 
the eight territorial governors were Democrats, appointed 
without much attention to island affairs by Woodrow Wilson 
in 1913 and 1918 and by Franklin Roosevelt in 1934, and 
even they were of conservative cast. To the dismay of the 
white business community, the first election for delegate to 
Congress was indeed won by Robert W. Wilcox, a part- 
Hawaiian who had joined in an abortive counterrevolution 
attempting to reseat Queen Liliuokalani. From then on, 
however, through ten elections until 1922, the delegate was 
Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole, a Hawaiian of royal de­
scent who chose to lead his people into an unhappy coalition 
with the white Republicans. The haole political strategy was 
to split the Hawaiian vote and gain most of it for the Repub­
lican policies; the Hawaiian hope was to win advantages, by 
bartering and as a kind of gratuity, within the ranks of the 
party that obviously had prestige and leverage in Washing­
ton. The move worked to disadvantage the Hawaiians as 
effectively as compromise had failed for them in the last 
years of the monarchy.
The territorial legislature was at first, by preponderance 
of their votes, controlled by Hawaiians. As Wilcox’s election 
had frightened the haoles, so did that of native legislators, 
who began conducting their sessions in the Hawaiian lan-
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guage. But haole strategy succeeded in this sphere too. Soon 
the legislature was predominantly Republican, elected by a 
coalition of Caucasians (mostly Americans, bolstered by the 
Portuguese) and Hawaiians who deserted their own Home 
Rule party.
Sugar was dominant in every way in the first part of the 
twentieth century in Hawaii. Annexation had assured a satis­
factory portion of the profitable American market. Finding 
the essential labor supply under the oppressive working 
conditions imposed by the plantation owners remained a 
problem, however. To make matters worse, after Hawaii 
became a territory contract labor was outlawed. The solution 
was to canvass willing workers from abroad, and the number 
of solicited immigrants increased each year.
The Chinese coolies increasingly left the plantations at the 
start of the new century: they moved to the cities, where 
many of them had already started small businesses and busi­
ness combines (huis). Japanese labor was imported in swell­
ing numbers until 1903, when an agreement with the Japa­
nese government ended immigration of workers from that 
country (but did not prevent an inpouring of so-called picture 
brides). From then on the planters saw to it that many other 
nationals were enticed to the islands to work for them in 
various categories. More Portuguese came—and Puerto 
Ricans, then Koreans, Samoans, and, increasingly, Filipinos. 
European stock, such as German and Scandinavian, was 
added, and Scotsmen proved to be particularly good 
managers and overseers.
The result of all this, obviously, was a population mixed in 
ethnic background and race. When the first reciprocity treaty 
was signed in 1876, signaling the spurt in sugar production, 
people of Hawaiian ancestry formed over 80 percent of the 
population, Caucasians about 6Vz percent, and Orientals 
some 10 percent. By 1940, as World War II approached, 
Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians constituted only 15 percent of 
the people on what had been their islands. Caucasian resi­
dents had increased to 23 percent, Orientals formed a husky
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44 percent (six to one, Japanese over Chinese), and various 
other groups composed 17 percent of the total.28
Plantation business, during the territorial period, became 
the paramount industrial activity. Around the plantation 
revolved almost every aspect of life in Hawaii. Other com­
mercial enterprises such as banking and transportation, as 
well as general merchandising to supply the needs of the 
growing population, depended to a large extent on producing 
sugarcane and, before long, pineapples. That tasty tropical 
fruit had been grown in the islands without fanfare (or much 
success) before 1900, but it was the acumen of James 
Drummond Dole, a cousin of the political leader Sanford 
Dole, that made pineapple a successful commodity and an 
important part of the islands’ economy. The local strain was 
further improved and the product was canned to overcome 
the spoilage that slow ship transport had caused.
The prodigious profitability of the plantations (dividends 
paid by the factor firms, which soon controlled most of the 
growers’ businesses, ran 50 percent or more in some years) 
meant that their dominance inevitably was extended in 
another direction: ownership of more and more land.29 Sug­
arcane and pineapple entrepreneurs recognized that good 
land for growing was limited on the islands (only about a 
tenth of Hawaii’s surface is “ prime” agricultural land)—and 
that good land was indeed good, ideally suited for the crops 
they were growing. Hence the demand for the limited re­
source became obsessive. Fortunately, some of Hawaii’s land 
resource was judiciously guarded: an act passed by the Terri­
torial Legislature in 1903 empowered the governor to set 
aside forest and water reserves, and a continuing preservation 
program resulted.30
The republic’s Land Act of 1895 limited to a thousand 
acres the amount of land that could change hands as a single 
parcel (a provision carried over into the Organic Act). It 
became important to the growers and their agents to have 
this curb lifted: although it was a restriction easily violated, 
by such devices as dummy owners, it still was a nuisance in
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acquiring land. In 1919 they lobbied though Congress a Ha­
waiian Rehabilitation Act that eliminated the unwelcome 
limitation and, in one of the coalition deals that was sup­
posed to help the Hawaiian people, also created an agency 
called the Hawaiian Homes Commission. The advantage this 
act gave the land-hungry planters was quickly obvious. An 
outstanding example was the purchase in 1922 of the entire 
island of Lanai—a 90,000-acre treasure of tropical landscape 
(the land that wears the many-colored lei, says a Hawaiian 
song)—by the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, which became 
the Dole Corporation, which was later controlled by the Big 
Five factor Castle & Cooke. The benefits that the Hawaiians 
gained from the act were not so clear.
During this time a number of large landed estates, some of 
which had been set up to protect the income of their foun­
ders’ heirs, became a major landowning element. With one 
notable exception and a few lesser ones, these trusts were of 
haole origin and inheritance. James Campbell, an Irishman 
who worked with Benjamin Dillingham to acquire major 
blocks of land for development, established an estate for his 
heirs amounting to about a fifth of the island of Oahu. 
Samuel Damon, a missionary son who secured large areas for 
ranching, left an estate amounting to over 140,000 acres. 
Lincoln McCandless, who with his brothers engineered the 
drilling of Hawaii’s early artesian wells and who was an 
active political figure into the 1920s, put together over 36,000 
acres for his descendants. In addition to these family inheri­
tances, large blocks of land scattered among the islands were 
accumulated by the Big Five corporations: from about
155,000 acres held by Castle & Cooke to a mere 38,000 that 
Theo H. Davies had in fee simple.31
Of all these trusts and estates, the largest by far was the 
Bishop Estate, not at all a haole holding but the lands of the 
Kamehameha family inherited by the last of that line, Prin­
cess Bernice Pauahi Bishop.32 Other Hawaiian royal and alii 
lands secured in the Great Mahele were formed into trustee­
ships (the Liliuokalani Trust amounts to almost 10,000 acres,
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some of it in the heart of Waikiki), but the Bishop Estate 
overshadows them all. Princess Bernice Pauahi, whose 
genealogy showed her to be a direct descendant of Kameha­
meha I, was an esteemed, attractive, intelligent woman whom 
Kamehameha V, as he approached death, tried to persuade 
to be his successor. Married to Charles Reed Bishop, who 
had way-stopped in the islands and then had stayed to 
become one of Hawaii’s earliest bankers, she preferred to 
avoid the responsibilities and frustrations of the throne, but 
she demonstrated her concern for the people by willing her 
land, in trust, to be used to its best advantage for the pur­
pose of educating Hawaiians. Some of the Kamehameha 
lands had been in the hands of Princess Victoria Kamamalu 
(heiress of Kaahumanu) and her father, Governor Keku- 
anaoa. These Princess Ruth inherited and passed on to Ber­
nice Pauahi Bishop, along with lands she had been awarded 
by the Great Mahele. Nine percent of Hawaii’s lands, about
370,000 acres, have been in this single ownership since Mrs. 
Bishop’s death in 1884, providing a powerful instrument for 
affecting the environment and the society.
Another major accumulator of Hawaiian land in the early 
years of the century was the United States government. Not 
only were crown lands and government lands appropriated, 
but additional areas were “ set aside” for defense purposes.33
Urban Design and Nondesign
Urban expansion continued to increase in the first decades of 
the century, primarily around Honolulu on Oahu and, in the 
towns that had already begun to develop before annexation, 
on the other islands. Several plantation towns grew to sizable 
proportions on the central Oahu plains, on the northern tip 
of the island of Hawaii, and elsewhere. The town of Lanai, 
on that island which had been sold outright for private use, 
became a sort of model company town, decently planned and 
developed, though built with quite miserable little houses. In 
fact most of the plantation homes (sometimes sentimentally
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invested with architectural merit by urban historians) were 
nondescript wooden boxes.
In Honolulu and even in other places influenced by the 
thriving economy, building construction increased appre­
ciably. Moreover, some attention was now being given to the 
quality of urban appearance.34 The cities grew haphazardly 
as needs arose and land became available, however, not by 
any kind of plan. Although no town-planning landscape- 
architect types appeared, several well-known American 
architects designed buildings in Hawaii. The early years of 
the century have been termed a Colonial Period in its archi­
tecture, since the influence was obvious of styles fashionable 
on the American mainland, imported to the territory by these 
visiting designers.
Even by 1910 the central part of Honolulu for a good half 
dozen blocks in each direction was quite solidly built up, and 
the expansion of “ downtown” continued rapidly.35 The 
stores and other commercial structures in those first decades 
of the century still averaged two or three stories high. Some, 
like the Alexander Young Hotel—built with modified Renais­
sance decorative finery in 1902 for $2 million,—were twice 
that height.36 Public buildings were added to the burgeoning 
civic center around Iolani Palace; the central library, typical 
Carnegie-grant Doric-porticoed neoclassicism, was built in 
1911. Up the Nuuanu Valley, where Kamehameha the Great 
had won his decisive battle for Oahu a hundred years before, 
one of the earliest American golf courses was stretched 
across the rolling foothills.
Church buildings—of all religions, sects, denominations, 
and architectural styles—appeared everywhere. There were 
such examples as the Central Union Church on the outskirts 
of Honolulu, designed in 1922 by Ralph Adams Cram, the 
well-known American exponent of Georgian Colonial reli­
gious architecture; the First Church of Christ Scientist, 
designed the next year by local architect Hart Wood in a 
remarkably contemporary manner; and the Izumo Taishakyo 
Mission, closely copied from a Japanese Shinto temple at
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about the same time by one Hego Fuchino. Another main­
land architect of repute brought to Hawaii for several 
commissions was Bertram Grosvenor Goodhue, designer in 
relaxed romantic styles, who began in 1925 the planning of 
the Honolulu Academy of Arts. Generally considered by 
both laymen and critics to be the public building most at 
home in the Hawaiian atmosphere, the design was completed 
(and simplified) by a local architect named Hardie Phillips.
The residential areas of the city spread first into the lower 
foothills and then stretched out in both directions along the 
coast. While many of the houses built during the territorial 
period were modest (a kind of single-wall simplified frame 
construction, used even today, was developed), the new afflu­
ence attained by so many during the period showed in the 
homes they created for themselves. Two architects of con­
siderable creativity added a good deal of originality to the 
work of the 1920s and 1930s. One was Hart Wood, who had 
practiced in San Francisco before he moved to Hawaii in 
1919; the other was Charles W. Dickey, raised in the islands 
but absent for study and practice on the mainland until he 
returned in 1934. Dickey devised a residential style with 
sweeping, overhanging roofs that fitted the Hawaiian land­
scape well; Wood had a general practice that produced not 
only houses but several distinguished commercial and reli­
gious buildings; together they designed one of downtown 
Honolulu’s most handsome structures, the home building for 
the Big Five company Alexander & Baldwin.
Another industry that was to become a major user of Ha­
waii’s lands in many parts of the islands noticeably emerged 
at this time: tourism. Recognized as a potential addition to 
the territory’s primary agricultural economy even in the pre­
vious century, the commerical entertainment of visitors did 
not amount to much as a business until several fairly large 
hotels were built at Waikiki. First the Moana Hotel as early 
as 1901 and then the luxurious Royal Hawaiian and the more 
modest Halekulani in the 1920s made Waikiki seem a busy 
place compared to the restful recreation spot for American
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and Hawaiian kamaainas that it had been. Now, however, 
large aircraft were bringing visitors across the Pacific from 
the American mainland in a bit over twenty hours. Local en­
trepreneurs saw signs of a sizable new industry.
By 1940 Honolulu had grown truly to city stature from its 
small-town size at the turn of the century; a panoramic pho­
tograph taken that year might be a picture of any of hun­
dreds of American municipalities of the time. But it was an 
insular community in more ways than one. As troubled war 
times approached, Hawaii did not seem to sense them. The 
only problem that worried the haole elite was the increase in 
size of the nonwhite population and its growing indepen­
dence. Both the workers of Japanese ancestry and the more 
recently arrived Filipinos had begun to form into labor 
unions, and many of their children, along with those of 
Chinese and other non-Caucasian groups, were crowding the 
public schools.
The Hawaiians seemed no longer a problem; they grum­
bled occasionally about loss of their land, but they provided 
an interesting cultural-historic background to display as addi­
tional enticement to the visiting tourists. Occasional moves 
toward statehood for the territory were made, but many 
haoles feared full inclusion in the American juridical-political 
system more than they wished complete citizenship.
There was little realization that major changes had already 
taken place in Hawaiian society, changes that would alter the 
islands’ political pattern and strongly affect the way its lands 
would be used. The workers who had been brought to the 
plantations had already reached numerical dominance in the 
population of Hawaii. Now they aspired toward economic 
and political strength—just as the war with the original 
homeland of their largest component, those with ancestry in 
Japan, was about to break violently on the islands.
chapter
The Lure of the New
THE bombs that fell on Pearl Harbor during the morning of 
7 December 1941 not only destroyed eighteen American war­
ships, they shattered Hawaii’s insular complacency as well. 
They set in motion forces that altered the islands’ social 
order drastically; that ended one-party political dominance; 
that moved sugar-and-pine agriculture from first place in 
Hawaii’s economy to a position below tourism and expendi­
tures by the military; that above all hastened the addition of 
Hawaii as the fiftieth state in the union of the United States 
of America and the inclusion of its people as fully qualified 
citizens. And the new forces once more altered the uses to 
which the islands’ lands were put and again changed the 
ways in which those lands were owned and valued.
The period from 1940 on has been a time of rapid Ameri­
canization, in every respect, of all the various groups of peo­
ple that had come together or been brought together on the 
Hawaiian Islands. The first touch of American policy and 
power was uncomfortable: during the war years Hawaii 
was governed by a military commission.' Martial law was 
imposed and most civil rights were suspended. The islands 
became a huge staging area and much more land, of course,
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was taken for military purposes. Two-fifths of the popula­
tion, the Americans of Japanese ancestry (often called AJAs) 
were at best kept under suspicious scrutiny and in many cases 
deported to mainland detention camps.
The years between the end of the war in 1945 and the 
achievement of statehood in 1959 were a time of turbulent 
readjustment, a shuffling of almost the entire population into 
new positions in a society that had been shaken awry. To 
some it meant the first chance for equal advancement and 
even the settling of old scores. To others it meant new or 
augmented business opportunities. To Hawaii as a whole, 
used to slow if steady lineal growth in population and 
economic stature, it meant the sudden start of an ascending 
exponential growth curve.
There were several elements in the Americanization pro­
cess. One of the most important to the future of the islands 
was consummation of the upward movement of the habitants 
of oriental ancestry. Although it is often remarked that in 
Hawaii the nisei (children of first-generation Japanese immi­
grants, which most adult Japanese Hawaiians were at this 
stage) did not suffer the same physical and emotional 
wartime injuries as those on the mainland (how could the 
territory intern 40 percent of its residents?), there were 
hardships imposed and insults offered that were not easy to 
forget.2 Those AJAs who served with soldierly distinction 
during the war formed into battalion, regimental, and even 
special intelligence alumni clubs afterward. Many used their 
G.I. Bill of Rights benefits to study on the mainland (largely 
law it would seem) and they were ready to take full advan­
tage of the social shake-up that followed the war’s disrup­
tions. It was politics and the professions that primarily 
attracted the Hawaiian citizens of Japanese descent, and 
their power over Hawaii’s lands as political decision makers 
became very strong in the postwar and particularly in the 
poststatehood periods.
The Americanization movements of the Chinese descen­
dants tended more toward business proprietorship, as indeed
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it had ever since the first coolies began leaving the planta­
tions to go to the towns. After the war such entrepreneurial 
figures appeared as Chinn Ho, Clarence T. C. Ching and 
two other Chings, the brothers Hung Wo and Hung Wai, 
and Hiram Fong (who mingled careers as financier and 
United States senator), many of whom became involved in 
land development either directly or through its financing. 
These ethnic-group interests were not rigidly distinct, of 
course; several Chinese Hawaiians in addition to Senator 
Fong became important figures in the political sphere, and a 
number of Japanese Hawaiians successfully entered business, 
including contracting and land development. In addition, the 
increasing number of Filipinos, the Portuguese who had 
stayed in the islands from earlier days, and other groups 
joined the upward movement to some extent and had their 
representatives in political positions and the business world.
It was that world of commerce and industry which became 
the second important element in Hawaii’s Americanization.3 
The scope of the activities of the old-time firms increased as 
they became involved in many diversified undertakings in ad­
dition to plantation agriculture. For this they needed corpo­
rate executives with broader experience than island activities 
had provided for the local people, and malihini faces 
appeared even in the Big Five administrative councils.
Another development was the appearance in Hawaii of 
new business organizations, branches of mainland establish­
ments and enterprising individuals, to compete in commercial 
activities that were already under way or to begin new indus­
tries. Under such impacts, the complacent old understandings 
that had divided local business benefits among the kamaainas 
were quite quickly replaced with a more typical American 
kind of competition.
A third element in the Americanization process was growth 
of a true two-party political system in the islands.4 Revitali­
zation of the nearly moribund Democratic party came from 
several factors: hard work by younger progressives who saw 
conditions changing; restlessness of Hawaiian, part-Hawai-
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ian, and other depressed ethnic groups; political action by 
militant leaders of Hawaii’s first strong labor union, the 
ILWU; and clever manipulation of all these forces, particu­
larly the ambitious AJAs, by a Montana-born, Kalihi-raised 
former Honolulu police officer named John Anthony Burns. 
The result was a political organization that was to dominate 
Hawaiian politics for at least twenty years. In what is known 
locally as the Revolution of 1954, Democrats captured the 
state legislature and two years later Jack Burns was elected 
delegate to Congress.
Earlier ambivalence about the desirability of statehood had 
pretty well disappeared by the time Burns arrived in Wash­
ington and began the necessary political maneuverings to 
bring favorable congressional action. It took several years, 
but in 1959 Hawaii did become the fiftieth state. Now the 
delegate to Congress would be replaced by two senators and 
a representative (later, as population grew, two). The gover­
nor would no longer be appointed by a president holding 
office in the nation’s capital four thousand miles away but 
would be elected by the islands’ own citizens. Hawaii was 
part of America, politically if not physically, and its people 
were Americans, by political circumstance if by neither 
heredity nor environment. In 1959, those people elected 
William F. Quinn, who had been the last territorial governor, 
as the first governor of the state. Four years later, Burns 
defeated and replaced him.
To a remarkable degree all these paths to Americanism 
focused on attitudes toward land. Hawaii’s lands had been 
through several stages of change since Cook’s time, and now, 
under the teachings and the pressures of American business 
enterprise, they entered a new phase of valuation, utilization, 
and even ownership. The American concept of the “ highest 
and best” use of land appeared a reasonable principle to the 
new nationals, and the American method of taxing real prop­
erty on its assessed potential worth, rather than its present 
use, seemed a good way to maximize public gain from this 
most plentiful resource.5 The extent to which values had
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changed since the Polynesian Hawaiians had considered that 
the best use for land was to support life was now very clear.
In immediate terms the newly introduced precepts meant 
that plantation agriculture had to be questioned: was that ac­
tivity land’s highest and best use in an expanding island 
economy? An organized labor force was achieving higher 
wages; competition in the production of sugar and pineapple 
was increasing on the world market; agricultural land, be­
cause of its reasonably level, accessible, buildable expanse, 
was becoming desirable for new, urban uses. To some land- 
owners, the highest and best use of land, for the time being, 
was to hold it off the market while its value increased. Some 
complicated economic-social-public policy formulas and some 
sophisticated land planning studies were now needed to weigh 
sugar-and-pineapple agriculture against diversified farming, 
to measure the islands’ own needs and the outside markets 
for various potential products, to balance loss of arable lands 
against mounting demands for housing and community ser­
vices, to calculate immediate and long-term tax revenues 
from alternative land-use possibilities. Hawaii’s territorial 
government had in time included a Planning Office, but it 
had neither the expertise nor the impulse to make the neces­
sary studies of costs and benefits for the public good.
Hawaii’s postwar legislators were not blind to the new 
trends in land uses, however. Nor were they unmindful of the 
effects of concentrated land ownership on the islands’ peo­
ple, their constituents. It was no longer only the land-poor 
Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians who worried about land for 
housing. The plantation workers of various backgrounds 
who had lifted themselves to a new status—which, they felt, 
should warrant home ownership—were also having difficulty 
finding places to live.6 In addition, the increasing numbers of 
malihini haoles moving to America’s tropical outpost were 
finding that land for living on was tightly held by the state 
itself or a handful of private owners.
Although it always seems to a newcomer that Hawaii has 
vast expanses of available land for any purpose, a large part
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of it is unsatisfactory for either farming or building. More 
than half of Oahu’s surface is too steep for residential con­
struction; only about 10 percent of the state’s land is truly 
arable. And the best land for farmers to till is also the easiest 
for developers to build on. As population continued to in­
crease, it was clear that one of the two uses had to give way 
to the other. As Thomas P. Gill, a leader of progressive 
forces in the legislature, said during the 1961 session, the 
land problems in Hawaii were shortage and monopoly.7
Thus Hawaii was caught on the horns of a dilemma that 
was not unique to the islands but seemed sharper there than 
elsewhere. More land was needed for urban development, 
particularly housing, and yet there were strong reasons for 
keeping the plantations and other open spaces intact. The 
economy of the state, it seemed, was still largely dependent 
on sugar and pine,8 and most landowners had no desire to 
break up their holdings until other uses could be proved 
more profitable. Land control legislation, in this situation, 
took two directions: toward broadening of land ownership, 
ostensibly to make more housing construction possible; to­
ward maintaining the plantation holdings in order to protect 
agricultural land from urban expansion. These two aims 
presented a dichotomy that has never been resolved.9
With these cross-purposes, land became a major political 
issue. The legislatures of the last years of the territory and 
the early years of statehood were so deeply concerned with 
land that its problems cut “ to the very core of Hawaii’s 
polity . . . connected in one way or another with virtually 
every major political issue on the Islands,” as one observer 
noted.10 To some the political differences seemed primarily 
a divergence on party lines: a stand of the Republicans— 
strongest in the Senate—still favoring the concentration of 
power (and of land ownership) that had characterized Hawai­
ian society for many decades versus a position of the Demo­
crats—dominant, now, in the House—leaning toward a more 
egalitarian division of resources and a more democratic 
participation in the benefits of island life (including land
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tenure)." Legislative debates during the 1950s and 1960s 
indicated such a distinction between “ conservative” and 
“ liberal” party policies. Indeed, some of the Young Turk 
Democrats were seriously concerned with the social aspects 
of better-distributed land ownership and better-provided 
home ownership, and many of the die-hard Republicans still 
spoke in patrician terms. The basic political struggle, how­
ever, was between the (weakening) hold of plantation agricul­
ture on the economy and the (increasing) strength of the 
forces of urban development—-and this issue often cut across 
party lines.
The stakes were high in these conflicts; both the power 
that accrues to land ownership and the profits that land uses 
can bring were at issue. Political figures found it difficult to 
be objective. As the earlier territorial legislatures had in­
cluded many members who were involved in plantation agri­
culture, now a large number at both state and county levels 
were interested, one way or another, with development and 
construction.
As singleness of land use was under attack, so was cen­
trality of land ownership. Four estates owned a third of 
Oahu; less than a hundred owners held half of all Hawaii’s 
land, and 40 percent more was in government hands. A 
number of legislative moves made at that time were directed 
toward greater distribution of land ownership. Governor 
Quinn had a program, proudly labeled the Second Mahele, 
which proposed selling 145,000 acres of state land, for 
private housing construction, at $50 an acre.12 Some called it 
the Great Hoax, pointing out that much of the land involved 
was leased to plantations and much of the rest was unsuit­
able for house construction. The Democrats favored further 
changes in taxation of privately held land, changes intended 
to penalize owners who were keeping off the market land 
considered essential for housing.13 Legislation to raise taxes 
on such “ nonproductive” property was offered in various 
forms during the 1959 and 1960 legislatures.
The first state legislature, in 1961, saw the most intense
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partisan struggle over this type of legislation, Senate and 
House producing different versions of a land/tax reform 
bill.14 A conference committee tried to resolve differences 
through three time extensions of the session made by the gov­
ernor, but they failed. In succeeding years, as the Democrat 
majority grew larger, further bills intending to break up the 
large holdings were passed, but they had small effect. Some 
estate lands were made available as fee-simple house sites and 
a great deal more were opened up as leaseholds. In the main, 
however, the large landowners have succeeded in keeping 
their land intact while that is to their advantage, letting it go 
in increments as land values have increased.15
All these moves, whether Democrat or Republican, had the 
basic intention of forcing land development—the endeavor 
that seemed most desirable in that period of expansion. 
Republican Governor Quinn, urging his Second Mahele on 
the 1961 legislature, argued that selling state land would be 
“ sometimes the only way to attract developers.” 16 Demo­
cratic representative David McClung introduced a bill for a 
double-taxation system on private land (the so-called Pitts­
burgh law, where land is assessed at a higher value than 
buildings on it)—intending it, he explained, to “ give a tax 
break” to the most highly developed land.17 Soon after this 
system became law in Hawaii, it was apparent that there was 
no need to attract developers. The problem might now be to 
restrain them, and in 1977 the state legislature repealed the 
proviso.
Moves to Manage the Land
The other kind of land legislation that Hawaii enacted during 
this transitional period had to do with the ways land was 
used rather than who owned it. Land use management at the 
state level was a new concept at that time. It obviously 
required analysis of the most appropriate (not necessarily the 
economic highest and best) uses for specific land areas. It 
needed careful land use planning, in short. Planning of this
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kind had been recommended by a firm of planners, Harland 
Bartholomew & Associates, in 1957, in a study sponsored by 
both government and private land-owners.18 The firm’s 
report urged that data be gathered from the federal Soil Con­
servation Service and other sources for preparation of a 
territory-wide land use plan. That same year a Land Study 
Bureau was established, to be operated by the University of 
Hawaii, to classify all lands in the territory by scientific 
methods; an act was passed that extended and regulated land 
uses in the forest and water reserves; the island-counties were 
mandated to prepare long-range land use plans; and a Terri­
torial Planning Office was set up and assigned the task of 
preparing a general plan to guide physical and economic 
growth.19
The general plan was completed as Hawaii became a state, 
the first such statewide plan in the nation. It was a remark­
ably forthright, laudably progressive document, with the 
great flaw that most general plans have: it lacked any poten­
tial of implementation. One important recommendation in 
the body of its text was, however, carried out—a proposal 
that the legislature devise and adopt land-use and land-classi­
fication legislation with the teeth the general plan lacked.
The lawmakers acted on this recommendation in the 1961 
legislative session, and Hawaii became the first state in the 
nation to legislate land use management on a broad basis.
Act 187 of 1961, which became known as the State Land 
Use Law, established a Land Use Commission, to be 
appointed by the governor, with the primary function of 
districting and classifying all lands in Hawaii in three 
categories: conservation, urban, and agriculture (a fourth 
category, rural, was added several years later but has been 
little used). The law required that after all lands had been so 
classified—zoned, in effect—classifications and regulations be 
reviewed “ comprehensively” every five years. It empowered 
the commission, moreover, to act on applications for changes 
in classifications (district boundaries, in the law’s terminol­
ogy) at any time it saw fit between reviews. The law also
revised methods of appraisal for taxation purposes, incorpo­
rating elements of the Pittsburgh plan, and provided for 
dedication of land to agricultural purposes for tax benefits.20
Hawaii’s people, even its legislators, did not seem to recog­
nize at the time the importance of the law that had been 
passed.21 During the busy 1961 session, Honolulu’s two 
newspapers scarcely noticed its passage. A study of the 
politics of land in that session, published by two intelligent 
observers, concentrated on the land ownership bills and vir­
tually ignored the passage of Act 187. The Democrats seemed 
content to let Governor Quinn take credit for the “ greenbelt 
bill,” as it was first called, and to explain its purpose as ‘‘a 
pioneering step in the effort to achieve logical and orderly 
urban growth.” 22
It is difficult to understand how this advanced land-use 
legislation, almost a decade ahead of its time, found its way 
through a legislature so tangled in the politics of land owner­
ship. One of its promoters insists that few people, including 
most legislators, understood its intent. Introduced by a 
coterie of the “ revolutionary” Democrats as “ A Bill for an 
Act Relating to the Zoning Powers of the State” and looked 
on by many simply as a means of putting Pittsburgh-law 
principles into effect, it was referred first to the Committee 
on County and Municipal Affairs and only later to the Com­
mittee on Lands. After three readings it passed, along with a 
number of other bills, at 2:53 a .m . on the ninetieth day of a 
session intended to last sixty days. The vote was 27-22, with 
the ayes including 26 Democrats and 1 Republican and the 
nays comprised of 16 Republicans and 6 Democrats.
Partisan politics continued to cloud any lofty purposes the 
law had. When the first commission, appointed by Repub­
lican Governor Quinn, began the process of land use clas­
sification, it was quickly “ fired” (nonconfirmed) by the 
Democratic legislature.23 This commission and a second one 
appointed by Quinn antagonized those who were protecting 
planned developments that might be hurt in the zoning pro­
cess, and it was not until Democrat Burns was elected gover­
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nor that the first working commission began its appointed 
tasks. At first temporary land-use boundaries were set up by 
the commission’s staff, and in 1963 Harland Bartholomew & 
Associates, with planner Donald Wolbrink as local partner, 
was commissioned to recommend boundaries of permanent 
land-use districts.24 The zones were delineated by a combina­
tion of pragmatic observations and decisions and by what 
scientific analyses could be made quickly from existing data. 
By definition of the law, Urban districts were “ areas charac­
terized by city-like concentrations,” and when these had been 
determined they were increased to accommodate an estimated 
1980 population. Agriculture districts were formed from 
lands already being farmed and grazed and lands which the 
university’s Land Study Bureau had classified as arable. Con­
servation districts included the forest reserves that had 
previously been set up, with additions and modifications (to 
guard against flood and erosion, for instance). It was recog­
nized that revisions would be necessary for some time “ to 
provide the opportunity for adjustments . . . which necessity 
may demonstrate” —an accession which has provided 
welcome excuses for affected landowners to request changes 
for years to come.
Although land questions had become political issues before 
passage of the Land Use Law, a new, nastier kind of land 
politics now was invited. For the first time in Hawaii’s 
history, an attempt was being made to regulate by law the 
uses to which land could be put. When a government adopts 
regulatory policies, it stimulates those whose activities are be­
ing regulated to find ways to control the decisions that are 
made, no matter what amount of intrigue that might entail. 
Inevitably, in this case, those whose business was develop­
ment of land or speculation in land would try to influence 
the commission’s decisions.
The commission’s record of objectivity has been far from 
unblemished, although the net effect of the law has un­
doubtedly been to constrain, if not, as one consultant firm 
noted, to “ minimize” the amount of “ new lands converted
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to Urban zoning on Oahu.” 25 It protected prime agricultural 
land to a considerable extent in the first decade of its opera­
tion and restrained land speculation somewhat for a while. 
There was a drop from 2,000 open-space acres shifted to 
urban uses in the four years before passage of the law to 
1,600 in the first four years afterward—but then applications 
for rezoning to the Urban category zoomed up to an annual 
rate of more than 1,200 acres.
The law gave to the commission—a politically appointed, 
nonprofessional body—very broad regulatory powers. There 
were no policy guidelines to follow.26 The original land 
classification and the two five-year reviews that have been 
held were made by professional planners who had to set cer­
tain policy criteria for themselves and their clients; but the 
free hand allowed the commission for boundary revisions at 
any time between reviews inevitably invited political persua­
sion.27 Except in very broad terms, the original legislation set 
no goals or objectives; it simply established procedural func­
tions. Not until 1977, sixteen years later, was an attempt 
made to establish policy guidelines.
In these circumstances different understandings of the 
intent of the law were embraced by conservation and 
proagricultural groups of citizens on the one hand and by 
prodevelopment groups on the other. The commission was 
left to choose between them. Generally speaking, decisions to 
release land to the speculative market as a commodity, pre­
sumably for ultimate development, have been more reward­
ing and less costly in a political sense than decisions to 
conserve land as open space. Hence many reclassifications 
from Agriculture and even Conservation to Urban have been 
made, decisions which not only reduced the amount of 
agricultural land but often destroyed important scenic and 
recreational areas.28
Although the zone recommendations made by Bartholo­
mew were not unduly “ affected nor influenced by property 
ownership” or “ specific plans for development,” the com­
mission’s decisions “ were contrary to [their] recommenda­
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tions in a few instances” in the original border-setting, the 
planners noted. Almost immediately after that job of land 
classification was completed the commission was faced with 
an important and difficult decision. Oceanic Properties, the 
development arm of Castle & Cooke, had for some years 
been making plans to develop a large community of homes 
on the upper-central Oahu plains at Waipio, just below the 
old plantation town of Wahiawa. The proposal had attracted 
much attention and no little controversy when it was first 
advanced in 1960, a year before the Land Use Law was 
passed. A ‘‘new town” was planned (well planned, in fact, 
by an experienced mainland group) on two thousand acres of 
land—this community, it was promised, would provide 
homes costing only $15,000 and would include all the other 
essential urban appurtenances: recreation, education, even 
employment. All this was to be on land which the commis­
sion zoned, in its first classification Agriculture, since it was 
arable plantation land. To his discomfiture, the developer- 
landowner had to take his proposal to the Land Use 
Commission, when that body was set up, and apply for 
reclassification of the land. At the first go-round the com­
mission members, five to three, disapproved the application. 
One member, Robert Wenkam, a conservationist photo­
grapher and writer, argued against the petition long and, it 
seemed, successfully. If this change in use should be granted, 
he said, it would be ‘‘only the beginning,” would ‘‘open the 
gates,” would in fact ‘‘make the Land Use Law meaning­
less.” 29 Nevertheless, after there had been time for suasion 
and reconsideration, the commission reversed its decision and 
granted the reclassification, by a vote of six to two, of some 
seven hundred acres.30
As this development has grown through the years (by 1977, 
1,435 acres had been granted on six approved petitions), it 
has provided attractive homes for many of Hawaii’s upper- 
middle-class citizens; but the promise of $15,000 homes has 
of course never been fulfilled, and the industries which were 
to provide local employment have never appeared. Mililani
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New Town, as it is now known, is a huge bedroom commu­
nity whose residents must travel on clogged highways to their 
work and entertainments elsewhere. The Land Use Commis­
sioners had concluded arbitrarily that the most appropriate 
use of a large part of Oahu’s plains, which they themselves 
had just decided should remain as agricultural land, became, 
when a developer asked for it, a site for suburban home 
building. The commission had set its own policy guidelines.
The commission has indicated through its life how impossi­
ble it is in contemporary Hawaii for a public agency to be 
objective about land use questions: its members are almost 
certain to be biased, if not involved personally in activities 
connected with the land. Conflicts of interest have been 
charged against four Land Use Commission members. When 
Shiro Nishimura of Kauai was appointed to the commission 
in 1963, he boasted that he now would be able to “ get things 
done.” One thing he did accomplish, in 1969, was to form a 
hui which bought 136 acres of land on his home island for 
$325,000, land which the commission rezoned to urban uses 
later that year and was sold, then, for $900,000. Governor 
Burns had to ask Nishimura to resign under these circum­
stances, which he did “ for reasons of ill health.” Commis­
sioner Wilbert Choi, a landscape gardener, participated in a 
vote which made possible his continuing use of land on Oahu 
as a nursery. Commissioner C. E. S. Burns voted on a 
number of occasions when firms with which he was con­
nected were involved (as an instance, on lands at Lahaina 
and Kaanapali owned by American Factors, of which he was 
a vice-president), as did Commissioner Alex Napier (voting 
to rezone lands of the Kahua Ranch on the Big Island, of 
which he was an officer).
In 1960, the attorney general of the state was asked by 
Governor Burns to investigate these incidents. His report 
“pulled no punches,” as a newspaper story said, in labeling 
many actions of these commissioners as instances of “ con­
flict of interest.” 31 It did, however, draw back from consid­
ering them criminal wrongdoing, even though it noted that
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some of the votes in question had been “ critical,” in the 
sense that the rezoning request would have been denied with­
out them. In any event, no action was taken as a result of 
the inquiry.
On the original commission, Robert Wenkam continued to 
be an obstreperous member. He voted, for instance, against 
rezoning land that would have permitted a cluster home 
development on Pacific Heights in which some political 
figures were reputedly involved. He failed to receive recon­
firmation of his appointment in 1966: his name was held in 
committee in the Senate until it was too late to go before the 
floor.32 Later appointees were more willing to bend with the 
varying winds that swayed Hawaii’s land use decisions in the 
1960s and into the 1970s. In August 1969, Eddie Tangen, an 
ILWU executive officer, was appointed to the commission by 
the governor. Tangen quickly became the strong voice on the 
commission, and before long he was made its vice-chairman 
and then its chairman, serving until 1977. From time to time 
he too was accused of voting with a conflict of interest in the 
outcome.33 The ILWU (sometimes working for continued 
agricultural jobs and sometimes for additional hotel employ­
ment) could undoubtedly benefit by having one of its top 
executives in a land-use decision-making position. In 1973 the 
State Ethics Commission cited Tangen for unethical prac­
tices, but a court ruled that the charges were unfounded, 
since it would be unfair “ to leave agricultural workers 
voiceless while the lands on which they work are being swept 
out from under them.” The good judge, in his eloquence, 
forgot or ignored the fact that Tangen could vote to sweep 
land in either direction that he and ILWU chose, toward 
farming or toward development.
In 1968 the first review of land use classifications was 
made. Professional consultants (Eckbo, Dean, Austin & Wil­
liams) did a thorough, analytical job: their report included 
recommendations for a number of changes in the law’s 
operation that would have tightened up procedures and 
defined more closely the commission’s duties, but none were
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adopted. On the contrary, early in the 1970 legislative session 
a bill was introduced (known to many, irreverently, as the 
God Bill) that would have broadened the commission’s 
powers to an alarming extent.34 It was not passed nor yet 
rejected; it was simply allowed to lie quiet for the time.
The effect of Hawaii’s Land Use Law, once studied as pro­
totype legislation by other states, is now widely questioned.
In judging “ effectiveness” of this legislation, however, the 
changes that have taken place in value judgments of land use 
must be remembered. Even in economic terms the impulses 
for land preservation have changed sharply in the past de­
cade. “ New concepts of land-use management are emerging 
with the current awakening of ecological principles and the 
realization that land is a finite resource,” notes a 1975 
publication of the Council of State Governments.35 The pur­
pose of the Land Use Law of 1961 was set forth in its pre­
amble: “ Inadequate controls have caused many of Hawaii’s 
limited and valuable lands to be used for purposes that may 
have a short-term gain to a few but result in a long-term loss 
to the income and growth potential of our economy.” 36 
There were other phrases about “ uses best suited for the 
public welfare,” but the key words are “ loss to the income 
and growth potential of our economy.” There is nothing 
about the contribution of nonurban spaces to the unique 
physical quality of Hawaii, about their scenic, aesthetic 
worth or their recreative value—and certainly not a word 
about the environmental harm that accelerating loss of green 
open land would bring. If goals had been set to guide the 
commission in 1961, they likely would have been ambivalent 
then and unsatisfactory today.
The plantations devoted to the production of sugarcane 
and pineapple, limited as the basic agricultural importance of 
those crops is, had constituted an “ i ndus t ry tha t  by its 
nature had kept vast expanses of Hawaii’s lands open. When 
the economy changed and urban development of those lands 
became, in commercial terms, their highest and best use, 
there might well be “ loss to the income” of the state in try­
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ing to keep them open. The premises on which the landmark 
law had been drawn had changed by the 1970s; in a way, the 
law itself was out of date. Land use legislation by then had 
other bases, some social and environmental, some built 
around totally different economic understandings than had 
prevailed in the early years of Hawaii’s statehood.
Hawaii’s 1961 Land Use Law is generally considered a 
strong forward move in land management legislation: an ad­
vance action in “ the quiet revolution” in land use controls.37 
In another sense, though, it must be thought of as a last- 
ditch effort to protect agriculture as a commercial enterprise. 
In Hawaii, that meant protection of the grip that sugar-and- 
pine agriculture had so long held on the islands’ economy, 
whether the plantation landowners still wanted it or not. The 
sponsors of House Bill 1279, which became Act 187, consid­
ered it an important step in the succession of land planning 
measures that had begun in 1957; they were anxious to keep 
farmlands green in land use plans, which is what the label 
“greenbelt” meant to imply. The plantation landowners did 
not originate or support the legislation, but neither did they 
actively oppose it. For some years after the law’s passage, 
they were pleased to benefit from its taxation provisions. 
After all, when they were ready they could apply for reclassi­
fication with reasonable assurance of success. Efforts in the 
legislature to “ repeal” Act 187, for several years after its 
passage, were instigated by land developers, not agricultural 
landowners.38
The Surge in Population
The pressures for urbanization of additional land were not 
based on unfounded speculation alone but resulted from a 
tremendous surge in urban population, along with the 
expanding economy, in the early years of statehood. 
Hawaii’s population, after a long period of near stability, 
had begun rising on a steep path at the turn of the century. 
The number of residents was about 150,000 in 1900, having
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risen from some 85,000 in 1850; but in the next half century, 
by 1950, it had increased to approximately 500,000. That 
growth total, accounted for largely by importation of planta­
tion workers, had enlarged to more than 750,000 people by 
the time of the 1970 census, a 50 percent rise in two decades 
produced by a very different kind of immigrant, mostly from 
the mainland United States.
Much of the population increase during that period was on 
Oahu and a large part of that in the previously rural areas 
outside Honolulu proper. The Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian 
percentage had dropped, as had the Japanese-descended pro­
portion, while the Caucasian share of the populace rose from 
25 to 40 percent. For a number of postwar years the neigh­
boring islands lost permanent residents and Oahu gained 
them sharply, as plantation workers moved to city jobs in the 
changing economy.39
While the major urban centers on the other islands grew in 
size, rather slowly, the City and County of Honolulu (en­
compassing the entire island of Oahu) spread out further into 
new suburbs as it also increased in height and density in its 
older sections. Urban tentacles stretched along the coast to 
Makapuu Point at the island’s eastern end and crept around 
to the windward side. Along these extensions nodules grew: 
Kahala, an area of former pig farms just beyond Diamond 
Head, had already become a fashionable suburb; Henry 
Kaiser, leasing Bishop Estate land, began development of a 
huge master-planned project at Koko Head, known as 
Hawaii Kai; in between, middle-class American-type tract 
houses surged up the valleys as far as safely buildable land 
allowed, and sometimes further; at Kaneohe and Kailua, 
around the eastern point, suburban growth was so rapid that 
two highways were built across the Koolaus to serve them 
and a third to be called H3, was planned.40
In the other direction, the civilian military activities at 
Pearl Harbor and various other defense installations in that 
area pulled population that spawned suburbs at Aiea, Pearl 
City, and Waipahu. A light industrial park development at
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Barbers Point by the Campbell Estate drew more people 
westward, and Castle & Cooke proceeded rapidly to build 
Mililani Town. In most cases the State Land Use Commis­
sion and the counties’ planning commissions and councils 
obligingly reclassified and rezoned these lands from agricul­
tural to urban use as they were requested by landowners and 
developers.
In Honolulu itself the growth was upward. While some 
enclaves remained much as they had been in the previous 
period—-the early settlement called Kaimuki, once the end of 
the streetcar line; the haphazard small-business stretch adja­
cent to downtown known as Kakaako; the old residential 
areas of Kalihi and Palama on the other side of midtown 
(once admired by Mark Twain as the prettiest part of town, 
destined later to become a Model Cities poverty area)—and 
while downtown itself remained for some time a sleepy back­
drop for the harbor, other parts of the inner city boomed.
The Dillinghams, for instance, used a stretch of reclaimed 
swampland called Ala Moana, just on the downtown side 
of Waikiki, to build one of the world’s largest and most 
successful shopping centers in 1959. The first high-rise 
apartment house appeared in Waikiki in 1954, and in 1961 
mainland architect Minoru Yamasaki designed a handsome 
apartment cluster, the Queen Emma Gardens, near down­
town. By the early 1960s the city was losing its moderately 
low, reasonably uncrowded look and starting on the road to 
metropolitan densities. The condominium ownership tech­
nique became popular even on leasehold land, where in the 
long run no one except the original trust could own anything. 
High-rise apartments began to appear in unlikely, scattered 
places, since the city’s zoning map had ignored visual consid­
erations. Valuable sight lines and view planes were lost as 
tall, often bulky, generally unrelated structures were b u ilt-  
up the sides of Punchbowl, into Nuuanu Valley, back of 
Waikiki, on the close-in slopes of lower Makiki Heights, at 
the base of Diamond Head, in Kahala, and of course as part 
of the burgeoning Hawaii Kai environs.
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Downtown developed in the late 1960s as an office center 
rather than a commercial core, and high-rise office buildings 
joined the new apartments to mold the three-dimensional 
character of Honolulu toward mainland models. In Waikiki 
the change was rapid from a restful retreat for visitors in a 
few hotels to a bustling center of tourist-shuffling activities. 
Kamaainas shuddered and remembered Waikiki’s old days; 
hordes of happy travelers filled its new rooms as quickly as 
they could be built; the tourist “ industry” could not have 
been more contented. Regular air service had boosted the 
early trickle of vacationers and sightseers to a steady stream 
in the first part of the century, and the first jet planes that 
flew between Hawaii and the U.S. mainland in 1959 opened 
the floodgates. In the 1950s there were fewer than 100,000 
visitors annually; by 1976 that figure had grown to 3 million. 
Such an influx demanded space accommodations, of course, 
and the approximately 1,000 hotel rooms that had been 
available after the war (an astronomical figure that had 
seemed at the time) jumped to over 40,000 in 1976. And 
more continued to be built.41
Waikiki’s phenomenon was based on high-density land use, 
but elsewhere the new hotels and resort complexes spread out 
over miles of the most attractive oceanfront land. Much of 
the agricultural and conservation land that was changed to 
“urban” uses by the Land Use Commission, to be adminis­
tered by the counties, was developed to attract tourist 
visitors, not to satisfy needs of the local population. As 
physical development increased in the towns and resort areas, 
and especially as Honolulu grew to metropolitan magnitude, 
building design and city planning arrangements should have 
become important considerations, but in these respects the 
urban quality worsened in the 1960s and 1970s. Outside Ho­
nolulu, some of the earlier unsophisticated charm remained. 
In a few places (Lahaina on Maui, for instance) it was re­
tained consciously through preservation; elsewhere it became, 
in time, haphazardly mixed with the new construction.
In Honolulu the trend was toward mainland big-city
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modernism—without benefit of the creative talents that 
megalopolitan architecture needs in order to have form and 
visual organization. Many island youths studied architecture 
in mainland schools and some returned to the islands con­
verted to new design fancies. Mainland architects founded 
practices in Hawaii in some numbers, either permanently or 
to establish outpost offices to capture local commissions. 
Few, of either local or off-island origin, succeeded in design­
ing anything in Hawaii that seemed to belong in Hawaii. In 
the way it used its central-city land, Honolulu, which could 
have had its own colorful tropical character, matured as 
carelessly and as drearily as any other American metropolis.
As the 1970s became Hawaii’s present reality, with the 
postwar expansion years of the AOs, ’50s, and ’60s now left 
behind as part of the islands’ past history and the 1980s 
looming as the start of a problematic future, it was clear that 
once more in Hawaii “ an era had come to its end.” That 
was the phrase used in the state legislature’s 1974 session as 
retiring Governor Burns, aging and ill but still an erect and 
distinguished figure, made a farewell address. Several of the 
House and Senate members who had sat there since the 1954 
political revolution also said good-bye.
Already there were restive signs of opposition to the 
unrestrained growth which had marked the era. But there 
were also indications that any such movement would meet 
strong counteraction. In April 1974, a heated hearing that 
lasted fifteen hours during two days brought out advocates 
and opponents of the proposed third freeway—up a third 
green valley rich with early Hawaiian artifacts, across land 
classified as conservation—to provide a new link that every­
one knew would encourage further development on the wind­
ward Oahu coast.
One of the speakers was Luka Nalui, representing a Ha­
waiian and part-Hawaiian community in Kahaluu near the 
windward end of the intended highway. She was head of a 
group that called itself Hui Malama ‘Aina O Ko‘olau (Those 
Who Care for the Windward Lands), some of whom lived on
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kuleanas their families had held since the Great Mahele. She 
feared, in a voice moved with emotion, that another remain­
der of the old Hawaiian life on the land would be lost to 
more high-priced suburbs.
But David McClung, then president of the State Senate (a 
native of Michigan who had joined the resurgent Democrats 
in Hawaii and been admitted to the local bar in 1957) and 
later a losing candidate for the governor’s office, testified in 
favor of the freeway. McClung spoke with a different kind 
of emotion. If the construction’s opponents were so worried 
about Hawaii’s population growth, he said, “ they should 
help solve the problem by resigning from the human race and 
allow the rest of us more room to breathe.” 42 While this may 
have been an exaggerated comment on the polarities that ex­
isted, there were clearly sharp differences between values that 
motivated Hawaii’s people as the postwar decade drew to a 




AS Hawaii prepared to enter a new era in its history the peo­
ple were torn between two opposing desires. One was a wish 
to save as much as possible from a past that was remembered 
with fond nostalgia; the other was a hope to gain as much as 
possible from a future that promised unparalleled prosperity. 
Hawaii’s old customs and their settings were still revered in 
memory while Hawaii’s new activities and the environments 
they needed were replacing them in fact. When the islands 
officially joined the New World as an American state they 
carried with them many memories and much material from 
their past. A nagging problem has been what to do with this 
cargo: how to save much of the old without having it inter­
fere with the new.
The past that Hawaii’s people recall is as oddly mixed as 
their origins. To those of Hawaiian descent, it is the Polyne­
sian time that is revered and the monarchy period that is 
remembered with pride. Many kamaainas have recollections 
of a more recent patriarchal time. One charming elderly lady, 
an ardent conservationist, reminisced in a talk to a gathering 
at the Honolulu Academy of Arts about the rice fields that 
once lay close to the city’s heart, where Chinese plowed with
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slow-moving water buffalos. She recalled this stage in the 
movement of the Chinese Hawaiians away from contracted 
labor on the plantations as a “ picturesque” time that pro­
vided “ amusing sights” to her and her haole friends as they 
rode by in their carriages.'
The aspect of preservation that has caused most soul- 
searching is the presence, in sizable amount, of early 
Hawaiian artifacts. Heiaus, house platforms, various walls, 
rock slides and other sport places, salt production ponds, 
remnants of wells, petroglyphs, burial caves pocking the 
hillsides—these and other remains of different times and 
diverse types, in varying conditions, can still be easily 
seen on all the islands if one wants to look for them. The 
watchful wanderer can even pick up smooth game stones, poi 
pounders, and such small relics. Without a preservation 
program, of course, these things are as easily lost as they are 
found.
Some parts of the islands, not yet exploited because of 
their inaccessibility, have changed little over the years. The 
route taken by the missionary Reverend William Ellis in an 
exploratory trek around the Big Island in 1824 was followed 
in 1973, in a reminiscent reenaction, by a group which the 
descendant of another missionary family, Thurston Twigg- 
Srnith, headed. The assemblage included journalist Robert 
Krauss, who wrote an account of the trip, as Ellis had done 
150 years earlier. These two described many places and ob­
jects, even people and their life-styles, in remarkably similar 
terms.2
On the other hand, where modernism has intruded there 
has been a distressing deterioration of artifactual history. 
Even Ellis’ journal of his trip, written soon after the death 
of Kamehameha I, reported neglect of earlier structures. At 
Kukaniloko on Oahu stand old Hawaiian “ birth stones” 
where royal mothers bore those destined to be alii—dating, 
one authority believes, from the twelfth century. Today, beer 
cans and broken bottles are cleaned up periodically from the 
site by members of a local Hawaiian Civic Club.3 On the
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island of Hawaii a landowner concerned with Hawaiian his­
tory keeps as her own secret the existence of burial caves on 
her property. She is afraid of pilfering.
The presence of artifacts cannot generally be ignored or 
concealed like that, however. They are so common that they 
become a nuisance to development activities, and there is 
constant conflict between the temptation to bulldoze ahead 
regardless of what aboriginal remains might be destroyed and 
the restraints of conscience or, in some cases, of law. Legis­
lation does require field inspection before the construction of 
highways and certain other public works so that archaeolo­
gists may try to save any found objects. Moreover, environ­
mental impact statements assessing potential harm to historic 
spots are called for under certain circumstances. What 
happens after that, though, is problematical. The Bishop 
Museum, institutional guardian of Hawaiian history, has a 
staff capable of identifying and evaluating items that might 
be located, and'they continuously catalog classified material. 
Sometimes this information is requested and is gratefully 
received before development goes ahead; at other times it is 
deprecated or ignored. Even public agencies anxious to pro­
ceed with pet projects are impatient with the need for preser­
vation; the State Department of Transportation has worked 
very hard to refute the testimony of archaeological experts 
about the worth of historic places and things that stood in 
the way of the projected H3 freeway in Moanalua Valley.4
Some few important heiaus and petroglyph sites are pro­
tected and maintained by county, state, and federal govern­
ment, but capital acquisition costs and maintenance and 
operating expenses force such projects to low-priority posi­
tions in public works budgets. The outstanding historic con­
servation in Hawaii is the City of Refuge National Historic 
Park at Honauna on the south Kona coast of the Big 
Island—which includes the restoration of a heiau built by 
Keawe, ruling chief of the area several generations before 
Kamehameha’s ascendancy, and expert reproduction of a 
number of other structures. It provides not only an illustra-
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tion of the worth of such an effort but also an example of 
the great cost involved, the need for professional control if 
inaccuracies and superficialities are to be avoided, and the 
risks of vandalism even when supervision is careful and 
constant.
Tourism in Hawaii should be a potential force for preser­
vation of artifacts, since it provides a commercial reason for 
keeping them available and visible. Unfortunately the visitor 
industry has not worked well as a guardian of history. The 
restoration it has sponsored or tried to accomplish itself has 
seldom been scholarly or thorough and the maintenance it 
provides tends to be careless.5
The likelihood of a full program of conservation of 
artifacts in situ that would be satisfactory to historians, 
archaeologists, and serious conservationists seems dim. The 
scope of the job is too great, costs are too high, official 
interest is too low. The historic sites branch of the Division 
of State Parks was mandated in 1969 to prepare such a pro­
gram, but one of the nine professionals who resigned from 
the activity by 1975 said that it was impossible to work “ in 
an atmosphere of distrust, lack of communication, misunder­
standing and annual threat of no funds, no jobs.” 6 In 1975 
the state legislature adopted an Environmental Policy Act 
which bespoke a vague aim to “ reserve scenic, historic, 
cultural parks and recreational areas . . .  for public recrea­
tional, educational and scientific uses” —without explaining 
what those words meant or voting any funds to implement 
them. An Environmental Quality Commission with no real 
powers was also established.
The difficulty is a basic problem of value conflicts. To 
preserve physical history, the land on which that history was 
made and on which its artifacts remain would also have to be 
preserved. In too many cases that would obviously interfere 
with development.
Hawaii has also had its problems with preservation of 
worthwhile structures from periods later than Polynesian 
times. Like mainland America, the state has been wasteful
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with its buildings, following the habit of tearing down in a 
few decades most of the urban construction that was earlier 
built at great cost and sometimes with great care. But in 
Hawaii the term “ historic buildings” has somewhat different 
connotations than in mainland America and other western 
countries. For one thing, the time span is unique: anything 
built before 1900 is an aboriginal artifact; on the other hand, 
structures put up as late as the 1820s are considered histori­
cally significant.7 Hence it is not easy for a conservationist to 
use conventional criteria in deciding what to keep and what 
to let go. Iolani Palace has undergone extensive and expen­
sive restoration in recent times, not by reason of its design 
excellence (it is “ pleasant, make-believe architecture,” 8 says 
its restoration architect) but because it is the only royal 
palace in the United States of America. It is easy to sym­
pathize with bewildered lawmakers. During a crowded public 
hearing on a proposed city ordinance that would designate 
the capitol environs a historic-cultural-scenic district with 
special protective zoning, a councilman admitted his puzzle­
ment to a community leader who was testifying. “ It doesn’t 
seem to me,” he said, “ that any of these buildings you want 
to preserve are old enough to be ‘historic’.” The witness 
agreed, but he added: “ If we don’t leave them there long 
enough to get old, they never will be historic.” 9
If there were contentions about saving the individual ob­
jects that covered the land with some evidence of historical 
continuity, they were small compared to the disaccord over 
preserving communities of people living in traditional and 
ethnically different ways. New developments must often de­
stroy places where those older life-styles still exist, and the 
people living in them are seriously hurt—even though the 
land, by contemporary values, may be “ improved.” 
Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians still furnish the most tragic 
instances of the destruction of earlier social and physical 
environments. Inevitably the Hawaiian population and the 
Hawaiian culture have become pocketed in the more remote 
parts of the islands where western man and his mores have
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not yet deeply penetrated. Into the 1960s and 1970s it was 
still possible for students of the Polynesian culture system to 
find viable remnants in places like Kau on the Big Island, 
Waihei on Maui, Koolau Loa on Oahu—and the island of 
Niihau, where the land’s owners, the kamaaina Robinson 
family, will allow no non-Hawaiians, even as visitors. No 
program for continued preservation of this culture is even be-, 
ing considered, however. Only the more visible and audible 
parts of the struggle to maintain a special Hawaiian kind of 
life on the land are noticed—the people of Kahaluu, Waia- 
hole, and Waikane fighting highway construction and subdi­
vision development that would force them from kuleanas 
they dated back to the Great Mahele; the people of Niumalu 
on Kauai working to prevent development plans of a land 
estate (ironically, a trust benefiting wealthier Hawaiians) that 
would mark the end of their very old community; the pig 
farmers of Kalama Valley on Oahu forced out by Kaiser’s 
development on Bishop Estate land, moving to the Waianae 
coast to be turned away again by highway construction lead­
ing to Chinn H o’s Makaha resorts; the small farmers on the 
Kona coast of Hawaii losing their coffee lands to retirement 
home developments.10
When immigrants from other countries began leaving the 
plantation company towns to find new opportunities, they 
grouped for some time in ethnically defined neighborhoods.11 
The Japanese seemed more venturesome than most, and parts 
of their early communities remain on all the islands, some 
still with traces of their original quality. The Chinese tended 
to move near Honolulu’s harbor (although Chinatown, lo­
cated there, soon became ethnically mixed), but they founded 
enclaves on other islands too. Their wish was to be close 
enough to established towns to find patronage for their new 
businesses yet far enough out to grow rice or taro or raise 
ducks. Portuguese, Koreans, Puerto Ricans, and others at 
times formed their own neighborhoods, but before long most 
of them were absorbed into the large communities or towns. 
As in cities on the mainland, waves of low-paid immigrants
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followed and replaced one another; the Filipinos, for exam­
ple, took over large parts of Flonolulu’s Chinatown at one 
point and now Samoans are occupying many of the old 
buildings there.
As these neighborhoods lost much of their distinctive 
quality, the desire to maintain a life-style came to mean a 
wish to preserve a more rural and independent, less regi­
mented and replicated (and certainly less costly) life on the 
land than the new developments allowed. The struggle 
against change became a battle against new development per 
se—and the argument that special cultures were threatened 
was used as an understandable, and forgivable, pretext.
As an instance, attempts in 1973 by the Flonolulu Redevel­
opment Agency to make Chinatown’s in-town real estate 
more productive were opposed by local residents (abetted by 
sentimental conservationists) who had learned to use the 
cliche terms of “ preserving life-styles” and “ keeping the 
Flawaiian way of life” when they really, and reasonably, 
wanted a continuance of cheap residential and commercial 
rents. In its turn the agency promised, with tongue in cheek, 
to preserve the “ indigenous quality” of the area by pinpoint­
ing a few old buildings to be kept.12
Further muddling the confusion, malihinis bring with them 
to the islands other concepts of a “ Hawaiian life-style.” For 
the most part they want a life in Hawaii lived in single-family 
houses in single-family-house suburbs—just like the ones they 
occupied on the mainland, but with a lanai added. As more 
high-rise apartment houses and condominiums are built in 
the towns, the haoles (and the Orientals who follow them) 
are happy to find the same room arrangements they had in 
New York or Detroit or San Francisco, again with the out­
door appendage called now a lanai rather than a balcony.
To a certain extent, Hawaii is also ambivalent about pre­
servation of the indigenous biota that its lands support. Only 
to a certain extent, however, because there are few besides 
scholars and specialists who really care, or even know, very 
much about the meaning of that word which has become so
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widely adopted in the conservation movement: ecology. Even 
for scholars there are subtle distinctions, for there have been 
several Hawaiian ecological systems. There was an ecology of 
sorts before the Polynesians arrived, whatever hard scratch­
ing was needed for existence. This ecology, as we noted, was 
radically altered when new plants were taken to Hawaii from 
other Polynesian islands further south and altered again 
when the white man came.
Since then there have been constant shocks to Hawaii’s 
ecology; flora and fauna brought from many places through 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have continuously 
altered the balance that existed and destroyed species that 
were or had become locally adapted. Once there were a thou­
sand or more plant species and at least a hundred birds en­
demic to the islands—that is, to be found nowhere else—and 
many more that had become indigenous—fully at home 
there. If endemic species disappear, they are gone forever, of 
course; and Hawaii has lost many, forced out of existence by 
newly imported exotics.13
This deprivation has distressed scientists and naturalists 
and the conservation societies. The responsible state agencies 
have done their best to check it, but ordinary citizens in 
Hawaii give little sign of caring. Fishermen and pet collectors 
continue to deplete the reefs of their many-colored, multi­
shaped indigenous fish types, with only mild community con­
cern. At one time some colorful parrots were imported to the 
Diamond Head district and at another an attempt was made 
to introduce a beautiful Brazilian toucan. They seemed 
appropriate, handsome additions to the local landscape, and 
the fact that they would endanger the existence of certain 
endemic but not too attractive birds stirred little local con­
cern. The parrots stayed, but the State Board of Agriculture 
stood firm on forbidding the toucan. People who enjoy hunt­
ing as a sport have been trying for years to get permission, 
over the opposition of conservationist groups, to add axis 
deer to the quarry available on the Big Island (including feral 
goats and sheep). The state remains firm on this issue, too,
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since the import would be disastrous to much endemic plant 
material. The state even has plans to eliminate the goats and 
sheep in time, but no great popular support has been evi­
dent.14
Because all these nostalgias had to do with things that hap­
pened on and to Hawaii’s lands, they clearly focused on the 
ways those lands themselves were treated. In recent decades 
there has been a growing awareness of the effects of pollu­
tion from so much building for so many people: awareness 
of the physical spoilage of the land, sea, and air that truly 
formed the “ Hawaiian way of life.” It had seemed impossi­
ble through the decades that the quality of the land in this 
Pacific island paradise could ever be impaired. Its ownership 
might shift from one proprietor to another, its uses might 
change, restrictive legislation might even be required, as in 
the Land Use Law, to protect its economic value. But vast 
open spaces and wide beaches would always remain, it was 
believed, kept green by the periodic rains and blown fresh by 
the constant tradewinds.
Yet suddenly, inconceivably, unhappy changes began to 
take place, and toward the middle of the twentieth century 
they were becoming sharply visible. Ugly scars appeared on 
prominent hills, formed by construction crews who, to flatten 
the slopes, pushed around the soil that thinly covered the 
lava and left it there—no longer able to guide the rain’s 
runoffs but ready to erode and be carried along the valleys 
and into streams and estuaries and bays.15 Low-lying areas 
where people lived began to flood for the first time in their 
history. Sandy coves started to fill with murky drainage run­
ning down from new tracts built above them.16 The meaning 
of ecological systems was becoming clear by demonstration: 
Kaneohe Bay began to die, its coral reefs, which supported 
schools of particular fish, killed by sewage and construction 
wastes in the waters where the coral had lived.
At first only the serious-minded groups called in aspersion 
“ environmentalists” protested, but soon the tangible evi­
dences of spoilage of land and pollution of sea could no 
longer be ignored by anyone. Waikiki itself, key to visitor-
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industry income, found its beaches sometimes reaching 
dangerous bacterial-count levels. Incredibly, something 
approaching the nature of smog could be seen hovering over 
parts of the landscape; even the constant trade winds could 
not blow away all the increasing automobile emission. There 
was still reluctance to give the change its proper name. On a 
smoggy day in 1976 the Advertiser noted that “ lack of the 
normal trade winds caused smoke from the Ewa Plantation 
to move over the Pearl Harbor-Pearl City area in a blanket 
effect.” Nonetheless, protest over careless, harmful develop­
ment on the land began to widen. Old-line organizations that 
had politely urged “ beautification” of the environment over 
the years became almost belligerent over its salvation; new 
citizens groups were formed, some still reasonably respectful, 
others angrily activist.
When the story of public concern over pollution of the 
land is told about any place, however, one must always 
remember that only a minuscule segment of the citizenry is 
being described. Most of the people in Denver or Pittsburgh 
or Los Angeles or Honolulu are not concerned at all. Or else 
they are concerned only with the quality of their own im­
mediate environment. This has certainly been true in Hawaii. 
The residents of Hawaii Kai have protested development of 
the shore near Hawaii Kai; those living in Lanikai have 
stormed over development on Mount Olomana above Lani­
kai; people living near Salt Lake have banded together to 
oppose the filling in and development of Salt Lake. Very few 
of them have worried about one another’s troubles, and even 
fewer have thought about the long-term implications of the 
overall loss of open space on the islands. When one of Ralph 
Nader’s “ raiders” spent some time in Hawaii in the early 
1970s and wrote a reasonably accurate description of the 
increasing environmental pollution, which he broadcast to 
travel agencies on the mainland, the general popular reaction 
was that such defamation was most unfair to the beauties of 
the tropical isles—not that an alarm had been sounded and 
should be heeded.17
The state administration and the state legislature reacted in
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several ways to the increasing evidence of land spoilage and 
land loss and to more insistent prods from the environmen­
tally conscious (some of whom were managing to get them­
selves elected to Senate and House). Governor Burns’ 
response was to set up an Office of Environmental Quality 
Control within his own office. It was to have, however, only 
suasive powers, even though it was later bolstered by 
appointment of an advisory commission.18 The State Depart­
ment of Health developed a pollution control “ plan” with no 
force.19 The legislature’s answer was to establish commissions 
and appoint commission consultants to make studies of the 
problem. None of these moves committed anybody; nor did 
they stop anything. They were the discreet reactions of those 
pressured on two sides by a society divided between a love 
for what it saw it was losing and a yearning for what it 
hoped it might gain.
The Yes . . . But Syndrome
This conflict between an emotional tug backward and a prag­
matic pull forward not only results in many inconsistencies 
and absurdities: it also makes life in Hawaii a euphoric 
experience, lived in a sort of advertising-agency promotional 
atmosphere. Hawaii’s people are used to hearing a new con­
dominium in Hawaii Kai described in television commercials 
as being near “ gentle waterfalls” and “ secluded beaches,” 
when they know that the community is becoming daily more 
densely developed and heavily trafficked. The future is seen 
through amber-tinted glasses because the vision of sustained 
expansion looks better that way. There is a blind belief that 
soft breezes will continue to blow away most of growth’s 
fumes and rolling surf will still lap up its wastes. Unwilling 
to make a choice between conservation and expansion, the 
state and its people want to believe that a kind fate will 
somehow allow them a share in the best of both attractive 
worlds. Since responsible people must face facts, the realities 
of environmental deterioration have resulted in a reluctant,
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qualified admission of loss. Hawaii is suffering from a 
“ yes . . . but” syndrome.
The growth of tourism is alarming, yes . . . but the visitor 
industry is now the major source of the state’s income. It 
would be foolish to restrict it.
Population projections have become frightening, yes . . . 
but (with an almost audible sigh of relief) everyone knows 
that, constitutionally, nothing can be done about it. In 1972 
Dr. Earl Babbie, university researcher, wrote a treatise which 
he called The Maximillion Report.10 Babbie demonstrated the 
connection between an increasing population and a decreas­
ing quality of life in Hawaii and suggested ways for the state 
(even without testing possible constitutional restrictions on 
limits to environmentally damaging growth) to hold the 
number of its residents to one million people. Since the cur­
rent total was something less than 800,000, that seemed to 
give enough leeway to make the goal reasonable and even 
possible.
Babbie’s paper was thoughtful, well documented, and per­
suasive. As population had grown on the isolated, separated, 
circumscribed island chain, he showed in charts and tables, 
so had crime rates and taxes, while recreational potential 
and other quality-of-life indicators declined. Babbie showed 
causal connections and described means for stabilizing 
population growth and arresting its social and cultural 
damage—means ranging from contraceptives to land use 
policies. The argument gained much attention for a time, and 
the local ILWU even adopted a Maximillion Policy at one of 
its conventions. Yes . . . but progrowth proponents in private 
industry and government said that such a goal was neither 
achievable nor desirable. Wesley Hillendahl, director of 
business research for the Bank of Hawaii, expressed in a 
symposium discussion on Babbie’s paper a common belief 
that more people meant more, rather than less, modern-life 
benefits.21 As Honolulu’s population densities had swelled, 
the number of night clubs and “ places to eat out” had in­
creased, he noted, and local residents could now even see live
94 THE STORY OF H A W A II’ S LANDS
mainland sports events on their TV sets via satellite. None of 
the candidates for the governor’s post in the 1974 campaign, 
Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative, believed 
that Babbie’s maximum million target was feasible.
Concerned people in Hawaii were not unmindful of the 
increasing worldwide conviction that there must be limits to 
growth—that trend lines of unchecked increases in people, 
with their demands, and of consumption of irreplaceable 
resources are on a course of inevitable collision. The Club of 
Rome’s book Limits to Growth, reporting on a computerized 
study conducted at M.I.T. with international sponsorship and 
showing dangers ahead unless growth could be stabilized, 
received a good deal of attention for a time in Honolulu 
circles. The work’s findings were debated in a number of 
well-publicized sessions at the University of Hawaii and 
under other sponsorship, and in 1974 Dennis Meadows, di­
rector of the research, and his wife Donella, principal writer 
of the book, were at the East-West Center in Hawaii and ex­
plained the study in several local talks. The limits-to-growth 
thesis is convincing to all save those who believe either in a 
divine providence or in a technological utopia. In essence its 
findings are that the down-curving supply of world resources 
will before long meet the upward exponential growth curve in 
population, production, food consumption, and pollution—if 
the world continues its present physical, social, and economic 
habits. If that should happen, the “ standard run” of the 
study’s computerized charts indicates that catastrophe would 
occur, probably not long after the turn of the century. If the 
world’s inhabitants should act to control their own fate, 
however, and should achieve, in time, a state of equilibrium 
between resources and consumption, disaster could be 
avoided perhaps indefinitely.
The study was found interesting, especially by intellectual 
and conservation-minded groups, yes . . . but even in those 
circles the findings were looked on not as well-documented 
warnings but as “ doomsday” prophecies with conclusions 
“ that should not be given much weight at this point.” 22
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Some University of Hawaii faculty members pettishly 
attacked the book on technical, pedagogical points rather 
than evaluating its purpose and its undertaking. One of the 
sharpest critics was a professional futurist, Dr. James Dator, 
who wrote a lengthy essay on “ The Limits to The Limits 
to Growth.” Among other comments Dator offered the 
optimistic credo that technology might lessen dependence on 
natural resources with new breakthroughs “ just in the nick 
of time, like the U.S. Cavalry in an Indian raid.” He pointed 
out, for example, that the authors of Limits to Growth 
“ apparently do not anticipate a rapid shift to synthetic food 
production” but “ expect the continuation of current farming 
techniques which require extensive farm lands.” 23
Even if the world could achieve such a land-free state as 
Dator hoped for in the next thirty or so years, the argument 
seemed inept and inapt in the islands at just that time. It cer­
tainly gave support to those who would rather use the arable 
land resource for urban development than farming. Castle & 
Cooke’s president, Malcolm McNaughton, had recently said, 
for instance, that preserving lands for agriculture “ doesn’t 
make much practical sense” because of escalating land 
values, which, he pointed out, become the overriding consid­
eration when land is employed at its highest and best use.24 
And Theodore and Harvey Meeker, prominent kamaaina 
businessmen, had written not long before that even “ the 
large-scale agricultural industries . . . are no longer essential 
to the economic well-being of our island.” Because of ■»/'* 
“ marketplace realities,” they explained, “ much of the 
agriculture on Oahu is in fact economically and socially 
undesirable.” That was a good statement of the economic 
change since the Land Use Law had been adopted to protect 
Hawaii’s agricultural lands: no longer could such preserva­
tion be justified on the grounds of economic necessity. Now 
technofuturists were adding the argument that it could not 
even be defended on a functional, food-production basis.
Another radical change in Hawaii’s land economy has wor­
ried some but to others has seemed just one more aspect of
96 TH E STORY OF H A W AII’ S LANDS
welcome growth—the quickening rate and increasing volume 
of capital investment from outside the islands.25 Since the 
mid-nineteenth century Hawaii has needed capital for its 
burgeoning businesses. By local bootstrap methods, the 
establishment of banks (authorized first by a bank charter 
bill passed during Kamehameha I l l’s reign) solved the prob­
lem for a time. Money has flowed from the United States 
mainland in increasing quantities over the years since then, at 
first as investment in the plantations and their offshoot 
enterprises. It reached massive size in the 1960s and 1970s, 
most of it now going to land acquisition and new construc­
tion. Other out-of-state investments also, almost unnoticed at 
first, became appreciable during that time. British-Canadian 
Grosvenor Estate, for instance, increased its stakes in open 
lands on Oahu and even in urban property in downtown 
Honolulu. Canadian investors bought several hotels and fi­
nanced construction of some office buildings. Then suddenly 
appeared a sizable amount of investment money from Japan. 
For a long time just one store, Shirokiya’s, in the Ala Moana 
Shopping Center, had been owned outright by Japanese 
interests. Now Japanese investors started to absorb through 
purchase completed hotels, resorts, condominiums—and raw 
land.26 The first trickle reached the proportions of a stream, 
if not yet a flood. By 1974, Japanese from Japan had a 
controlling interest in twelve hotels comprising about four 
thousand rooms—11 percent of the state’s total. By 1976 that 
number had grown to nineteen. Before long, conflicting reac­
tions were surfacing in Hawaii.
For a time, this threat to the old tightly and locally con­
trolled island economy seemed, to the business community, 
as great a challenge to “ the Hawaiian way of life” as loss of 
older buildings and earlier life-styles was to the conserva­
tionists. The local tourism entrepreneurs were particularly 
worried; they saw the possibility of a “ package” invasion, 
with Japanese airlines bringing Japanese visitors to Japanese- 
owned hotels, to sightsee on Japanese-controlled buses, eat in 
Japanese restaurants, and buy souvenirs in Japanese shops.
The president of the Hawaii Visitors Bureau felt that “ there 
is a very real fear that they will try to hog it.” 27
Most of the worry was about impact on the economy, not 
on the environment. A state senator objected to the sale of 
land to foreign owners because “ he who controls land con­
trols the political and economic life-blood of any communi­
ty.” 28 But former Lieutenant Governor Tom Gill commented 
soberly that “ when we let outsiders buy into our tourist in­
dustry we’re also selling them our clean water and air and 
our scenery . . .  so let’s insist that they use us properly.” 29 
An excellent idea, certainly, but no such caveats were added 
to any of the sales agreements.
Soon, however, the excitement subsided and the volume of 
Japanese investment decreased. The Japanese government 
itself placed temporary restrictions on moving capital abroad 
and, noting the adverse reaction in Hawaii, advised its coun­
trymen to make their new enterprises seem to “ grow out of 
the Hawaiian soil, as the earlier Japanese immigrants became 
an important part of Hawaii.” Many local businessmen still 
sensed a threat to home control, but not all did. When a 
Japanese financier bought the Sheraton Waikiki, including 
the proud old Royal Hawaiian Hotel, in 1974, kamaainas 
were outraged. But Chinn Ho, defending his sale of part of 
the Makaha development to Japanese interests, said of the 
inflow of Japanese capital that “ economic stagnation” 
would come to the islands without it. George Kanahele, a 
part-Hawaiian, in 1973 secretary general of the Japanese- 
American Economic Council, commented that “ the amount 
of Japanese capital in the islands [some $350 million in 1975, 
compared to several billions of U.S. mainland money] is so 
minuscule that I sometimes wonder why there’s all the fuss.” 
Anyway, Kanahele added, “ I submit that the benefits are far 
greater than the costs.” He counted as benefits “ needed 
capital . . . jobs . . . new professions and skills . . . and a 
counterbalance to U.S. mainland investment.” 30 On that note 
of acceptance—more capital for more expansion, to provide 
a kind of symmetry with other new capital for other new
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expansion—the arguments seemed to rest for a time. Yes, 
foreign investment was dangerous to conservation of 
Hawaii’s traditional qualities . . . but it was necessary for 
further priming of the production pump.
Trying to Look Ahead
While there seemed to be a consensus that the best of both 
worlds, old and new, could be grasped and held, there was 
not much examination of the likely future the state faced if 
present trends continued. A Governor’s Conference on the 
Year 2000 was held in 1968 and a program based on the 
new discipline of futuristics was instituted at the university. 
These were attempts to study desirable alternative futures for 
the year 2000 and beyond, assuming that present-day aims, 
ambitions, and attitudes could be changed. There were few 
analyses, however, of the real probabilities for the years im­
mediately ahead. For land use, there were several ways that a 
potential protraction of the growth curve of the past few 
decades could be estimated, and some attempts were made to 
draw lines into the approaching future. One could, for exam­
ple, add up plans already in the minds of landowners, devel­
opers, and investors and calculate what part of total future 
reality they were. Trend lines could be drawn from some 
distance in the past and projected for some distance into the 
future for an extrapolated guess. And if these more or less 
mathematical methods of forecasting were not sufficient, one 
could listen to the hopes (or fears) of those who felt they had 
some special means for foreseeing Hawaii’s future.
Oahu provided a model for the pragmatic method (simply 
toting up plans that developers had announced or were ob­
viously preparing) and several people who took the trouble 
to calculate in the early 1970s came up with about the same 
figure: between 30,000 and 35,000 additional acres were 
planned for development by their owners, most of them still 
classified and zoned for agricultural use. At that time only
37,000 acres were zoned for civilian urban uses.
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Ramon Duran, a planner who had been staff officer for 
the State Land Use Commission until he resigned in the early 
1970s in protest against the indiscriminate reclassifications, 
used a device in talks he made later to civic groups: he would 
pin cardboard cutouts representing planned developments on 
a blown-up copy of the general plan of Oahu.3' As he pro­
ceeded around the map, placing more and more swatches on 
the areas zoned for agriculture or preservation, his audience 
always gasped with disbelief. Starting at Hawaii Kai, show­
ing its major planned expansions inland, along the shore, 
and on to Makapuu Point at the island’s eastern tip, he 
covered next with cardboard the areas that were planned 
for development in the suburban districts of Kailua and 
Kaneohe—almost 2,000 acres. Then he put a piece on 700 
acres already rezoned for development at the rural communi­
ty of Kahaluu, a larger one on the several thousand agricul­
tural acres which developer Joe Pao later bought from the 
McCandless Estate, and another on 600 acres further on the 
windward coast where Lewers & Cooke had development 
rights.
A huge piece of cardboard would fit over most of Kahuku 
Point at the northeast tip of Oahu—land that had been a 
sugar plantation and the source of Hawaii’s watermelon crop 
until it began “ phasing out,” as the term went—where a 
large hotel had already been built as the start of a resort 
community. Further along the north shore, over 700 acres of 
Bishop Estate land and some 2,800 acres owned by the Dill- 
inghams, land planned for withdrawal from sugar production 
and slated for development, had cardboard placed on them.
Duran would then move across the map to Makaha. (The 
western end of the island around Kaena Point was too rug­
ged for profitable development; yet construction on its 
conservation-zoned land was planned by the state itself, 
which intended to push a highway along the shore.) There he 
would show the 2,000 or so additional acres that Chinn Ho 
was ready to develop or sell for development as soon as he 
could get it reclassified. Comparatively small cutouts would
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dot the shore leading toward the agricultural central plains 
until the Campbell Estate holdings were reached. Then ex­
pansion of an existing industrial park would be shown, and 
further on a huge piece was added to represent a proposed 
new town on about 4,000 acres still zoned for agriculture at 
Honouliuli.
In this central area, containing most of Oahu’s arable 
land, the Robinson Estate had 350 acres already zoned for 
urban uses and intended to ask for rezoning of another 2,000 
acres of sugarcane land; Castle & Cooke, builder of the huge 
suburb Mililani Town through its development arm, Oceanic 
Properties, had plans for three more increments that would 
take that bedroom community in the heart of the cane coun­
try to 3,500 acres; above the town of Aiea the Bishop Estate 
and the Austin Estate each had some prime agricultural 
acreage already rezoned for development; and finally the 
Bishop Estate was requesting reclassification of 4,500 more 
acres of the Wahiawa slopes (much of it plantation land) for 
its own version of a new town. On toward downtown Hono­
lulu and the already urbanized sections, additional cardboard 
pieces were tacked on the map—at Waipahu, Pearl City, Salt 
Lake. And as Duran’s demonstration worked back to Hawaii 
Kai, he stopped to pin bits of cardboard on the hills along 
the already congested Kalanianaole Highway—at Aina Koa, 
Aina Haina, Kuliouou.
These were developers’ intentions, and of course not all of 
them were certain to go ahead. The State Department of 
Planning and Economic Development, concerned about the 
implications of the proposals for the central Oahu plains 
area, made a study in 1972. They estimated that if the land- 
owners and their developers did what they said they were 
going to do, more than 10,000 acres of land would be built 
up in that area alone to contain some 55,000 living units.32 
The report strongly recommended against expansion of that 
magnitude, primarily because of the tremendous cost of 
public services and transportation that would be required.
The study was gratefully received by the legislature and filed.
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In the meantime, the University of Hawaii announced plans 
to build a major second campus in this area. The three prin­
cipal landowners (Bishop, Castle & Cooke, and Campbell); 
hoping to sweeten their intentions and hasten the rezoning 
they wanted, vied to have the campus located on their prop­
erties. The only problem that the university saw was choosing 
among the offers (Campbell ultimately won out); there was 
no doubt in anyone’s mind that removal of any of the lands 
from agricultural uses could be had on request.
Intentions of large-scale development appeared also on the 
other islands.33 For a forecaster, a difficult problem was to 
guess what the immediate plans of the buyers and sellers of 
land really were; speculation rather than building seemed 
to be the purpose in many cases. Requests that the state 
reclassify and that the counties rezone were often made only 
to escalate assessed valuations so that the land (or rights to 
its development) might be sold at a greater profit, often after 
it had been held idle for some time. An example was the 
reclassification in 1968 of some 3,500 acres of the Molokai 
Ranch Company’s land at Kaluakoi on Molokai, ostensibly 
for a huge resort community development to be completed in 
ten years. Six years later construction was still promised but 
not yet begun, although a number of major land sales and 
leases had been transacted. (Construction of a large hotel has 
since gone ahead.)34
In many other cases it was not easy to know real intentions 
unless one was somehow privy to corporate plans, which 
were often formulated elsewhere than in Hawaii if foreign or 
mainland American money was involved.35 It was impossible 
for people in Hawaii to know what might really happen to 
about 1,000 acres of Kauai land that Grove Farm Company 
planned to sell to a development corporation headquartered 
in Florida, to two major parcels on Maui and Kauai that 
Amfac, Inc. sold to out-of-state resort developers, to 1,500 
acres on Oahu’s windward side and 15,000 acres on the Big 
Island (rich with koa forests, sandy beaches, and fertile land, 
scattered with heiaus, slides, house platforms, and other arti­
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facts) that the Bishop Estate negotiated to sell to mainland 
investors presumably planning residential resort development.
No one could be sure that all the land which seemed to be 
planned for development would really be built upon, even 
over a long period of time. Plans to develop the land often 
sounded as impossible, in their way, as hopes to save the 
land from being developed often seemed, in theirs, to the 
conservationists. On Kauai, a multimillion-dollar resort was 
announced for the old cannery site of Kapaa; on the Big 
Island a consortium of Laurance Rockefeller, Eastern Air­
lines, and Dillingham, (later split up) announced a multi­
million-dollar extension of the Mauna Kea Beach resort, and 
later in that same area Boise Cascade and a Japanese joint- 
venturer asked for rezoning to permit the first, $50 million 
stage of a huge planned development; further south on the 
coast a development consortium announced plans for six 
hotels, four thousand apartment units, and a residential 
village with six thousand homes; the Lanai Land Company 
announced plans for a multimillion-dollar development on 
that island; back on Kauai, the Hanalei area was rezoned to 
allow a multimillion-dollar grouping of residential resort 
communities; and rezoning for the thousand-acre develop­
ment that Joe Pao planned on the windward side of Oahu 
was requested by the McCandless heirs. Each week, almost 
each day through the mid-1970s, new multimillion-dollar 
“ announcements” were released. It was difficult for a 
reporter to keep up with them all.
Even a conservative prognosticator could assume that 
ultimately much of this announced residential and resort 
development would take place, after enough speculative gain 
had been milked from the land through the shuffling of 
ownerships. Most forecasters did not depend on stated inten­
tions, however, but used the method of extrapolation of past 
trends into the future—projecting certain variables whose 
behavior in the known range could be charted into the un­
knowable time ranges ahead. Those who did this became sure 
that at least double the number of acres for which plans had 
been announced would ultimately be developed.
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The state had a capable statistician, the Department of 
Planning and Economic Development from time to time 
made its own demographic and economic projections, and, in 
the area of land uses, the Overview Corporation, headed by 
Stewart L. Udall, former secretary of the interior, included a 
prognosis of development prospects to the year 2000 in an 
open-space plan it prepared for the state in 197 2.36 Most of 
these predictions were based on modified extrapolations, go­
ing back as far as statistics were available to develop trend 
lines that could then be projected into the future with some 
degree of confidence.
The underlying factor for all future projections is, of 
course, the number of people whose demands must be met. 
The food required for sustenance, the industrial capacity to 
produce all the things needed (or wanted), the resources that 
would have to be used to provide for this production, the 
construction on the land surface to house people and their 
activities, the resultant creation of wastes and pollutants—all 
these variable factors depend on the numbers of people who 
generate them. In Hawaii this is more clear than it usually is, 
because all the related activities take place in close, highly 
visible surroundings. There had been a drop from the
250,000 or so Hawaiians who lived in the islands at the time 
of Cook’s arrival to a low point of some 57,000 total resi­
dents in 1870. But then, as new arrivals increased, the 
population had begun rising rapidly, not only in numbers 
of people but in rates of increase. By 1970, with 770,000 
residents, Hawaii’s population was growing at an annual rate 
of about 2.5 percent compared to a mainland U.S. rate of 
increase of 1.4 percent.37
Four-fifths of these people lived on the island of Oahu in 
the early 1970s, although that island contained only 9 percent 
of the land in the state. Hence Oahu’s densities had grown to 
be great: in 1970, for the entire island, there were 1,058 per­
sons living on an average square mile of land; in Honolulu 
proper the ratio was 3,550 to the mile; one census tract was 
populated at the ratio of 35,000 persons to a square mile and 
another at 60,000. (Chicago and San Francisco each has
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about 15,000 people per square mile, Manhattan some 
70,000.)38 The trend toward relative concentration on Oahu 
was continuing, despite the state administration’s desire to 
disperse people to the other islands and despite a rise in the 
absolute population on those islands after a period of 
decline. Extrapolating from these trends, the state’s statisti­
cians estimated that by the year 2000 Hawaii’s population 
would reach somewhere between one and one and a half 
million. At one time Honolulu’s city planners predicted a 
population for Oahu alone of two million, but that figure 
frightened everyone and it was later revised to one and a 
quarter million by 1995.39
Estimates of economic growth were based largely on an 
assumed continuing increase in tourism.40 The three top 
“industries” on which the islands’ economy had long 
depended—agriculture, the military, and tourism—had been 
reduced to two with the decline in sugarcane and pineapple 
production and the lack of real interest in other kinds of 
agricultural activity. The military was an unpredictable 
source of revenue and local employment. Defense agencies 
spent $350 million in Hawaii in 1960, and the sum grew close 
to $1 billion by 1975, creating by far the largest part of total 
personal income in the state. The Oahu Development Con­
ference suggested stimulating even more activity by the 
defense departments to make the military a “growth in­
dustry” for Hawaii.41 The idea never caught on, primarily 
because plans from Washington are apt to run hot and cold 
and are an unsafe, unsure base for an island economy. At 
one moment there may be talk of moving major divisions 
and their dependencies complete to Oahu and at another 
threats of curtailing military land uses and transferring com­
mand posts to another location.
The visitor “ industry” as such is by no means the only 
other economic activity, but it is the hub around which 
revolve many of the businesses that provide income and pro­
duce jobs. Prognostications about tourism were important, 
then, as statisticians and others tried to foresee the future.
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Past trends were clear: in 1950, visitors spent maybe $40 
million in the islands, which seemed a sizable sum then; by 
1960 that had grown to $130 million; and then the expo­
nential curve steepened. Expenditures by tourists were $550 
million in 1970, $645 million in 1971, and over a billion 
dollars in 1974.42 Surprisingly, the income from tourism 
held up even during the big slump of the 1970s although 
during that decline growth was minimal compared to the 
earlier increases (about 10 percent annually rather than 25 
percent). As we have seen, the number of people who spent 
that money had increased from a few thousand in the first 
decades of the century to more than three million a year by 
1975. A Tourism Advisory Committee appointed by the 
governor foresaw five million visitors by 1985, just ten 
years ahead. Increasingly they were arriving in tour groups, 
shipped by prearranged schedules from one island to another, 
from one hotel to the next, guided to the sights to see, the 
places to eat, and the shops to patronize. This development 
resulted in the continually increasing number of hotels on the 
land, along with more roads leading to them and more facili­
ties serving them. Projections considered conservative in 1975 
indicated that sixty thousand rooms would be needed by the 
tourist trade in 1985, an increase of at least twenty thousand 
in ten years.
By 1975 and 1976 there was general agreement in Hawaii’s 
business community that tourism was the most certain—if 
not the only—industry that could be counted on to continue, 
into the future, supplying revenues for the state and jobs for 
its people. An Economic Advisory Task Force reported to 
the governor its conviction that agriculture would keep on 
declining, the military would remain unpredictable, and the 
development of other industries would be minimal—while 
“ the travel industry appears to be the only area in which 
there is a distinct substantial growth potential.” At the same 
time the governor’s Tourism Advisory Committee told him 
that its primary worry was whether enough new capital 
would be available to meet tourism’s demands.43
i o 6 THE STORY OF H A W AII S LANDS
Other trends that might be taken as growth indicators 
(most of them, of course, stimulated by the visitor influx) 
achieved increases in the ten-year period between 1960 and 
1970 that, extrapolated, would produce almost absurd esti­
mates. Personal income rose from about $1 billion in 1950 to 
$1.5 billion, approximately, in 1960—and then jumped to 
$3.5 billion by 1970 and over $5 billion in 1975. From a 
modest increase during the 1950s, completed construction 
grew from $275 million to $784 million during the 1960s (and 
then sagged badly during the middle 1970s, partly due to the 
national recession but largely because developers had greatly 
overbuilt high rises for the condominium market). Bank 
deposits rose during the 1960s from $670 million to $1.5 
billion and by 1974 had reached $2.5 billion.44
Several attempts were made to extrapolate the amount of 
land that would have to be converted from open-space uses 
to urban development purposes to accommodate all these 
proliferations. While preparing its open-space plan, Stewart 
Udall’s Overview Corporation made projections of acreages 
of presently open land that would have to be reclassified to 
urban uses if the growth curves continued. Its forecasts were 
a doubling of urban districts between 1970 and 2000—from
145,000 acres to over 300,000. Since there were in 1970 only 
about 330,000 acres of plantation lands (the primary source 
which new developments drew upon), Udall’s figures would 
indicate a great reduction in the state’s farmlands. For Oahu 
alone, with about 60,000 acres of plantation land, Udall 
estimated 46,000 additional acres added to urban-zoned 
districts by the year 2000. Overview Corporation and others 
foresaw further loss of open space on the other islands in 
sizable amounts, but not at the same pace as on Oahu.
Large as these acre and dollar and people projections were, 
time after time local demographers and economists hedged 
their estimates, pointing out that all previous appraisals had 
been surpassed by the actual turn of events in recent years.
An important reason for uncertainty about the rate of 
growth was that Hawaii was no longer a distant, isolated
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island territory whose future was fixed by a small band of 
local businessmen. It had become part of a wider universe, 
affected by events originating outside its borders and over 
which it had no control.
Increasingly, then, hard-nosed, experienced social and 
economic planners turned away from the carefully calculated 
trend charts and began estimating the state’s future by the 
course of world changes and Hawaii’s potential place in new 
global relationships. Some saw a surge of population and 
business to the islands from the continental United States. 
Others looked further, toward a flood of additional people 
and new enterprises from both East and West, as Hawaii sat 
in the center of their freshly opened concourse.
Among those predicting a great inflow from the U.S. 
mainland was Dr. John Craven, head of the university’s De­
partment of Oceanography and state coordinator for oceano­
graphy, who foresaw hordes of “ refugees from the main­
land” in the decades ahead. He based his reasoning largely 
on a belief that Hawaii’s islands would always offer more 
comfortable and attractive living than the increasingly 
polluted continental metropolitan areas. Craven envisioned a 
much greater population density than any official forecast 
predicted. And he saw only two possible ways to contain it. 
One was to begin planning huge megalopolitan concentra­
tions in the manner of “ arcologies” of architect Paolo Sole- 
ri. The other, which Craven advocated instead, was to start 
designing and arranging to build additional “ floating city” 
islands off the shores of the Hawaiian archipelago—these 
would provide a skillfully engineered and tightly planned liv­
ing environment for a tremendous future population and 
would allow much open space on land to be preserved. The 
imaginative idea caught the fancy of a number of people, but 
Craven did not explain how the artificial islands would 
benefit from better planning or more careful development 
than Hawaii’s land surfaces had received.45
A number of serious and experienced political-economic- 
physical planners also foresaw a much greater population
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and business expansion for Hawaii than Hawaii itself dared 
count on. One who stirred local business imagination was 
Fred Smith, an official of the prestigious National Planning 
Association who visited Hawaii often in the mid-1970s as a 
representative of Laurance Rockefeller, then planning the ex­
pansion of his Mauna Kea Beach complex on the Big Island. 
Smith contended, in one statement he made, that “ Hawaii 
cannot escape becoming the primary staging area for a grow­
ing army of pilgrims moving in both directions to build an 
unprecedented and crowded bridge between East and West.” 
He felt that Hawaii would have no way to stop growth or to 
stabilize it. “ Hawaii,” he reminded his audiences, “ is Ameri­
ca’s front door.” As eastern nations broadened relations with 
America, he said, Hawaii would be “ the one strategic stop 
on the only Pacific sea and air highway to Western society, 
to the Western economy, and to Western institutions.” Smith 
warned his listeners that plans should be made to benefit 
from the “ inevitable fallout” of this traffic.46
Hawaii’s disinclination to face the problems that further 
unprecedented growth on its limited land would bring is the 
topic of the last part of this book. Unwillingness to choose 
between limiting growth or welcoming growth has resulted in 
an inability to plan for either alternative. The best scheme, in 
political terms, has seemed to be to wait and see what hap­
pens.
Thus Hawaii was approaching its next decade of develop­
ment ill prepared for the expanded expansion it was told to 
expect. Historian-environmentalist Gavan Daws lamented 
that “ we’re sleepwalking with a dreamy smile on our face.” 47 
The only thing that seemed clear in that dream of the future 
was that every estimate of growth which was made would be 
exceeded.
The thousand rooms and endless ballrooms, convention 
halls, restaurants, and night clubs of the huge Sheraton 
Waikiki, when they were thrust into the sky between the 
genteel Royal Hawaiian and the comfortable Halekulani, had 
seemed about as much as the tiny Waikiki peninsula could
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take. But then the Waikiki Biltmore Hotel, built with great 
fanfare in 1953, was dramatically demolished in 1973 to 
make way for a twin-towered resort planned for intensely 
greater density: an aggressive haole developer named Chris 
Hemmeter announced that it would be a $100 million combi­
nation of hotels, condominiums, and commercial enterprises 
which “ would make the [Waikiki] Sheraton look like a 
small thing” and would eventually overshadow Chinn H o’s 
complex around the Ilikai Hotel. By 1976 Hemmeter had 
completed a twin-towered hotel—the Hyatt Regency—whose 
additional thousand rooms were quickly absorbed by the 
island’s visitors.
Chinn Ho himself was looking toward expansion of a dif­
ferent kind. The Makaha Inn, where a Hawaiian haole cou­
ple had watched the parade of handsome Hawaiian ladies to 
the Sunday meeting of their Civic Club, had been sold to a 
Japanese investment company. That did not mean the end of 
Ho’s interest in the lush Makaha Valley, however. There was 
more land to be developed, sometime, and more land to be 
sold at augmenting prices in the meantime.
Chinn Ho, among others, saw the great surge ahead pri­
marily as financial bounty from land sales. “ There’s no 
money in hotel operations any more,” he told an interviewer 
in April 1974. “ The money is in real estate.” 48 It was still 
possible to gain fortunes from caring for tourists in hotels, 
but that was a transient, depreciating source of wealth. The 
Biltmore had lasted only twenty years before it was sold and 
its land rebought for a new and larger capital investment.
Land for development, not the development itself, was “ th e ^  
basis of all wealth,” reaffirmed the real estate salesman on 
Honolulu television.45
In two hundred years Hawaii had not only condensed the 
history of people’s uses and misuses of the earth that had 
always supported them. It had also begun to demonstrate, 




P A R T
The Worth of Hawaii’s Lands
THE worth of land has been measured in many ways 
throughout history, and in Hawaii most methods of valua­
tion have been used, from simple to sophisticated. For many 
people (especially those whose lives have not been fully ab­
sorbed into urban surroundings) the greatest regard one can 
have for land is a sense of belonging to it, a feeling that we 
are part of the earth we live on: by tramping through it and 
resting on it; by seeing a sunset give it brilliance before it 
darkens or watching the moon lighten it later; by appreciat­
ing the variety of the forms it assumes and marveling at the 
myriad growing things it supports. Perhaps that was land’s 
first assessment by humans—as a living thing itself, pro­
genitor, stern parent, mother earth. The Polynesian people 
chanted of earth rejoicing, earth thirsting, earth giving, earth 
mourning.
But people have also made practical use of the land, and 
through the ages its worth has been measured in terms of 
how useful it might be. Different people have wanted to use 
land differently, however, so “ usefulness” has been defined 
in many ways. In a time when there is almost daily confron­
tation between those who want to conserve land and those
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who want to develop it, there is a tendency to oversimplify 
and consider only the extremes of the ways land is used—at 
one extreme, kept open and natural; at the other, developed 
and thereby altered. One tends to think only in terms of 
“good” uses and “ bad” uses according to one’s particular 
bent. In planning parlance, the term “ land use” has a purely 
pragmatic connotation; it is based on functional classifica­
tions like residential, recreational, commercial, industrial 
land—even, dispassionately, urban land and conservation 
land.
A more useful way than this to consider the worth of land 
might be to think of the underlying social reasons (social in 
the broad sense, encompassing economic and political moti­
vations) for which the land is esteemed. In these terms there 
seem to be three basic types of valuation: the first considers 
land as a resource, the second as a commodity, the third as 
an instrument of power.
When land is valued as a resource, it is looked on as a 
treasured store to be drawn on carefully as human needs 
arise. The portioning out can have a number of essential pur­
poses: to satisfy the need for pleasure, to supply emotional 
re-creation or physical recreation, to provide essential suste­
nance, or to furnish shelter from the elements. In any case, 
the finite, irreplaceable nature of land is apt to be recognized 
when it is valued as a resource, and its inherent qualities are 
likely to be understood and respected. Land thus considered 
is often looked on as a public asset to be guarded by society 
against depletion.
Land valued as a commodity is more likely to be consid­
ered as personal property: capable of being bartered, bought 
and sold, or transferred in some way to another owner or 
user in order to make a gain from the transaction. With this 
valuation, land is looked on more as a source of wealth than 
enjoyment or sustenance.
The third valuation of land’s worth, as a source of power, 
regards it as a tool that can create or bolster personal influ­
ence or political potency. Through history there seems to
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have been conviction that mastery of a region’s land meant 
control of its destiny. It was primarily to secure influence 
over more of the earth’s surface that the great explorations 
of the eighteenth century took place, one of which opened 
Hawaii’s lands for transfer of power from kings and alii to 
later political elites.
These three ways of gauging the worth of land, and the 
ways of treating and using land that result from them, are 
not always clear-cut and rigid, although it is easy enough to 
find instances of each. More often evaluations and intents 
are blurred and overlapping. That is what makes land plan­
ning and land management the difficult disciplines they are. 
Nevertheless, in Hawaii perhaps more clearly than in most 
places, one can see the effects of the different ways land has 
been esteemed on the way land has been treated. The follow­
ing chapters examine the result of considering land’s greatest 
worth to be that of an essential resource, a valuable com­




WHEN people consider land a valuable resource, to be used 
lovingly with full understanding of its intrinsic qualities, to 
be guarded with the utmost care against loss or depletion of 
its benefits, they are commonly tagged “ conservationists” or 
“ environmentalists” or sometimes “ ecologists.” The terms 
are often used as pejoratives, imputing to groups of aroused 
citizens objectionable aims that would harm the economy or 
the society, whereas their real objectives may range from 
protection of some wildlife environment in an urbanizing 
world to prevention of the building of a detrimental develop­
ment in a pleasant neighborhood.
The first fact that must be faced by idealists and pragma­
tists alike is that no “ natural environment,” once discovered 
can ever be conserved in a pristine state; when people have 
found it, they unwittingly change it by their very presence, 
no matter how carefully they move into it. Even if our wish 
is only to enjoy it, to revel in its refreshments, there are 
obstacles to its true conservation. One must get to it to savor 
it, and that means that trails and roads must be laid across 
it; one must protect it to relish it, at least against fire and 
blight, and that means inevitably that political considerations
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crop up, with rules and regulations and bills and budgets. 
Since political issues always have two opposing sides, there 
are inevitable conflicts between the public upholding conser­
vation of land and the public supporting development of 
land.'
In a world peopled by ever more numerous habitants on 
ever more precious land, the conservation-minded are bound 
to be considered visionary in their political position and the 
development-disposed regarded as practical. Often the oppo­
site is true. In Hawaii, tourism illustrates the dilemma: is it 
possible to maintain the beauty of the islands as tropical 
paradise, mecca for vacationers, when the hordes of visitors 
who are attracted and the development that must be built to 
satisfy them destroy the very values that lured them? Even 
Hawaii’s open-land plantation agriculture finds itself in con­
flict with conservation’s ideals at times. On the island of 
Maui, the Hanawi stream is not only a beautiful sight to see 
in the Hana district: it is habitat for a number of native fish, 
crabs, and shrimp that are becoming increasingly difficult to 
find. When the East Maui Irrigation Company, a subsidiary 
of Alexander & Baldwin, asked permission to draw ten mil­
lion gallons of water a day from the stream for seven months 
a year, ecologists, zoologists, marine biologists, and plain 
citizens protested, but permission was granted by the state’s 
Board of Land and Natural Resources. The company’s vice- 
president allowed that “we realize that we will be altering 
the stream,” but he was happy that its water would now be 
raised into an irrigation ditch to supply sugarcane fields.2
When Hawaii’s Land Use Law set up the “ conservation” 
classification, it seemed an easy enough category to define, 
but through the years it has been subject to innumerable 
definitions, interpretations, and administrative regulations. 
The trouble is that the state itself defines conservation as the 
practice of protecting and preserving natural resources “ by 
judicious development and utilization.” 3 Hence the state has 
for the most part considered conservation policy to be a 
judgment about the way conservation land should be used
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and when it should be developed, rather than how it should 
best be preserved. Lands classified as conservation by the 
Land Use Commission are administered by the Department 
of Land and Natural Resources, governed by a so-called 
Land Board, further complicating the already fragmented 
government controls over land uses.4 Originally the standards 
for inclusion of lands in Conservation districts were clear 
enough: forest and water reserve lands were included; some 
scenic and historic areas were selected; generally, those parts 
of the islands that did not seem to be in the path of urban 
development and were unsuitable for agriculture were incor­
porated in this category. But over the years so many ways 
were found to “ develop and utilize” conservation land that a 
complicated set of regulations was drawn up for its adminis­
tration and “ subzones” of the Conservation districts were 
established. In the early 1970s there was such general dis­
satisfaction with the administrative regulations that several 
attempts were made to revise them, first as a commission 
given to Stewart Udall’s Overview Corporation and later by 
the administrative agency itself. In each case the suggested 
changes were found too restrictive by developers and too 
loose by conservationists, so the special zones and subzones 
described in Regulation 4 remain a tangled mess. Within the 
broadest use category, the General Use subzone, almost any 
conceivable activity is permitted: not only logging, quarrying, 
and such, but even the building, under certain circumstances, 
of residences, resorts and hotels, military structures, and air­
ports.
Thus the Conservation districts have become, in a sense, a 
catchall for various uses that are neither agricultural nor tru­
ly urban. In another sense they are a kind of holding stage 
until landowners have other plans for their lands and the 
Land Use Commission is ready to reclassify them.5 Each year 
the Land Use Commission reclassifies districts from Conser­
vation to Agriculture and Urban on individual petition. Even 
more approvals of applications for diverse uses are granted 
by the Department of Land and Natural Resources. So far
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neither the administrative agencies nor the legislative 
branches of the state government have been willing to face 
up to the basic problem of clearly defining and then firmly 
maintaining Conservation districts.
Playing political games with these districts is a sport al­
most as popular as parceling out acreage from Agriculture 
districts. In 1975, an area of conservation lands on the slopes 
of Diamond Head was allotted to the university as a site for 
a junior college, and then a bit later a parcel of that site was 
leased to the producers of the television series called Hawaii 
Five-O. Conservation groups and nearby residents protested 
that there would be noise and constant traffic as a result, 
that the use was far from conservation-oriented, and that at 
least an environmental impact assessment should be made.
But the NBC crew, from top officers and public relations 
personnel to actor Jack Lord, mounted a political campaign 
that the city council members could not resist. The lease 
stood.6
When either state or county officials have decided that an 
area really deserved perpetual preservation, other means than 
classification as Conservation have had to be found. In one 
instance the Big Island’s county council even bought an im­
portant heiau site from the Bishop Estate to be sure that it 
was permanently preserved.7 In 1972 the legislature created a 
Natural Areas Reserve system to save some of the state’s 
own valuable open space.
The other major problem that always faces conservation of 
land in an unspoiled state is the difficulty of explaining, in 
sufficiently clear terms to have legal validity, why certain 
places have scenic, historic, cultural, or ecological values 
worth preserving. The first task that must be undertaken by 
any region considering land conservation is to inventory its 
natural assets in both quantitative and qualitative terms. 
Hawaii has never taken on this job; not even the extent and 
characteristics of lands classified as Conservation under the 
Land Use Law are inventoried.8
In pre-Cook times Hawaiians had understood and classi­
SOURCE OF PLEASU RE
fied, by memory and name, variations in land form and land 
characteristics. There was one name for central mountain 
ranges and other names for hills that rose alone, hills that 
were clustered, and hills that stood in line. Below the moun­
tain top, soil qualities and bearing capacities were known and 
named: the belt where small trees grew, that where forests of 
larger trees occurred, and the stretch that supported giant 
species. Wilderness areas and rain forests were recognized, 
and further down the slopes descriptive names were given to 
various kinds of arable land. The classification continued 
down to the sea: a hard-baked, sterile belt was named, a belt 
where flowers naturally grew, a slippery strip above the prin­
cipal habitable lands, which were the dry, open-country 
areas, and finally the shoreline stretches.9
In contemporary times there has been considerable study 
of the basic geographic and geologic nature of the islands’ 
lands. Most recently land and soil characteristics have been 
analyzed by the University of Hawaii’s Land Study Bureau 
and, under the guidance of the Department of Land and 
Natural Resources, by the Soil Conservation Service of the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. This work, using a new soil 
classification system, was the first such classification to be 
completed for any state in the union.10
As many planners have discovered, however, the material 
is too academic in some respects and too difficult to apply in 
others to be useful as a guide for specific questions of con­
servation or development or for political-administrative judg­
ment between the two. To decide the appropriate use of a 
parcel of land on the basis of its natural resource characteris­
tics, the data available would have to be translated into prag­
matic terms—into an index of what is where supplemented by 
a great deal more information that is not now available. Not 
only soil classifications, watershed areas and water supply 
sources, forests and wildernesses, and places of value because 
of mineral deposits should be included, but also scenic views 
and vistas, historic spots, places laden with cultural artifacts, 
and many other categories.
” 9
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Several starts in this direction have been made. The “ inter­
pretations” made by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
from its 1972 soil survey analysis supply maps for “ soil 
limitation ratings” (slight, moderate, or severe constraints 
for community development and recreational uses) in broad 
terms. In preparing the open-space plan he presented to the 
legislature, Stewart Udall used such data—as well as available 
information on slope gradients and natural vegetative cover, 
along with scenic and historic qualities—to pinpoint areas 
that should remain as open space. An ambitious, computer­
ized mapping of natural data as well as social characteristics 
for a limited area around Kaneohe Bay has been under way 
for some time by an environmental research branch of the 
university (Hawaii Environmental Simulation Laboratory). 
Whether they are considered inadequate or, perhaps, all too 
informative, none of these efforts have been used for deci­
sion-making purposes by state or county agencies—certainly 
not by the Land Use Commission in classification or reclassi­
fication of conservation land. Several methodologies for 
environmental resource analysis have been developed on the 
mainland; among them Hawaii could find a useful prototype. 
Any of them, however, must begin with complete data in 
usable form—and this comes back again to the need for an 
index of natural resources.11
The Meaning of Recreation
Conserving land as open space, in as natural a state as possi­
ble, does not always mean that it must be kept totally un­
used. Even the most ardent conservationist must admit that 
land has assets beyond its qualities of visual beauty and eco­
logical vitality. The simplest functional use to which we put 
it, which demands the least change in land’s natural order, is 
for recreation. Since its earliest habitation Hawaii seems to 
have used its lands generously for recreational purposes. The 
Hawaiians whom Cook discovered must have had their pas­
sive enjoyment of the landscape, but their best-documented
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recreations were active, sometimes violent, games played in 
special places set aside for them. Some sports were indivi­
dual, competitive exercises; some were group games; and at 
specified times there were gatherings for large festivals. One 
manifestation of the culture shock that helped destroy the 
Polynesian society in Hawaii when the white man began 
coming in numbers was the almost complete, almost immedi­
ate, discontinuance of the sports that had been developed. 
There was a good deal of gambling associated with game 
competitions. David Malo reported that after losing smaller 
possessions in a game like noa (where the location of a small 
piece of wood or stone hidden in a bundle of tapa had to be 
guessed), a man might wager his property and “ perhaps risk 
everything he had and become beggared.” As haole concepts 
of personal possession of sizable, valuable goods became 
established, such betting could be disastrous. And of course 
the whole idea was repugnant to the missionaries when they 
arrived.12
Popular contests included sliding down slopes at great 
speed on a sled with oiled runners called a holua (or, in a 
different game, on ti leaves or coconut ribs), bow and arrow 
shooting, wrestling, boxing, and foot racing. Among the alii, 
the art of spear throwing was practiced, and even of dodging 
or catching spears thrown by others. (Kamehameha the Great 
was reputed to be highly skilled at this demonstration of 
strength and bravery). Less dangerous were games where a 
disk or dart was skimmed along the ground toward stakes set 
thirty or forty feet away. Group games ranged from variants 
of hiding the noa to a sophisticated game of lovemaking 
called ume, with male and female partners picked by lot 
from a circle of participants.
The great time for fun and games on the land was the fes­
tival of makahiki, beginning about the middle of October 
and lasting four months. During this time no work was done, 
normal religious observances were suspended, and relaxation 
and recreation were mandatory. The celebration was in honor 
of the fertility god, Lono, and the time of “ the growth of
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plants and the spawning of fish.” There were other events 
than sports festivals during the makahiki, the most important 
being collection of taxes by a representative of Lono who cir­
cled the islands to check with the konohiki landlords whether 
all taxes had been paid. For the common people, however, 
the big thing was the continuous enjoyment of sport, tourna­
ments, dancing, and singing—-with flower-decked crowds 
numbering into the thousands attending the scheduled 
events.13
During the nineteenth century, the more affluent members 
of both native and haole groups tended to organize their 
recreation along social lines. Several private clubs were early 
formed in the outskirts of Honolulu. Waikiki remained a 
pleasant resort spot for the alii elite, who were joined in time 
by haoles who built homes there.14 A great swath of open 
space near Diamond Head was set aside and developed as 
Kapiolani Park—not, at first, as public recreational open 
space but for landscaped drives and a race track.15 On a less 
organized basis many people, from the early haole days on, 
enjoyed walking and camping in wilderness and forest areas. 
The Hawaii trail system remained usable for a long time, and 
later arrivals developed paths and trails of their own, some­
times overlapping with the earlier ones. By the 1870s there 
were four hundred miles of trails available to hikers.16
Recreation for the less well-to-do malihinis, including the 
successive waves of imported plantation workers, was not 
well taken care of during the early years. These people found 
what relaxation they could, with no land especially set aside 
for it, through much of the nineteenth century. The concept 
of public parks grew slowly in Hawaii, at first through public 
benefaction. Samuel M. Damon, an amateur horticulturist, 
carved a magnificent park from his estate lands around the 
turn of the century, furnished it with authentic Japanese 
structures, and made it a public park called Moanalua 
Gardens. A civic-minded group naming itself the Pan-Pacific 
Club did its best to establish an area along the Nuuanu 
stream close to downtown Honolulu, to be known as Liliuo-
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kalani Gardens. The city of Honolulu itself (having allowed 
both the Moanalua and the Liliuokalani park gardens to be 
“ cannibalized,” as one historian puts it) tried for years to 
get estate lands to make an oceanfront park in town back of 
Ala Moana Beach—a job that the New Deal’s Works Prog­
ress Administration finally did. Even today a nonprofit 
foundation, together with heirs of the Damon Estate, is 
struggling to develop Moanalua Valley as public park space.
It has been handicapped, however, by the determined efforts 
of the State Department of Transportation to build a freeway 
through it.17
When Hawaii became part of the United States, spaces for­
mally designated as parks, based on national standards, 
began slowly to replace the earlier haphazard uses of land for 
public recreation. Today Hawaii’s total of federal, state, and 
county park systems is impressive (even though it may be de­
ficient in meeting acres-per-thousand-persons standards used 
on the mainland). And, generally speaking, the spaces are 
jealously and zealously guarded. Recreational needs and the 
lands necessary to satisfy them were studied in the first 
general plan of the state and then again in the first revision 
to that plan. An additional study of recreational land needs 
was begun in the late 1960s as a State Comprehensive Out­
door Recreation Plan (SCORP). Updated several times, most 
recently in 1971, it is a serious study of needs, using general­
ly accepted standards and modifying them by an analysis of 
available resources and of demands indicated by the local 
people.18 To some extent the state has followed the SCORP 
recommendations, although budgets have not allowed true 
implementation and conflicts with development desires have 
prevented acquisition of all the necessary land.
The open-space park system in Hawaii includes federal 
parks under jurisdiction of the National Park Service 
(designed primarily to preserve natural and historic areas of 
national significance); state recreational reserves (classified as 
state parks, state monuments, state recreation areas, and 
state waysides); and county parks (almost entirely designed
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for local community recreation). The national parks total
207,000 acres and include several important preserves with 
very high user counts: Haleakala National Park, centered 
on a dormant volcanic crater on Maui; Hawaii Volcanoes 
National Park, encompassing a crater system that is still very 
much alive on the island of Hawaii; and the City of Refuge 
National Park, also on the Big Island.19
The state park system, with all its components, totals 
about 16,000 acres and includes such magnificent scenery as 
Waimea Canyon and Kokee Point on Kauai, Akaka Falls on 
Hawaii, and Iao Valley on Maui, as well as certain separate 
spots designated as monuments, among them Diamond Head 
and even several heiaus and other historic sites.
Many county park areas, particularly important on Oahu, 
are beach parks. The islands have 934 miles of tidal shore­
line, but only about 185 miles are classified as sandy beach 
and only 13 percent of this mileage, or 24 miles, is con­
sidered really good for beach recreation use (which means 
that if all the 33 percent of the population who say they en­
joy beachgoing were to decide to sun themselves at the same 
time, there would be about 12,000 people on each mile of 
good sandy beach).20 While it seems to a visitor driving 
around the islands that there is a plenitude of beach park 
space, on a sunny weekend the beaches are filled and the 
roads leading to them are clogged.
Indeed, while Hawaii seems to have a large park reserve, it 
is really not too great for the present population, swollen as 
it is by several millions of visitors annually. The great prob­
lem now is how to keep adding to it as numbers of people 
and their recreational demands grow, with ever greater com­
petition developing for open lands. For those who see a need 
for further urban expansion, particularly more housing for 
the growing population, setting aside large expanses of open 
land for “ unproductive” recreational use is socially wasteful. 
At the same time, to those concerned with preservation of 
the natural environment, many recreational uses are ecologi­
cally damaging.
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The competition between public needs for recreation and 
private desires for development is most acute along the ocean 
shore. Theoretically, all beach is state property back to the 
vegetation line, but in reality private owners facing the shore 
preempt much of the beach use. Honolulu’s deputy parks di­
rector estimated that about half of Oahu’s sandy beach front­
age is being used for nonrecreational purposes. Access to 
good beaches is made difficult; there is little use in saying 
that the shore is everyone’s property when private holdings 
block the way to it. Not long ago on Molokai, a great public 
march across private lands and an all-day luau on the 
island’s best sandy beach effectively protested the way a 
landowner was making access impossible through his proper­
ty; the beach is now accessible.21 Even in Waikiki, access 
ways that by law are supposed to be kept open are blocked. 
The Royal Hawaiian-Sheraton complex, among others, 
makes the required public routes past the hotels invisible and 
almost unusable.
Urban recreation spaces, especially in Honolulu, are a 
special problem. The Honolulu Parks and Recreation Depart­
ment admits that national standards for urban parks of 
various categories are by no means met. And as the popula­
tion increases, the amount of parkland per person—or per 
thousand people, as the standards are measured—drops 
further each year. The municipal budget for acquisition, 
development, and maintenance of parklands is inadequate, 
and competition for desirable spots exists as it does on open 
lands and beachfronts. Since the costs are very great (land 
for parks suffers from the same inflated valuation as any 
other real estate), there is an understandable wish by govern­
ment to hang some of the price tag on the shoulders of 
private developers. In 1972 the state mandated the counties 
to pass “ park dedication’’ ordinances requiring developments 
of certain sizes and kinds to set aside land for parks to be 
developed and maintained by the counties.22 The great fault 
with such a procedure is that it inevitably produces segre­
gated park enclaves—the favored residents are allowed and
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the adjoining, often less well-to-do neighbors are forbidden. 
Another disadvantage is that the overall result, in time, could 
be a pattern of almost private park sites located wherever 
new developments occur, rather than a recreational program 
planned objectively for the full population, in the older 
ethnic neighborhoods as well as in the new subdivisions.
One of the most outrageous instances of the political jock­
eying of private developments and public parks was the fill­
ing in of Salt Lake, an inland body of water lying in the 
cone of a volcanic crater on Oahu, by entrepreneur-financier 
Clarence Thing Chock Ching, a master of political logrolling. 
Alia-pa‘akai, as the early Hawaiians knew this “ salt pond,” 
was in legend formed by Pele as she traveled around the 
island. Her eyes watered as she worked at the task and drops 
fell that formed the salt in the pond. Geologists explain its 
origin in more scientific terms as the result of a subsurface 
hydromagnatic explosion that thrust up a cone of ashy lime­
stone pellets some 150,000 years ago.23 In 1957 the heirs and 
trustees of the Damon Estate, modern-time owners of that 
part of the island, were not as concerned with historic preser­
vation as they were with cash flow. Clarence Ching nego­
tiated a purchase of 1,200 of their acres, including the lake.
This was before the Land Use Law had been passed and 
such areas had been formally classified as Conservation dis­
tricts, but various state and county permissions were never­
theless required before development plans could proceed. 
Ching was Democrat Governor Burns’ financial campaign 
chairman and at the same time a heavy contributor to Hono­
lulu’s Republican mayor Neal Blaisdell,24 so there seemed to 
be no problems ahead for him. Before long he had ready a 
handsome presentation of plans for use of the land and the 
lake, and in September 1959 planner George Houghtailing (a 
former city planning director whom developers found a use­
ful translator and effective advocate for their plans) submit­
ted it to the Honolulu Planning Commission.23 The plan 
showed that the lake was to be dredged and developed for 
water sports. On its shores there would be 2,500 individual
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homes and forty landscaped acres of hotels and “ deluxe” 
apartments. An additional twenty-two acres would be 
developed as apartments for middle-income families, and the 
plan showed a shopping center and other neighborhood 
amenities. One of the most attractive features was to be a 
private park with Japanese and Chinese gardens and a 
marina on the lake. As the greatest gratuitous gesture of all, 
Ching offered to set aside a ten-acre public park space.
Such promises were irresistible, and the commission readily 
approved the zoning request.26 Soon subdivision houses and 
suburban apartments began to appear on the land. From 
time to time further rezoning requests were made and ap­
proved (the 40 acres of apartment-zoned land grew to 135 
acres)—but the lake remained uncared for, even partly silted 
with fill from the construction areas, and neither of the 
promised parks was built. Then, in 1966, in petitions to the 
city’s Planning Commission and the board of the state’s De­
partment of Land and Natural Resources, Ching discarded 
his earlier plans: he now asked permission to level the lake. 
He wished to fill it in so that he could build on its surface a 
private golf course.
There was no more difficulty in gaining the essential per­
missions this time than there had been earlier. The Planning 
Commission (chaired at that time by an architect) consented 
to loss of the lake—despite pleas from the local neighbor­
hood that its need was for public parks, not private golf 
links, and conservation arguments that the lake was unique 
and irreplaceable although the golf course could be built 
elsewhere. ILWU officer Eddie Tangen, speaking for his 
union, testified that “ we will do all we can to prevent this 
destruction.” The Land Board (which by then had jurisdic­
tion over use of Conservation land) proved no more difficult 
to convince. Its own staff recommended approval, and the 
board’s vote on 9 September 1966 to grant Ching’s request 
was unanimous. Even a member who was an ILWU business 
agent abandoned the union’s previous position.27
That might seem victory enough, but Clarence Ching had
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more ideas. The golf course/lake was sold to a local automo­
bile dealer (suspected by some of being a front for Japanese 
interests, though Ching’s attorney denied that),28 and Ching 
turned his attention to other projects. Sales of condominium 
apartments in the Salt Lake development had been so suc­
cessful—despite wide recognition that the crowded buildings 
were badly placed and poorly designed (Ching himself has 
been quoted as agreeing that the neighborhood has “ a clut­
tering effect” )—that more space for more building could 
obviously be used.29 In 1972 a request was made to city and 
state that twenty-nine more acres of conservation land 
adjacent to the community be rezoned to permit high-rise 
development.
Once again Ching promised that if his application was 
granted he would provide park space—sixteen acres for a re­
gional park, this time, and two smaller parcels (three and a 
half and four acres) for neighborhood parks. Local residents, 
who by that time had formed a community association to 
keep vigil on the developer’s various moves, were under­
standably torn between those who wished to keep the conser­
vation land as a shield against further development and those 
who were willing to compromise to gain some of the park 
space that had so long been promised.30
By now the government end of the political fulcrum had 
changed somewhat. Ching’s Republican friend Neal Blaisdell 
had been succeeded as mayor of Honolulu by Democrat 
Frank Fasi, who, during his successful 1968 campaign, had 
named Ching as one of the city’s “ fast-buck operators.” 
Nevertheless Ching contributed to Fasi’s campaign fund 
($8,000 according to one reporter) and Fasi strongly sup­
ported the proposed apartment-zoning/park-dedication 
operation.31 It would be “a good deal for the developer, the 
residents, and the city,” he said.32 An additional change in 
strategy was needed, however, to complete the deal: the 
Department of Land and Natural Resources was not involved 
now, but the Land Use Commission would have to approve 
the further change in land classification from conservation to
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urban use. Something slipped up for the first time in Salt 
Lake’s progression from natural resource to high-rise suburb. 
This step was too much for the commission to allow to be 
taken. In February 1973, the application was disapproved.
So, for the time being, the story seemed to end. Clarence 
Ching, of course, withdrew his offer to make parklands 
available, until such time as the Land Use Commission might 
change its mind. Like other developers who have suffered 
rezoning setbacks in the commission’s continuing series of 
arbitrary decisions, he is content to wait. Conditions and 
characters will change again. The parkland is badly needed 
and is available at any time the developer’s terms are met. It 
is almost the only area of conservation land near the center 
of the city that could be used for recreational purposes, but 
neither the state nor the city government, for a long time, in­
dicated any intention of acquiring it so long as the possibility 
of a political arrangement remained. Finally, late in 1976, the 
Honolulu city council asked the state to release funds ($2.5 
million was suggested) for purchase of a site from Ching for 
the public park that he had once proposed to provide.
In fact, as the population continued to grow at rates that 
seemed to justify more Salt Lake-type developments, it was a 
good question whether enough additional Hawaiian land 
could be preserved anywhere for the local people’s enjoyment 
and recreation, without a radical change that would replace 
politics with policy. It was not difficult to demonstrate the 
problem. A professor and a student in»the university’s archi­
tectural department made some calculations in 1974 showing 
how recreational needs in the broad sense (re-creational was 
the word form they preferred) could be made a measure of 
the state lands’ capacity for carrying a load of human popu­
lation.33 They proposed using the three common method­
ologies for planning recreational space—standards, demands, 
and resources—not as checks on one another but as factors in 
a single formula. They calculated the need, the demand of 
people in Hawaii for recreation of various sorts, and 
measured it against accepted standards to determine how
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much land space would be required for each person. They 
then figured the amount of land that could be reasonably 
used for recreation of the kinds required—the total available 
resource—and divided this by the space needs to calculate the 
number of people who might be accommodated decently by 
the resource. The figure came out very close to one million 
persons: the number that others had used intuitively as an 
optimum maximum population for the islands.
There was little likelihood, however, that the politics of 
land use in Hawaii would support such an objective conclu­
sion as policy. Rather, the approach to relating people and 
recreational space continues to be first, satisfying the land 
needs of building for urban growth and then examining state 
and county budgets to see how much of the land left over 
might be acquired for the unprofitable, nonessential purpose 
of human pleasure. Everyone knew it would not be enough.34
chapter
Source of Sustenance
THERE are numerous additional ways in which land func­
tions as a vital asset, none more important than its support 
for life’s essentials of food and shelter—as arable agricultural 
land and as buildable urban land. The competition between 
these two demands on its limited supply and their mutual 
contest for conservation land constitute the largest part of 
today’s land management problem.
There may come a time in the future when agricultural 
lands are not of such prime importance, when, as many bio­
chemists believe, chemical or microbiological synthesis will 
supply our essential nutrients. For a long while, however, it 
seems likely that we will continue to depend on foodstuffs 
grown in or raised on land. As needs increase with popula­
tion growth, they will be met for some time to come by in­
creased land yields rather than technological substitutes.1
Hawaii’s history is peculiar in this respect, and it may 
presage some of the difficulties that lie ahead for the rest of 
the world. It is a story again of rapid change, in this case a 
shift from a satisfied dependence on local products for the 
necessary food to dependence on imports. Each situation has
132 TH E W O R TH  OF H A W A II’ S LANDS
involved risks. The Polynesian Hawaiians worked hard for 
their crops and chanced damage and drought. “ Food was a 
child to be cared for, and it required great care,” wrote an 
early native historian.2 Food in Hawaii is now, to a large 
degree, a child of the shipping industry and the airlines, to 
be cared for, when it arrives, by supermarket distributors.
The Hawaiians before Cook were good, proud farmers. 
They understood their land and they knew where it would 
bear well and what things and when. To provide for a 
limited but ample diet, their methods of cultivating food­
stuffs and raising livestock were crude but skillful. From pre­
paring the soil to harvesting its produce, agriculture was an 
integral part of life on the land, an inseparable aspect of the 
union of nature, man, and deity. The word for land, ‘aina, 
comes from the verb ‘ai (meaning to feed) with the suffix na 
and has been translated as “ that which feeds.” 3 For the sus­
tenance that work and the land’s productivity provided, the 
Hawaiian paid feudal tribute to the chief and made grateful 
offerings to the gods, many of whom were respected in 
particular ways for help in growing food.4
The primary farming tool was a crooked stick ( ‘o ‘o), trea­
sured and preserved when it had proved to be a particularly 
good one, supplemented by the farmer’s own hands and 
feet. Irrigation was carefully planned: taro patches, which 
required water, were formed by earth banks reinforced with 
stones; carefully selected stones were used to construct fish 
ponds (some, credited to the earlier, smaller inhabitants 
remembered as Menehune, of extremely skillful construc- 
don); stone irrigation ditches were formed where they were 
necessary.5
The time of planting was carefully considered, and the ef­
fect of dry, rainy, warm, and cool seasons on the crops was 
well understood. In addition, planting was guided by phases 
of the moon; leafy produce was put in the soil when the 
moon was full, root vegetables later in the lunar cycle. Soil 
qualities were comprehended and capably utilized. Land that
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supported wild growth (under the jurisdiction of the god 
Laka) was best for most produce, and it was well understood 
that weeds and wild materials held within them the vital 
essence of good land; they were carefully dug in or left to 
mulch. Taro, a food staple, needed wetlands for some varie­
ties and drier but well-irrigated soil for others. Sweet pota­
toes grew best on dry land (known as kula, which was also 
the word for a bald man). Farm plots were planted with 
successive seasonal crops, so that some produce was always 
ready to use. If the soil became sour (because Laka was dis­
pleased for some reason), it was covered with wild growth 
and allowed to improve until the god was satisfied and the 
farmland could be used again.6
These products of the soil furnished a diet that was simple 
but adequate and remarkably nourishing. Its basis was taro, 
breadfruit, sweet potato, and yam, supplemented by certain 
leafy vegetables. The taro was eaten in several ways, as it is 
today, but most commonly as poi, produced by pounding the 
root and cooking the resultant pulpy substance. Coconut and 
sugarcane provided succulent variety for the fare and certain 
fruits, including bananas and mountain apples, were plenti­
ful. Seafoods of many kinds were included in the diet, of 
course, and edible seaweed grew plentifully along the shores 
and on the reefs. For meat the choice was limited: there was 
pig, chicken, and dog, and that was about it. Fresh water 
from streams and springs was no problem, and a headier, 
narcotic drink called ‘awa was brewed from shrub roots.7
The land provided not only foodstuffs but the means for 
preparing them as well. Cooking was done in the imu: an 
underground oven still used for roasting the pig and steam­
ing other ingredients of a luau meal (hot stones are placed in 
or around the well-salted animal or leaf-wrapped victuals). 
Quite clearly the Hawaiian diet was heavy in starchy foods, 
but it provided sufficient protein and also furnished vitamins 
and the essential minerals, amino acids, iodine, and other 
nutrients we work so hard to add to our fortified foods. In
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addition, of course, it contained plenty of calories. The Ha­
waiians were (and still are) a sturdy, well-built, often over­
weight folk who were nevertheless generally healthy—until 
the white man came.
For the newcomers the diet was neither appealing nor satis­
fying. Poi is always difficult for a malihini to learn to like, 
and the haole taste for beef, white potato, and green vega- 
tables is hard to change. Captain Cook on his second trip 
(knowing by then what the local limitations were) brought 
with him not only goats but sheep and a different kind of pig 
and seeds to propagate onions, pumpkins, and melons. As 
other ships began to arrive, they too carried food offerings. 
Vancouver made a major change in the available fare when 
he introduced horned cattle. Captain Charles Berkley added 
turkeys to the diet. Don Francisco Marin introduced many 
vegetables and a number of fruits now considered indige­
nous: guava, lime, lemon, mango, and probably the pine­
apple.
By the time the first missionaries came in 1820, then, the 
islanders were accustomed to many new fruits and garden 
vegetables, and additional importations continued. David 
Malo, recording the changes, noted in the 1830s that “ among 
the kinds of food brought from foreign countries are flour, 
rice, Irish potatoes, beans, Indian corn, squashes, and mel­
ons, of which the former are eaten after cooking and the lat­
ter raw .” He also reported that “ many new intoxicants have 
been introduced from foreign lands, as rum, brandy, gin.” 8
In political-economic terms, this importation of exotic pro­
ducts marked a shift in emphasis in the agricultural use of 
Hawaiian land from raising essential food to developing an 
industry. Vancouver and others admitted their purposes were 
several. In part they were self-interested, wishing dietary 
improvements for themselves; to some extent they were 
generous, because no foreigner could believe that the 
Hawaiians did not need additions to what seemed a meager 
fare. But they were also farsightedly businesslike, for these 
pioneers saw that an expanded base of food and cattle
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production could go a long way toward taking Hawaii into 
the growing pan-Pacific trade as an important producer and 
exporter.
Turning Agriculture to Profit
The new values that were being introduced to Hawaii and its 
people required that an economic footing be found for the 
islands; otherwise they would be a picturesque but useless 
addition to the modern world that had discovered them. The 
first search, very reasonably, was for ways to turn agriculture 
to profit.
Many products were tried in the early years of the nine­
teenth century.9 When Ladd & Company leased the Koloa 
land in 1839, they planted five thousand coffee trees, an 
equal number of banana trees, and taro in forty-five well- 
irrigated patches. The missionaries saw the need not only 
to improve food supplies but to make the “ wasted fertile 
land” productive—and sent back to New England an appeal 
for experts to help them raise cotton, silk, indigo, sugar, 
and other edible goods, avowing that their activities would be 
based on “ Christian and benevolent principles,” with their 
aim primarily “ teaching the people profitable industry.” 10 
Soon, however, missionaries themselves were finding profit 
in raising certain crops (primarily sugarcane) and their princi­
ples and purposes shifted somewhat.11
During these early times unsuccessful attempts were made 
to raise silkworms and cotton and there were sporadic tries at 
producing and exporting kukui nut oil, arrowroot, mustard 
seed, tobacco, a fern product called pulu, and even goat­
skins. None of these efforts caught on well enough to war­
rant further development. In the 1850s, wheat was grown for 
a time and several flour mills were built. These experiments 
and the foodstuffs they produced were almost entirely for 
local benefit until the whaling industry, growing in size and 
making more use of Hawaii as a fueling and resting place, 
provided a new market. The first whaling ship arrived in
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1819, and during the 1840s and 1850s more than four hun­
dred were coming annually. In addition to relaxation and 
amusement their crews needed supplies of all sorts, including 
food.12 The opening up of California and Oregon, particular­
ly during California’s gold rush, provided a further stimulus 
to Hawaii’s commercial agriculture.
That western U.S. market was a particular spur to potato 
growing in the islands. In the 1840s, 80,000 to 100,000 bar­
rels of potatoes were exported annually, and then the activity 
began to decline. Coffee trees were introduced early and 
grown successfully in several places, most notably on the 
Kona coast of the Big Island. Coffee immediately proved to 
be a profitable export item and continued to be a successful 
activity for a long time. However, the small farms on the 
Kona coast have never abandoned hand picking (until recent­
ly requiring school schedules to be arranged to suit the har­
vesting season), and now they are unable to compete with 
mechanized activities elsewhere.13 Commercial fowl and egg 
production, and the raising of pigs, began slowly from the 
original Hawaiians’ supplying their own needs and increased 
through the years.
Raising cattle, for both food and hides, began auspiciously 
soon after Vancouver carried the first horned beasts to the 
islands, and it continues a profitable activity to the present 
time. In the early days cattle raising and crop farming were 
not compatible activities—most of the cattle brought early 
were allowed to become wild and the farmers suffered from 
their depredations. Even when ranching became organized 
and grazing was controlled by cowboys (paniolos) brought 
from Mexico and Spain the trouble continued for some time, 
and in 1841 a Law Respecting Mischievous Beasts was 
enacted.14 (In the highlands above the ranches on the Big 
Island some wild cattle still wander quite visibly.) Never­
theless, ranches grew in number and size and many of them 
continue to thrive today. In 1848 there were about ten thou­
sand head of cattle in Hawaii; in 1970 that number had
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grown to around sixty thousand head using over a million 
acres of land—one fourth of Hawaii’s area—for grazing.15
While the planters had their attention focused on agricul­
ture as a commercial activity, the food needs of the growing 
local population were increasingly overlooked. The planta­
tion workers brought to Hawaii from other places (to help 
grow crops of little nutritional value) added sharply to the 
need for food supplies. What they wanted to eat was often 
quite foreign, once again, to the crops that the lands of the 
islands were growing. Vegetables such as bitter melon, egg­
plant, gobo dasheen, wonbok, and daikon were imported 
and planted at that time and have become staples of home­
grown agriculture. New exotic fruits such as the persimmon, 
lychee, and pummelo were added to the local orchards.
The primary new food requirement in the late nineteenth 
century was rice. Efforts to grow rice had been made earlier. 
Oriental varieties did not do well, but grain from the 
southern United States flourished and produced a small 
boom in the 1850s. For some time rice was such a success 
that it replaced taro on many of the wetland fields and be­
came an important exportable item. At one point some 6,400 
acres were devoted to rice growing. In the long run, however, 
it could not compete with California’s machine-processed 
product and its cultivation declined until today it is a rare 
crop on the islands.16 It is still a major food staple but, 
absurdly, its great local usage must be satisfied by importa­
tion from outside.
Gradually, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
this downtrend spread to one kind of local food crop after 
another. Before long it was clear that sugarcane had become 
the most profitable crop. Raising sugarcane and manufactur­
ing sugar from it began in earnest in the 1830s. Cane had 
been brought from the south by early Polynesian settlers and 
had long been grown by the Hawaiians on small plots and 
used for chewing as a sweet. The white settlers soon saw its 
commercial possibilities, but for a long time attempts to
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grow it in quantity were not successful. The first large-scale 
enterprise was that of Ladd & Company at Koloa on Kauai. 
After their difficulties, others took over the operation, and 
that plantation remained through the years one of the largest 
and most productive on the islands—until the present owners 
decided in the 1970s to develop large portions of it for 
resorts.17
As Koloa succeeded, other plantation enterprises were 
undertaken and land was acquired for increasingly large-scale 
production. In 1836, 8,000 pounds of sugar were exported; 
by 1860 it had reached 1 Vi million pounds; a decade later the 
export poundage had grown to 19 million; just before annex­
ation in 1879, the total was 500 million pounds. (Hawaii’s 
peak year, 1968, had exports of 214 billion pounds.)
From Sustenance to “Industry”
Aside from the continual need for good farmland there were 
other problems in a rapidly growing economy on islands so 
recently changed from an aboriginal state. There was a 
chronic shortage of capital during the early plantation days, 
along with the continual difficulties in finding sufficient 
amenable labor. The U.S. Civil War caused a boom during 
its duration, but later in the century production began to 
overreach available profitable markets. There was pressure 
for a reciprocal tariff treaty with the United States that 
would give Hawaii preferential access to the American mar­
ket, an aim that was successful in the 1870s. The next push 
was toward annexation, which the growers saw as an even 
more secure way of supplying sugar to meet American needs. 
That goal took a little longer to achieve, but when it was 
reached in 1898 little stood in the way of sugar plantation 
dominance of the islands’ economy—and of course its land. 
The number of plantations grew to fifty-two in 1900 and 
then leveled off as they consolidated and increased in size 
and productivity. Growth in the industry continued through 
the years until its very recent decline.
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Raising pineapple and developing ways of exporting that 
fruit and its succulent juice began as a serious enterprise 
much later than did sugarcane growing.18 Before the 1870s 
occasional shipments of the fruit itself were made, but the 
first canning was done on the Big Island in 1882. Although 
the quality of the fruit was improved and the canning process 
was further developed during the 1880s and 1890s, the indus­
try really got under way only after annexation. Acquiring 
land for growing pineapple became as important, and as 
ruthless, as finding it for cane growing had been. When 
James D. Dole formed the Hawaiian Pineapple Company in 
1901 one of his first—and continuing—needs was land, and 
in 1922 he managed the purchase of Lanai.19 Like the sugar 
plantations, pineapple lands and canneries proliferated and 
then, in time, consolidated. Along with sugar, pineapple has 
remained a profitable, growing activity until the last decade. 
Before production began to slide in the 1960s, Hawaii sup­
plied 80 percent of the canned pineapple and all the pine­
apple juice sold in the United States—and 75 percent of all 
the pineapple juice drunk anywhere in the world.
For about a hundred years—from the 1860s to the 
1960s—ever more land was needed to support these two agri­
cultural uses. In 1875, less than fifteen thousand acres had 
been devoted to growing sugarcane and a great deal less to 
pineapple. As the peak of activity was reached in the 1960s, 
a third of a million acres, or one-twelfth of the state’s sur­
face and almost three-fourths of its prime agricultural land, 
was devoted to the two crops. By contrast, all the green vege­
tables grown in Hawaii use only six thousand acres.20
The days when the islands’ arable lands had been used pri­
marily as a source of sustenance—essential foods to supply 
the needs of the local people—were long since gone. As the 
sugar-and-pine agricultural economy had expanded, almost 
all other kinds of farming on Hawaii’s richly fertile soil had 
declined, for many crops almost to the point of extinction.
Slowly, during the plantation time of the first half of this 
century, the distinction between agriculture as sustenance and
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agriculture as business had become blurred. For a very long 
time data on farm production has been given in terms of 
amounts exported and dollars earned, never in degrees of sat­
isfaction of consumer needs. Decisions to plant one thing or 
discontinue the planting of another have been based on prof­
itability of export, not on essentiality of product. In fact, 
there is no longer much understanding that there are the two 
different agricultural functions of food supply and com­
merce. The term “ agricultural industry” is used now by both 
government and the private sector to describe the state’s soil 
cultivation activity. To designate specifically the growing of 
foodstuffs, another phrase, “ diversified agriculture,” has 
been devised.
“Agriculture, ” says the dictionary, is the science and art 
of farming, the work of cultivating the soil, producing crops, 
and raising livestock: tillage, husbandry. An industry, on the 
other hand, is any branch of trade, business, or manufactur­
ing, often involving production—but, Webster says, produc­
tion of a kind “ as distinguished from agriculture.” Thus 
the combination of the words in one descriptive term is a 
revealing distortion of diction. This contrived usage of the 
language became necessary when sugarcane and pineapple, as 
commercial export items, assumed the use of almost all 
arable land in Hawaii. Defining either of the activities as 
“ agriculture” is an extension by courtesy of the meaning of 
that word. Sugar is indeed a part of our diet, but certainly 
not an essential nutrient; pineapple is a luxury fruit providing 
some food energy (from its sugar) but composed of 85 
percent water. Describing the state’s farming activities as an 
agricultural “ industry” simply recognizes the fact that 
Hawaii put its arable lands almost exclusively at the service 
of the commercial producers and merchandisers of these two 
commodities.
Several interesting problems result from this change in ag­
ricultural emphasis and the redefinition it has required. One 
is the fact that Hawaii has been far from self-sufficient in 
food supplies during the twentieth century. Another is that
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arable land has become valuable not by reason of its food- 
producing qualities but in relation to the income it can 
generate. A third is that arguments for protecting open land 
from development because of its fertility—one of the primary 
justifications worldwide for greenland conservation—are 
specious in Hawaii. It is unconvincing to urge preservation of 
agricultural land when its “ agricultural” use has long been 
commercial production of a crystal sweetener and a sweet 
fruit.
As the politics of land shifted—from strategies designed to 
protect the plantations from the spread of urban growth to 
tactics planned to encourage urban development and permit 
the phasing out of plantation agriculture—some worried citi­
zens and some anxious politicians began to rethink the results 
of the loss of local crops. Even as the population had been 
growing, the islands had become gradually more dependent 
on food supplies imported by sea or by air. Hawaii’s people 
had thus been placed at the mercy of shippers and their 
unions and were paying just about the highest food bills in 
the nation.
In the 1970s, only 40 percent of the fresh fruits and vege­
tables consumed in Hawaii was produced locally. About half 
the beef used in the islands was local (with the remainder 
sent about equally from the U.S. mainland and from New 
Zealand and Australia) and slightly over a third of the 
pork.21 An odd feeling had developed that local things should 
be looked down on as provincial and common; imported 
items were more precious, hence more desirable, therefore 
better. This despite the fact that the quality of most of 
Hawaii’s homegrown products was excellent: Manoa lettuce, 
Maui and Molokai onions, Kahuku and Molokai water­
melon, Chinese bananas, Ewa poultry and eggs, local potato, 
yam, turnip, celery, cucumber. The local beef, less tender 
perhaps but certainly more tasty than the artificially fattened 
mainland product, is ignored by most haoles and western- 
oriented Orientals; its sale is primarily in out-of-the-way local 
stores in the native sections.
I 4 I
142 TH E W O R TH  OF H A W A II’ S LANDS
Under both Governor Burns and Governor Ariyoshi, direc­
tors of the State Agricultural Department, Fred Erskine and 
John Farias, worked seriously to bolster diversified produc­
tion. Ariyoshi continually stated as principle his belief that 
agricultural lands should stay in agriculture and should 
remain productive, even when they were abandoned by the 
plantations. Some truly diversified crops were already being 
raised and exported. Of the ones that early growers had pro­
duced in the nineteenth century for export, few remained. 
Potatoes are still grown—but the lands that produce the best 
yields are prime targets for urban expansion. Coffee is still 
raised and handpicked on Kona farms—but its future is very 
uncertain. Commercial fowl and egg production remains a 
viable activity, supplying a sizable part of the local need, 
although it has never become an export item. The same can 
be said of pig farming, with the big difference that the poor 
souls in that enterprise have been more harried and harassed 
than any other food suppliers on the islands. Guava and pas­
sion fruit, ginger root, and other luxury items with fringe 
food value have shown signs of catching on as commercial 
export items. Macadamia nuts are becoming an important 
crop: the amount of land devoted to this crop has increased 
from four thousand to nine thousand acres during the decade 
of the 1960s. The product with perhaps the greatest sign of 
successful export is papaya, long enjoyed locally and now 
shipped in greater quantity all the time and finding increasing 
markets on the U.S. mainland and in Japan.22
The Move to Save Farmland
As the plantations threatened to close or gradually shut 
down, state-appointed agencies known formally as Task 
Forces were set up to encourage employment substitutes that 
would not always require land-use zoning changes to permit 
building development. Various ways were tried to bolster 
local industry by these groups, from establishing group­
farming activities in agricultural parks to encouraging
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nurseries for tropical plants or orchards for tropical fruits, 
and even, in one instance, deserting agriculture altogether to 
subsidize a controversial and not too successful plastics 
manufacturing plant.
The task that these forces faced, with state and county 
government input and advice from many segments of the pri­
vate sector, was well-nigh impossible. No preparations had 
been made or long-range planning undertaken for replace­
ment of the plantations in any of the places where task forces 
were formed. At Kohala on the Big Island, at Kilauea on 
Kauai, on Molokai, and in other locations, ad hoc decisions 
were made to lease land or subsidize operations that were 
seldom well thought through. At Kohala, where one of the 
earliest plantations had been established in missionary days, 
most task force efforts failed, but the state stubbornly kept 
putting money in those that remained.23 The county, how­
ever, was not so optimistic. Early in 1976 the Hawaii Plan­
ning Commission approved land rezoning in south Kohala 
for a huge resort development planned by a Japanese invest­
ment group: it seemed a more certain way to stimulate local 
industry and guarantee local employment.24 On Molokai, 
where the task force had blocked out an agricultural park for 
small-farm enterprises, the sole tenant, a potato farmer, gave 
up and canceled his lease. He had found, he said, that it 
was not possible to farm successfully on such a small scale, 
and a larger acreage was not available to him in Hawaii. He 
planned to move his operation to northern California.25
On Maui a different sort of state-county political conflict 
developed, in this case over what were known as agricultural 
subdivisions. The Land Use Law permitted the sale of good 
agricultural land to individuals in parcels as small as two 
acres, presumably to allow small-operation farming in sub­
divisionlike groupings. At one time the idea was appealing 
(as homesteading always has been, in principle) and a 
number of local people eked out a living that way on long- 
familiar land. In recent years, however, developers had taken 
advantage of the proviso, finding it a loophole in the land
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classification system: they sold sites in agricultural subdivi­
sions as two-acre estates to wealthy buyers who had no inten­
tion of farming. The scheme rapidly became another political 
game played by state and county agencies with the develop­
ers; players on both sides knew that the label of agriculture 
on these plots was a deceit.
When Ariyoshi’s state administration began making moves 
to protect farmlands, this trickery turned on the government 
that had allowed it to develop. Denied a large-scale rezoning 
of fertile valleys on windward Oahu, developer Joe Pao 
used agricultural subdivisions as a threat: give me an urban 
classification for these agricultural lands so that I can build 
moderate-priced homes there, he said in effect, or I will 
develop the land anyway as high-priced estates.26 On Kauai 
in the mid-1970s some twenty such subdivisions were in the 
planning stage, most of them by small-scale operators. On 
former Kilauea Sugar Company land, where the state’s task 
force hoped to establish an agricultural park one of these 
high-class tracts reached the stage of application to the coun­
ty Planning Commission. It was approved. Under the law, 
the commission contended, it had no other choice. The state 
brought suit against the Planning Commission and the main­
land couple who hoped to subdivide seventeen acres of arable 
land, as a test case, to see what the courts would say about 
the rights and wrongs of this mismanaged bit of state land 
management.27
So sure were plantation landowners that they would even­
tually gain urban zoning for their farmsteads that they often 
had no hesitation in dropping their own insufficiently profit­
able tillage, or canceling nonremunerative leases to others for 
farm uses, and simply waiting. In 1975 Ariyoshi’s adminis­
tration made plans for another court test to experiment with 
an innovative way of preventing this kind of loss of agricul­
ture on fertile land. An investment company named Kilauea 
Management moved to cancel leases it had extended to farm 
and ranch operators and a number of truck farmers on C. 
Brewer & Company land, which had once been the Kilauea
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plantation, even though its application for partial rezoning 
had been turned down by the Land Use Commission. The 
state’s scheme to counter the cancellation threat was to con­
demn not the land itself but the leasehold interest in the 
lands—and not permanently but for a term of ten years. The 
intention would be, when the state had acquired first lease­
hold rights, to sublease the farms and ranches back to 
farmers and ranchers, at reasonable rates, in reasonably sized 
acreages.28 It would take some time to test the idea in the 
courts and there was sure to be opposition and counterlitiga­
tion. The ubiquitous Eddie Tangen, for one, testified against 
the state’s intention immediately (whether as chairman of the 
Land Use Commission or an officer of the ILWU, news 
reports did not make clear).29 If the move worked, it would 
be less costly to the state than outright land condemnation, 
unquestionably, but it appeared to be a circuitous, temporary 
device that would hold farmlands from development for ten 
years at best. By then the pressures for rezoning could have 
become too strong to resist. The scheme was never tested in 
court, however. In 1976 Brewer announced a well-planned 
long-range use of its land which would keep a “ major part” 
in agriculture (guava raising) and aquaculture (prawn farm­
ing) and the next year the state dropped its plan to condemn 
the leasehold interest.
Those Hawaii citizens who believed that plans should 
be made for the future—carefully considered, not quickly 
contrived; as a matter of determined policy, not political 
expediency—kept their fingers crossed as they watched the 
operations and listened to the quarrels about task forces, 
subdivisions, and lease condemnations and heard the gover­
nor reiterate his intention to save agricultural land. It was 
encouraging that some moves were being made; they seemed 
to mark a clear change from the consistent prodevelopment 
approach of the previous administration. Yet there was not 
an equal consistency evident in the new proagriculture stance. 
While the state’s Agricultural Department set up task forces 
to preserve agriculture, the Land Use Commission continued
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to approve applications to abandon it. The political support 
for the new administration was the same as it had been for 
the prior one; few of the faces in state offices had changed. 
The new state director of agriculture, John Farias, vowed to 
keep windward Oahu’s lands in agriculture (as the previous 
director had also promised) while the director of transporta­
tion, E. Alvey Wright, held over from the former regime, 
continued to press for a new freeway to open them for 
development.
What was wanting was firm policy, consistently pointing to 
an assured future for agriculture in Hawaii. There was no 
lack of foundation for such a position, but the political will 
was absent. The University of Hawaii has a respected College 
of Tropical Agriculture which over the years has done what 
it could—in inadequate facilities and with a small budget—to 
help improve and bolster local growing capacities and tech­
niques. It has never found the same enthusiastic support 
from the business community that, for example, the school 
of Travel Industry Management enjoys. A new dean was 
appointed in 1976, the former head of a United Nations 
agricultural agency, and he arrived full of enthusiasm. “ I see 
Hawaii as an agricultural-commercial center for the Orient 
and the Pacific,” Dr. William Furtick said. “ One of the 
most important problems facing mankind is developing a 
strong agricultural capability in the tropical areas, the only 
major untapped reservoir of food production left.” 30 Those 
were exciting words. One wondered, though, whether the new 
dean—an employee of the state now—realized that Dr.
C. Peairs Wilson, the man he succeeded, had once arrived 
with equal enthusiasm . . . and had left with a sense of 
frustrated hopelessness because of the state’s coolness to the 
college’s programs.
To direct his school to the broad goals he outlines, the new 
dean would also have to contend with the attitude expressed 
by two economic study groups at about the same time he 
arrived, one appointed by the governor and the other private­
ly sponsored. They agreed in their findings that Hawaii’s
SOURCE OF SUSTENANCE 147
economic future lay with tourism, not agriculture. Both 
concluded that the plantations were indisputably on their 
way out as a major economic and employment base for the 
islands and could not be replaced in that role by other kinds 
of agriculture. Small support for farming could be expected 
from the business community, then. And in the face of those 
predictions little hope could be held for a political policy of 
protecting agricultural lands for agricultural uses.
The problems that serious farmers faced in this situation 
were manifold. Land was costly and in competition with 
other uses. The local market was unstable and tempted by 
more stylish imports. There was not the government activity 
in finding wider markets that there had been during the lush 
days of sugar-and-pine export. An example of the difficulties 
in farming’s way was the experience of an ex-architect named 
David Curtis, son of a mainland rancher-farmer. Curtis saw 
great agricultural potential on Molokai, gave up his architec­
tural practice in Honolulu, and leased from the state two 
hundred acres of fertile but tough, windy land. Curtis was 
realistic. He knew that he must produce profitable exports to 
make his venture work in the long run and he decided that 
they were to be macadamia nuts. Until those trees matured 
and bore, and as a move toward true food farming, he raised 
onions, of the sweet variety that grows quite well locally. In 
a few years he was producing and shipping to Oahu 17,000 
bags annually, but then his crop was struck by a blight 
(which the University’s tropical agriculture experts frantically 
worked to cure for him) and in 1973 his onion output 
dropped to 3,000 bags. Then he grew cabbage, which did 
well, and beans, which proved to be a good crop, and hung 
on until his onions revived. Still he faces continual, unpre­
dictable competition in the Oahu markets from imports of 
produce from off the islands, such as Texas onions, that at 
times arrive in distressful quantities.
Curtis is a medium-sized farmer (twenty people at times 
work for him), not a large corporate enterprise but certainly 
not a homesteader. He and a few others like him know what
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they are doing, what they need, what the soil will produce, 
what mechanization is essential, what capitalization is re­
quired. Farmers of this kind, whether experienced oldtimers 
or newcomers, represent the enterprise that would be needed 
to keep Molokai’s agricultural land, as well as similar lands 
on the other islands, in agricultural production.
“There is so much talk about Molokai’s being the bread­
basket of Honolulu, but it’s not a very well thought out 
idea,” says Curtis indulgently. “ The market so easily gets 
out of balance.” 31
In Hawaii’s present mood, there seems little likelihood of 
achieving the sort of balance that Curtis and others need—a 
stability that only a firm policy of government support con­
sistently implemented could provide. The political preference 
is for a balancing act that juggles arable land back and forth 





EVEN though Hawaii is threatened with overbuilding on its 
open green lands, there are not enough homes to shelter all 
its people properly. Every few years someone makes a new 
study of the “ housing problem” and comes up with a fresh 
version of an old set of facts: for its own residents, Hawaii’s 
supply of living places is insufficient in numbers, inadequate 
in quality, and overly expensive in cost. It appears, then, that 
the lands of Hawaii are not being well used for provision of 
shelter. This seems to be another case where the Polynesian 
inhabitants of the islands, with their primitive technology, 
were better able to acquire life’s necessities from the land 
than are today’s residents with all their vaunted know-how.
The early Hawaiians constructed well what quarters they 
needed, placed them in the most suitable and convenient lo­
cations, and built them of materials that the land provided. 
The contemporary dwellers on Hawaii live, typically, in 
houses built very carelessly, located wherever a subdivision 
developer finds unused space for sale, and manufactured of 
products brought from many places by commercial suppliers. 
The original natives knew their lands well enough to grow
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their food in one place and build their houses in another, 
separated but conveniently near. Today’s people of Hawaii 
allow houses to be built on thousands of acres of the land 
that is best for growing foodstuffs.
The comparison is totally unfair, of course. There were 
only some 250,000 Polynesian Hawaiians when Captain 
Cook found them; today there are three times as many in­
habitants. Then, because they lived an agrarian life, farming 
and fishing, they were able to scatter their buildings on the 
hillsides so that a village of perhaps ten thousand people was 
almost invisible to the discoverers when they came.1 Today’s 
urban centers and residential subdivisions and the wide roads 
connecting them are obtrusively visible. People must assem­
ble to work wherever the businesses that employ them are 
located. They must have their homes built where utilities are 
available and where schools, shopping centers, and service 
stations can be provided. It is a different kind of life. Dwell­
ing units are not made individually by hand but are mass- 
produced in suburban rows or in high-rise tiers as they are 
everywhere else in the industrialized world—with not much 
consideration for how people really want to live in the 
islands or how their lands want to be used.
The early Hawaiians (who probably, at first, lived in 
caves) had a carefully developed construction system for 
their houses by the time Captain Cook arrived.2 The primary 
materials they used were stone, timber, pandanus leaf (lau 
hala), and pili grass. The stone adz, the principal construc­
tion tool, was supplemented with shaped shells and bones. 
Structures were cleverly lashed together (these were sailors as 
well as farmers) with occasional use of wooden pegs fitted by 
bone drills. The basic construction system was post, plate, 
and rafter, highly stylized, with descriptive names for each 
member. The timber skeleton, secured to a stone foundation 
platform that was sometimes earth-filled, was thatched with 
pandanus or strong grass. The typical building had a single 
low entrance. There were no windows or other openings. Stu­
150
SOURCE OF SH ELTER
dents of early Polynesian history have provided detailed de­
scriptions and drawings of the many construction details that 
were developed and carefully followed. A number of studied 
reconstructions have been made to demonstrate the system, 
too, so this aspect of the Hawaiian life-style before the white 
man came is well documented.3
The home of the typical household (a unit within the ex­
panded family, or ‘ohana,) consisted of several buildings. 
Considered as fundamental were a living and sleeping build­
ing, a house where the men prepared food and ate, and an 
eating place for the women of the household. More preten­
tious places included a separate building for menstruating 
women (usually a comfortable thatched house) and other 
structures that might be needed for work: a canoe house for 
a fisherman, a tool house for a farmer, buildings for tapa 
makers, mat weavers, and so on.
There was no profession of home builder as such, but 
skills in the art were developed and appreciated and experts 
were much in demand for guidance and help.4 The location 
of the home was so important that it required the services of 
another specialist: a diviner who knew, for instance, that if a 
house faced the road illness would result, if it was situated 
above its neighbors, wealth might come, whereas disputes 
would develop if it was placed behind others. Great care was 
given, then, to location as well as to the planning and con­
struction of the buildings; even death might occur, it was be­
lieved, if major alterations had to be made to a home after it 
was completed. While home building of this nature was, by 
all evidence, the common tradition until the white man came, 
Ellis described other kinds of shelter he saw on his travels: 
spacious caves in some places; larger family residences,
“quite open,” in others.5
Malo and other early writers refer to “ villages” and 
“ towns” and Cook described villagelike gatherings of houses 
that he saw, but these were not commercial or political 
centers as we know urbanized places. Homes were built in
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clusters because land for housing, even then, was a limited 
resource considering the size of the population. The popula­
tion was widely dispersed, nevertheless. Some of the village­
like complexes were inland or on the slopes, if occupations 
such as farming made this reasonable; others were on the 
shore near good fishing places.
Although political control might change as a result of 
battle or inheritance, towns grew up inevitably around the 
chiefs’ residences. The town of Napoopoo on the south side 
of Kealakekua Bay, where Cook and his men saw more than 
a thousand homes, was one of these. It clustered about the 
court of Kalaniopuu, the king who ruled that part of the 
island of Hawaii before Kamehameha’s rise to power. John 
Ledyard, one of Cook’s officers, described the community as 
attractive and the houses as having “ an air of elegance and 
comfort.” These groupings close to court became more ur­
ban in character, Malo notes, and their inhabitants developed 
characteristics quite different from people in the more rural 
settlements. Whereas country folk were industrious and 
“ humble,” enjoying simple games, inclined to “ gathering 
together for some profitless occupation or pastime for talk’s 
sake,” and enjoying casual personal and sexual relations, 
those gathered around the chiefs were likely to be “ overbear­
ing, loudmouthed, contentious,” searching for more sophisti­
cated pleasures in a more tense atmosphere, with prostitution 
and even homosexuality common. Undoubtedly different 
kinds of personalities were attracted, to begin with, by urban 
excitement and rural contentment, even as they are today.6
This tradition of building communities of houses did not 
survive for long the advent of the white man.7 Soon after the 
first haole arrivals, houses and other buildings constructed 
with boards nailed to studs, fitted with glazed windows and 
trimmed door openings, began to appear along the rough 
streets of the new towns. Not only did Kamehameha build 
himself European-style residences: his royal family and the 
alii who gathered about his court felt that they also must im­
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prove on the houses that had once satisfied them. Shortly 
before 1800 Vancouver’s men visited a kingly family in its 
compound of sleeping and eating places and other houses 
built carefully in the traditional manner. But soon after the 
turn of the century a visiting dignitary called on Queen 
Namahana, one of Kamehameha’s wives, in her “ pretty 
little house of two stories, built in the European manner.” 
Already Honolulu was boasting many frontier-style wooden 
buildings.8
Construction materials became an important item on the 
bills of lading of the ships that began making Honolulu a 
regular port of call, but it was a long time before anything 
like enough timber and fittings were available. Some build­
ings were constructed of blocks of coral stone or lava 
rock, but these masonry materials were difficult and time- 
consuming to use.9 Thatched structures were still built for 
some years, distasteful as they were to the foreigners, and 
early drawings of Honolulu, Hilo, and Lahaina show an odd 
structural hodgepodge.10 The common Hawaiian native was 
not likely to enjoy either a “ pretty” or a well-built home in 
town when he left his thatched house. With the influx of 
newcomers and the movement of the Hawaiian people away 
from the land toward the new communities, Hawaii’s 
perpetual housing shortage had begun.
During the years of the monarchy, as some of the towns 
grew to substantial size, the construction industry prospered 
and thousands of solid homes were built. But the deficiency 
in housing for the natives and other less affluent members 
of the community was never solved. The troubles of the 
ordinary Hawaiian had to do with loss of contact with the 
land. In a new urban life removed from the sustenance of the 
soil, the Hawaiian people learned that jobs and salaries were 
necessary for subsistence, but their dispositions were disin­
clined to this social pattern. Food, which had grown so 
readily from Hawaiian soil, was now often hard to come by. 
Homes, which had been built so easily on the open land,
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were now often difficult to find in the native quarters of the 
new cities. The problem was carried into the government ad­
ministrations that followed the overthrow of the kingdom 
and it increasingly involved more of the population than the 
Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians. Chinese, Japanese, and then 
Filipino plantation workers moved to the cities to seek jobs 
or start businesses that they hoped would improve their lot— 
and they needed places to live. Inevitably, workers from the 
mainland and abroad came to find employment in the 
increasing commercial activities in the towns, and not all of 
them were well fixed or well paid; they too needed urban 
dwelling places.
Hawaii went through all the phases of the “ housing prob­
lem” and tried all the solutions the U.S. mainland had tried 
in the early twentieth century. Honolulu and to a lesser ex­
tent other towns allowed ghettos to develop and tenements to 
be built. Company towns were established at the plantation 
sites. Endless efforts were made to encourage homesteading. 
None of these panaceas worked in other places and they all 
failed in Hawaii as well. The underlying difficulty was 
modern man’s inability to relate land, as a resource, with 
shelter, as a need, when land was considered a commodity.
The plantation towns were no better than company-owned 
communities usually are; one chronicler describes them as 
“ ugly and harshly uncomfortable places,” segregated living 
places for non-haole workers." When living conditions 
became so bad that it was difficult to keep workers in the 
fields, paternalistic improvements and some rehabilitation of 
crowded and unsanitary quarters were often undertaken.12 
(When the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association was formed, 
this was one of its first recommendations to its members. At 
best, however, life remained strictly controlled and income 
was often mortgaged. It took union organization in the 1940s 
to begin real improvement in plantation-town conditions 
(with the militant organizers, at first, evicted from their 
homes) so that later some plantation communities could
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boast of excellent living conditions and fine recreation, 
health, and education facilities. Dependency on the company 
remains a socioeconomic problem, nevertheless; as the plan­
tations phase out, the worker-dwellers often find themselves 
with neither job nor living quarters.
The Homestead Experiments
From the time when Kamehameha III worried about the 
Hawaiians leaving their land to live in town, there were 
periodic tries at some form of residential subsistence home­
steading. After the revolution that overthrew the monarchy, 
Sanford Dole, guided by Jeffersonian ideals of a resident 
yeomanry, was determined to advance the homesteading con­
cept.13 The republic’s Land Act of 1895 made possible small 
acquisitions for homesteading from the bank of public lands, 
and some eight hundred people asked for and received about 
forty thousand acres for that purpose.14 After annexation, 
the Organic Act attempted to make homesteading more 
attractive and the Land Commission of the territory was 
mandated to survey, open up, and sell public land to any 
association of twenty-three or more eligible citizens who 
applied for it. Partly because of bureaucratic difficulties, dis­
appointingly few such applications were received, however, 
and few of those granted showed signs of success.15
The most serious homesteading attempt of that period was 
made in 1918 at Waiakea on the Big Island. When the lease 
of the Waiakea Mill Company ran out, the government took 
back six thousand acres, in 216 lots, of good agricultural 
land and offered them to “ serious, bona fide” homesteaders. 
Over two thousand applications were received and the plots 
were distributed by lottery. Serious or not, there were few 
experienced farmers among the recipients and they received 
little advice. Within a short time the plantation had most of 
the land back again.16 The failure of the Waiakea experiment 
did not discourage homestead enthusiasts, however. Congres­
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sional Delegate Prince Kuhio, Territorial Senator John Wise 
(a part-Hawaiian), and others continued to push for more 
favorable legislation.
By the time of the 1920s these continuing efforts to help 
the Hawaiian people regain a foothold on their native soil 
were joined in an unhappy political linkage with the planta­
tion owners’ wish to gain more land. A large number of 
government land rentals, many of them negotiated during 
Kalakaua’s reign, were about to expire, and the planters 
wanted to be in a position to dicker for more acreage than 
they had.17 Particularly, they were anxious to have the 
ownership limitation of one thousand acres removed. To 
accomplish this and gain several other aims (making it 
difficult for local Japanese to acquire land was one of them) 
the landholding oligarchy was willing to make some apparent 
concessions toward placing Hawaiians on the land. They felt 
sure that the homestead plots would again, before long, 
revert to the plantations. A lobbying delegation to Washing­
ton worked out a bill that finally passed Congress—the 
Hawaiian Rehabilitation Act (often known as the Hawaiian 
Homes Commission Act) of 1920,18 which was “ conceived in 
almost purely political terms,” as one analyst has put i t .19 
The thousand acre limit was removed, Japanese were forbid­
den federal jobs (making it hard for them to gain land), and 
gestures were made toward homestead housing. All “ highly 
cultivated lands” were to be leased to the highest bidder, and 
some 200,000 acres were earmarked for the “ rehabilitation” 
of the Hawaiian people.
The moral pretense of this politically conceived legislation 
was obvious at once. The best lands went to the top bidders, 
which meant the wealthiest, as John Wise noted, and they of 
course were the plantation owners. The lands set aside for 
homesteading were seldom good agricultural plots.20 There 
was no more attempt now to formulate a workable plan 
through helping the homesteaders in farming and marketing 
than there had been at the time of the Waiakea fiasco. The
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temptation of the new homestead owners to lease workable 
plots back to the plantations (whose managers then put 
Filipino laborers to work cultivating them) was still great.2' 
There were some successful experiments, particularly on the 
island of Molokai, but in general it was true, as a later of­
ficial analysis of the act concluded, that not only was the im­
mediate rehabilitation program a failure but “ the demand 
for the opening of new homestead tracts practically ceased” 
with the passage of the bill.22
By the time of statehood, there was agreement among most 
groups that despite the efforts that had been made over the 
years homesteading attempts just would not work in a com­
petitive society where agriculture had become big business. 
Certainly there was little likelihood that such rehabilitation 
efforts would furnish the housing that the Hawaiian people, 
along with other unaccommodated groups, needed. Yet even 
today a Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, established in 
the 1960s as successor to the Hawaiian Homes Commission, 
continues to administer remnants of a government home­
steading policy. Billie Beamer, a part-Hawaiian director of 
the department appointed by Governor Ariyoshi, has made 
valiant efforts to improve use of the lands that remain in the 
program. Many lie unplanted and unbuilt upon, some are 
almost unusable, a good quantity has been leased for other 
purposes (including the Hilo and Molokai airports), a por­
tion was early “ set aside” for federal government uses, and 
of those that were being farmed by resident homesteaders, 
as intended, a sizable number are in serious rental arrears.
In a report to the legislature in 1975, Beamer called for a 
reevaluation of the entire program—from objectives to im­
plementation. “ We search for directions,” she said, admit­
ting that less than 10 percent of eligible Hawaiians were then 
on homestead land and only 13 percent of them were using 
their plots for farming or ranching.23 The legislature has not 
yet indicated directional guidance (failed, in fact, to act on 
Beamer’s recommendation in its 1977 session), and family
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farming, pleasant as it may be as a way of life to some, 
remains a small and unimportant solution to the overall 
problem of housing Hawaii’s people.
Once it was obvious that homesteading was not going to be 
an important method, the attitude of most territorial gover­
nors toward ways to use the land for housing was ambiva­
lent. Generally a conservative succession of appointees, they 
tended to defend concentrated land ownership, but as time 
went on it became increasingly clear that homesites for the 
growing population would have to be subtracted from planta­
tion acreages. Governor Stainback (1934-1942), disturbed by 
the fact that so few held so much of the territory’s lands, 
proposed a forward-looking Hawaiian Homes Development 
Corporation to tackle the problem—a move that the 
legislature considered communistic and defeated. He did, 
however, appoint a Land Revision Commission which recom­
mended against any further homesteading efforts and ad­
vocated sale of public lands for single-family homesites and 
other urban development purposes. Although the governor 
supported his commission’s proposals, little effective legisla­
tion resulted. Governor King (1953-1957), a part-Hawaiian, 
made one last effort to revive interest in homesteading, still 
without success. When Governor Quinn (1957-1959 and then, 
after statehood, 1959-1962) proposed his Second Mahele, its 
major intention was to have the private trusts sell some of 
their land for fee-simple home ownership. After the Demo­
crat takeover of the legislature in 1954, much of the land 
reform legislation, proposed or adopted, had to do with forc­
ing more land to be available for housing construction. A 
Hawaii Land Development Authority, somewhat similar to 
the one Governor Stainback had wanted to create, was 
appointed in 1959. It was not as strong in potential as some 
legislators had wished and was never used to the fullest of 
what promise it did have.
The problem that was faced then, and was not solved, 
continues today. With so much of the buildable land held by
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a few owners, a great proportion of Hawaii’s homes are 
necessarily built on leased property. The leasehold land 
system has developed its own set of customs, rules and 
regulations, and legal sanctions. Leases are negotiated for a 
period of years and must be renegotiated at the end of that 
time if the lessee wants to stay on. Lessees pay taxes and 
assessments on the land they use just as though they owned 
it. “ Improvements,” including the house itself, can be built 
on the property with the permission of the landowner and, 
under most lease arrangements, can be removed at the end of 
the lease period. Absurd as that provision seems, it makes 
financing home construction easier and provides a kind of 
lever at the time of renegotiation.
In recent years pressure on the landed estates to allow 
fee-simple land sales in place of leasehold tenancies has 
increased. Inability to own one’s own land has been galling 
to middle-class malihinis from the mainland indoctrinated in 
the great value that America attaches to the ownership of the 
land one lives on. More seriously disturbing, lease negotia­
tions have resulted in greatly increased payments as the 
valuations assigned to urban land have risen sharply. On the 
average, land in Hawaii has grown in market and assessed 
value to seventeen times its 1950 worth—in some areas as 
much as fifty times.24 The fact that rises in residential land 
costs would give landowners a reason to be tough in their 
renegotiation of leases—to a point that might make home 
ownership on leased land precarious—had been evident to the 
legislatures concerned with land reform measures in the 
1960s. A right-to-purchase law, known as the Maryland law 
because it was similar to legislation adopted in that state, was 
passed as Act 307 in 1967. It turned out to be an ineffective 
measure and, because of built-in administrative difficulties, 
was seldom used. The state was supposed to be able to buy, 
at a minimum, five-acre tracts for resale to leasehold owners, 
if enough of them in the five-acre area wanted to buy their 
plots. This law raised certain problems, however: no one was
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sure whether it was constitutional, and no one really wanted 
to test it.
When lease renegotiations conducted by inflexible land­
lords guided by cold-blooded tax appraisers began to make 
it impossible for many families to live in the homes they 
themselves had built, pressures for more effectual land-lease 
reform increased. There were a number of reasons for the 
rising cost of urban residential land which resulted in the 
larger appraised values which seemed to justify the greater 
sums asked for renegotiated leases. The limits on land avail­
able as homesites, in a market where demand was increasing, 
was obviously one reason. Desire for speculative profits on 
the part of homeowners themselves was another. During the 
1970s house-hopping became a common practice.25 Some 
houses in more desirable areas had FOR SALE signs dis­
played several times a year. The ability to sell one’s home at 
as much as a 100 percent “ profit” made many families 
overlook the fact that any new house or apartment they 
might move to would be burdened with a similar arbitrary 
increment. Not only greedy homeowners but professional real 
estate speculators recognized the inviting ability to buy and 
sell houses at a handsome gain within a matter of weeks.
Whatever the causes, the higher evaluated prices, even if 
they were not true values, seemed to justify greatly increased 
land rents. For lower-income people in rural areas, like the 
farmers living on leased land in windward Oahu’s valleys, or 
the townspeople in older areas like Kalihi and Palama, the 
situation was tragic: they could not afford the new rents they 
were asked to pay and had no other place to go. Some were 
preparing to fight eviction. As a community leader said, 
emotionally, “ This is the stuff revolutions are made of.” 26 In 
more affluent neighborhoods problems of a different scale 
were faced, but their results could also be disastrous. In the 
Waialae-Kahala area, where an upper-middle-class suburb 
had been formed from pig farms in 1950, the Bishop Estate 
land had been valued at about thirty cents a square foot then
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and was leased at around $90 a year per lot. After fifteen 
years these rates were renegotiated—to $250 or $300 a year. 
But after a decade or so of speculative inflation, the estate 
set “ renegotiated” lease costs at ten times those rates, 
boosting them to $2,500 or $3,000—a jump in the family 
budget from perhaps $25 a month to $250.
Faced with such increases, more owners of homes on 
leased land wanted the privilege of buying the property they 
were occupying. In 1975 the legislature passed two new 
measures and amended the 1967 act in several ways.27 In ef­
fect, the law now says that annual lease rents must be limited 
to 4 percent of “ fair market value” less certain off-site 
improvement costs (which still allowed many leases to be 
boosted by several hundred percent) and that landowners 
must buy improvements on the land at their full value if the 
lease is not negotiated. It also includes provisions making it 
more possible for the state to carry out the intent of the so- 
called Maryland law.
No one is sure what the long-term effects of this legislation 
will be. Local people are now accustomed to lease arrange­
ments. (Almost two-thirds of Hawaii’s residents, until recent­
ly, rented their homes, compared to one-third in the main­
land United States.) Spokesmen for the Bishop Estate first 
said that it, for one, would be happy to get rid of its small 
leased properties (under “ equitable” conditions, of course). 
But later the estate challenged the new lease ceilings in the 
courts and declared a moratorium on all lease extensions 
until the whole matter was “ clarified.” The restrictions 
on lease rents and the encouragement of sales to lessees 
“changed the rules of the game,” as one estate trustee put 
it, making it necessary to “ adjust policies” to protect the 
estate’s income.28 Still later, in early 1977, both the Bishop 
and Campbell estates expressed willingness to discuss ways to 
sell off their residential land parcels.
How many homeowners will really want to “ own” their 
homes will be known only over a long period of time. One
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group of lessees of land on a smaller estate in Niu Valley 
moved quickly to take advantage of the new provisions, with 
careful legal advice, and succeeded in arranging a satisfactory 
purchase agreement, but not many others planned to follow 
suit immediately. If the law has the effect that was intended, 
a larger question will remain: will fragmented rather than 
concentrated ownership be helpful or harmful to effective 
planning and reasonable use of Hawaii’s residential lands?
From “ Problem” to “Crisis”
Aside from questions of leasing or owning land, or of paying 
rent or paying off a mortgage on a house, in the larger sense 
of adequacy and availability of accommodation the housing 
situation in Hawaii reached a truly critical stage during the 
first decade of statehood. From then on it has been referred 
to as a housing “ crisis” rather than a “ problem.” In 1970 a 
penetrating report entitled Hawaii’s Crisis in Housing was 
prepared by the state’s then lieutenant governor, Tom Gill.29 
The study made these points: 70,000 to 100,000 additional 
dwelling units were needed just to meet current demands; 
more than half o f Hawaii’s citizens were exceeding the com­
monly budgeted 20 percent of income for shelter; the cost of 
new houses in Hawaii was 60 percent above prices for those 
built on the mainland (even though no heating systems were 
needed); residential land costs were three times the national 
average; the local housing industry was tightly controlled and 
in many ways inefficient.
Gill recommended four government actions. One was to 
make suitable public land, state and federal, available for 
housing construction. Another was for the state to enter into 
contracts with competent developers to build large-scale, 
well-planned, cost-controlled communities (on nonagricul- 
tural land). A third was to develop government-sponsored 
financing arrangements so that the new units would be 
available to all socioeconomic groups. And, finally, the
Gill report recommended that the state—in order to forestall 
the speculation in built homes that was boosting original 
prices—buy back at original cost plus interest any units that 
the first owners wanted to sell.
Under the rising pressure, Burns’ administration proposed 
and the legislature adopted in that same year, 1970, a grab- 
bag housing measure, Act 105, that promised great things 
but produced few of them. It followed many of the sugges­
tions in the Gill report: it gave authority to the state to 
condemn land, help finance construction costs, guarantee 
mortgages, contract or joint venture with developers, and 
build innovative communities. It also permitted the state to 
issue revenue bonds to finance the program, although for 
many years no bonds were floated. Implementation of the 
program was put under the jurisdiction of the Hawaii Hous­
ing Authority (HHA), an agency with no great record of ac­
complishment. There it languished, partly due to insufficient 
staff to administer it, partly because of lack of administrative 
enthusiasm. Since the provisions of the act were very little 
used after its passage, it was inevitable that cynical citizens 
came to believe that Burns, through sponsoring the measure, 
had simply made a political gesture that helped him succeed 
in his campaign for reelection that fall. After all, his unsuc­
cessful opponent in the Democratic primaries had been Tom 
Gill.
In 1972 the state commissioned another comprehensive 
study of the housing crisis. This one, made by the consultant 
firm of Marshall Kaplan Gans Kahn & Yamamoto, was 
entitled Housing in Hawaii: Problems, Needs and Plans.30 
Although the data gathered for this study were more 
complete than Gill’s, its findings were much the same. It 
documented a great deficiency in housing for middle and low 
income groups and showed in detail why it would be impossi­
ble for private industry to meet those needs. The report 
indicated that fifty thousand units would be required in the 
next five years to fill the existing lack, meet the additional
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anticipated demand, and replace the worst of the deteriorated 
places. A program of action was proposed, including estab­
lishment of a state land bank, state financing to write down 
land acquisition costs, use of air rights and other devices to 
lower land costs for planned communities in urban areas, 
and a number of other innovative moves. The report was 
applauded by all who read it, was widely quoted (and is still 
the best source material available)—and was shelved.
Hawaii cannot be blamed more than any other part of the 
United States for its inability to house the middle and low 
income sectors of the population. This is an unanswered 
challenge in all of industrialized America. Costs of land, 
construction, and financing under a building-for-profit 
system have created a burden that a great proportion of the 
citizens on the mainland as well as in Hawaii can carry only 
with government assistance of some kind.31 As Hawaii 
became fully Americanized it inherited all those contem­
porary difficulties while it was still struggling to unravel its 
own tangle of shelter problems produced by the quick 
changes of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Along with the problems of modern America, of course, 
the islands also gained the opportunity to try the mainland’s 
solutions to them. From time to time in its history Hawaii 
has experimented with procedures developed under the Hous­
ing and Urban Development administration—and generally 
has discovered that they did not help very much. Redevelop­
ment agencies, under the federal Urban Renewal Program, 
were set up in Honolulu and in Hilo, and some of the more 
colorful areas in those cities were demolished, as slums, to 
make room for typical American commercial and residential 
developments. Some good things resulted from these pro­
grams: Queen Emma Gardens, an apartment complex hand­
somely designed by Minoru Yamasaki, Detroit architect, but 
priced beyond the low-income families for whom it was 
intended; Kukui Gardens, a lower-rise grouping of lower- 
priced units designed by a more matter-of-fact firm (Daniel,
Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall) in a more prosaic manner; 
several commercially successful shopping areas in the two 
cities; office buildings, public and private; and even a hotel 
in Hilo. But they were by no means answers to the wide­
spread, deep-seated housing deficiency.
The various FHA programs of the 1960s for subsidies and 
lower interest rates were used by some developers until those 
aids were eliminated under the Nixon administration. The 
HHA had been established as a public housing authority very 
early after statehood, and it had succeeded in building about 
a thousand living places under the federal public housing 
program. One, Kuhio Terrace, an ugly, ill-planned high rise, 
could challenge St. Louis’s famous Pruitt-Igoe project for 
unsuitability to the life-styles of its tenants. Pruitt-Igoe 
was ultimately demolished, however, while Kuhio Terrace 
remains, miserably visible and unhappily occupied.
Facing other legislative sessions with no additional moves 
likely, a number of citizen groups, brought together by the 
local chapter of the League of Women Voters, formed a Peo­
ple’s Housing Coalition in 1974 and proposed a comprehen­
sive program of housing action. This program included 
measures to curb speculation in the short housing supply 
through buy-back and owner occupancy provisions, controls 
over unwarranted rent increases, establishment of a semi­
public housing development corporation similar to New 
York’s Urban Development Corporation—and strengthening 
and implementing Act 105. The legislators at first seemed 
impressed by the proposals and the extent of their public sup­
port: they debated a number of the suggestions, including the 
development corporation concept, at some length. In the end, 
however, they backed off. They did little more to attack the 
basic problems than their predecessors had done.
All the studies, recommendations, debates, and occasional 
bits of legislation about housing dealt with the economics of 
providing shelter, certainly one of the toughest parts of the 
problem. By 1975 the average sales price of a new home in
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Honolulu was $83,000—in a state where the median income 
of a civilian family was around $10,000.32 The average citizen 
of upper middle income, to say nothing of the lower-paid 
worker, was finding it increasingly difficult to pay the 
monthly costs of either a mortgaged or a rented house on 
either mortgaged or rented land. An updated study by the 
state in 1977 noted that 55,000 homes had been added to the 
supply since the 1972 Housing in Hawaii report, with most 
available units “ not within price ranges which can be afford­
ed by those residents who have the greatest housing needs.” 33
In such a crucial situation, land, the restricted resource on 
which all shelter, high-priced or low, must be built, also has 
to be thought about in primarily economic terms. How much 
of it will be available for new housing? At what prices? How 
can more be obtained and how can its cost be lowered? 
Questions of what lands were most appropriate for residen­
tial use were seldom considered and seemed almost irrele­
vant. Stewart Udall, preparing his open-space plan, recog­
nized that “ on the surface” his proposals for conserving 
open space seemed to “ contribute to and perpetuate” the 
lack of low-priced land to build houses on. He hopefully 
argued that better planning would solve the problem and 
make the proper distinctions among proper uses.34
It did not require a professional planner to see what a 
drastic choice faced Hawaii’s decision makers in the land­
housing relationship. If more homes were to be built to 
loosen up the tight market that helped to force costs to im­
possible figures and perpetuated the use of unfit places, there 
were only two directions for them to go. They could be built 
in districts already classified for urban uses, at increasingly 
high densities, on land that was usually costly. Or they could 
spread out on undeveloped, less expensive land, at densities 
as low as desired, where reclassification from agricultural or 
conservation uses would be required.
Since there seemed no likelihood of a decision to limit 
population growth, Hawaii’s people had to choose, then,
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between living more closely together, to save their open 
spaces, and living dispersed, in suburbs which consumed that 
open space. In the 1970s the decision was being made by 
default. Developers went ahead with their developments 
wherever they could find land that would attract a market 
that could afford their product. Some were happy to build 
in-town condominiums on land zoned for urban uses; others 
preferred to seek the zoning that would allow them to build 
on raw land outside the central city.
As for the citizens who needed a place to live, they still 
seemed to prefer “ the Hawaiian way of life” in mainland- 
style subdivisions. The number of high-rise apartments 
(generally condominiums) built annually began to outpace 
new single-family house construction, but many of them were 
for transients, retired mainlanders, and speculators; local 
people who lived in tract-home neighborhoods still out­
numbered the in-city dwellers. In addition, not all the con­
dominiums were really in town. A number of new apartment 
developments were built in suburban areas like Hawaii Kai or 
Salt Lake—even as far out as Chinn Ho’s hillside high rises 
in Makaha Valley.
Neither in the outer stretches of the islands nor within the 
towns and cities, however, could a way be found in modern 
times to make Hawaii’s lands serve well as a resource for its 
people’s shelter. There had been enough attempts to combine 
a way of living on the soil with the process of farming it to 
demonstrate that that simple solution could not work here 
and now as it had in primitive places. To live comfortably on 
the land by even the simplest modern standards it was 
necessary to make arrangements with a myriad of owners, 
vendors, and agents. It did not seem to make much dif­
ference whether the land itself was offered for lease or 
outright sale, whether the offerer was a profit-oriented entity 
or an eleemosynary institution, whether or not government 
interceded in the transaction. The result was almost always 
the same: acceptance of living accommodations that were
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priced above a proper share of family income and placed 
where economics, not suitability, dictated. There were, of 
course, degrees of discomfiture resulting from this process— 
from the distress of less-favored families to the inconvenience 
of the better-advantaged. All, however, suffered from the 
same basic disadvantage: the intrusion between dweller and 
dwelling of a long series of profit-generating stages. The 
citizen of a modern capitalist industrial state, which Hawaii 
has become, is accustomed to this process in every aspect of 
life, from securing food to finding entertainment. In Hawaii, 
however, the stretch between the ability to buy and the price 
that must be paid is nowhere so great as it is for the com­
modity we coldly call “ housing” —a living place on the land.
chapter
Source of Wealth
ON an August morning in 1965, Henry Kaiser, the industrial­
ist who had made a worldwide reputation for building huge 
engineering projects and then building his own construction 
and development empire, had a meeting in Honolulu with the 
trustees of the Bishop Estate. Kaiser had gone to Hawaii to 
vacation in 1950 and decided to stay and introduce mainland 
American methods of land development and construction. He 
was now leasing six thousand acres of Bishop Estate land at 
the eastern end of Oahu to build a small city and was in a 
hurry to get started. This stocky, solemn, but restless 
malihini had to satisfy the kamaaina trustees of the estate of 
Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop that his plans were feasible 
and would produce a satisfactory income for the Kameha­
meha Schools. To him the procedure was an unavoidable 
nuisance.
Kaiser sat at the end of a long koa table in a large 
koa-paneled room along with the trustees (all selected by Ha­
waii’s Supreme Court justices as the will of the Kamehameha 
heiress provided, most well along in years, only one with a 
tinge of Hawaiian blood) as though he were one of them. No 
one seemed to question his right.
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Several members of the firm of planners and architects 
who had made Kaiser’s plans for him explained the extent of 
the proposal. Graphs and charts were tacked on the walls 
and maps and drawings displayed on easels. It was an im­
pressive presentation of a development that would change the 
character of a major part of the island. The trustees and 
their own technical advisers looked, listened, nodded from 
time to time, and at the end congratulated Mr. Kaiser. For 
him, that was enough. He stood, nodded in his turn, with 
satisfaction, and moved to leave the room. At the door 
he stopped and as though in afterthought asked no one in 
particular, “ How soon can we get started now?”
Frank Midkiff, one of the most down-to-earth of the 
board members, smiled and said, “ Henry, we have a few 
steps to take yet, even after we have informal approval from 
the City. A change in the general plan, zoning revisions, 
other formalities that we will all have to go through.”
Kaiser thought a moment. “ All right,” he said then. “ But 
let’s see that it doesn’t take too long.” '
It did not, as those things go, but to Henry Kaiser, anx­
ious to re-form that part of Oahu in the image he pictured, it 
seemed an interminable process. Taken by the beauty of the 
islands—and the tremendous profit potential of that beauty— 
he had transferred his personal interests from the numerous 
mainland Kaiser industries to development activities in Ha­
waii. He had already altered the character of Waikiki by 
building a hotel at its far western end, tremendously extend­
ing the reach of tourism there, and had started a new in­
dustry for the state in the production of cement.
Now Kaiser’s consuming enterprise was this plan to make 
the entire Koko Head end of Oahu into a resort-residential 
town to be called Hawaii Kai. What a remarkably fortuitous 
coincidence that the first syllable of his name was the Hawai­
ian word for the sea! Hawaii Kai, reached from Honolulu 
only by a narrow road winding between sometimes steep 
foothills and often sharp drops to the ocean, was nevertheless 
to have endless tracts of suburban homes, a large shopping
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center, communities of condominiums along the ridges, 
numerous hotels on the beaches, a marina, several golf 
courses—all on those six thousand acres of Bishop Estate 
land that were not at that time zoned for such purposes, but 
were classified for open-space conservation uses by city and 
state.
In the end, there was no problem and the impatient Mr. 
Kaiser did not have to wait very long. By another of those 
happy coincidences that seemed to bless his career, the 
General Plan of the City and County of Honolulu was 
undergoing revision just then and it was very convenient for 
the public planners to incorporate Kaiser’s consultants’ plan, 
with some revisions, in their final document.2 When the city’s 
new long-range plan was approved by the Planning Commis­
sion and adopted by the city council, Hawaii Kai was an 
integral part of it, as Henry Kaiser had never doubted it 
would be.
The story of Kaiser’s project illustrates handsomely the 
contradictions and counteractions in the determinations of 
Hawaii’s land uses. Land development today provides neces­
sary homes for an upper-middle-class segment of Oahu’s 
population; in that sense the land is being used as an essen­
tial resource. The rental income that the Bishop Estate 
receives helps to educate children of Hawaiian descent; to 
that extent some of Hawaii’s lands still benefit the Hawaiian 
people. But Hawaii Kai has also made a small fortune for 
the Kaiser enterprises and Henry Kaiser’s heirs (as well as 
decent profits for numerous subcontracting developer- 
builders). Considered in that way, it has used for private 
monetary gain land that had once been set aside as a great 
park for the public.
Many questions are raised by these conflicting values— 
questions that were not asked when government agencies 
simply approved Kaiser’s intentions and allowed the eastern 
end of Oahu to become a huge suburb. Have those houses 
really satisfied a need that existed? Or, by being built, have 
they created one, just as a new highway generates additional
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traffic and a new airport increases the wish to travel by air? 
If they were necessary, was that the best place to put them, 
or would they have been better located on other land? And 
assuming still that they are essential living places, are they 
the kinds of homes in the kind of community that Hawaii’s 
people really need, or are they just Henry Kaiser’s idea of 
the sort of shelter for the sort of resident he wanted Hawaii 
to have? Are the answers to these questions ones that an 
economist can supply, or a sociologist, or a land planner?
Or would they best be furnished by the people of Hawaii 
themselves? No one asked those questions in 1965, and there 
is no indication that the people now living in Hawaii Kai are 
bothered by them. Their concern is how to have a wider, 
faster road to downtown Honolulu.
Economists in Hawaii as in other places have not provided 
very useful answers to such questions—they disagree on the 
ways to estimate the worth of land and the income that may 
be derived from it. Not many students of economic theory 
would endorse the simplistic distinction between land used as 
a resource, satisfying certain human needs, and land used as 
a commodity, providing someone a monetary profit or loss. 
In economics, everything must be capable of quantification 
so that it can be put on one side or the other of a ledger. It 
seems impossible to assign dollar values to all of our needs, 
but attempts to do so are increasing.
Even social theorists and citizen activists today are shying 
away from the defense of physical environments as spiritual­
ly, aesthetically, or even socially essential for individual 
fulfillment or the public good. The tendency is to develop 
economic rather than social or even ecological arguments for 
keeping some lands open. Cash-flow analyses are beginning 
to replace emotional reasons to defend husbandry of other 
lands for sustenance and shelter.3 Ways are being sought to 
meet, on their own ground, the Henry Kaisers who want to 
make money from land.
This new approach, of course, has to consider two aspects 
of land use management: one for land we should leave alone;
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another for land we must lay our hands on in some fashion. 
To use to their best advantage places where it would be most 
appropriate to grow food or build housing, the argument has 
been the familiar plea for good planning—land is limited and 
must not be used wastefully. The early Hawaiians knew, bet­
ter than we do, where those appropriate places were and how 
to protect them. But even though no economist, not even a 
thoughtful developer, would disagree with that principle as a 
premise for land usage, it has not prevented thousands of 
acres of essential farmland from being removed from agricul­
ture and developed carelessly. The pressures for using land as 
a source of immediate, visible income have just been too 
great.
During the 1960s and 1970s a counterforce to the compul­
sion to make land pay quick profits began to appear. It 
even had an economic validity of its own that was useful to 
environmental planners. It was a growing realization that 
public costs are generated by private land uses and that 
sometimes these become excessive financial loads on all tax­
payers. The public costs come from the need for roads to 
new subdivisions; sewerage and water supply to developments 
on raw land; schools, libraries, and parks for neighborhoods 
being formed; protection by police, fire fighters, and other 
public servants for communities that developers developed, 
sold, and then left.
On the mainland several cities which retained consultants 
to advise them about the course of future growth received 
unexpected findings. Their analysts sometimes discovered 
that unless expansion was carefully limited, controlled, and 
planned it would be better not to have it at all: costs to the 
citizens would be too great. Palo Alto, California, was told 
by a consultant team that every new house built on a stretch 
of undeveloped hill land would cost the city much more in 
services than it could ever get back in taxes.4
In Hawaii itself, a central Oahu planning study made by 
the Department of Planning and Economic Development in­
dicated that if developers went ahead with their plans for an
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additional 55,000 homes on Oahu’s central plains, the costs 
that taxpayers would have to bear just for new highways, 
schools, and sewer and water supply (not even considering 
such municipal services as fire and police protection, local 
roads, and so on) would run to about $723 million—three- 
fourths of a billion dollars that no one had thought of at all. 
It pointed out further that the state would lose $25 million 
annually in income from the built-over plantations. In total, 
by any calculations, this would be far more than any feasible 
real-property taxes and other public sources of income from 
the development could possibly bring.5
In 1973, under University of Hawaii auspices, a conference 
was held to study this aspect of development economics:
“The Public Costs of Private Development.” 6 One of the 
Palo Alto consultants, an analyst for the central Oahu study, 
and others presented their findings. The information gathered 
was impressive, but it seemed to affect no one but those 
attending the conference sessions. Lawmakers from the state 
and the counties were invited; almost none attended.
The reasoning in studies of this kind had to do primarily 
with the most economical, least wasteful ways to allocate 
and use lands for farming and housing. The problem that 
remained, a more difficult one, was how to estimate hard 
cash costs and benefits of keeping land truly open for 
historic, scenic, cultural, or even recreational reasons.7 Some 
economists would not even listen to the possibility that 
economic costs and benefits might be calculated, in cash 
terms, for open-space preservation. They saw little evidence 
that there could be monetary as well as spiritual or ecological 
losses when pristine beaches were lined with hotels and farm­
lands were covered with condominiums. A report made to 
the state legislature by economists at the Economic Research 
Center of the University of Hawaii in 1971 grudgingly admit­
ted that there might be “ some real wealth enhanced” by 
keeping a certain amount of space open—for “ residents and 
tourists who enjoy driving through [s/c/] farm and conserva­
tion lands on the urban fringe.” 8
SOURCE OF W EA LTH *75
With this limited understanding and valuation of the 
natural environment, the report contended that the amount 
of private profit, not the degree of social need, should deter­
mine land use. If developers are willing to pay more for land 
than are farmers or others, then their intended use must be 
the best. After all, “ retention of land in less than its highest- 
valued uses reduces the welfare of society.” Even speculation 
in land (“ risk-bearing for profit” ) performs an essential 
function, the report said, in holding land off the market and 
out of use until its development is profitable.9
To a critic who objected that values were changing and 
new social attitudes could alter such an economic theory, 
Louis A. Rose, author of the Economic Research Center’s 
report, insisted that he had no way “ to know society’s valua­
tion” of open space. Perhaps, he allowed, “ some day 
economists, psychologists, and ecologists will come up with 
such an estimate.” In the meantime he had no reason to 
believe that either preservation of agricultural lands or 
prevention of speculation in land are “ economically desirable 
goals.” Economics is a hard-boiled social science, he said, 
which “ simply tells it like it is . . . not like it ought to be.” 10
Other economists, even in Hawaii, did not agree. Some 
had begun developing methods of calculating the overall 
economic return to society when certain lands were kept 
open. Even other members of the local university’s Depart­
ment of Economics studied ways to figure nonpecuniary, 
long-range, public economic costs and benefits along with 
immediate, private cash input and outgo.
Some factors, even environmental costs, were easy to 
translate directly into dollars: additional water supply needed 
when open lands were urbanized, for instance, and valuable 
natural drainage ways that were lost and had to be replaced. 
Others were less tangible but nonetheless provable public 
deficits: increased erosion and surface runoff into coastal 
estuaries and decreased amounts of topsoil with its oxygen- 
producing vegetation. Mineral resources and land-related 
sources of power are often lost to the public when land
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tenure becomes private." Factors such as mental and physi­
cal health are even more difficult to express in terms of 
either public or private budgets, but the researchers believed 
it was possible. At least a start had been made in developing 
a further argument and a new point of view. And in the con­
servation temper of the times there seemed no doubt that it 
would be pursued further. For the time being, however, land 
in Hawaii remains a profitable commodity, its speculative 
manipulation defended by social custom, by economic princi­
ple, and, with certain restrictions, by law.12
The Speculating Game
Using land for other than basic needs and treating it as an 
article of commerce was a concept that haoles had to implant 
slowly in Hawaii. Among the Polynesians, land changed 
hands at times, but what manipulation there was came from 
a desire for power or prestige, more than profit. There was, 
of course, full understanding of the value of one ahupuaa 
compared with another, and great care (even jealousy) 
attended the distribution of land after a victory or on a new 
accession. Once assigned, however, the land stayed in the 
care of one chief until death or war brought a redistribu­
tion.13
As for the makaainana, the commoner who lived on the 
land and worked it, he could leave his kuleana if he wished, 
although there is evidence that great pride attached to long 
tenure of one family through generations, ‘‘until the coconut 
trees grow old.’’ But at no level was there anything com­
parable to selling or even bartering land, and it took some 
time for profit, one of the most radical concepts brought 
from abroad, to be applied to land transactions. It was 
enough to gain what the soil produced.
Although the haole newcomers were happy to acquire land, 
and early monarchs were generous, for some time full per­
sonal ownership was not terribly important. Even when ques­
tions of tenure became so confused that the pressure for
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change resulted in the post-Mahele legislation that allowed 
both aliens and natives to own their properties, there is little 
record of land immediately being sold simply for speculative 
profit. It was desired, and its value increased, because it was 
needed for specific uses: for homes, farms, businesses, and, 
before too long, for large-scale plantation agriculture. Leas­
ing, even very early, made it possible to use land profitably 
without acquiring ownership;14 leases from government and 
crown lands were the basis for first formation of the largest, 
most lucrative plantation operations, from Ladd & Com­
pany’s enterprise on.
Eventually, operators were inevitably attracted to the 
islands. They wanted to barter the precious land rather than 
use it. All speculation in commodities depends on some 
ultimate consumption, though, and the “ risk-bearing for pro­
fit” during the first half of the twentieth century was based 
on faith in easy markets for sugarcane and pineapple. For an 
environmentalist, there is reason to be happy that the lands 
of Hawaii, once they were valued as a commodity, found 
their most profitable use for so long in the plantations; no 
great long-range physical harm is likely to come to farmland. 
Agricultural fields are open space, ecologically altered, 
perhaps, but not irretrievable for other uses. Their natural 
qualities can easily enough be restored if anyone wants to 
take the trouble, whereas concrete-paved urban spaces 
can be returned to an open-land state only with the greatest 
difficulty.
Not until after World War II did that same land become 
doubly valuable as the need for land to support urban 
growth increased. Then the consumer contest for land that 
was both arable and buildable brought about the Land Use 
Law, with its attempt to classify the state’s lands according 
to their most economically productive uses and preserve the 
plantations. For the speculative dealer in real estate, it does 
not matter too much how land is going to be used, what may 
go on it, or how it will be treated, and in the land boom of 
the 1950s and 1960s great fortunes were made in real estate.
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Chinn Ho has described how in 1955 he was offered, for 
$2.25 a square foot, the property on which the Ilikai Hotel 
now rests. He thought that was high for land so far from 
Waikiki proper and did not buy it. Two years later, when he 
was interested, the asking price had gone to $25 a foot. (In 
the meantime Henry Kaiser, willing to extend Waikiki’s 
growing hotel strip, had put together the deal that gave him 
the present Hilton Hawaiian Village property for less than $7 
a square foot.)15 Ho bought the land and after some com­
plicated financing built a 500-room hotel on the seven-acre 
site, which has now grown to 680 hotel rooms, a thousand 
condominium units, convention and banquet facilities, and 
fourteen restaurants and night clubs. The Capital Investment 
Corporation, which Chinn Ho heads, finds it an extremely 
successful enterprise, but Ho himself, considering that land 
in the area where he and Kaiser bought and built is now, 
twenty years later, worth close to $50 a foot, knows of what 
he speaks when he concludes that the truly great profits are 
now in real estate—in buying and selling the land itself—not 
in the businesses performed on the land.16
As the boom continued into the 1970s, as manipulation 
rather than utilization became the most profitable way to 
make money from land, new malihinis with fresh capital 
were increasingly attracted. The polite word for their purpose 
was not speculation but investment. The investment of 
mainland and local American money, and then funds from 
foreign countries, sent real estate prices further skyward.
Often the game was quite frankly trading in a negotiable 
article whose value was obviously increasing, as in any bear 
market. Nonbeachfront land that did not seem desirable to 
local investors was sold abroad for $2,000 an acre. More 
attractive land brought $3,600 an acre.17 No one believed that 
such properties would be immediately developed; they would 
be likely to change hands several more times before reaching 
some useful purpose. In other cases the process was to buy 
the land, build something on it to indicate its income poten­
tial, and then sell land and improvements.18 Many of the
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hotels purchased by foreign investors have been bait of this 
kind designed to lead to land sales. The Japanese purchasers 
of the land on which the Makaha Inn rests brought suit 
against the Capital Investment Corporation in 1976, claiming 
that the hotel’s income potential had been misrepresented in 
order to sell the improved property. (In 1977, as though to 
prove their point, they went into bankruptcy.)
In the mid-1970s it seemed as though every other person in 
Honolulu was selling real estate. A parcel of land on the Big 
Island was advertised on television by Jerry (“ land is the 
basis of all wealth” ) Assam. He noted that there was no 
worry about near neighbors: the land was in a conservation 
district and could not be built upon anyway.19 A buyer could 
only assume capital appreciation. Newspaper ads touted land 
in unlikely places, supposedly ripe for subdivision, assuming 
that people had forgotten some postwar fiascos on the Big 
Island that had left about 75,000 acres subdivided but 
undeveloped.20
Many who were looking for ways to gain wealth from land 
continued to find profit in leasing it without bothering to 
try to purchase it. As an example, the Sheraton hotel chain 
obtained a lease on Bishop Estate land in Waikiki, on which 
sat the venerable Royal Hawaiian Hotel. To provide an 
income above the tremendous rental the lease called for, the 
lessees built the huge, tasteless, highly successful Sheraton 
Waikiki Hotel on the property, dwarfing the relatively re­
served Royal Hawaiian. Then, having proved their combined 
income potential, Sheraton sold the hotels to Kenji Osano, a 
Japanese financial (and in a shadowy sense, political) wizard 
who has invested heavily in Hawaii. Many kamaainas were 
infuriated. “ When we can sell the historic Royal Hawaiian to 
a foreign [buyer] I have to believe that some in this commu­
nity would sell anything for a buck,” fumed one.21
Not only were kamaaina landmarks sold for eager dollars 
and yens, however. Kamaaina landholdings, once considered 
by the big estates almost as “ inalienable” as the crown lands 
had been, were also disposed of. Even the Bishop Estate
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began to reconsider its long-held policy, presumably imposed 
by the princess’ will, of leasing the Kamehameha properties 
of which it is composed but never selling any of them.22 As 
the temptation grew to gain high-percentage interest from 
invested capital rather than sometimes unsatisfactory income 
from leased land, disagreements developed within the estate’s 
board of trustees and among people in the community of 
Hawaiian descent. The Hawaiians, by and large, wanted to 
see their ancestors’ lands, dedicated to the education of their 
children, kept intact.23 One of the trustees, Richard Lyman, 
Jr., insisted that the terms of the will be literally followed.
He accused his fellow trustees of being poor businessmen and 
letting the estate’s lands go for less than they could bring on 
the booming market.24 Nevertheless, sales were consummated 
for 15,000 acres on Hawaii, 4,000 acres on Molokai, 1,500 
acres on Oahu, and more. Some of the arrangements have 
been embarrassing to the estate and some harmful. Accord­
ing to a real estate broker on the Big Island, one purchaser 
of Bishop Estate land resold it quickly for a 300 percent,
$9 million, profit.25 At Keauhou on the Kona coast, a deal 
with mainland financier-developer Troy Post, intended to 
permit the estate to finance a huge resort development 
without harming its tax-free status—a complicated financial 
arrangement which would have allowed Post to buy 1,200 
acres of Bishop Estate land at far below its likely value after 
the resort was build—was castigated by the courts (where 
trustee Lyman had taken it). A circuit court judge said that 
the majority trustees had failed to act “ in a manner which 
might reasonably be expected of ordinary, intelligent and 
prudent businessmen.” And the State Supreme Court upheld 
his harsh judgment.26
Although the trustees, by these sales, succeeded in raising 
cash which they felt was needed, it is likely that they will stay 
away, in the future, from the hard-boiled huckstering of 
Hawaii’s land surface that sales in today’s market involve— 
at least until the hunger for land produces even greater 
pressures. Other estates and trusts, however, governed by
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more astute men of business, continued to sell large blocks of 
once tightly held land to gain quick profits (or show book 
losses) while the easy opportunities remained.27
The Trouble with Taxation
As more and more land was bought and sold for capital gain 
rather than continuing income, many people in and out of 
government began to wonder about the use of taxation— to 
control speculation, to gain some of the newfound wealth for 
the public purse, and, possibly, to make an appropriate use 
of land more profitable to its owners than selling it would 
be. Slicing some of the gain from selling real property off 
the top, as public or private tribute, is certainly not a new 
concept: tithing goes far back in the history of land-based 
human relationships. But the idea of manipulating capital 
gains taxes and tax assessments so as to influence the way 
land might be utilized—really a first step toward land 
management—is a fairly recent notion.
In Hawaii’s early days, taxation was a form of profit 
drawn from the land by its owner (the king) and its assignee 
(an alii) and collected by a kind of estate manager (the 
konohiki). The commoner who lived on and from the land 
was entitled to what he could raise after he had paid his 
taxes in goods (supplemented sometimes by tributary labor). 
Taxes were not light. The early Hawaiian historian Kamakau 
found that even before the white man’s influence became 
strong, Kamehameha’s “ uniting of the land” increased taxa­
tion to an “ excessive” point (an early instance of the fiscal 
effects of centralized government). And although he recalled 
a good, plentiful life in those early days, he also remembered 
very heavy taxes.28 Taxes on land, direct or indirect, levied 
against the Hawaiian people, continued into the monarchy 
years. During the time of the desolating sandalwood trade 
everyone was taxed a certain weight of wood to be taken 
from the forests.29 Kamehameha I l l ’s Constitution and Laws 
of 1842 included regulation of taxation on farmlands: for a
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large farm, a swine one fathom long; for a small one, a beast 
one yard long.30
When haoles began to make use of the lands they received 
as gifts or grants, they largely avoided payment of taxes on 
them for some time, and what little was paid did not much 
help the government’s finances. Even those dues were consid­
ered objectionable —“ unequal and unjust, bearing hard upon 
the poor natives” (sic)—and in 1852 were eliminated.31 Soon 
after a real-property tax was imposed (in 1859, at the rate 
of !4 percent of assessed valuation) and was made law in 
18 7 7.32 During the territorial period land taxes remained 
light; necessary revenues were derived from more widely 
distributed sources than the few landowners. They came from 
poll taxes and road taxes, for instance, and an excise tax 
on all kinds of enterprises. The territory’s income tax was 
regressive: it levied a flat percentage on everyone. It is 
improved today in that regard, but it remains one of the 
nation’s highest. The excise tax, a tax on the gross income 
from almost all business and professional activites, continues 
as an important source of state revenue.33
Real-property taxes as such are still moderate in Hawaii 
for individual homeowners; they revert to the counties rather 
than the state, although a state tax department assesses 
valuations. Land taxes, based on land uses, have been the 
most difficult form of tribute to levy equitably and have 
become a particularly controversial political issue as the idea 
grows that they might be a land-use-planning tool. The 
estimated “ highest and best” tax system adopted in the 1960s 
has worked hardship on small farmers whose properties are 
near urban areas and likely to be absorbed for development. 
It is almost essential for the owner of fertile land toward 
which urban growth is pointing to apply for reclassification 
that would permit development—if he wants to avoid paying 
high urban taxes on land producing a lesser agricultural 
income.
This tax system and the so-called Pittsburgh law, until it 
was repealed in 1977—political moves that had been intended
in the 1960s to prevent properties from lying idle by forcing 
their development so that they would become productive 
resources adding to the public revenues—were, in the 1970s, 
making it more difficult to keep essential green spaces open.
There seemed an obvious way out of the dilemma that 
had developed: to base taxation of agricultural land on 
agricultural use, if that was a serious operation, rather than 
on its most profitable potential. For some time it had been 
legally possible for owners of small farmsteads to “ dedicate” 
their land to agricultural uses and gain a promise of con­
tinued low taxes, but the process was a complicated one and 
the long-term commitment frightened most farmers. In 1974 
a law passed that applied the same principle to larger parcels. 
It allows land acreage to be dedicated, committed to agricul­
tural uses for ten or twenty-year terms, and thereby gain 
assurance, during that time, of taxation at a farmland rate. 
The law provides that if the owner should make application 
for rezoning at some time in the future (so that he could then 
develop his land, or sell it profitably, or market development 
rights), he would pay the accrued back taxes that would have 
been levied if the land had been put to urban uses earlier, 
plus a penalty for having changed his mind.
There was no doubt that this legislation helped financially 
those who honestly wished to farm their agricultural acres. 
For instance, at a small scale, a hog farm of nine acres in 
Waianae had its assessed valuation dropped from $4,900 an 
acre as potential urban space to $1,750 an acre as dedicated 
farmland. At a larger scale, several thousand acres at Kilauea 
on Kauai, used to raise grain, were taxed at $140 an acre 
after dedication rather than at the former rate of $1,050.34
This legislation offered convenient loopholes, however, to 
those owners who looked forward to future capital gains 
from selling their farmlands. It provided, for example, a con­
venient tax shelter until the most advantageous time came to 
sell. Then payment of a tax differential from previous years, 
even with a penalty added, would not seriously stand in the 
way of a rezoning application. It would simply add one more
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item to the sales price and the ultimate development cost. 
Such an assumption of the use of tax legislation that seemed 
on the surface well meant was not overly cynical. Tremen­
dous windfall profits can be made through the reclassifica­
tion and rezoning process. Land with a market value based 
on agricultural uses can instantaneously—at the stroke of a 
commissioner’s pen—increase to a new book value based on 
urban uses and make millions of dollars for a successful 
applicant when sold. There were instances where cane land, 
with a possible sales price of $5,000 an acre at its current 
use, was reclassified to urban use and suddenly became 
worth something like $40,000 an acre. This unearned incre­
ment of $35,000 on each acre would amount to $35 million 
for a thousand-acre parcel. It was clear that a tax penalty at 
the time of sale would not be an important deterrent to the 
rezoning application in a case like that.35
An illustration of the political maneuverings that resulted 
when such sums of money were involved is the case of 
Robinson Estate lands at Waipahu, east of Honolulu proper. 
A sizable acreage of good cane land found itself in a corner 
formed by two intersecting freeways. The obvious conflicts 
developed. The landowning estate saw great profits in the 
sale of development rights if the land could be rezoned. Con­
servationists, agriculturists, and, for a time, the lessee, Oahu 
Sugar Company, and its workers, unionized members of the 
ILWU, saw a great loss to the plantation potential of central 
Oahu if the lands were rezoned. The location was such that 
changes in the use of this key area could trigger development 
all the way up Oahu’s central plains to the old settlement of 
Wahiawa and the new suburb of Mililani Town.
The first request for reclassification of the property came 
in 1967. At that time the commission’s staff recommended 
against approval and the commissioners denied the applica­
tion. But then the firm that wanted to develop the land 
(HMS Ventures, headed by a builder-developer named 
Herbert Horita) used persuasion, and second thoughts came 
to the sugar company, its employees, and the members of the
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commission. When a new application was made in 1968,
Oahu Sugar and the ILWU supported it. Union executive 
Eddie Tangen was appointed to the Land Use Commission in 
August 1969. In September the commission approved the 
application and the land became developable—and extremely 
valuable.36
The role of the unions, particularly the ILWU, in deals 
of this kind was interesting. When the union movement in 
Hawaii that had begun among the plantation workers in 
the 1940s made headway, after rough struggles, the union 
members depended on continuation of sugarcane and pine­
apple growing for their livelihood, and it was on that basis 
that their organizers and negotiators operated.37 As hotel 
workers were added to the union rolls, and then construction 
workers, conflicts in self-interest began to appear in labor’s 
position on land use and development. The plantation owners 
and the developers well understood this friction, and it often 
appeared that the workers were being manipulated along with 
the land. As the unions sought their own greatest financial 
benefits from the land-based enterprises their members were 
engaged in, they inevitably became instruments in the overall 
search for the greatest wealth the lands could produce for 
their owners.
In the spring of 1972, an application was made to the 
Honolulu Planning Commission to rezone a parcel of land at 
Kahuku, on the northwest corner of Oahu, to allow a pro­
moter, F. R. Schuh, to build a commercial “ theme park’’ 
there. (The theme was to be an imitation Polynesian settle­
ment with an accompanying amusement area to attract pay­
ing tourists.) The area was prime cane-growing land, but the 
sugar company operating it wanted to close out, the local 
people feared for their jobs, and the state’s Land Use Com­
mission had agreed to reclassification.
A member of the city’s Planning Commission who, in 
preliminary hearings, had indicated his skepticism of the pro­
ject and its requested rezoning, received a phone call one day 
from the ubiquitous Eddie Tangen, by then vice-chairman of
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the Land Use Commission and still an ILWU official, asking 
him to change his mind because “ our boys really need jobs 
out there.” 38 The commissioners were about evenly divided 
on the question, and its outcome was uncertain. But a few 
weeks before the final vote another ILWU officer received an 
appointment, this time to a vacant seat on the city’s Planning 
Commission—and his vote for the development made a deci­
sion to recommend approval certain.39 As many had sus­
pected, the jobs the local people had been promised never 
developed; the entrepreneur could not finance his scheme and 
gave it up. But in the meantime the land had tremendously 
appreciated in value, and it was now rezoned to permit any 
urban uses that the owner, the Campbell Estate this time, 
might find profitable.
Another kind of land taxation was urged at that time by 
citizen groups and some legislators; it was to tax directly as 
capital gains the unearned money, the windfall, that accrued 
to a piece of land when it was rezoned. The theory was that 
since the act of rezoning produced wealth, some of it should 
be returned directly to the taxpayers, at least to help pay for 
the public improvements that development on the rezoned 
land would require. Some thought this might inhibit specula­
tion in land prices and its concomitant political implications; 
others disagreed.
A bill for an act to this end was introduced in the 1971 
legislative session.40 It was a study of this proposal, made for 
the legislature by a university research economist, which 
resulted in the report referred to earlier, questioning whether 
maintaining open land or preventing land speculation were 
“economically desirable goals.” The report’s conclusion 
about the capital gains tax was that it would “ hinder the 
construction of housing and hold up the price of housing.” 41 
Since the buyers of homes built on rezoned agricultural 
lands, not the land’s owners or developers, would be asked 
to absorb the capital gains tax on top of the new artificially 
escalated land valuations, the economists’ conclusion was un­
doubtedly correct. The lawmakers believed so, anyway, or at
least they used the argument as a good excuse not to impose 
this forfeit on profit from the rezoning-selling-developing 
destiny of Hawaii’s fertile farmlands.
The difficulty encountered by this and other attempts to 
control land use and land management by taxation was that 
no one, from legislators to low-income citizens, really wanted 
to interfere with the wealth-producing land development pro­
cess. The private incomes to be made from buying and sell­
ing, speculating with, and ultimately building on the land 
could always be justified as rewards for making raw land 
available for essential housing and needed employment, thus 
contributing to the public wealth of the state. These myths 
persisted even after it had become clear that the jobs were 
often illusory and the housing, when it was produced, was 
beyond the means of the native population. Planning com­
missioners learned to turn off their ears when applicants for 
zoning and general-plan changes based their appeals on pro­
mises of “ low-income housing.” They knew that the 
requests, when granted, always resulted in additional high- 
priced subdivisions.
It was naive, in any event, to expect the state legislature to 
inhibit speculative land profits. A majority of its members 
was in some way professionally concerned with the income to 
be derived from real estate—directly as developers, indirectly 
as attorneys, insurance brokers, consultants to developers, or 
managers or salesmen of developers’ land.
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The Tourist Trap
One of the major wealth-producing land-use activities in the 
state was difficult, as it expanded, to classify in terms of 
land’s worth to the island society. It was the building of 
physical facilities for the movement, storage, and protection 
of the staples of the state’s top industry—tourism. Those 
staples, or commodities, were of course the visitors: the 
articles of commerce in the business of moving people from 
one location to another. Tourists had to be transported from
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place of origin to place of destination and then back again, 
with transfer stops along the way, just like any wares han­
dled in any industry. They required container vehicles to 
convey them and roads to move them over. At storage and 
loading points they had to be kept in prime condition like 
any other fragile article. That required hotel rooms, restau­
rants and banquet halls, swimming pools, golf courses. They 
could generate profits all along the route they were moved 
on, so boutiques, night clubs, and commercial entertainment 
facilities of various kinds were indispensable parts of the 
industry.
Was this use of Hawaii’s lands responding to public needs? 
Or was it merely another way of exploiting the natural 
resources of the islands for the profit of a small group of 
entrepreneurs? Did it provide enough jobs of a desirable kind 
for the local people? Did it furnish enough public income 
of sure continuance to justify the increasing amount of 
irreplaceable open space it was consuming? Were the 
travelers themselves really enjoying a worthwhile vacation 
time with recreational and cultural benefits? Or were they 
being moved onto and off of Hawaii’s lands like so much 
valuable merchandise?
These questions were becoming increasingly important.
The land this industry needed for its operations in growing 
amounts was the most desirable in the state—the most beauti­
ful long stretches of white sand beach and the most verdant 
valleys—and the public costs of satisfying this activity were 
obviously increasing. A definitive socioeconomic cost-benefit 
analysis was needed. Several had been made, but none had 
satisfied enough people to settle the questions, either in the 
public mind or in regulatory legislation.42
The state had assumed from the first days of tourist 
arrivals that its role should be to promote this developing 
industry. As early as 1903 the territorial legislature appropri­
ated $5,000 for advertising the beauties of Hawaii as a place 
to visit and in 1904 the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce 
added $500 to the promotional kitty. Even today the Hawaii
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Visitors Bureau is a quasi-state agency receiving regular 
appropriations from the legislature in addition to money 
raised from private business—its task to attract tourists and 
build tourism as a source of income.43 Not until very recently 
has there been any recognition either by the industry itself or 
by the government that there might be disadvantages as well 
as advantages in the growing influx of visitors.
On the plus side, it would seem, were the two standard 
apologies: jobs and revenues. Unquestionably, employment 
was produced by the traffic in tourists: at high levels, for 
hotel managers, travel agency executives, and such; at 
intermediate ranks, for specialists like tour operators and 
guides, restaurant managers, maitres, and chefs; lower down 
and in greater bulk, for bellboys and busboys, waiters and 
waitresses, maids and janitors. In the early 1970s, around
18,000 work functions were created in hotels,44 another 
25,000, perhaps, in other tourist-related activities. And, one 
analyst calculated, for each of these jobs one and a half 
more was generated in other sectors of the economy.
There were questions about these raw data, however. 
Although statistics were confusing, it appeared that more 
than half the executive-level employees were trained people 
transported to Hawaii from the mainland as positions opened 
(although the local university tried to draw them, earlier, to 
its School of Travel Industry Management)—and the un­
skilled jobs were not that desirable. Lower-level hotel work 
was not very well paid, even with action by the unions, and it 
was a vocational dead end for sometimes ambitious local 
people. Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians were finding it 
difficult enough to move up the socioeconomic ladder. For 
other natives with plantation-worker backgrounds it was 
not very inspiring to see their children acting as servants to 
tourists.45 “ The travel industry,” wrote one commentator, 
“ furnishes the lowest-paid and socially least desirable 
employment for local people of any industry that the state 
might encourage.”
The housing situation seemed to be worsened rather than
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helped by tourism. It was always hoped that construction of 
hotels would include provision of housing for employees, but 
that seldom happened. New employees needed new houses, 
and in most cases they had to shop in the already sparse 
local market. When home people were employed, they usual­
ly found that they had to travel from what homes they had.
As for bolstering the state’s economy and even providing 
direct revenues for the public treasury, there was no doubt 
that tourism was generous. Visitor expenditures passed the 
billion-dollar mark in 1974 and kept on growing. More than 
$100 million in state and local taxes was generated annually 
by the industry. Countless fringe benefits came from the 
tourists: construction, for instance, and of course merchan­
dising of all kinds increased in volume because of the 
visitors’ vacation extravagance.46
Peculiar factors were turned up in some analyses of the 
income-producing aspect of tourism. On the one hand, not 
all the money spent in Hawaii stayed there, perhaps not 
much more than half. On the other hand, the cash that visi­
tors left in the islands multiplied as it was passed around, in 
a way difficult to pinpoint. What was termed the “ catalytic 
effect” of tourism on the state’s economic growth was the 
subject of several controversial studies, at least one of which 
questioned the weight of its impact on the state’s economy.47
The stability of the industry that Hawaii had come to de­
pend on so greatly was also examined by analysts. Tourism is 
a fragile business. It depends on a stable economy and steady 
levels of personal affluence in the places where tourists come 
from. Further, to continue drawing paying guests, the loca­
tion must remain more attractive (both to travel agencies 
and to the traveling public) than other places that might be 
visited. Although they may be handled like so much mer­
chandise once they are on their way, vacationing travelers are 
fickle in their choice of destination. There was plenty of 
evidence of this for Hawaii’s entrepreneurs and legislators to 
study. And they lived with the knowledge that islands further
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south in the Pacific were ready to tout their fresher, and 
often less expensive, attractions.
The immediate physical effect of tourism on Hawaii’s 
environment was evaluated by impact-analysis methods in 
several studies. As public costs of services had been found at 
times to outweigh the revenues provided by residential sub­
divisions, so the facilities that the state and the counties had 
to furnish for visitors were obviously mounting seriously. 
Roads, and good ones, had to be built to the resort areas, 
often far from urbanized places. Water, sewerage, and pro­
tection services of various kinds were necessary.
The possibility of levying a separate occupancy tax on 
hotel rooms to ease the public cost became a political issue, 
with the industry spokesmen protesting that it would kill the 
visiting geese now laying their golden eggs so lavishly.48 
Unpleasant arguments developed between state and county 
officials as the problem of public expenditures became more 
pressing. There was a perennial question how state and city 
funds should be allocated to bolster the decrepit services in 
Waikiki and plan the necessary new ones, a dispute which 
prevented anything at all from being done there for countless 
years.
There was a large increase in the early 1970s in the number 
of packaged tours—prepaid tour groups traveling together in 
great guided numbers—and many who feared the block im­
pact of these tourist herds suggested that “ quality” tourism 
should be stimulated instead. In practice this would mean 
encouraging and building for visits by wealthier people than 
those now generally arriving. A few expensive places like the 
Mauna Kea Beach Hotel on Hawaii and the Kahala Hilton 
outside Waikiki on Oahu already drew people who had more 
money to spend and presumably more regard for the environ­
ment than the tour-type tourist. On the face of it, there 
seemed to be much greater benefits in this kind of trade than 
in catering to the low-budget groups.
Aside from the interesting social questions these proposals
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raised—is it right to discriminate against the less wealthy 
traveler?—it appeared that there were economic complica­
tions involved. A report made for the state pointed out that 
the high-income visitor needs more land for his hotels 
because he does not like to be crowded; he requires more 
physical services and more lavish appointments, which are 
costly and space consuming. With all this, he may or may 
not spend more dollars per day locally; in fact, “ there is 
evidence that [he] is characterized by a slightly lower cost- 
benefit ratio than the middle-class visitor.” 49 That is, the 
corporation head may not return as much money to the state 
while he is in Hawaii as the once-in-a-lifetime retired shop­
keeper, although he unquestionably demands much more 
space and imposes a more intensive use on the land.
The social impacts of tourism were found to be as difficult 
to evaluate as the economic effects. The lives of people 
living on the islands’ lands, interrupted by “ visitors,” were 
affected in several ways. The most violent impact on local 
residents was that they were often asked to leave when 
tourists were invited to come. The displacement of native 
people by resort development was not great in numbers of 
individuals disturbed (the new hotels were likely to be on 
raw, vacant lands). But when it occurred it caused acute 
social pain.
More subtly damaging was the effect on the people leading 
natural lives in tranquil communities when they found sight­
seers peering over their shoulders. Affluent citizens could 
ignore the visitors if they wanted to but, as so often happens, 
it was the least wealthy who felt most sharply the social 
stress. It was bad enough to be segregated de facto at play­
time, with one beach for the transient tourist and one for the 
home folks, but it was worse to have one’s “ quaint” life­
style photographed at any time. The people of Koloa, one of 
the oldest of the plantation towns, on the road to those 
hotels that preempt Kauai’s Poipu Beach, were having hard 
enough times in the 1970s. The Grove Plantation was threat­
ening to close and leave them without livelihood. Jobs that
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were offered by the Sheraton Kauai and other hotels on the 
shore helped some. But busloads of strangers—driving 
through their quiet town, stopping to take pictures, poking 
into the local store, wandering up the neighborhood streets— 
made tourism’s benefits doubtful. Normal living habits stop 
under such circumstances and are replaced by a kind of liv­
ing performance. In 1976 another assault by tourism on local 
neighborhoods began to cause concern. It resulted from a 
shortage of hotel rooms in some key spots and a glut of 
condominium apartments (overbuilt to the extent of 16,000 
units, one source said).50 Many of the apartments were rented 
to short-term visitors—upsetting the balance “ not only in 
terms of the services provided but also in the life-style of the 
community,” as one planning director put it.51
What was happening to the land? This was the ultimate 
question that had to be asked about tourism after all the 
economic and social effects had been analyzed and debated. 
Again, quantitative measurements did not mean much. Only 
a small percentage of the lands of the islands was being given 
to resort use, but that was not the point: they were obviously 
the most beautiful places of all, and the most unspoiled, 
when they were taken over. Otherwise the industry’s finger 
would never have been put on them. And it was the best of 
these best lands that were the most profitable for tourism 
and the most overbuilt and overcrowded.
Once the highway had been improved to the first few 
hotels on Amfac’s beach land at Kaanapali on Maui, once 
water lines had been laid and a sewer system installed, it 
made economic good sense to build as many hotels there as 
possible.52 The restaurants and stores did better business, 
then, and soon a proprietary shopping center could be built 
with guaranteed success. Anyway, people liked to see more 
people; if they did not, they felt they had gone to an un­
popular place. The path toward the greatest profit potential 
of the land was clear. Before long the original good inten­
tions to keep densities low and vistas clear, formalized at one 
time by a team of architect-planners, went by the boards.
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Condominiums and hotels nudged one another along a new 
resort strip on one of the islands’ greatest beaches.
The report made to the state legislature in 1973 by a Tem­
porary Visitor Industry Council recognized the dangers to the 
very environment that had attracted the tourist hordes that 
were now overloading it. It based a suggested controlled- 
growth policy for tourism on the premise that “ the unlimited 
expansion of the number of tourists in Hawaii is something 
which the fragility of our social and physical environment 
cannot tolerate.” 53 But by that time the ability of tourist­
serving land to generate wealth for private pockets and the 
public purse had been demonstrated so convincingly that it 
was difficult to keep in mind its other values.
The 1973 report of the Temporary Council resulted two 
years later in appointment of a governor’s Advisory Commit­
tee. Its further analysis, in turn, pointed to the many more 
hotels that would be needed to accommodate the great in­
crease in visitor traffic required to make tourism Hawaii’s 
economic mainstay. The legislature began, finally, to 
recognize the need to plan for such growth and started to 
consider legislation to that end. However, a “ fact-finding” 
trip to Latin America, the Caribbean, and other resort areas, 
made by a group from the state House and Senate in that 
same year, discovered, not surprisingly, that places like 
Miami can become physically unpleasant, that others, like 
Puerto Rico, can turn visitors away by being socially 
unpleasant, and that, in general, tourists are fickle and 
tourism is flighty.
The traveling legislators unanimously admired Bermuda’s 
careful control of its beauty along with the continuing suc­
cess of its tourism. One of them felt “ good vibes” there; 
another noted a pleasant “ retained image” ; all were im­
pressed with the income figures they saw. Few, however, had 
any wish to apply any of these lessons to their own islands. 
Bermuda is “ a Utopia,” one solon said, “ as far as authori­
tarian planning is concerned . . . but what they do is not 
applicable to Hawaii.” Another concluded that it was “ a
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tremendous place to visit,” but “ the government calls the 
shots” and “ in terms of government, Hawaii can never be in 
this position.” Others who had made the trip concurred with 
this conclusion. A newspaperman agreed editorially:
“ Tourism in Hawaii doesn’t want government controls.” 54 
What that judgment seemed to imply was that those who 
were profiting from tourism’s use of Hawaii’s land might 
welcome a growth plan for their industry, but they would not 
tolerate government action to protect the environment upon 
which the growth depended.
chapter
Source of Power
MASTERY of a region’s land means command of its 
destiny, and nowhere has this truth been more clearly demon­
strated than in Hawaii. In early days, the kings knew they 
had to secure the land to gain authority—-and hold it to keep 
control over their people.1 After the kingdom was estab­
lished, the gradual loss of governmental power by the alii 
and its transfer to white foreigners came about with changes 
in the system of land ownership. The final forfeit of the 
throne became inevitable as the plantations assumed increas­
ing power over the land. After the overthrow of the monar­
chy, the provisional government and then the United States 
itself asserted authority by taking title to the lands the 
kingdom had owned.
The oligarchical powers of the planters and their agents 
during the time of the territory came from their domination 
of the land—and the overweening command of the federal 
government was demonstrated by the setting aside of great 
areas for national, primarily military, use. The war years 
after Pearl Harbor, with martial law invoked, saw even 
greater parts of the lands of the islands absorbed by Wash­
ington for the defense establishment, to remain permanent 
witness to the national power.2
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As private control over land shifted, in the postwar years, 
to those who owned or secured development rights, this new 
group’s influence began to show itself in actions of agencies 
at the state level and (since the state had no firm policy 
regarding land use) increasingly at the plane of county zon­
ing. Today there is widespread, cynical understanding that 
“ the developers,” as a class, pretty well control the state’s 
politics.3 The new worry is whether the increasing transfer of 
land tenure to investors outside the state may mean that these 
new owners will, in their turn, use the powers that go with 
land to control the islands’ future.
While certain civil laws obtained in ancient Hawaii, pri­
marily as religious taboos, basically “ everything went accord­
ing to the will of the king.” 4 Government and land were 
closely related in the old days, writes the historian Kuyken­
dall.5 Acquisition of power by the principal chief of an island 
meant sole ownership of all the land, and the allegiance of 
the king’s chiefly supporters depended on their receiving 
grants of land parcels. The authority that an alii might have 
came from his dominion over the common people, the 
makaainana, who were living in their kuleanas on his 
allocated property.
The king’s need for a diplomatic adviser in the distribution 
of land was clear; the nature of the areas that were appor­
tioned determined the relative power of the alii. Mokus and 
ahupuaas varied in size and even in shape and some gave 
greater scope and authority than others. Jealousies were in­
evitable, and there were many wars inspired by a desire for 
better distribution of land power before Kamehameha drove 
Kiwalao off his short-held throne. When the fighting stopped 
after these contests, as when a chief named Umi-a-Liloa 
succeeded in taking over a section of the island of Hawaii 
several generations before Kamehameha’s rise, “ the lands 
were apportioned and chiefs set up over each district, land 
section and ahupuaa, and all was at peace.” 6
When a new chief did assume command, civil wars were 
likely; those with land tenure did not want to relinquish
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control and those who had been with little or no land wanted 
to gain the power they had lacked. It was the maldistribution 
of land after the death of the old king Keawemauhili that 
inspired Kamehameha’s thrust for power on the Kona coast 
of Hawaii. In the traditional manner, after his wars were 
over, Kamehameha made sure that close friends and relatives 
were first rewarded with land. He then gave to a political 
adviser the duty of distributing authority—“ dividing the 
lands to the chiefs and commoners, to all those who had 
used their strength for the victory” —in a manner that would 
avert later disputes.7
With the chiefs wielding such power and the common 
people so beholden to the will of the landed alii, intraclass 
rivalries would seem unlikely, but apparently they did exist at 
times. When a makaainana felt he was being treated unfairly 
he had just one recourse: to leave his land and find another 
kuleana under a more just owner and manager. The chiefs, 
on the other hand, could be more ruthless when they thought 
a commoner was exceeding his prerogatives.
“ It was not for a commoner to do as he liked,” wrote 
Samuel Kamakau. “ If a chief saw that a man was becoming 
affluent, was a man of importance in the back country, had 
built him a good house, and had several men under him, the 
chief would take everything away from him and seize the 
land, leaving the man with only the clothes on his back.” 8
The haoles who arrived early in Hawaii remarked how the 
chiefs used land control to maintain their prestige and noted 
with what tenacity they held on to this mark of authority. An 
old chief’s unhappiness at the kuleana grant of 1849 was 
described by a missionary writer: “ If we cannot take away 
their lands,” he asked, “ what will they care for us?” 9
Apparently the idea that land might give it political or 
personal power did not immediately occur to the foreign 
population. As an early trader wrote, “ the white men, who 
hold extensive lands, derive little benefit from them unless 
they cultivate the ground.” 10 The early missionaries had no 
thought of using the land they were allowed to occupy for
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any purpose other than living on it themselves and building 
on it churches and schools for teaching their beliefs to the 
natives. There is little suggestion in the history of the increas­
ing influence of the missionaries of any wish to acquire land 
for the power it might bring." Those who stayed in the 
church’s service were anxious from the beginning to see the 
native people themselves become more “ self-sufficient, free 
and enterprising” in the way they used their land. The 
thought that their kanaka converts occupied kuleanas only 
at the will of often heathen konohikis was repugnant to their 
New England freeholder tenets.
The records of those missionaries who left the fold to 
enter government service have also pretty well satisfied later 
historians that their motives were unselfish. Generally they 
did not work to their own advantage or that of their religious 
band in seeking wealth, assuming personal political power— 
or acquiring land. People like Richards, Bingham, and Judd, 
who had tremendous influence on the successive kings and 
their governments, tried their best, according to their stan­
dards, to bring Hawaii to a sense of Christian social morality 
and an ability to govern itself; they did not, except perhaps 
in a few instances, reach for self-serving power.
Gerrit P. Judd, the most hardworking adviser to the mon­
archy, was firm enough in his beliefs to antagonize many and 
sure enough of his abilities to annoy many more, but he 
never achieved a secure position. After his enemies succeeded 
in seeing that he was “ retired” from the kingdom’s govern­
ment he had difficulty supporting his family for the re­
mainder of his life.12
The haole contingent outside the religious fraternity, how­
ever, had no such restraints. (Nor did the second generation 
of the missionary families, many of whom stayed in the 
islands and started or joined business enterprises.) In fact, 
the burgeoning business community was increasingly annoyed 
at the pro-Hawaiian position of the missionary advisers to 
the government. Seeing that these good-hearted public ser­
vants were intent on strengthening the hold of the Hawaiian
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kings and the alii on the islands’ lands, they began to 
move into politics themselves, often with more selfish pur­
poses. Many of the haole cabinet members whom the later 
Kamehamehas and then the last monarchs added to their ad­
ministrations were objective advisers, a few were adventurers 
who gained the royal families’ confidence, but an increasing 
number were established professionals and businessmen 
who wanted full control of the lands of Hawaii, and the 
political power they carried, to be in the hands of the white 
island residents.
What signaled the end of the monarchy was in essence a 
series of adopted and proposed changes in the kingdom’s 
constitution attesting to the shaky nature of haole land 
politics while the Hawaiians were even nominally their own 
rulers. There was a fairly authoritarian Hawaiian constitution 
which Kamehameha V sponsored, a weak, so-called bayonet 
constitution forced on Kalakaua by his cabinet, and another, 
projected constitution prepared by Liliuokalani, which would 
have strengthened native control again.'3 This last one the 
queen’s cabinet balked at; to the by-then proannexationist 
members of the business community it was insulting. They 
were, after all, the people of Hawaii who now governed its 
land, and that fact, they felt, should give them authority over 
its civil polity as well. Their proclamation of 1892, justifying 
the revolution, said of the queen’s proposed constitution that 
it would “ disfranchise over one fourth of the voters [viz. 
white] and the owners of nine tenths of the private properties 
of the kingdom.” 14 When a band of local businessmen 
walked the few blocks from the office of one of them to the 
government building to tell the queen that her rule was 
ended, she made no resistance: she yielded to “ the superior 
force of the United States of America” in 1893,15 as 
Kamehameha III had to yield to Britain’s superior force fifty 
years earlier. Although America’s might did not officially 
support the revolutionaries, this time the submission was 
permanent. The Hawaiians’ power over the life of their 
land was now gone, no longer with hope that it would be 
returned.
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After the Haole Takeover
The story of the passage of national power does not end 
quite at that point, however. What followed is important 
to the claim of today’s people of Hawaiian descent that 
retribution is due them for land illegally taken from their 
forefathers. The takeover had almost seemed a simple, polite 
accession by a group of nice people. Sanford Dole, who 
agreed to lead the new government, was a kindly gentleman, 
a lawyer, well enough liked by the Hawaiians despite his 
association with the haole hegemony. He and his provisional 
government were anxious now for the next step they foresaw: 
annexation by the United States.
President Benjamin Harrison’s first term of office was in 
its last days when the revolution took place; when Grover 
Cleveland succeeded him, one of his first acts was to send an 
emissary named James Henderson Blount, former chairman 
of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to investi­
gate at first hand in Hawaii what had happened. Blount re­
ported that the taking of power had been with the assistance 
of the United States—it would not have been possible if the 
U.S. minister, John L. Stevens, had not helped out, prim­
arily by ordering American troops (from the USS Boston, 
under command of Capt. G. C. Wiltse) on shore at the cru­
cial time.16 The president was disturbed at Blount’s report 
and moved, at first, to put Liliuokalani back on her throne. 
When the provisional government in Hawaii remained ada­
mant in its power, however, and the former queen was 
stubborn about hers, he referred the problem to Congress. 
That body set up its own investigation in Washington under 
Chairman John Tyler Morgan of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. Morgan’s final report concluded, contrary 
to Blount’s findings, that the landing of U.S. troops had 
been only for “ the preservation of law and order” to pro­
tect “ the rights of American citizens resident in Honolulu.” 
With that patriotic justification, Congress decided to wash its 
hands of the affair and, for the time being, let Hawaii work 
out its own fate.
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Agitation for annexation increased, however, despite con­
cern about the results of universal suffrage.17 It finally suc­
ceeded during the administration of President William 
McKinley, when on 15 June 1898 Congress passed a joint 
resolution remembered by the name of its sponsor, Senator 
F. C. Newlands. By then it seemed “ manifest destiny” that 
the islands be annexed, as one enthusiastic congressman put 
it.18 When, two months later in Honolulu, Dole ceded the 
Republic of Hawaii to the United States of America in a 
formal ceremony, the flag of an independent Hawaii was 
lowered and the islands finally became a territory of a distant 
power. Former President Cleveland, looking back on the 
earlier stages of “ this miserable business,” said “ I am 
ashamed of the whole affair.” 19
Land and power went together in these moves. Each suc­
ceeding government made sure that it had acquired not only 
political control but possession of the lands which were its 
token. The provisional government barely had time to turn 
itself into a tightly controlled “ republic” —to say nothing of 
adopting a constitution and deciding what laws of the 
kingdom should be retained and what new ones should be 
considered—before annexation became a fact.20 But time was 
found in that short interim for the most important act of all: 
making sure that all the monarchy’s lands passed into the 
hands of the new government.
The republic established its land policy in the Land Act of 
1895.21 Crown lands and government lands were merged, in 
this legislation, as public lands to be administered by a com­
mission. Where the control over land uses really lay was 
made very clear in the charge to the commissioners: they 
were authorized to “ lease, sell or otherwise dispose of the 
public lands, and other property, in such manners as they 
may deem best for the protection o f agriculture and the 
general welfare of the Republic.” 22 It followed naturally that 
during the time of the republic large areas of these public 
lands were disposed of to the plantations, some by sale, more 
by long-term lease.
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At the time of annexation the public lands that remained 
were “ ceded” to the United States, which thus acquired 
about 1,800,000 acres of mid-Pacific territory with no blood­
shed and with not a penny of payment.23 Under terms of the 
Newlands Resolution and then of the Organic Act that 
regularized the annexation, the president of the United States 
was supposed to appoint another commission—a five-man 
body to study Hawaii’s peculiar land situation and make 
recommendations to the Congress on its regulation.24 This 
was never done. Tacitly it was agreed by all parties that 
management of the now federally owned public lands would 
remain in the hands of the territory, with full understanding 
that sovereignty over them had passed to the mainland 
government. Hence the interim administration (a continua­
tion of the regime of the republic, still headed by Sanford 
Dole) and then the first appointed governor (the same San­
ford Dole) continued to operate under the Land Act of 1895 
until the Organic Act was passed. At that time it was stated 
clearly that all public land was property of the United 
States but remained, for administrative purposes, under the 
“ possession, use and control of the Territory of Hawaii.” 
When Hawaii became a state the Statehood Act provided for 
a division of the public lands—a new kind of mahele— 
between federal and state governments. Much of the ceded 
land was transferred back to the state,25 so that at the present 
time approximately 400,000 acres remain with the national 
government and almost 2,000,000 acres are in state owner­
ship.
The plantation owners and the businessmen whose fortunes 
depended on them saw that things were still working to their 
advantage. Nothing stood in the way of their assumption of 
the powers over the islands that had been so tantalizingly 
close during the last years of the monarchy. The one part of 
the new legislation that made them unhappy—the proviso in 
the Organic Act which limited anyone’s possession of land to 
a thousand acres—they would have to work to remove. This 
they succeeded in doing with the 1920 Rehabilitation Act.26
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One other restraint stood in the way of handling all land 
as the local haoles wanted during the territorial period. The 
military establishment and some congressmen were worried 
that if public-land management were left entirely to the local 
government, even bound as it was to the national administra­
tion in Washington, the United States might not be able to 
take what it wanted, when it wanted, for national defense 
purposes. After all, securement of the islands as a defensive 
outpost had been a main reason for annexation. (A garrison 
of troops arrived in Hawaii four days after the annexation 
ceremony and bivouacked alongside Waikiki.) President 
McKinley, stimulated by a military report in 1899,27 issued a 
series of executive orders and proclamations ordering that 
certain lands which the military wanted be “ set aside.” 28 
About 287,000 acres thus became specifically engaged as 
federal property for defense and related purposes. None of 
this transfer disturbed plantation lands, however; in fact, the 
new military population and the old industrial-agricultural 
society got along very well together, each in its way utilizing 
Hawaii’s lands to enhance its own authority.
Although much more land was set aside for the military 
than it could immediately use, a good deal of defense con­
struction did take place soon after annexation. A system of 
defensive forts was established which required sizable land 
areas: Fort Shafter on high ground above Honolulu harbor 
and Fort Armstrong at its entrance; Fort Kamehameha and 
Fort Weaver near Pearl Harbor; Fort DeRussy in an attrac­
tive beach location near Waikiki and Fort Ruger on the 
slopes of Diamond Head. The greatest land take was for 
Schofield Barracks, high in the central plains of Oahu, one 
of the largest of all U.S. garrisons.29 The lands that had 
earlier been ceded at Pearl Harbor were prepared for inten­
sive use for the first time: the channel mouth was dredged to 
allow entrance of large ships; docks were constructed; an­
cillary shore work was begun. By the time America entered 
World War I the harbor was usable as a major naval base. 
Other smaller acquisitions followed during the early years of
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the century, such as Wheeler and Hickam airfields. No one 
foresaw then the competition for land that would develop 
after World War II, but the presidential executive orders 
from 1898 through 1900 “ have contributed,’’ as one study 
puts it, “ to land use problems that remain unresolved to the 
present.” 30
One of the most visible problems finally erupted as a 
violent protest by an angry group of Hawaiians over use of 
the island of Kahoolawe as a target for military bombing 
practice. Kahoolawe is a volcanic dome forming a small 
island lying off the Kihei shore of Maui, its highest parts 
once covered with deep soil and its beaches used during 
Polynesian times by fishing villages. Now it is pocked with 
the remains of live ordnance deposited there during years of 
persistent bombing by the Navy. Several times members of a 
protesting “ ‘Ohana” paid forbidden visits to the island, to 
occupy it as a demonstration of their concern for this mis­
used part of their native soil. On one trip two young men 
were lost from the surf boards they were travelling on. The 
Navy, however, continued to insist that the most important 
use of this island was for military training, no matter how 
destructive to the land.
Many accounts have been written describing the great 
powers that the plantation oligarchy possessed during the 
first half of the present century in Hawaii, but the story is 
still hard for a later generation to credit. It is difficult to 
understand how the government of the United States, which 
had devised its own constitution to guard against focalization 
of power, could have allowed its Pacific territory to fall 
so completely into the hands of a small group of colonial 
planters. There were reports sent back from time to time, but 
Hawaii was pretty far away in those days (it took the sons 
and daughters of the kamaaina elite ten days by ship and 
train to get to their mainland colleges, one of them recalls). 
Moreover, the occasional investigating bodies that Congress 
sent to see what was happening were well entertained in the 
islands.
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Even during Franklin Roosevelt’s administration and 
the New Deal, Hawaii was still largely ignored. Political 
lobbying machinations by the planters’ representatives in 
Washington, involving even Harold Ickes and James Farley, 
precluded any real governmental concern for the way Hawaii 
was handling its politico-economic affairs—and its land.31
The Polynesian Hawaiian land-tenure system is often 
referred to as feudal, and in many respects the aliis’ control 
of land, in an authoritarian society of simple technologies, 
did give them a hold over the commoners that was not unlike 
a lord-vassal relationship. And in some ways the white 
kamaainas who owned the land in territorial times exerted 
just as great a power over the common people (especially on 
the plantations), in a more industrialized, democratic society, 
through such devices as political appointments and interlock­
ing directorates. In other terms, the powers and life-styles 
of the elite in Hawaii are often likened to the antebellum 
plantation-centered society in America’s south, and there 
were in fact many similarities. In both cases the economy 
was based on a nearly one-crop agriculture, produced on 
land controlled by a genteel aristocracy, and farmed by an 
imported labor force. In America certain democratic prin­
ciples that had been adopted by the founding fathers pre­
vented the southern plantation-owning class from becoming a 
true political oligarchy, although it approached it at times in 
ways that helped lead to the Civil War. In Hawaii, however, 
the transition from a monarchy (itself so recently an 
aboriginal society) to a territory of a democracy was so 
rapid, and the distance from the national seat of government 
so great, that it took a half century before the powers of the 
landholding oligarchy could be challenged.
The scope of the hegemony included every aspect of 
Hawaii’s economic, social, and political life. In the economic 
sphere the arrogation of power was through the medium of 
the Big Five factors, or agents, who not only marketed sugar 
but began early to develop additional commercial enterprises 
and assist in the formation of others. The agricultural in­
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dustry required banking support, trust activities, and related 
financial facilities; ships were needed for transport of the 
plantations’ products; construction of all kinds was required 
by the plantations and their offshoot enterprises; stores and 
all sorts of merchandising businesses grew up around the cen­
tral industry; insurance companies, advertising agencies, and 
all the professions found clients in the correlated activities.32
Perhaps never in capitalist history has there been such a 
maze of meshed directorates—certainly never one so tightly 
woven—as the network of board members that ran Hawaii’s 
commercial companies in the 1920s and 1930s. The same 
names repeated themselves as directors: of the Big Five, of 
Matson Navigation and Inter Island Steam Ships, of Oahu 
Railroad and Land and Honolulu Rapid Transit, of the Bank 
of Hawaii, Bishop Trust Company, International Trust, and 
Hawaiian Trust, of Liberty House, of hotels, insurance agen­
cies, all kinds of wholesale and retail business firms, even of 
the utilities, the Honolulu Electric and Honolulu Gas com­
panies and Mutual Telephone.33 Social historian Lawrence 
Fuchs has calculated that one kamaaina family had members 
on the boards of eighteen companies and another was 
represented on ten.
In a political sense the elite group was able, almost until 
Pearl Harbor, to influence appointment of the territorial 
governor, to control election of the territorial delegate to 
Congress, and to make sure that the actions of the territorial 
legislature were not detrimental to elite interests. All this 
required adroit political maneuvering because the haoles were 
still, for a time, outnumbered by the Hawaiians.34 If they 
had been prepared, and if they had had sophisticated leader­
ship, the Hawaiian people would have had a remarkable 
opportunity under democratic American procedures to regain 
control of their islands. This did not happen, however. 
Increasingly, they were landless in a territory where authority 
lay with the land.
The social domination of the white elite was as complete as 
it has historically been in any colonial territory. Occasional
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marriages with Hawaiians who had royal connections (and 
often alii land) added some color to a few of the kamaaina 
families, but other than that the social and cultural activities 
were confined to the ruling clique. For that gentry it was a 
fantastically pleasant life in a tropical paradise, lived with the 
aplomb, the assurance, the dignity of a landed aristocracy. 
Even half a century later the detachment of the old families 
remains. Their social clubs and their cultural associations 
have been breached by newer newcomers, just as the old-line 
companies have had to admit new administrative talents. But 
they are still the kamaainas, the native-born. The ethnically 
mixed non-Caucasian population calls itself the “ locals,” 
and the haole kamaainas are willing to accept that termi­
nology.35 New arrivals are malihinis (strangers or guests), and 
after a short time in Hawaii every new resident wants to 
graduate from that rank. But there is no name for the great 
group of people who have more recently been attracted to the 
islands and have remained, many of them more thoroughly 
involved in social, political, and cultural affairs than either 
the kamaainas or the locals.
The Breaking of Plantation Power
In a political sense plantation power lasted into the 1950s. In 
economic terms the Big Five and the related businesses they 
spawned during territorial days still control much of the local 
activity, since they still own major parts of the land on which 
income is produced. Socially, the oligarchy began to lose its 
absolute grip during the 1940s when the plantation workers, 
particularly the Chinese and the Japanese, started to move up 
the ladder of American-type success.
The first break in socioeconomic paternalism came with 
attempts to unionize the plantation workers. Early moves to 
protest working and living conditions were not very suc­
cessful. A man named Pablo Manlapit organized Filipino 
workers in 1924, but their attempt to strike resulted only in 
mass arrests and Manlapit’s forced departure from the 
islands.36 A decade later, encouraged by the National Labor
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Relations Act, Filipino plantation laborers organized again 
(and struck again fruitlessly). Organizers from mainland 
maritime unions who came to Hawaii with slogans of class, 
rather than ethnic, solidarity were more successful, however.
After struggles, strikes, and settlements the ILWU (CIO), 
having unionized first the dockworkers and then the sugar 
and pineapple plantation laborers, emerged as a powerful 
factor in island political as well as economic affairs. The 
American Federation of Labor, many of whose craft union 
members had found work in Hawaii, also sent its organizers, 
and before World War II almost all major industries were 
unionized.37 The planters’ complete control over the way 
their plantations and the businesses allied with them were to 
be operated had been broken.
In the meantime, many of the early plantation workers 
who had moved to the towns had not only established their 
own commercial enterprises but had formed their own social 
and business organizations. The Chambers of Commerce in 
Honolulu and Hilo had always been haole kamaaina organi­
zations. Now separate Chinese and Japanese chambers were 
formed. Against some quite strong haole opposition, the 
public schools were opened to the socially upward-moving 
groups, and the Japanese particularly took quick advantage 
of the educational opportunities.
Even before the war, the end of the exclusive social, 
economic, and political power of the select kamaaina class 
was in sight. Yet the absolute control it had held over the 
island lands allowed it to maintain authority for some time. 
Sugarcane and pineapple production still dominated the 
economy and the economy controlled the government. The 
unions had become powerful in their right, but they held no 
land and had not yet learned how to exercise control over the 
way land was used. The major transfer of control came 
about after the war. With rapid urbanization, power began 
to shift from those who farmed land to those who 
manipulated it.
The kamaaina landowners tried to maintain a measure of 
control over their lands into the 1960s and 1970s. When the
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Big Five and the trusts and estates sold land they lost contact 
with it, of course, just as the Bishop Estate did. To avoid 
that they devised several methods of gaining profits from 
development without losing tenure. Sale of development 
rights was one common means; joint venturing with a 
builder-developer was another.
Once in a while an old-line landowning company itself 
became the development entrepreneur. Oceanic Properties, 
development arm of Castle & Cooke, planned and developed 
Mililani Town; in that same central Oahu area the Campbell 
Estate proposed to joint venture, for another new town pro­
ject to hold 85,000 persons, with Grosvenor International, 
subsidiary of a British financial trust anxious to spread its 
activities.38 And still in that agricultural district the Bishop 
Estate sold development rights for three thousand acres to an 
association called Amfac-Trousdale.
An interesting power struggle among these three combina­
tions resulted when the University of Hawaii decided it 
wanted to build a new central Oahu campus—each of the 
landowners and his partners realized that locating it on his 
property would be of tremendous assistance in getting cane 
land rezoned for urban use. The combination of pressures 
from a kamaaina landowner, an aggressive developer, and 
the board of regents of the university, they figured, would be 
found irresistible by the state and county zoning agencies. 
Maneuverings went on for years until finally, in 1974, the 
regents decided in favor of Campbell Estate’s Honouliuli 
land on the far western edge of Pearl Harbor. There seemed 
no question in anyone’s mind that the necessary reclassifica­
tion and rezoning would be obtained; that was considered 
just a final formality which would have to be observed.
It was hard to say, even for someone watching the inner 
struggles from a close vantage point, what power pressure 
had been most effective in the final choice.39 It was obvious 
that such decisions were no longer comfortable arrangements 
between friendly members of a colonial cabal. The chairman 
of the board of regents at one point was Harold Eichel-
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berger, retired president of Amfac, but he refrained from 
voting on the question. One of the petitioners was Frederick 
Trotter, a Campbell Estate inheritor and trustee, but the 
estate let Hirano Brothers, its selected developer, apply much 
of the pressure.
If the question had been only selection of a land parcel 
from among three offers, one could almost believe that 
political power plays had little to do with the choice. A quite 
thorough analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
each location was made for the regents by a responsible plan­
ning firm. Although no specific recommendation was made, 
the findings seemed to point to Honouliuli as the best suited 
of the three sites.40 A number of other power struggles im­
pinged on the campus-site selection process, however. The 
university’s regents had all been appointed by ex-Governor 
Burns, who had made it clear during his administration that 
he favored placing any new campus on the Big Island. In this 
case Burns’ influence over his usually loyal cohorts had 
failed; the board of regents was adamant through the years 
about its preference for central Oahu, where the three in­
fluential landowners were vying for it. The State Land Use 
Commission’s consultants for its first five-year land classifi­
cation review said that a campus on those agricultural plains, 
with its urban-generative effect, “ could well negate one of 
the most significant purposes of the State Land Use Law .” 41 
The State Department of Planning and Economic Develop­
ment issued several memoranda and a strong report opposing 
the proposed location. They insisted that “ no further 
encroachment on agricultural lands in central Oahu be 
allowed” 42 and, going further, suggested eight alternatives— 
from building on the island of Hawaii to planning a more 
imaginative system of small liberal arts colleges on the 
neighbor islands. One alternative was not building any new 
campus at all but intensifying use of the existing, inefficiently 
organized Manoa campus facilities.43
Not only were the state administration and the state 
university in conflict but the continual struggle between state
2 1 2 TH E W O R T H  OF H A W A II’ S LANDS
and city over control of Oahu’s lands was also involved. 
Honolulu’s planning department was urging growth in the 
Ewa direction, where the new campus would be located; the 
state was pushing for the H3 freeway, which would lead to 
growth in the other direction, toward the windward coast.
The stubbornness of the university’s position was difficult 
to understand, unless it was intended to be a sheer demon­
stration of power. When a central Oahu campus had first 
been suggested in a 1967 consultants’ report,44 the univer­
sity’s enrollment of four-year and graduate students was 
increasing quite rapidly; by the mid-1970s those registrations 
were decreasing. The location proposed for a new conven­
tional campus was only nineteen miles from Manoa, an 
absurdly short distance between major duplicated facilities. 
No recent analysis had been made of educational needs 
that might justify what looked like fiscal and educational 
extravagance.
The university seemed as obstinate in pushing for this 
change in land uses as the state was in insisting on building 
the H3 freeway; both were outdated concepts kept alive and 
moving by the sheer momentum of institutional force. Gover­
nor Ariyoshi stayed neutral on the issue. The legislature, 
excepting a few of its members, seemed content to let the 
university play out its game and appropriated enough funds 
for it to begin classes in temporary quarters (which it did, 
with dismal enrollment). But in 1974, to everyone’s surprise, 
the State Land Use Commission denied Campbell Estate’s 
application for reclassification of two hundred acres of 
agricultural land to urban uses. The campus now seemed 
unlikely.
In no way did this rejection alter the university’s inten­
tions, however. Instead of pulling back and reconsidering the 
effect its intended move would have, the university adminis­
tration began thinking of ways around the unexpected rezon­
ing obstacle: asking for a conditional use permit from the 
city, perhaps, which would bypass the state’s commission.45 
It might now take “ two, three, four, or even five years’’ to
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get started, said University President Fujio Matsuda, but few 
doubted the end result. Even though all considered judg­
ments about best use of land opposed the campus proposal, 
the combined strength of its proposers seemed likely, in time, 
to prevail.
In other cases, the transfer of power from early land- 
owners to later land brokers was more clear. When the Land 
Use Commission agreed to reclassify the land occupied by 
Oahu Sugar Company in 1969, it was developer Herbert 
Horita, not the Robinson Estate, who engineered the deal. It 
was developer and new owner Clarence Ching who obtained 
approval to fill in Salt Lake, not the original owner, the 
Damon Estate. During the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s the pressures 
for urbanizing open lands came from developers with names 
new to island politics, seldom from the familiar missionary- 
descended or haole oligarchy families. By the time of the 
1974 land-use boundary review of the Land Use Commission, 
letters of intent to develop open lands were sometimes signed 
by Alexanders and Baldwins and Castles and Cookes, but 
most were submitted by the new owners and developers and 
their planners and attorneys: Ing, Sakoda, Minder, Palk, 
Omori, Calilao, Freitas, Agena, Nakamura, Yuen.
Many odd combinations came about in the actual devel­
opment process also, in the rush to urbanize long-held 
kamaaina lands. A planning consultant familiar with 
Hawaii’s land history remembers sitting in a meeting in 1965 
between Clarence T. C. Ching, landowner and developer, 
born on a Kauai plantation, and representatives of the 
Dillingham Corporation, builders, a business descended from 
the Benjamin F. Dillingham who had organized the Oahu 
Railroad and Land Company in 1889, as they negotiated 
prices and divided anticipated profits from a housing project 
to be built on land acquired from the estate of Samuel 
M. Damon, who had helped found Hawaii’s first bank in 
1850 and later took part in Queen Liliuokalani’s ouster.46 
They were strange bedfellows that Hawaii’s lands were bring­
ing to couch.
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A Time of Consensus
The division of power in the decades of the 1950s and the 
1960s has aptly been called a “ consensus.” 47 Although the 
successful revolution of the Democrats that started in 1954 
had had elements of reformism, particularly in land control, 
the state administration soon found it convenient to collab­
orate with a number of oddly diversified elements. The 
consensus before long included not only the nisei and union 
constituency which had made the original political victory 
possible, but also certain still powerful Republicans and 
many newly powerful members of the developer-builder 
group. A very cozy concord on most matters was reached.
The Republican mayor of Honolulu, part-Hawaiian Neal 
S. Blaisdell, shared friends, supporters, advisers, and even 
policies and programs with the Democratic governor, main- 
land-born John Burns. An architect moving to Hawaii from 
the mainland in the early 1960s, anxious to make useful con­
tacts, was introduced by one of his clients to both the mayor 
and the governor—to whose campaigns, he explained, he 
contributed equally. The local builder advised the malihini 
architect to do the same; favors could come equally from 
both ends of the capitol district.48
The ILWU and the Sugar Planters Association no longer 
had any serious conflicts during that time (strikes are easily 
arbitrated in an atmosphere of consensus). Both were 
prodevelopment and ready to work together to promote 
Hawaii’s expanding urbanism, even when it meant expanding 
onto the agricultural lands where the union had once strug­
gled to survive. With most members of the state and county 
legislative bodies also development-oriented, the consensus 
was complete. As a cynical observer puts it: “ The wheels 
were greased and the machine rolled between the Capitol, the 
Land Use Commission, City Hall, and the Planning Commis­
sions. Everyone was everybody’s friend and everyone made 
out.”
As political power increasingly centered in the new types
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controlling land, opposition to unlimited expansion began to 
develop in the 1960s and 1970s, not so much from a break 
in the consensus among political figures (there were no sub­
stantive differences in the programs of Democrats and 
Republicans in the legislature in these years) but from an 
awakened public concern about Hawaii’s lands. Citizen 
participation in the political process assumed new strength 
across the mainland nation in the 1960s, particularly on 
issues affecting land use. Moves toward citizen-participatory 
political action and participatory planning were felt in 
Hawaii, too, and to some extent introduced a new force in 
land-use power manipulation.
In one sense citizen activism is a reaction to the growth of 
bureaucratized, centralized government and an attempt to 
recapture some of the control the political establishment has 
appropriated. Hawaii’s people could certainly find cause to 
react to a long history of concentrated power over land. In 
some ways it is a sophisticated move: it recognizes that pure­
ly political considerations, swayed by power groups, have 
a strong effect on decision making—and tries to create a 
counterforce with its own political power. In other respects it 
forms what has been termed a “ third public” of ordinary 
citizens affecting policy. It is a loose, amorphous, and 
unorganized public, yet one to be reckoned with in decisions 
such as land use allocations in addition to the more profes­
sional development-oriented and conservation-minded 
publics.49
One must recognize that citizen articulation is often a self- 
solicitous move; beneath much of the new activism lies a 
desire to see that everyone gets his share of a good, affluent 
life before options are closed. In Hawaii, this desire has 
often translated into an insistence on tropicalized American 
suburbanism. Increasingly, of course, fear and frustration 
have inspired the citizen-initiative movement. Pollution, the 
environment, that vague thing called ecology—these matters 
really concern more and more people, in Hawaii as much as 
anywhere else.
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Because of its various motives, this attempt to reassert 
popular power had mixed results in the islands, as it did 
elsewhere. Much of the new political populism centered on 
the question of how land was used—and particularly what 
was happening to Hawaii’s open spaces. The old-line 
organizations became more belligerent: the Outdoor Circle, 
the League of Women Voters, and even the Junior League 
began monitoring commission meetings and issuing position 
papers on land planning matters. The Oahu Development 
Conference, an influential, primarily businessmen’s organiza­
tion directed by a nationally respected professional planner, 
Aaron Levine, centered more of its attention on land 
management problems, and Honolulu’s Downtown Improve­
ment Association took the lead in urging a lethargic city 
planning department toward central-city land planning. 
Similiar moves, on a smaller scale, were made in Hilo and 
Kailua on the Big Island and in some few other places. Con­
servation societies such as the local branch of the Sierra 
Club, the Conservation Council, and even the Audubon 
Society found fresh adherents and compatible colleagues.
New organizations were created. Some formulated positions 
and lobbied for consumer interests and others more ag­
gressively demanded environmental protection measures. In a 
few instances, organized local citizen councils prepared plan­
ning studies and made informed approaches to government 
bodies: the most effective, Windward Citizens Planning 
Council, was guided by a professional planner-administrator, 
Leonard Moffitt. Heads of a number of the locality groups 
combined, in 1974, to form a parent organization they 
named the Council of Presidents. This council exerted con­
siderable influence on such issues as shoreline protection.
In most cases, however, the grass roots movements were 
unorganized or were put together for a single campaign on 
an ad hoc basis. Students of the subject have pointed out 
that well-organized, well-informed environmentalists are 
generally in favor of areawide (state or regional) land use 
controls and professional land planning,50 while the more ir­
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regular citizens coalitions tend to be interested in decentral­
ized, locality-oriented issues. This characteristic of much 
citizen activity is evident in any public hearing before a 
government decision-making agency. Each local group is anx­
ious to protest actions that it feels may harm its community, 
but has no evident concern for the problems of any other 
place or the overall area. Even within that limited interest, 
constructive suggestions are rare unless there is expert 
guidance; commonly, only arguments against some proposed 
action are heard. Planning commissioners, in Hawaii as in 
other jurisdictions, become inured to the testimony of 
neighborhood organizations opposing every new develop­
ment, no matter how essential, well placed, and well planned, 
especially when it might bring “ new elements” into a closed 
community.
Nevertheless, in Hawaii the antidevelopment protest 
movements had a cumulative effectiveness as they grew in 
size and volume. In the 1960s there came a threat to a 
revered environment that stirred the entire Oahu public: a 
serious proposal was made for resort development at the 
makai foot of Diamond Head. A huge gathering of ordinary 
citizens crowded the council chambers in Honolulu Hale, the 
city hall, to remonstrate at a public hearing against that 
environmental sacrilege. The city council was properly 
impressed: it promised that there would be no development 
there and that ways would be found to make the majestic 
mound a state, possibly a national, monument.51
After this success (Diamond Head is now a national land­
mark, and the city has designated it a special scenic, cultural, 
and historic zoning district) other public protests followed, 
some with uncertain results. In 1969 a large outpouring 
testified against Joe Pao’s attempt to develop the side of 
Mount Olomana, a handsome 1,600-foot-high peak to which 
a legendary giant is supposed to have leaped from the island 
of Kauai.32 The Planning Commission recommended disap­
proval of the project to the council, which still, after all these 
years, remains undecided. Another scenic, cultural, and
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historic district around the state and city capitols and Iolani 
Palace, approved by the Honolulu Planning Commission, 
was threatened with emasculation by the Council at the 
behest of adjoining property owners. A great outpouring of 
citizens protested, and much of the plan was saved.53 Other 
public remonstrations have resulted in an ordinance protect­
ing views toward Punchbowl, where the National Cemetery 
of the Pacific is located, and, for a short time, moves to pre­
vent high-rise construction adjacent to Thomas Square, the 
intimately scaled and landscaped park marking the place 
where Kamehameha III received Hawaii back from the 
British in 1844.
The citizen organization with the broadest effectiveness 
on land matters has been a group called Life of the Land. 
Staffed by a small coterie of ardent, youthful environ­
mentalists and led by a tireless, single-mindedly devoted 
individual, a former writer on land planning matters named 
Tony Hodges, LOL grew through the 1970s in size, respect, 
and impact. Continually in financial straits, as are all such 
organizations that depend on support from a citizenry larger 
than its active membership (and randomly irritate elements of 
that community by their actions), it has learned to use what 
power the public does have in environmental protection. The 
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) and Ha­
waii’s state counterpart (HEPA) establish certain require­
ments, assessments, and scrutinies for public works, at least. 
If they are not observed properly, the projects can be chal­
lenged in the courts. The process is costly, time-consuming, 
and often frustrating, and those who make the effort are 
seldom popular in the community: they are “ troublemak­
ers.” By scrounging funds, gaining the help of many capable 
volunteers, and ignoring the inevitable epithets, Hodges and 
LOL succeeded in restraining a good deal of potentially 
harmful public development and bringing into litigation or 
challenging a great deal more (including the H3 freeway). By 
late 1976, however, both LOL and Tony Hodges were com­
pletely out of funds. Then in 1977 a sizable federal grant
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allowed a reorganized Life of the Land to proceed in a total­
ly different direction (as aid and adviser to community plan­
ning groups). Hodges had to seek new outlets for his 
dynamism.
The Sound of Vox Populi
The public which began to assert itself during the 1960s 
included those of Hawaiian descent. For a long time the 
Hawaiians’ only extrinsic association with the use of their 
ancestors’ lands had been through the Bishop Estate, 
established to employ income from its landholdings for the 
education of their children. The community of Hawaiians 
and part-Hawaiians protested, at times, the fact that few 
trustees of Hawaiian lineage were appointed to the estate’s 
board (appointments are made by the Supreme Court).54 
There were, moreover, occasional rumblings about the quali­
ty of the curriculum (improved, when a former president of 
the University of Hawaii, Thomas H. Hamilton, was added 
to the advisory staff), and, as we have seen, serious objec­
tions were raised when some of the estate’s land was sold. By 
and large, however, the beneficiaries of Princess Pauahi’s 
will accepted with little question the academic benefits of the 
income from the Kamehameha family’s lands—which were 
provided in handsome school buildings on a hill above 
Honolulu, segregated from the rest of the community’s 
educational system.
In an odd, indirect way, the Hawaiian people thus exert a 
tremendous, though not always salutary, power over the 
lands of the islands. The estate has been called a second 
Hawaiian government; it has the ability to improve or 
destroy the quality of large parts of several of the islands. 
With the advice only of a rather small technical staff, 
trustees can make arbitrary decisions on the use of 10 percent 
of the lands of the state—subject, of course, to agreement of 
the normally amenable state and county zoning agencies. 
When the board of trustees was plantation-oriented, land was
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often leased to sugar interests at low rates and investments 
were made in sugar-related paper like plantation bonds and 
plantation-railroad stock. When the economic temper of the 
trustees changed along with that of the rest of the business 
community, they turned their influence toward land develop­
ment enterprises. Their only objective in making land use 
decisions was the goal that Princess Bernice Pauahi had 
established in her will and the courts rigorously protected: 
providing the maximum possible income for the Kameha­
meha schools. Through the boom years of development on 
Bishop Estate lands, the only protests heard from the com­
munity of Hawaiian people (aside from expressions of con­
cern about loss of income when land was sold) have been 
isolated objections from some younger activists when pig 
farmers were ousted from their leaseholds to make room for 
construction.
The strongest manifestation of interest by twentieth- 
century Hawaiians in the overall status of the lands that 
had supported their ancestors has been a movement to gain 
reparations for native lands taken by the United States 
government. A Hawaiian Native Claims Settlement Act was 
introduced in Congress in June 1974. It asked for a cash 
settlement of $1 billion and a return of 2Vi million acres of 
land, the income to be administered by a native corpora­
tion.55 The sponsoring entity, an organization called ALOHA 
(acronym for Aboriginal Lands of Hawaiian Ancestry), was 
formed in 1971 through the activity of an ardent part- 
Hawaiian named Louisa K. Rice, a taxi driver who had 
become inspired by reading Queen Liliuokalani’s account of 
her last days as monarch. As time went on, with advice from 
local and mainland attorneys as well as those who had led 
successful reparations movements of native Alaskans and 
American Indians, the group became more sophisticated. In 
1973 it incorporated itself as the Aloha Association.
Demands were added to the original request—most im­
portantly for income from all public and private revenues 
derived from Hawaii’s natural resources—and a resolution 
was adopted (on advice of the association’s Alaskan- and
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Indian-experienced friends) declaring Hawaiians to be “ a 
people who are still a sovereign nation.” 56 Louisa K. Rice 
was made a lifetime director of the association, but she 
resigned in 1976, impatient at what she termed “ stagnation” 
of the movement.57
Congress has taken the claim with sufficient seriousness 
for the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee to 
travel to the islands in early 1976 to hear testimony on its 
justification.58 Hawaii’s congressional delegation has at times 
been lukewarm in its support for the legislation: Senator 
Inouye has proposed that a commission be appointed to 
study the validity of the claim before any serious decision is 
made one way or another.59 This suggestion is simply con­
sidered insulting by ALOHA’s leaders. The pertinent history 
is well-enough established, even if its interpretation may be 
disputed. It begins with the statement in Kamehameha I l l ’s 
constitution of 1840 that Hawaii’s lands did not really belong 
to the king any longer, but “ to the chiefs and the people in 
common.” It notes the Great Mahele’s division of land be­
tween the ruler and his chiefs and the legislation that allowed 
fee-simple land ownership to all residents of the islands. It 
involves the declaration, in the act of 3 January 1865, that 
the crown lands were “ inalienable” from the crown. It takes 
account of the Blount Report of the overthrow of the monar­
chy, a lawful government, “ through the agency of the U.S. 
government” ; the Organic Act of annexation, whereby all of 
Hawaii’s public lands were ceded by a haole republic to a 
haole American nation with the question of equitable settle­
ment left unresolved; and the Articles of Statehood under 
which the United States government retained some of the 
public domain as federal property and returned the rest to 
the State of Hawaii.
Emotionally, the settlement claim is based on Queen 
Liliuokalani’s passionate insistence that “ to prevent the shed­
ding of the blood of my people . . .  I quietly yielded to the 
armed forces brought against my throne and submitted to the 
arbitrament of the United States.” 60 Historically, it focuses 
on the fact that the United States never did “ arbitrate” the
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disputed domain’s unresolved problems but rather, quite 
quickly, annexed it in all of its landed parts. Legally, most 
experts agree, the case rests on the further fact that these 
Hawaiian ancestral lands, held until 1893 by an independent, 
sovereign government, were taken away with absolutely no 
recompense or compensation.
There are many sticky questions that will have to be 
resolved if a commission does investigate all the ramifications 
of Hawaiian land tenure. Who really did own what at the 
time of the revolution? Royal ownerships, crown land rights, 
government land possession, and private holdings, as we 
have seen, were never clearly resolved. (One scholar has even 
disputed the genealogical successions which passed on to 
Princess Bernice Pauahi the Kamehameha lands now held by 
the Bishop Estate.61 Both commoners and chiefs in many 
cases sold lands they had acquired after the Great Mahele. 
Queen Liliuokalani sued the U.S. government for income 
from the crown lands which she thought, to the end, should 
provide income for her personal use.
Some present-day descendants of the royal lines want the 
ALOHA claim to distinguish among kingly, chiefly, and 
commoner land rights. Aside from the quality of lineage, it 
becomes difficult to define a Hawaiian today. Should com­
pensation be made to those with any part of Hawaiian 
blood? What fraction—half, one-fourth—should prove the 
descendant’s equity? Since the federal government never 
distinguished between the rights of the people to public land 
and the rights of the state, does that imply that the natives 
held no rights? Or does it signify that they were deprived of 
their rights? All but 400,000 acres of public lands were 
returned to the State of Hawaii by the federal government in 
1959. Does that limit the extent of damage that can be 
sought from the United States? And someone will surely ask 
whether, despite the Blount Report of U.S. involvement in 
the overthrow of the monarchy, America took land from a 
native nation or, after a hiatus, received it from a haole 
republic.
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Forgetting all these quandaries and quibbles, two salient 
facts seem clear enough to justify a claim for settlement. One 
is that Hawaii was a sovereign nation when the revolution 
took place, a nation with whom, indeed, the United States as 
well as other countries had negotiated treaties as an equal— 
and it was certainly not so treated in the succession of 
governmental changes that took place between revolution and 
statehood. ALOHA’s advisers point to five recorded treaties 
and agreements between the Kingdom of Hawaii and the 
United States to establish that point, including the treaty on 
tariff reciprocity and the agreement on Pearl Harbor. Pro­
posals have been made that this issue of the “ constitutional­
ity” of America’s acquiring Hawaii might be tested in the 
courts.62 Other land acquisitions by the U.S. federal govern­
ment were by undisputed cession, through purchase, or as 
treaties. Western American lands were ceded by the colonies. 
Texas, a nation, voluntarily gave up its sovereignty to join 
the union. The United States bought Alaska from Russia in 
1867 for $7 million. The Alaskan situation was further 
different from Hawaii’s at the time of claim settlement in 
the fact that much of the federally held land there was 
unassigned. In Hawaii, by contrast, all the land that the 
federal government now retains is assigned in some way to 
particular agencies for specific uses.
The other, and most persuasive, justification for a com­
pensatory settlement without looking too deeply into histori­
cal complexities is the fact that Hawaii’s lands were taken 
with absolutely no payment. All questions of compensation 
were indefinitely postponed and then conveniently forgotten 
by Congress. ALOHA’s guides have pointed out that in 
Alaska’s case the original recompense was inadequate and in 
the case of the American Indian lands it was unfair, but for 
Hawaii it was nonexistent. Awards were made in the other 
two instances to “ extinguish” any further claims, as the legal 
phrase goes, and in this respect the Hawaiian people seem to 
have the strongest argument of all.
There is a disturbing aspect of ALOHA’s action, however.
!'
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The claim is for money and for land which would produce 
money. There is no attempt to set up a land management 
procedure, only a financial distribution agency. In the discus­
sions there has been no mention of land use planning or land 
use controls, no insistence on restoring to those of Hawaiian 
descent some power over the way their ancestral lands are 
used. Looked at that way, the ALOHA movement could be 
seen as the latest instance of the Hawaiian peoples’ will­
ingness to accept money, as their government did during the 
monarchy, for the loss of their land. Alaska does not present 
an inspiring precedent in this regard. Shareholders in the na­
tive corporations which handle the benefits established by the 
Alaskan Native Claims Act of 1971 receive cash payments 
and look forward to further income from exploitation of 
their land and its minerals. Conservationists in Alaska find 
themselves not at all pleased with the newly gained power the 
natives have over their land; rather, they are apprehensive. 
Whether the Hawaiian people will offer reassurances on this 
point to their fellow inhabitants of the islands remains to be 
seen.
The ALOHA action is a unique bid for new land power by 
today’s Hawaiian people—now, unhappily, only a segment of 
the present population of the islands. Ideally, in a democratic 
society, the power of the public should be expressed through 
the actions of elected government officials. Redress of 
wrongs as great as the taking of their land from a sovereign 
people requires special effectuation, but scattered citizen pro­
tests against individual misuses of the land and isolated 
citizen court actions delaying certain treatments of the envi­
ronment are costly and inefficient ways to effect the public 
will. Too often they are merely nuisances to those whose 
actions are challenged, nuisances which eventually can be 
overcome.
Expressions of direct political will of the kind that LOL 
has made have become necessary. There is no clear “ public” 
policy position, expressed in unambiguous terms, which 
could direct official action, if elected officials wanted such 
a guide, or force it if they demurred. In most cases there is
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little wish for such guidance. Our administrators and legis­
lators, as representatives of an amorphous constituency, must 
recognize a numer of organized publics whom they represent. 
And, as pragmatic politicians, they are likely to be responsive 
to those with the greatest immediate power. Firm public 
policy can hamper the freedom of political action.
There are, fortunately, exceptions to this unhappy rule of 
the political science thumb; there are some candidates for 
office who possess and express intrinsic convictions (that we 
must respect our environment, perhaps) and who become 
public officials for that very reason. Sadly, in Hawaii there 
has seldom been strong political leadership on land matters. 
After speaking enthusiastically at a conference in Oahu about 
the land controls he would like to see adopted, Shunichi 
Kimura, then mayor of the Big Island, lapsed into pessi­
mism: “ Our problem is that now we go back and face the 
so-called realities, and we give up .”
If a popular ground swell were to develop in Hawaii, 
indicating a strong desire for careful management of the 
islands’ lands, these political realities might change and the 
worries of people like Kimura could vanish—but no such 
general wish has yet appeared. In the 1974 gubernatorial elec­
tion three candidates vied for the Democratic party nomina­
tion: Frank Fasi, mayor of Honolulu, who insisted through 
the campaign that further growth on the land was desirable 
and inevitable; Tom Gill, former representative, both in 
Hawaii and Washington, and later lieutenant governor of the 
state, who had been an important participant in the passage 
of Hawaii’s progressive land legislation during the 1960s; and 
George Ariyoshi, current lieutenant governor, “ slow growth” 
advocate, whose campaign was effectively organized by the 
still-active Burns machine. Ariyoshi won the nomination, 
with Fasi second, and easily carried the general election. (The 
Republicans, with a kind of death wish, had nominated a 
slate of two figures from territorial history.) Fasi remained 
mayor, biding his political time. Gill, for now, has with­
drawn from politics.
Since his election, Governor Ariyoshi has indicated a desire
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to control careless land development and save agricultural 
land. Effective land management, however, does not come 
about through good wishes. It has to be based on popular in­
sistence that land again be valued as a finite resource, not as 
a commodity for financial and political barter. Hawaii’s peo­
ple, if they have that wish, must find ways to express it more 
manifestly than any of their predecessors since Polynesian 
times have done. Their will, their ultimate power, will deter­
mine the fate of their lands, in ways which the final part of 
this book discusses.
P A R T
The Fate of Hawaii’s Lands
THE Hawaiian people used land in the ways for which it 
was best suited. This was a simple land management policy, 
dictated by the requirements of people and the mandates of 
nature, not by any government decision. Control over the 
land might change as an alii nui suffered military misfortunes 
or alterations of allegiance, but uses of the land stayed the 
same unless floods, volcanic eruptions, or tsunami waves 
interfered. There was no need for people to debate land 
use issues; they were solved by experience, translated into 
custom, and codified, if at all, as religious taboos. And there 
was no need to find ways to enforce these accepted policies: 
the population of the islands by Cook’s time was fairly 
dense and the land was clearly limited; to have abused it at 
that stage of technological development would have been 
disastrous.
The white man, however, taught the Hawaiians that land 
could be adapted to purposes that did not appear natural. 
Meadows that had always stood open could be used for 
building construction. Wells could be dug to provide water 
where none seemed to exist. Before long it was not necessary 
to save the best farmlands for growing food, the best forests
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for timber and vines and tapa, the best hunting grounds for a 
meat supply. Technology, even in nineteenth-century non- 
sophisticated forms, furnished the means for changed uses 
(essential products could be imported, or manufactured, or 
replaced by substitutes). A desire for profit from the land 
furnished the motive.
Suddenly, then, it became necessary to make choices about 
the ways land should be used. And since the person who 
owned the land seemed to control those decisions, it became 
necessary in this new world to decide who could be the 
owners. And ultimately, since the new land uses produced 
public costs as well as private profits, it became necessary to 
consider new ways to assess taxes. That is, policy decisions 
were necessary, whether by decree or by ballot. Then, if 
policies were adopted, plans would be needed to carry them 
out, and designs to effectuate the plans.
To a limited degree Hawaii has faced up to these modern 
necessities. There have been brief periods when government 
enunciated strong land policies in the public interest, longer 
periods when private owners seemed to control policy deci­
sions, and many periods when no firm policies were at all 
discernible. Today Hawaii seems to be in a time of indeci­
sion, deliberating over various land policies that might be 
adopted, without adopting any. The initiative that the state 
had when the Land Use Law was passed seems to have been 
lost, relinquished to others.
In recent years, a number of other states have enacted 
legislation for land management; by the end of 1974 more 
than twenty had some form of land use program under way.' 
Very few followed Hawaii in attempting direct statewide zon­
ing and regulation of overall land uses. Vermont passed a 
Land Use Development Law in 1970 establishing criteria for 
specific sorts and sizes of development (commercial, on more 
than ten acres; housing, of more than ten units). That same 
year Colorado adopted a promising Land Use Policy Act, 
which was weakened in later legislation. Florida, through its 
Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972,
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designates areas of “ critical state concern,” overriding local 
land-use regulations and establishing its own when that 
becomes necessary. Oregon, in 1973, passed a law which 
received wide acclaim but, in practice, seemed to be a well- 
meaning statement of policy without application to any 
specific plan.
Most state land-control laws are even less comprehensive 
than those. One category follows Florida’s lead in pinpoint­
ing areas where the state seems to have particular reason 
to be concerned about local land-use controls. Delaware’s 
Coastal Zone Act, California’s recent Coastal Zone Conser­
vation Act, Michigan’s Shorelines Protection and Manage­
ment Act, Maine’s Site Selection Law (intended largely to 
protect the shoreline)—all concentrate on waterfronts as areas 
of most critical concern.
Another kind of land control statute was adopted by a 
number of states in the late 1960s and remains tempting to 
others; it is delegation of unusual authority over land uses in 
specific areas to regional agencies, usually with supervisory 
authority and ultimate right of approval held by the state.
The philosophical as well as constitutional basis for such 
acts is a state’s right to control the uses of land (failing any 
federal assumption of power) and its traditional delegation of 
land-use zoning authority to local governmental jurisdictions. 
Wisconsin’s Water Resources Act of 1966 led the way in this 
direction, mandating to the state’s cities and counties the 
duty of protecting land uses near lakes and rivers. Minnesota 
established a Twin Cities Metropolitan Council in 1967 to 
regulate land uses in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area; in New 
Jersey the Hackensack Meadows Development Act of 1968 
gave a local commission the authority to develop and enforce 
a master land-use plan for that valuable real estate. Various 
urban development corporations, notably New York’s, estab­
lished in 1968 and highly successful until it overextended 
itself and expired in 1975, fall in the same category.
That checklist, hardly complete, indicates the many 
directions that state land-use regulations have taken since
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Hawaii’s 1961 law was passed—and makes the important 
point that none of the later acts have dared be as broad in 
scope as Hawaii’s earlier one. Recent legislation differs from 
Hawaii’s in basic intent: its aim is directed more toward con­
servation of “ environmental resources and natural beauty,” 
as Vermont’s law puts it, and less toward “ income and 
growth potential of the economy,” as Hawaii’s does. Yet, 
having studied Hawaii’s experience, the others shy away 
from statewide management controls; most refer to particular 
regions or specific uses. Sometimes they establish policies; in 
other cases they fix regulations. Seldom do they span, com­
prehensively, the full process from setting goals and develop­
ing plans to implementation. Hawaii’s law, at least in intent, 
is still the only one that is truly comprehensive.
Yet Hawaii also fails to provide an example of effective 
land management techniques. The reason is easy to state but 
hard to solve: the opposition of political influences (crudely 
put, developers versus conservationists) has a neutralizing 
effect. Clear-cut policy statements and firm decision making 
are inhibited. When other states planning land legislation 
sent delegations to Hawaii to study the operation of the 
islands’ landmark law, they quickly saw this defect in its 
draftsmanship. “Although procedures were established the 
[land use] commission was given no guidance in law on the 
relative emphasis to place on such major controversies as 
tourist-related development versus the preservation of natural 
and scenic attractions, or agricultural land versus the supply 
of land for reasonably priced living accommodations,” says 
a report from Oregon State University.2 Yet the visitors went 
back home and fell into the same faults themselves. Most of 
the legislation their states produced was strong on proce­
dures but weak on goals. The purposes the laws intended to 
accomplish were generally put in ambivalent terms that 
would offend neither developers nor conservationists.3 Inevi­
tably the execution of such laws has tended to hurt no one. 
Opposing groups have been granted at least some of their 
desires: some conservation land saved, some development
allowed. Firm decisions are avoided and long-range conse­
quences are ignored.
Having moved so quickly from aboriginal land-use mores 
to leadership in modern land control legislation, with docu­
mented experiences under various conditions, Hawaii remark­
ably demonstrates both the need for a comprehensive 
approach to land control and the difficulties that lie in the 
way of achieving that goal.




IN early human history the concept of a land “ policy” was 
unknown. None seemed necessary; land was limitless and was 
there to be used. Flood and frost, bane and blight, might 
reduce its functions for a time, but there was always a 
greener valley across the mountains or over the seas. Ancient 
history is a story of migrations, first in search of better hunt­
ing grounds and then in hope of more fertile farmland—and 
they could always be found.
So long as the population was small and the world’s vast 
face was largely unexplored, any restrictions on land’s uses 
were nature’s, not man’s. When there were only a few 
million persons scattered on the earth, aboriginal people 
could not seriously worry about land depletion; but when 
there were a billion, around the time that Captain Cook 
landed on Kauai, modern men and women were finding it 
necessary to govern the uses of their home territories—and to 
reach for more. The great explorations of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries constituted a continuing search for 
additional lands with additional resources.' Cook’s sponsors 
wanted him to find the elusive northwest passage to connect 
the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans, so that distant places and
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the incomes they could provide might be brought closer to 
home.
But then as the explorers found new lands and settlers 
colonized them, they carried along the problem—and the 
policies that were supposed to solve them—they had become 
used to at home. The questions about land that Europe and, 
to a certain extent, America found pressing toward the end 
of the eighteenth century were created by the industrial 
revolution and enhanced by the urban growth it brought. 
They were primarily issues of tenure, use, and taxation, none 
of them worrying Hawaii in the early 1800s. Imposition 
of land policies that were products of an industrial-age 
capitalistic society on a people emerging from a stone-age 
feudalistic era produced some of modern Hawaii’s first 
major cultural conflicts.
Policies regarding tenure that had been developed in 
western Europe and carried to America were based on the 
concept of individual private ownership.2 Hawaii, of course, 
was still functioning under the concept of central, kingly 
ownership; and any distribution of land further into society 
was revocable at the king’s will. To the Hawaiians this was 
natural and workable; to the newcomers it was an unaccept­
able policy that had to be changed.
Policies governing land use had become troublesome issues 
in capitalist Europe, but they were of little import for a long 
while in Hawaii. In an industrializing, urbanizing society it 
was easy for fair land to be fouled by misuse; ugly towns 
and slums developed quickly with the industrial revolution, 
and competition between open-space uses and urban develop­
ment began with the building of the first factory.3 Hawaii, 
on the other hand, had seemingly endless expanses of land 
little developed, and its population, far from expanding, had 
begun to shrink.
How land uses were planned in Europe’s older areas and 
America’s new ones is another story, but the fact that they 
were planned, as policy, quite ardently during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, is part of the history of land
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management and land policy.4 The land use policy questions 
that had to be settled abroad were procedural—how much 
liberty the individual possessed and how much control the 
public, through its government, might exert. They were also 
substantive—to what uses, in what proportions, land should 
be put. Some of the early settlers of Hawaii had seen English 
towns like Nottingham restricted and crowded because they 
were surrounded by inviolable agricultural lands; on the 
other hand they had seen fertile fields invaded by expanding 
industry. Hawaii did not have to face any of these problems 
yet. One can imagine that some of the pleasant sense of 
abandon the foreigners found in the islands came from see­
ing so much land with so few problems of competing uses 
and no need, apparently, to worry about policies in this 
regard.
The Hawaiian people themselves were confused about land 
use concepts after the white man came. They were torn be­
tween a desire to hold to the old, logical system of letting the 
nature of the land itself determine how it was to be used and 
a conflicting wish to follow the new idea of finding its most 
profitable use. The period of the sandalwood trade demon­
strated how income could be created by a policy of exploiting 
land’s assets. It showed also how quickly that policy could 
deplete resources. The Hawaiians, bewildered by many inno­
vations, did not appear to learn much from either lesson.
The newcomers, however, were willing to continue looking 
for more land-generated income and defer any policy forma­
tion that might restrict their freedom.
Taxation policies had also become a bothersome matter in 
the industrializing countries. New land uses, greater concen­
trations of population, and rising standards of health and 
sanitation all demanded greater outlays for public services.
Ad valorem assessment, based on the imputed value of a 
property such as land, was the kind of tax policy Hawaii’s 
early settlers had been used to at home. And although this 
was another penalty of modern civilization they were glad to 
forego for a while, before long real-property taxes were
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applied in the islands. Although Hawaii’s monarchy did not 
need, much monetary revenue in its early years (the govern­
ment budget in 1842 was $41,000),5 public services soon 
demanded a larger public income. A mild tax law passed in 
1877 continued as policy until the territorial government 
revised it after annexation. The first clearly stated policy 
decisions about land in Hawaii, then, dealt almost exclusively 
with matters of tenure. Questions of ownership forced the so- 
called land reform movement of the 1840s, brought about the 
land division of the Great Mahele, and effected legitimization 
of individual ownership and the rights of sale and inheri­
tance. After these policies were established, all the concomi­
tant problems that private land ownership entails had to be 
faced: questions of private property rights versus public 
rights as well as eminent domain, regulation of transfers, 
sales, and inheritances, and all the statutory tangles that can 
be wound around realty law and the economics of property.6 
Very little in the way of formal public land policy was 
adopted during the monarchy period, however. Government 
lands were most often leased, sometimes sold outright, but 
the dealings were made with few set criteria or established 
policies, as an editorial in the Islander complained in 1875.7
By the time the monarchy was overthrown, the New 
World’s values had been sufficiently consolidated in Hawai­
ian life. The opportunities as well as the restraints they 
posed were so clear that the new political leaders felt a need 
for stating them as explicit policies. This they did in the 
republic’s Land Act of 1895, so clearly in accepted American 
land-commodity terms that the Organic Act did little to 
change its provisions. In Washington, Congress seemed to 
wish to slow the concentration of Hawaii’s lands in the con­
trol of the plantation owners (though not prevent it) and 
there appeared to be a real desire to encourage homestead 
farming. To these ends the terms of leases of public land 
were restricted to five years, the thousand acre ownership 
limitation was imposed, and various attempts to stimulate 
family farming were pursued. The oligarchy in Hawaii felt
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sure it could overcome the inhibitions to plantation expan­
sion these new policy measures posed, and after several 
decades of politicking, pressuring, and compromising in 
Washington and Honolulu it succeeded. The Hawaii Rehabil­
itation Bill set basic land policies for some time: no serious 
opposition to concentration of land ownership; an accep­
tance of plantation agriculture as the most-favored land use; 
gestures toward residential homesteading as a subsidiary use.
If the social consequences of these policies were ques­
tionable and the political result was partriarchal control, 
there was no doubt that the economy of the islands bene­
fited. Whereas the monarchy had always been in debt and its 
exports of capital and goods had fluctuated widely, the 
territorial government (accepting high consumer prices and 
business monopolies) was able to stabilize the agricultural 
industry and bring the economy to a state of development 
that was the envy of other plantation-agriculture countries.8
What ended this economic idyll and presaged the need for 
a revision of land policies was another stage in the constantly 
rising population curve. The pleasures and the penalties of a 
planters’ empire could continue only so long as there were no 
seriously competing demands on the land. And that condition 
could last only while the population was just large enough to 
supply the needed labor force, sufficiently docile to be sta­
tionary, and so constant in numbers as to be controllable.
But around 1940, about the time when the world reached its 
second billion of inhabitants—and Hawaii had tripled its 
turn-of-the-century population, from 150,000 to 450,000—the 
islands began to feel the pressures of urbanization that other 
countries had already experienced.
New policy questions started to arise during the terms of 
the later territorial governors. One was the increasing need 
for lots on which the growing populace could build homes, a 
problem that many realized for the first time to be distinct 
from providing estates for the haoles and homesteads for the 
natives. Governor Stainback wanted to force sale of idle 
lands from large owners to prospective home builders, and
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the commission he appointed recommended the development 
of subdivisions on public land.9 Stainback and his successor, 
Governor Oren Long, foresaw an increasing demand for 
urban lands, for commercial as well as housing purposes, 
and urged public-land policy changes in that direction.
Another question about land use began to surface. Should 
land with no profitable use at all, land preserved as a natural 
resource, be protected as a matter of policy? Although the 
conservation movement was well established in mainland 
America,10 in Hawaii there still was so much unused land 
that its preservation seemed almost an absurd proposition. 
The idea of “ conserving” some land crept into discussions of 
public land policy from time to time, but never very seriously 
until after the war. Governor Stainback’s commission, for 
example, suggested that public lands “ not suitable for 
residential purposes be conserved.” " But the definition and 
purpose of conservation were unclear at that time (as they re­
mained during the drafting of the state’s Land Use Law). 
Those conserved lands, it was felt, might later be “ disposed 
of only upon lease” and for specific kinds of development. 
But at least the thought that policies might be needed regard­
ing urban land uses, on the one hand, and land conservation, 
on the other, was not a totally new idea when Governor 
Quinn brought it forward after the war and then when the 
Land Use Law established conservation districts as a kind of 
holding category.
New Pressures, New Programs
It would be interesting to speculate on the changes that might 
have come about in Hawaii in the 1940s if World War II 
had not produced the transformation it did. Changes were 
obviously inevitable. And the needs and demands of the 
growing, restive, ethnically mixed population were bringing 
them constantly closer. But the war with its impacts did 
come, and when it had gone, leaving scars on the society and 
military garrisons on the land, the old policies no longer 
worked. There were many more people, who needed places to
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live and jobs to work at and schools to attend. And there 
were new types among those people, who were willing to 
break sugar-and-pine agriculture’s grip on the land in order 
to develop new uses for it that would satisfy the new urban 
needs.
The Land Use Law of 1961 recognized those new pressures 
and noted that there are many uses for land in a modern 
society. Its declaration of purpose said it was the state’s 
policy “ to preserve, protect and encourage the development 
of the lands of the State for those uses to which they are best 
suited for the public welfare.” 12 That sounded at the time 
like a high-minded purpose, relating land uses to land 
qualities, even though it said little of substance that would 
guide administration of the law.
The basic intent of the 1961 legislation, then, was to set 
new policies regarding land uses, whereas the legislation of 
the 1840s, at the time of the Great Mahele, had been directed 
exclusively to questions of land ownership. Although other 
so-called land reform bills have surfaced from time to time, 
the principle of concentrated land ownership has never been 
seriously challenged as policy until very recently, as residen­
tial land-lease rates have become excessive. The great hold­
ings of the comparatively few landowners have not been 
disturbed, in fact or by plan, except as the owners themselves 
have begun selling off pieces of them.
Increasing population pressures and the expanding needs 
they produced again led Hawaii to a reexamination of land 
policies in the mid-1970s. At the time the world approached 
its fourth billion of people and as Hawaii passed a de facto 
population of 800,000, it became obvious that no present 
policy could save the islands from rapid environmental 
deterioration. For the first time the concept of “ conserving” 
land began to mean something specific. Now it was a press­
ing need. New words and phrases that were common par­
lance on the mainland were heard too in Hawaii: “ ecology” 
and “ environmental protection” as imperatives; “ pollution” 
and “ congestion” as perils.
The first element of environmental policy to receive atten­
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tion in the legislature was open-space planning. By the late 
1960s several other states had adopted formal open-space 
plans.13 Techniques were well developed for determining what 
parts of a region’s land should remain undeveloped, not only 
for agriculture and grazing but as forest reserves, watersheds, 
protected ponds and streams, essential shorelines, natural 
landmarks, scenic and historic areas, and recreational space. 
Having led the way in land control legislation, the Hawaii 
legislators did not wish to lag too far behind in this new pro­
cess. In 1969 they called for preparation of an open-space 
plan for Hawaii.14
The following year Governor Burns commissioned Stewart 
Udall’s Overview Corporation to prepare this plan. Burns 
had known Udall in Washington when the Hawaii politico 
was territorial delegate to Congress and the mainland 
politician-cum-environmentalist was congressman from Ari­
zona. Within the conservation-minded groups in Hawaii there 
was speculation at the time of the appointment whether 
Udall’s plan would take as strong an open-space position as 
his recent writings had expressed or whether it would be 
designed to satisfy the governor’s progrowth and prodevelop­
ment position. In an odd, unintended way it did both.
The Udall report, entitled From the Mountain to the Sea: 
State o f  Hawaii Comprehensive Open Space Plan, was issued 
in 1970. It tried to accomplish two things. One was the job 
that the Overview Corporation had been hired to do: prepare 
a plan for the state indicating what spaces, for what reasons, 
by what means, should be preserved as open lands. The 
methodology used by the professional planning staff Udall 
hired for the project and located in Honolulu for the dura­
tion of his contract was based in large part on a system that 
had been developed by the much-admired mainland ecologist- 
planner Ian McHarg. In essence it consisted of identifying as 
accurately as possible ecological features such as forests, 
marshes, and beaches, geological properties like rock and soil 
formations, physical characteristics including rainfall and 
climate, and factors of scenic, historic, or cultural worth. 
These findings are mapped in graduated value tones on
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transparent sheets and overlaid on each other—the resultant 
darkness or lightness indicates the suitability or, conversely, 
the inappropriateness of any given land for certain uses.15
Ideally, using such a method, a planner should be able to 
tell what areas are best kept as conservation or farming lands 
and which are most suitable for development of various 
kinds. This rather simplistic system caught the imagination of 
ecologically enthusiastic planners, and indeed it is a much 
more objective and reliable process for determining land uses 
than the arbitrary decisions that political agencies generally 
depend on. Udall’s report included specific plans showing 
areas recommended to be kept open, undeveloped, on each 
island.
But Udall went further than that: he explained in the 
preface to his report that he was “ committed to holistic plan­
ning.” Overview was a “ generalist organization,” he said, 
and no good open-space plan could be prepared without a 
comprehensive analysis of all environmental factors—“ such 
as population policies, urbanization patterns, resource uses, 
transportation alternatives, and other man-engineered growth 
vectors.” 16 Certainly Hawaii needed, at that time, just such a 
broad review of its total planning process. It is rather tragic 
that the efforts of Stewart Udall and the competent team he 
put together were largely wasted; in the end they turned out 
to be a futile effort even to guide Hawaii to an environmen­
tally oriented land policy. The plan did not achieve accept­
ance by the administration that had commissioned it, by the 
legislature to whom it was addressed, by the community at 
large, or even by the citizen organizations which eagerly 
awaited it.
There were several reasons for this lack of success. In the 
first place, Udall’s estimable wish to broaden his study so as 
to be comprehensive diluted his particular open-space recom­
mendations. Attention was distracted, for example, from the 
advice that Salt Lake and Mount Olomana, among other 
places, be given first-priority conservation status—distracted 
by a controversial, detailed proposal for rearranging the 
state’s entire zoning, planning, and environmental protec­
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tion organization. Then for some reason Udall avoided any 
attempt at participatory planning and instead adopted the 
method of the self-assured planner of the early days of city 
and regional planning. This approach for many years had 
been to accomplish planning as a personal creative act in the 
planner’s sanctum and then, when the plan was completed, 
to make an impressive presentation to the client and “ sell” 
the community at large on the plan’s merits. As a result of 
Overview’s reversion to this process the political leaders, the 
general public, and active citizens’ groups were largely ig­
nored during the plan’s preparation and found, when the 
handsomely printed final report was presented, there were 
parts of it they did not like.17
The greatest disappointment was with the incomplete way 
the report handled an important part of its commission: rec­
ommendations for legislation and other ways of implement­
ing the open-space plan. The report suggested that the state 
should “ adopt quality growth as its official policy” and also 
“adopt as a long-range policy the goal of stabilized popula­
tion.” Beyond those two rather inconsistent generalities there 
was a somewhat vain proposal that “ legislation be adopted 
to make Overview’s . . . Plan the State’s official growth 
policy for the future.” Specific recommendations for the 
reorganization of state planning were listed, but no further 
detailing of legislation was attempted.
As means for preserving the open spaces that the plan in­
dicated to be important, in four stages of priority, the report 
broadly discussed methods that had been tried elsewhere, at 
times with a degree of success, at other times with only a 
measure of hope—easements, zoning, development rights, 
compensable regulations, lease, dedication, gift, purchase, 
eminent domain, and so on.18 The report ended by recom­
mending that the state create a land acquisition fund of $100 
million by marketing general obligation bonds. Since the 
state’s bonding authority was already stretched, this proposal 
placed Udall’s plan, in the minds of the legislators and many 
other pragmatists, in the blue-sky realm. The community was 
left with a hopeless feeling. It now had an open-space plan
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that no one, apparently not even the expert who had pre­
pared it, knew what to do with.
Policies, Goals—and Delays
Another important study of land use policies was made in 
1973 by a Temporary Commission on Statewide Environmen­
tal Planning which the legislature authorized Governor Burns 
to appoint for the purpose of exploring further the policy of 
quality growth the governor had enunciated. The report of 
this study group, issued as a brochure entitled A Plan fo r  
Hawaii’s Environment, dropped the phrase “ quality growth” 
and suggested a new kind of policy for the state, one that it 
termed an “ environmental ethic.” It called for the adoption 
of two goals: conservation of Hawaii’s natural resources by 
controlling pollution and “ safeguarding the State’s unique 
natural environmental characteristics” ; and enhancement of 
the quality of life in the islands by “ developing criteria” and 
“ adopting strategies” to hold population at an optimum 
level, encouraging economic activities “ in balance with the 
physical and social environments,” and planning communi­
ties “ in harmony with the physical environment.” 19
In presenting these goals and thirty-seven policies that am­
plified them, the temporary commission chaired by Adam 
A. Smyser, editor of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, carefully 
avoided the errors that Udall’s firm had made. No appointed 
task force agency had ever been so diligent in taking its pro­
posals to the public for suggestions and reactions or in detail­
ing legislation that might implement its recommendations. As 
soon as the commission had a tentative set of policies ready 
to talk about, it published and disseminated them as a draft 
for general discussion. It arranged open forums in each 
county. It sent teams to any meeting of any organization that 
wished to learn about or debate the proposals. This proved 
to be much more than a gesture of goodwill; the public’s 
reactions were strong and surprisingly effective.
The group’s first set of policies was overly general and 
became progressively weaker as the report moved from basics
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to specifics, but major improvements were made in redraft­
ing and most weak wordings were changed or omitted. A 
policy to “ protect the shorelines of the State from encroach­
ment of man-made improvements” finally said just that, 
whereas the first draft had added the mangling words “ ex­
cept those for public use and public benefit.” In short, the 
final report was a much stronger public-policy proposal than 
the first draft had been.
In addition to improving its language, the commission’s 
ultimate report added a concept that gave great dimension to 
the policy proposals. It was the idea that a physical environ­
ment can “ carry” just so much people-imposed burden with­
out being overloaded; that any area’s “ carrying capacity” 
can be determined by environmental-ecological measure­
ments; that overloading environmental capacity will inevita­
bly result in ecological damage.20 The report recommended 
strongly that the governor initiate a program to analyze 
Hawaii’s environmental capacity and advised that any area 
found to be overloaded or in danger of overload be protected 
against further development.
This concept, already recognized elsewhere as a good 
rationale for land management policies, was a quite radical 
notion to Hawaii. It pleased those who were plugging for 
limitation of developmental growth. It alarmed those who 
believed that continued expansion was essential for the state’s 
economic health. In a way the idea was an extension of the 
requirement for the environmental impact statements (called 
EISs by the cognoscenti) that national and many state gov­
ernments (including Hawaii’s) were already calling for in cer­
tain circumstances; it carried to more sophisticated levels the 
thought that the environmental effects of loading additional 
development on the land should be analyzed before permits 
were issued.
Even those who liked the idea realized that its ultimate 
effectiveness, as with other parts of the report’s recommen­
dations, would depend on the seriousness with which state 
officials took it and the strength of any implementation mea­
sures that might be adopted. In this case, the commission left
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nothing to chance when it suggested legislative action. Its 
major recommendation was adoption of a State Environmen­
tal Policy Act, and this was drafted as a proposed bill for the 
legislature, as were three additional bills and two proposed 
concurrent resolutions for House and Senate.21
In retrospect it was apparent that an error of judgment 
was made in the legislation drafting process by segregating 
the Policy Act as a separate bill from the other legislation 
which carried the teeth that would make policies bite. Partic­
ularly, one of the implementing acts proposed was an exten­
sion of the state’s requirement for environmental impact 
statements (at that time simply an executive order asking for 
statements only for work by the state or on state land) into a 
law that would require such environmental assessment for all 
major work, public or private, anywhere in the state. There 
was a great risk, many felt, that the legislature would willing­
ly adopt a motherhood-type policy statement but refuse to 
father effective action measures.
The legislature did pass the separated Policy Act, as had 
been predicted. And then, later, it enacted an environmental 
impact requirement weaker than the commission had recom­
mended.22 (For instance, it did not require the state or the 
counties to insist on EISs when changes were proposed in 
land-use classifications or in zoning.) Among the conserva­
tion-minded members of the community there was consider­
able disappointment and some bitterness at the legislative 
results: it seemed as though little had been accomplished 
beyond an expression of good intentions. Yet an environmen­
tal policy had been adopted for the state for the first time.
Up until then all land-control and land-use policy had used 
economic value as its premise. Now, at least in words, there 
was a stated policy on the books that promised protection 
of lands and shorelines because they were irreplaceable 
resources. Whether the words would have any real weight 
remained to be seen.
Another pro tern study group established in that period 
was a Temporary Visitor Industry Council headed by Dr. 
Thomas Hamilton, who had been president of the University
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of Hawaii and later executive head of the Hawaii Visitors 
Bureau and now was a consultant to the Bishop Estate. It 
worked closely with the commission on environmental 
planning. Its major recommendation was that a ten-year 
growth plan for tourism in the state be developed-taking 
into consideration the jobs and the revenues that visitors 
could provide but also assessing carefully the carrying capac­
ity, the “ load-bearing factor,” of the physical and social 
environments.23 It took some time for its report to bear fruit. 
Not until 1976 did the legislature ask for further analysis of 
its findings and begin considering implementation.
2 4 6
That Question of Growth
The most difficult and inevitably the most controversial 
policy any state must consider in this period of environmen­
tal concern is that dealing with growth. Hawaii, like most 
other political jurisdictions, has hedged on the question.
Some attempts have been made to “ develop criteria” for an 
optimum population limit, as the Environmental Policy Act 
proposed, and Governor Ariyoshi believed that his adminis­
tration was pursuing a “ slowed growth” policy. Yet when­
ever the visitor count dropped to less than a solid advance 
over the previous year’s figures there was concern. In mid- 
1976, economists for the leading banks saw the state’s econ­
omy doing no better than continuing on a “ high plateau,” 
and that worried them.24 Hawaii’s citizens seemed ambivalent 
on the subject, although a survey conducted in 1974 by the 
Honolulu Advertiser discovered that more than half of voters 
wanted some kind of restriction on growth.25 A 1976 state 
study reaffirmed this finding.26 Governor Ariyoshi, after his 
election, referred from time to time to a report from the 
Department of Planning and Economic Development recom­
mending restricted growth. Ariyoshi spoke as though it were 
state policy, although no policy position on the subject had 
been adopted by the legislature.
It has long been obvious that there would not be state and 
county cooperation on the question. Kauai had adopted a
PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 247
comprehensive zoning code based on growth limitation. Maui 
and the Big Island were somewhat indecisive on the subject 
in their general plans; they seemed to believe that further 
growth, of a desirable kind, could be controlled by such 
devices as impact assessment. With no clear policy, of 
course, this hope rested on decisions of the local legislative 
bodies being miraculously guided by objective values of envi­
ronmental analysis instead of the political criteria they were 
used to. On Oahu, however, where more than 80 percent of 
the state’s population was centered, the city administration 
recommended to the people that they accept growth as it 
might come and plan always to accommodate rather than 
limit it.
After years of delay the city’s Department of General 
Planning brought forth two volumes of a proposed revised 
general plan in the fall of 1974. A section called “ Population 
Assumptions” explained the policy regarding growth on 
which the plan was based. It was to assume no fixed figure 
or “ target” for any given time but was to use a range of 
estimates based on “ high and low rates of growth attained in 
the past years.” Using estimates of continuing trends was the 
only “ practical” way to make plans for what growth might 
come, the city’s planners said. With this fatalistic approach 
to setting goals there was no attempt to calculate the island 
environment’s carrying capacity, as the state’s policy advo­
cated. In fact, the general plan document said, “ in a prac­
tical [that word again!] sense ‘capacity’ is not an absolute 
fixed number.” 27 For instance, the text explained, “ capacity 
can be increased as long as one more chair can be squeezed 
into a classroom or one more car onto the highway.”
In the meantime the state planning office had taken a very 
different tack. The Department of Planning and Economic 
Development, as part of its general plan revision program, 
produced a document in the spring of 1974 entitled Growth 
Policies Plan: 1974-1984 which described four growth alter­
natives among which Hawaii’s people might choose. One 
was a continuation of existing trends (the likelihood that 
Honolulu’s city planners considered inevitable), another was
248 TH E FA TE OF H A W A II’ S LANDS
an attempt to stop growth, the third was a slowing down of 
the rate of growth, and the last was promotion of accelerated 
growth.28 Dr. Shelley Mark, the department’s head, recom­
mended the slowed growth alternative: a policy to “ slow the 
rate of growth in the State’s population, as well as to slow 
the rate of growth in certain sectors of the economy while 
accelerating the rate of growth in other sectors.” It was this 
recommendation that Governor Ariyoshi seemed to assume 
as policy.
The report reviewed Hawaii’s history of growth and its 
results. The income of the state had increased, it pointed out, 
and to a certain extent the quality of life had been improved. 
Now, however, various measurements indicated that rapid 
growth’s harms were outweighing its benefits—particularly in 
environmental deterioration and the per capita costs needed 
to try to control it, but also in the growing burden, for each 
state resident, of providing services for an expanding popula­
tion.
The slowing down of growth rates that was recommended 
would allow an annual civilian population increase of some 
l 2/3 percent (a drop from the 1970-1973 rate of 3.2 percent 
but still about twice the national growth rate). It was felt 
that this decreased rate of growth could be achieved by re­
ducing both birth rates and in-migration. Birth rates might 
be lowered through educational programs and by tax reform 
to reward small families rather than encourage large ones as 
at present. In-migrdtion might be checked by such means 
as “ selectively slow” employment growth (for instance, 
encouraging industries that would provide jobs for local 
people and discouraging those that would require skills and 
employees brought from outside), and “ modest” housing 
supports (manipulating the delicate housing supply so that 
new units would be provided for residents who needed them 
while second homes and speculative purchases by nonresi­
dents would be discouraged).
The policy recommended—slow growth—was admittedly 
a compromise. Loss of agricultural lands would not be 
stopped; it would become “ relatively slow.” There would be
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“ possible reduction” of traffic congestion, not elimination. 
Difficulties in meeting educational needs and supplying essen­
tial services would only be “ reduced.” There would be a 
“ relatively healthy” economy, with “ most citizens” sharing 
the economic prosperity.29 Nevertheless, another policy state­
ment with potentially important effects on the future of 
Hawaii’s environment had been thrown in the long-range 
legislative hopper. Questions had been raised and courses of 
action suggested that could never again be completely 
ignored. Sharp conflicts lay ahead—not only in the com­
munity, among citizens with differing values, but also in the 
political realm. Whether growth of the population and 
economy should be slowed had obviously become a political 
issue. The administration of Oahu, the dominant island, con­
tended that it could not be done, directly opposing the state 
government, which said that it could, and should at least 
become public policy.
In his State of the State message to the legislature in Janu­
ary 1977, Governor Ariyoshi made what seemed a bold state­
ment on population growth. “ Too many people can spell 
disaster for this state,” he said. “ Hawaii is a very fragile 
treasure, one which can be destroyed by overpopulation and 
excessive demands on its resources. . . . We need bold and 
innovative ideas and actions now if we are to achieve what 
we must achieve.”
That sounded good, but in his extension of the proposition 
and his proposals for implementing it the governor indicated 
that his concern was socioeconomic rather than environmen­
tal. The too many people would mean “ too few jobs and too 
much competition for them . . . too much pressure on all our 
governmental and private institutions.” Ariyoshi’s proposals 
had nothing to do with the danger of overloading the envi­
ronmental capacity of the islands. They were limited to 
asking the federal government for a “ more equitable 
distribution” among the states of immigration from abroad 
(and for financial assistance for those states receiving more 
than their share); and (probably implying a constitutional 
amendment) state legislation requiring a year’s residency
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before government employment or welfare benefits could be 
obtained. The legislature, without much enthusiasm, agreed 
only to the public-employment residency requirement, and 
that move was rejected by a federal court as unconstitutional.
For environmental policy, recent sessions of the legislature 
have limited moves to the seeking of advice in preparation 
for later action. Most significant of the projections and 
presentations called for was a comprehensive policy plan to 
be ready for consideration at the 1978 legislative session. Its 
scope was to be ambitious: setting the basis for a fresh gener­
al plan, providing guidelines for direction of the Land Use 
Commission, even delineating policy about growth. A coor­
dinated state-county planning council was established to 
oversee preparation of the plan, which, the legislators hoped, 
would “ serve as a guide for the long-range development of 
the state.” There were those who held great hopes for this 
brave attempt to set state policies, including land policy for 
land planning. There were others who could not believe that 
in such a short time all the conflict that had prevented effec­
tive management of the islands’ environment over the years 
could be so readily resolved.
Nevertheless a start had been made toward a new land pol­
icy. Hawaii’s land reform movements of the 1840s and the 
early 1960s had served their purposes at their times, and now 
again times had changed. New policy considerations had been 
introduced in the tentative land legislation of the mid-1970s, 
especially questions of ecology and growth. They were cer­
tain to affect land ownership, use, and taxation patterns in 
some ways. In the meantime, with or without articulated 
policy statements, plans continued to be made for using the 
lands of the islands. Over the years land planning in Hawaii 
had proved to be as indecisive, in most respects, as the set­
ting of land policies had been.
chapter
Plans Without Purpose
IN the absence of policy guidelines it has not been possible 
for effective plans to be made and satisfactory designs drawn 
for the handling of Hawaii’s lands. To plan is to give con­
scious purpose to actions that might otherwise be random. A 
plan’s purpose can become conscious intent only when firm 
objectives have been chosen and determined policies guide 
the actions which will lead to those goals.1
Everyone has a certain ability to plan his or her own life, 
limited as that freedom may be at times, but in a community 
those individual plans are affected and often frustrated by 
the plans of others. Hence groups of people, societies, towns, 
states, and sometimes even nations try to make plans which 
at least many of their members may agree to. Broad-based 
planning of this kind is a risky enterprise of fairly recent 
origin (still considered a romantic notion by some and a 
radical idea by others). And to have any degree of success it 
must try to find mutual purposes and common principles.
For land planning to be effective, then, there must be a rea­
sonably wide agreement about the ways a community’s envi­
ronmental resources should be consciously employed.
Through Hawaii’s history many disparate sorts of indivi­
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duals living in the islands have planned their own lives well 
and designed their courses of action firmly, sometimes suc­
cessfully. Seldom since the white man’s arrival, however, has 
there been enough agreement on policies, or even objectives, 
to make possible societal planning. At those times when 
goals were widely accepted, as when a plantation society in 
the early 1900s had little doubt about the best uses of the 
islands’ lands, there seemed no need to plan. In those pleas­
ant, prosperous days the path to the future appeared clearly 
enough marked, the design of the tropical paradise sufficient­
ly satisfactory.
In an organized society plans must be made to reach so­
cial, cultural, and economic objectives as well as goals of 
physical development. Planning the husbandry of resources 
so that all these desired ends can be achieved has become, in 
modern times, a complicated job requiring a high degree of 
sophistication in techniques. Early primitive societies had 
neither the skills nor the needs for meticulous planning. For 
the same reasons that land management policies were unnec­
essary-goals were simple and resources ample—land use 
plans could be primary, almost instinctive. But the people 
who maintain primitive cultures today (most of them, as the 
African nations, trying to leap directly to a place in the 
modern industrialized world) find an acute need to plan. New 
objectives must be reached quickly, often with resources 
shrinking as populations rise.
Hawaii in the nineteenth century was in a peculiar position 
in this respect: hurried and harried in its changeover from a 
primitive society which had sufficient resources for its simple 
technology, it yet lacked any clear picture of where it was 
heading or what its needs would be. When the white man 
came to the islands with his new social and economic con­
cepts, his strange ideas about the ways land should be used, 
and his early hints of technological advancement, the need to 
plan became suddenly acute. But the absence of any desir­
able, discernable future restricted the ability to plan—and 
resulted in the confusion and confoundment that destroyed
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the early society and then undermined the monarchy. The 
Hawaiian people of that time could not plan; the haoles saw 
no reason to.
Before Cook’s arrival, however, the Polynesian Hawaiians 
managed over the centuries to define overall land uses care­
fully and arranged their settlements logically and convenient­
ly. The division of an island into mokus, ahupuaas, and 
kuleanas was not only a scheme that fitted the simple social 
relations: it also resulted in land being used in the most 
appropriate ways. The ahupuaa—the island slice that encom­
passed stretches suited for every purpose—was the most intel­
ligent division of real estate any planner could have devised 
for an island society that lived from the land it loved. When 
war came or death intervened, land changed hands; but the 
fertile areas were still set aside for farming, and the villages, 
near the farms and the fishing grounds, remained where the 
earth, the climate, and such necessities as water had sug­
gested their locations. The plan held.
What seemed to some a lack of planning in the villages 
was in fact thoughtful if innate: individual houses were 
placed where they had communication with one another but 
privacy of their own; temples were positioned where they 
could command respect; recreation places were located so 
that they were convenient gathering spots. To the newcomers 
this arrangement appeared aimless nonplanning. Cook wrote 
that “ the houses are scattered about, without any order, 
either with respect to their distances from each other, or their 
position in any particular direction.” 2 On the other hand, his 
lieutenant Ledyard found the town grouping of Napoopoo 
“ very compact,” and although the house arrangements “ do 
not seem to have been the effect of much design,” he noted, 
there were nevertheless “ a number of little streets that inter­
sect one another very happily . . . generally paved.” Further, 
there was attention to what we self-consciously call amenities 
these days: “There are coconut and other trees interspersed 
artificially among the houses all over the town, and in the 
middle of it there is a level course for running and other
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exercises, which is very beautifully skirted with trees from 
end to end, and is kept very clean.” 3
The haole settlers who followed Cook and the other 
explorers had, themselves, very rudimentary understandings 
of land use planning and town design. They showed no de­
sire, at least for some time, to substitute another basic land- 
division system for the one the Hawaiians had developed, but 
they did want to see orderly settlements built in place of the 
rambling villages. Yet the only background that most of 
them could draw on was the New England cluster of houses 
on a gridiron street pattern reaching out from a central 
square where town hall and church stood.
Unquestionably this was the model on which the nine­
teenth-century Hawaiian towns were based; how they grew 
from that form to their later, larger shapes is a separate, 
peculiarly undocumented story (“ crying for elucidation,” 
says one environmental historian).4 For a less detailed survey, 
it seems enough to note that the Hawaiian people were not 
forced directly from their nonurban condition into modern 
concepts of urbanism. The change came slowly in plan ar­
rangements, as it did in construction methods, but it did in 
time come. Toward the end of the nineteenth century Hono­
lulu was bragging about being “ a modern city, laid out on 
the best American and European plans,” 5 and Hilo and a 
few other towns were growing pridefully larger.
The later, more sophisticated haole immigrants to Hawaii 
brought with them knowledge of town planning develop­
ments abroad which had no pertinence whatsoever in the 
tropical islands but which ineluctably exerted an influence, 
particularly on the development of Honolulu. The eighteenth- 
century prototypes with which they were familiar were the 
monumental city-planning concepts that had produced polite, 
classically symmetrical urban spaces like Grosvenor Square 
in London, the Rue de Rivoli in Paris, and the Capitol 
surround in Washington. This phase of design-oriented plan­
ning, carried to American towns, had resulted in formal 
features overlaid on essentially ugly places—grand boulevards
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with no true grandeur and focal squares on which nothing of 
significance focused. Honolulu in its turn gained from this 
period the Ala Moana and Kapiolani Boulevards and some 
open space around Iolani Palace. Essentially it remained an 
unplanned city. From “ the best American and European 
plans” it had learned only a few superficialities.
During the early decades of the twentieth century, the 
Territory of Hawaii was subjected to contemporary Ameri­
can city planning influences by visiting professionals and 
immigrant residents who had watched new developments on 
the mainland. Ebenezer Howard’s and Sir Patrick Geddes’ 
garden city concept in England, transplanted to America and 
adopted eagerly as part of a city-beautiful, municipal-art 
movement, was one such development that Hawaii learned 
about. Another was the broadening of landscape architecture 
as a profession to form the new discipline of city planning. 
On the mainland Frederick Law Olmstead, a landscaper, and 
Daniel Hudson Burnham, an architect, indicated how well 
urban open spaces could be planned, as in New York’s Cen­
tral Park and on Chicago’s waterfront, and then how “ the 
art of town arrangement” could be extended, at least on 
paper, to entire cities like San Francisco. Several mainland 
architects and landscape architects, inspired by this new 
vision, found commissions in Hawaii and held high hopes for 
a tropical version of the city beautiful.6 In the end, however, 
its interpretation in the islands was limited to a few parklike 
areas. Honolulu and Hilo gained some breathing spaces in 
their increasingly clogged cores and along their compacting 
waterfronts, but any hope that new tropical garden cities 
might develop proved vain. Several plantation towns— 
notably Lanai’s one “ city” —were drawn with formal pret­
tiness but built with practical plainness.
In Honolulu, Kapiolani Park, the magnificent stretch of 
green between Diamond Head and Waikiki, was acquired in 
time, under popular pressure, and Honolulu’s civic and 
administrative center went through several planning stages 
that had sufficient effect to ward off much of the impinging
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commercial construction.7 The in-town waterfront, however, 
despite the classic focal point of Aloha Tower, built in 1921, 
became too crowded with miscellaneous commercial activity 
even for decent functional arrangement of harbor spaces, to 
say nothing of allowing concern with civic beauty.
When the city of Honolulu finally took steps to make ur­
ban planning a part of municipal government, the reasons 
were not aesthetic but purely practical. The first commission 
on planning, appointed in 1912 as an advisory panel to the 
board of supervisors, was concerned primarily with matters 
of sanitation and health (the classic reasons for planning of 
cities, in Europe and in America) and then with rudimentary 
zoning to protect property values (the original impetus for 
zoning, on the mainland). It was not until 1939 that a plan­
ning commission with some authority to plan was installed 
and began to consider allocation of land uses for the island 
as a whole.8
In the meantime, the only public agency seriously con­
cerned with orderly arrangement of the city’s parts was 
Honolulu’s Park Board, for whom Lewis Mumford, even 
then an eminent urban critic, prepared a report in 1938 that 
contained such informed and literate comments as “ Hono­
lulu is a little like a beautiful woman, so well assured of her 
natural gifts that she is not always careful of her toilet; she 
relies upon her splendid face and body to distract attention 
from her disheveled hair, her dirty fingernails or her torn 
skirt.” 9 He was particularly distressed at Honolulu’s evident 
lack of planning, because he saw such great opportunities to 
form a remarkable city in that setting. “ No other city that I 
know of would proportionately yield such high returns to 
rational planning as Honolulu,” he wrote.10
Steps toward such rational plans were slow, however, even 
though Mumford as well as several local architect-planners 
made specific proposals for immediate improvements.11 
During the 1950s and into the 1960s both the city of Hono­
lulu and the state of Hawaii followed the lead of mainland 
American jurisdictions in establishing systematic planning
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procedures.12 On the mainland, the concept of an overall 
plan for an urban area indicating how land should be used in 
its various parts—a master plan, or general plan as it was 
named in the federal government’s Housing Act of 1949— 
was becoming well established as a municipal or county land- 
control device (although there was a great deal of confusion 
for a long while about how much of what kind of infor­
mation the plan should contain).13 The general plan was 
ordinarily followed by a zoning map (usually adopted as an 
ordinance) establishing very specific uses and often densities 
of the municipality’s parts, almost parcel by parcel. Zoning, 
or detailed classification of land uses, was not used as a pro­
cedure in statewide planning until Hawaii’s landmark general 
plan suggested it and the 1961 Land Use Law adopted it.
For some time Honolulu’s Planning Commission tried to 
use zoning alone, without general planning as a first step, for 
direction of urban development and disposition of public ser­
vices such as schools and parks. In 1954, however, a city 
charter was adopted that mandated the preparation of a com­
prehensive physical plan for the city. The first such docu­
ment, quickly put together to meet the new requirement, was 
as quickly found by the courts to be inadequate.
What Is a General Plan?
It was not until 1964 that the first general plan in Hawaii 
that followed all the current rules and practices was com­
pleted and adopted—by the City and County of Honolulu. It 
too had its troubles in the courts, primarily because it was 
excessively specific and consequently inflexible, unable to 
meet changing conditions.14 The city’s charter was revised in 
the early 1970s and, like the earlier version, this document 
had a good deal to say about city planning. It pointed out 
that planning procedures had changed in America since the 
1964 plan had been drawn; general plans were now more 
comprehensive in content but less rigid in format. Unfortu­
nately, Honolulu’s department of general planning never sue-
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ceeded in translating the charter commission’s injunctions 
into a workable plan. Rather it has been bogged down, from 
that time on, in apparent confusion and uncertainty about 
the general planning process.
In the meantime, the Territorial Planning Office, which 
had been established back in 1939, had long ago begun work 
on a comprehensive plan for the totality of the islands. When 
that office became the State Department of Planning and Re­
search, it continued its work and produced the nation’s first 
statewide general plan in 1961. Passage of the Land Use Law 
and appointment of the Land Use Commission, which fol­
lowed, were the principal results of that 1961 plan, which 
was quickly outmoded and outgrown as a planning docu­
ment. It was revised in 1967 and is in process of a second 
revision—without ever having succeeded in providing a usable 
land-management tool for the state or even policy directions 
for the Land Use Commission.
The reasons why Hawaii’s state plan and Honolulu’s city 
plan have been documents with little value to purposeful ac­
tion are worth analysis. The islands simply demonstrate more 
pointedly than most locations, because of the containment of 
their population and the limitation of their land, the dif­
ficulties that have universally developed in city planning. 
Hawaii is suffering, perhaps more sharply than other places, 
because the planning profession is having a hard time making 
up its mind what a general plan should be. Lacking profes­
sional leadership, the general public, naturally apathetic 
about the formal planning process, has become even more 
disenchanted. In the islands, the state and city planning 
departments are in accord with one another and in agreement 
with public planners elsewhere in taking a dim view of earlier 
general plans made by their predecessors in office, but they 
are in complete dissent over what should be done to replace 
them. The result is a kind of planning vacuum—just when 
urban growth is at a stage where it desperately needs plan­
ning direction.
One reason for this confoundment is that it became
PLANS W IT H O U T PUR PO SE 2 5 9
fashionable in America in the 1960s and 1970s to deprecate 
“ physical” planning. The argument went that city planning 
in its infancy, through the first half of the twentieth century, 
paid too much attention to map planning and not enough to 
the social and economic situations that lay behind the map­
ping. Time was taken up drawing lines on paper, showing 
where physical things like houses and schools and parks 
should go. Not enough interest was shown in the way people 
lived and how their lives would fit into the plans that were 
being drawn.
That was undoubtedly true. And the change that began to 
take place around 1965 or so came partly because planners 
themselves, as well as their public and private clients, realized 
that cartography was an inadequate tool for shaping the 
future of a city, a state, or a region. There was another in­
centive too for a new kind of city planning at about that 
time: the federal government was handing out funds to local 
agencies for overall planning—provided the plans were broad 
in scope and considered social and economic needs as well as 
physical arrangements. There was a new meaning for the 
term “ comprehensive.” 15 Many hundreds of plans were made 
that at least gestured toward broad socioeconomic back­
grounds to justify their arrangements of physical things.
A bit later on, as the 1970s approached, a new worry pro­
duced another shift in attitudes about planning and a recast­
ing of the methods city planners used. It was the sudden 
great concern over change: the awareness of its rapidity and 
its unpredictability. There was increasing realization that ex­
ponential, explosive growth in people and people’s needs was 
forcing change on us faster than we were able to plan for it. 
A master plan intended to be achieved over a decade became 
obsolete within a few years as requirements multiplied.
Comprehensive planning, then, became in its turn a some­
what obsolete term, and the new words for up-to-date 
general planning were “ evolutionary” and “ dynamic.” With 
people and the buildings they needed increasing so quickly in 
numbers and with social values being transformed so rapidly
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and so radically (and nowhere faster than in Hawaii), it was 
clear that any master plan, no matter how comprehensive 
in scope, had to be subject to almost constant revision if it 
was to be at all helpful. Planners began to see their job as a 
continuing process rather than a single act to be repeated 
only at some point in the future.
These changes in planning attitudes seem very sensible 
when one understands the reasons for them. The search for 
ways to put them into planning practice, however, had dis­
turbing results in Hawaii and many other places. Forsaking 
physical map planning so quickly, so completely, not only 
confused the general public, who should benefit from plan­
ners’ plans; it also disarrayed the professional planners them­
selves. In trying to make plans comprehensive, planners had 
lost the ability to reach any definite goals. And as general 
plans had once been too rigid, unable to adapt to conditions 
as they changed, now they were so pliable that they provided 
no timely guidance at all.
In Hawaii this sequence of planning postures was mirrored 
faithfully on state and county plans. The state’s first general 
plan in 1961 had a concept of continuing growth as its tacit 
underlying policy, and it included very specific plans for land 
use, economic development, tourism, transportation, and 
other factors that such growth would affect. Later state 
planners deprecated it as illustrating the “ common urban 
planning theory of the 1950s,” based on the belief that 
“most economic and social problems could be handled by 
making man’s environment efficient, esthetic and func­
tional.” 16
When this plan was revised in 1967 a step forward was 
made, according to later state planners, although the ideal 
had not yet been reached. “The old ‘general plan’ approach 
was discovered to be archaic and had given way to the ‘plan­
ning process,’ “ they explained.17 The first revision program 
was largely an outline of this process. It included descriptions 
of a state economic model, a land use model, a recreation 
planning methodology, and so on. Models, in planning termi­
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nology, are accumulations of data on which plans can be 
tested. There were no plans to be tested, though; plans had 
become symbols of an antiquated approach.
To demonstrate the dynamic aspect of the new planning 
process, various “ planning projects,” as they were termed, 
were subsequently undertaken by the state planning office, 
producing numerous reports, analyses, studies, sometimes 
recommendations and proposals, but seldom plans. The best 
of these were an Oahu Transportation Study in 1967, a 
Hawaii Tourism Impact Study in 1972, and a Central Oahu 
Planning Study that same year. Any specific plan proposals 
that crept into the process, such as Udall’s Open-Space Plan 
of 1972 and a consultant’s State Comprehensive Outdoor 
Recreation Plan (SCORP) in 1971, were wasted: principles 
were preferred. Dr. Shelley Mark, the state’s director of 
planning and economic development, vigorously protested 
this evaluation of the work of his office, contending that the 
SCORP study had stimulated federal funds, that the central 
Oahu study had influenced the Land Use Commission, and 
that other planning “ facts and figures” had “ halted the 
planned use of hundreds of acres of agricultural land for ur­
ban development.” '8 Granting the so-called planning projects 
credit for certain immediate results, the fact remained that 
no overall state plan had been developed to which they could 
be related and so, in the end, they had to be shelved. The 
next stage in the state’s history of planning was a second 
general plan revision program. So little had been accom­
plished by 1975 that the legislature, in essence, called for a 
fresh start at that time.19
More Compromise and Confusion
Of the counties, the Big Island of Hawaii evolved the most 
firm general plan, since it had set the most defined policy 
goals. Under the capable direction of a determined planning 
director, Raymond Suefuji, with sympathetic guidance from 
the then mayor, Shunichi Kimura, Hawaii’s general plan,
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completed in the early 1970s, won a well-deserved national 
planning award. Development plans—detailed land use pro­
posals for particular parts of the county—began to follow as 
neighborhood discussions determined local goals.
On Kauai and on Maui private consultants were retained 
to help the county officials do general planning. In both 
cases plans were drawn that were compromises between the 
wish to stay rural and natural and the desire to benefit, in 
jobs and revenues, from the development of conservation 
and agricultural lands. Such a straddle required the plans to 
be quite specific in indicating where things should happen or 
not happen on the land, and the general plans of both coun­
ties were sufficiently old-fashioned to indicate land use in 
some detail. Within a few months, unfortunately, they had 
demonstrated the havoc that quick change, uncontrolled, can 
indeed bring to a rigid, nondynamic plan: in its 1974 bound­
ary review the State Land Use Commission altered many of 
the land use boundaries the counties had fixed.
For the island of Oahu, containing most of the state’s 
population, there was no hesitation about abandoning old 
methods. Its first general plan, in 1964, had also had ongo­
ing growth as its policy goal, and it was specific in its plans 
for the way land should be used and facilities distributed. 
Later city planners disparaged it, as the state’s planners had 
criticized the 1961 state plan, terming it “ primarily a land- 
use plan, focusing on ‘where’ activities should occur,” rather 
than why or how.20 The city charter adopted in 1972 man­
dated that the general plan, when it was revised, should be 
both comprehensive and dynamic. Charter Commission 
members intended that general planning should primarily 
determine policies; then development planning would carry 
policies forward toward implementation in specific land-use 
and other plans.21 However, the plan revision documents that 
began to appear in 197 422 (following a long, wordy, abstruse 
study of the purpose of general planning)23 were a melange 
of fluid “evolutionary” policies and rigid “ physical” land 
use arrangements.
PLANS W IT H O U T PUR PO SE 2 6 3
The first two reports in this general plan revision program 
described the new process being used by comparing it defen­
sively with the old methods. It was, the text said, not “ com­
prehensive” in the traditional sense, because “ an effort to be 
‘comprehensive’ by analyzing all of the community’s major 
objectives and policies at one time is not a viable course of 
action.” 24
In an effort to be viable, then, the new plan focused on 
residential objectives. It compared basically two alternative 
residential growth policies. One was to concentrate growth in 
the central city on land that was for the most part already 
zoned for urban uses (the “ intensive development” alterna­
tive). The other was to let growth extend on toward central 
Oahu, even though that would involve the conversion of “ a 
minimum of 10,000 acres” of agricultural lands when the 
population reached 1.4 million people (the “ directed growth” 
alternative).25 After an analysis of the two choices offered, 
based almost entirely on a study of the current cost of build­
ing houses under differing conditions and the long-range cost 
of supplying municipal services to them in different loca­
tions, the directed growth alternative was recommended. The 
city council was unhappy with the study and refused to con­
sider it a complete general plan document. Through the com­
munity, opposition developed to the “ directed growth” plan, 
reaching as it did beyond the the present urban areas. Those 
1974 plan attempts remained, then, quite useless exercises. 
They were never accepted by the general public and never 
adopted by the city’s legislative body.
If Hawaii’s planning documents seemed ineffectual, its 
planning procedures appeared, to many observers, to be dis­
organized. Within the Honolulu city-county government there 
had been a restructuring of planning when the charter was 
revised: the planning department was split into a section 
dealing with general planning and one concerned with more 
immediate problems. The planning director, controlling both, 
became the chief planning officer, working directly under the 
mayor with a rank above the administrative line departments.
264 THE FA T E OF H A W A II’ S LANDS
A result of this well-intentioned arrangement was that the 
chief planning officer, Robert Way (formerly a principal in a 
local planning firm), became a spokesman for the mayor’s 
political policies, all too ready to do battle with the city 
council on political issues and before long launching violent 
personal attacks on anyone who might dare criticize the city’s 
planning procedures.26
The state’s organization for planning had moved since ter­
ritorial days in a fragmented direction that many observers 
considered unfortunate. At the time of statehood the Terri­
torial Planning Office was succeeded by two departments of 
the state government, one on planning research and one 
on economic development. Later these were combined as a 
single Department of Planning and Economic Development 
(DPED). The result of this fusion (which incidentally elimi­
nated the office of state planner) was not a gain through 
better coordination, but a loss through dispersion of the new 
department’s powers. There were now “ blurred” respon­
sibilities, “ diffused and divided,” as the department itself 
attested.27
The DPED is a line agency of the state, along with many 
others. It has no authority to enforce its plans on the actions 
of its sister departments, and as a result planning at the state 
level is actually scattered among many agencies: the Depart­
ment of Transportation, off on its own planning highway 
systems unrelated to any land use plans that might exist; the 
Department of Land and Natural Resources, charged with 
so much land management responsibility that a legislative 
auditor’s report told of complete confusion of function;28 the 
Department of Taxation, achieving an “ assumption of plan­
ning powers,” as a consultant’s report noted,29 through its 
ability to assess land values; the State Land Use Commission, 
able to assume broad planning powers because of its right 
to classify and reclassify basic land uses; the University of 
Hawaii, choosing sites for new campuses with no reference to 
existing or planned land uses; the Department of Education, 
similarly making its independent plans for primary and sec­
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ondary school facilities; the Office of Environmental Quality 
Control, moving in on the planning process through the use 
of mandatory environmental impact statements—and so on.
The division of rights and responsibilities between the state 
and the counties had become even more muddled. On the 
mainland the trend has been toward centralization of land 
planning in state hands to achieve overall coordination of 
efforts and find greater objectivity in managing land uses. 
American municipalities and counties are likely to consider 
only their own local interest and to think of land develop­
ment primarily as a tax source. Hawaii, when it became a 
state, had set up a centralized government structure, includ­
ing the planning function, but for quite different reasons.
Hawaii’s counties are separate islands, not adjacent land 
areas, and except for Oahu were quite rural in fact and in 
feeling at the time of statehood. The process of planning, 
along with administration of the educational program and 
most other social and economic concerns, fell almost neces­
sarily into the hands of the central state government.
As time went on, however, the county governments were 
strengthened and some remarkably capable and powerful 
political figures assumed local leadership—Anton Vidhina on 
Kauai, Elmer Cravalho on Maui, Shunichi Kimura on Ha­
waii. Planning departments were established in the counties 
and drew as directors planners who were at least as capable 
as those in the planning offices of the state—and with much 
of the authority in their bailiwicks that the state planners had 
lost in theirs. To a large degree, it was the local people and 
often the county governments who wanted most seriously to 
use their land well and preserve it in as natural a condition as 
possible. The politicians in the State Capitol were the ones 
pressing plans for growth, tourism, and urban expansion.
Originally, as a strong state government was established, 
the state planning office was supposed to prepare a statewide 
general plan and then break it down into separate county 
plans.30 This was never done; no state general plan was ever 
sufficiently solid to be frangible. As time went on and the
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county governments gained competence, it began to seem 
that exactly the reverse might be the better procedure. If only 
the state could determine firm enough goals on which to base 
plans, each county might develop its own general plan (as 
they were doing anyway, in view of the planning vacuum at 
state level) and then these might be combined into an overall 
state general plan.
Legislation was introduced in 1974 and again in 1975 that 
would have accomplished just about that result. But pre­
sented by minority Republican legislators (albeit with advice 
from an impressive, informed task force), it got nowhere.31 
Instead, the 1975 bill calling for a policy plan referred the 
job back to DPED—in a measure that confused polity and 
planning while confounding county programs and state 
policies.
Planning Means Politics
Another reason why Hawaii has produced no usable gen­
eral plans is that it finds formal public planning politically 
undesirable. Since the politics of land is so dominant in 
Hawaii, land planning has inevitably become a political 
game. Landowners and developers traditionally want public 
plans to be loose enough to allow manipulation when pres­
sure is applied. Legislative bodies customarily chafe at being 
restricted to the setting of policy; they want to plan the re­
sults of their policies, as well, and see the plans implemented. 
That is where the action is—and the benefits of action. In 
Hawaii, since administrative plans have been lacking, or con­
fusing, or indeterminate, there has been little to prevent the 
state legislature and the county councils from taking over the 
planning function. The legislature has not been able to resist 
controlling actions of the Land Use Commission, retaining 
control over the planning of tourism, and dictating plans for 
development to the University of Hawaii—all to an extent far 
beyond its policy-setting prerogative.
In the city of Honolulu, where the administration’s plan­
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ning department was demonstrating inability or unwillingness 
to produce a general plan, to such flagrant measure that one 
newspaper editorially called for removal of the chief planning 
officer and a columnist for the other proposed that a compe­
tent consultant firm be retained to do the job, the temptation 
for the council to act was irresistible.32 Answering the council 
president’s inquiry, the city’s corporation counsel expressed a 
doubt that the 1974 plan-revision documents of the planning 
department would hold up in court.33 In 1976, then, the 
council itself decided to move into the vacuum that had been 
created: during the spring, summer, and fall it prepared its 
own general plan. First it reduced the budget of the official 
city planning department far below its current level as ad­
monition;34 then it produced a 47-page manuscript of objec­
tives and policies—its own general plan—as exemplar. The 
work was done by the council members, divided into 
appropriate subcommittees, and a meager permanent staff 
with the nominal help of unwilling planning department pro­
fessionals and a kind of casual compliance from a sixty- 
member citizens “ advisory” group. The work was inspired 
and largely accomplished by the then council president, 
George Akahane, who had become seriously concerned about 
the city’s need for planning and the ineffectiveness of the 
general planning department in producing a plan.
It was a remarkable document that the council produced.
A special kind of indeterminate language has developed 
around political policy statements and the council’s policy 
plan made full use of it. The first objective was “ to control 
the growth of Oahu’s resident and visitor population . . . ,” 
but control meant simply use of “ the most satisfactory” pop­
ulation projections available (1,039,000 people by the year 
2000). No goal setting, only acceptance of the expected, and 
no speculation, even, about what effect this number of peo­
ple might have on the city’s social and economic future. No 
reminder, certainly, that this was a prediction plucked arbi­
trarily from one point in time on a continuing growth curve. 
Most of the goals set down in the sections that followed were
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careful exercises in avoiding the key issues: goals so general 
as to be meaningless. As public hearings continued and con­
troversies developed over major points, the wording became 
increasingly obscure. There was one objective to “ maintain 
the viability of Oahu’s resort industry,” another sought to 
“maintain the viability of agriculture on Oahu,” a third to 
“ increase the amount of federal spending on Oahu.” There 
were the three existing economic supports, with no priorities 
given. No advice was offered to help the land-classification 
decisions that lay ahead.
There was a policy affirmed to “ preserve the island’s well- 
known and widely publicized beauty,” and one to “ protect 
the island’s well-known resources,” such as the mountains 
and the shorelines. (Apparently public relations was the 
criterion rather than ecological, historic, or scenic value).
An urban design plan was called for as one policy, without 
definition; nothing was specified about establishing heights, 
bulks, view lines—only a wish to form “ attractive, meaning­
ful and stimulating environments.”
The council’s catalogue of objectives and policies did 
include two affirmative statements, however. One was a 
specific bit of political land use allocation: “ designating ap­
propriate areas of the island for resort use” —areas arbi­
trarily selected by the councilmen. They included several 
areas (West Beach on Campbell Estate land at Honouliuli 
and Queens Beach on Bishop Estate land at Hawaii Kai) 
which were strongly opposed by segments of the community. 
The other definite decision made by the council in its plan, if 
it could be taken seriously, was where future growth might 
occur on Oahu. The policy posited was somewhat of a com­
promise between the contained and the extended growth 
alternatives which the planning department had earlier 
described; it was to “ facilitate” development of the primary 
urban center, to “ encourage” development in the suburban 
Ewa area, and to “ reduce or at the most maintain” present 
percentages of the total island population in the rural and 
urban fringe areas.35
The council’s own conviction about this new policy, unfor­
tunately, did not last even until it had adopted its own plan. 
In August of 1976, while a draft of the proposed plan was 
still in its public hearing stage, the council, with just one 
dissenter, overrode a veto by the mayor and decided to grant 
urban classification to 510 acres of prime agricultural land at 
Waipio, an “ urban fringe area,” on the central Oahu plains 
for a housing development by a corporation called Gentry- 
Pacific Ltd.36 No policy to “ reduce or maintain” population 
levels was mentioned when the chips were down. It was quite 
apparent that nothing in the vague generalities of the new 
plan, a plan produced politically rather than professionally, 
would be likely to interfere with the political gamesmanship 
that substituted for land use planning in Hawaii.
The agency which had taken greatest advantage of the 
planning void at the state level was the Land Use Commis­
sion. Intended originally only to establish and then police 
land use classifications in the broadest terms, by the middle 
1970s the commission, under labor leader Eddie Tangen’s 
aggressive chairmanship, was in fact acting as a planning 
agency, examining and holding public hearings on detailed 
development proposals. In the 1974 classification review pro­
cess, it listened to arguments about the kinds of housing that 
should be built in the Waiahole-Waikane valleys on the wind­
ward side of Oahu and even debated the costs at which the 
housing should be sold. At a meeting in March 1975, one 
application for a change in classification on Maui was 
rejected and another was approved because of the type of 
housing proposed. While the commissioners might be making 
commendable decisions about housing policy, residential 
planning was clearly not their rightful job. Many such irrele­
vant specifics considered by the commission during that 
period gave the appearance of a planning base to arbitrary 
land use decisions.37
The Land Use Commission tried for even greater planning 
powers at one point. One piece of legislation that failed of 
passage but continued to return for several sessions would 
have allowed the agency almost absolute authority over any 
lands it judged to be areas of critical state concern.38 Instead
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of ordering land uses on the basis of an adopted plan, this 
bill would have permitted the commission to overturn poli­
cies or plans of any state department, plans that had been 
prepared by any county, regulations set forth in codes and 
ordinances, even decisions of local county councils, in what­
ever places it adjudged to be “ critical.”
The tide turned against such moves, however, when the 
commission’s assumption of ad hoc planning powers unex­
pectedly hurt a number of landowners and developers. In 
1974, several members of the commission were dilatory about 
attending hearings and lost their votes at crucial times in the 
final decisions. In addition, two ex officio members (the 
head of the Department of Land and Natural Resources and 
the director of the Department of Planning and Economic 
Development) were on the point of leaving office and sud­
denly decided, with restraints of allegiance to the administra­
tion removed, to vote against urbanization of agricultural 
and conservation lands in a number of cases. The result was 
that several landowners’ plans were frustrated and some 
developers who had put big money into planning for antici­
pated developments were hurt financially. It suddenly became 
obvious to many people, who up to then had been content 
with the haphazard process, that unpredictable, uncontrolled 
decisions by a group of individuals basically uninformed 
about land management was not smart land use economics.39 
Enough pressure was put on the legislature (by developers as 
well as conservationists) so that the 1975 land planning bill 
mandated DPED to prepare “ guidelines” to direct the com­
mission in its decisions.40
Hawaii’s unsatisfactory situation in land planning in the 
1970s was not generally recognized outside the state. The 
Land Lise Law remained impressive to most mainland plan­
ners for a long while and kept the myth of Hawaii’s leader­
ship in land use control alive. In 1972 a study conducted at 
the Georgia Institute of Technology found Hawaii the most 
successful of all states in the union in meeting criteria of 
what was called “ an emerging model of state planning.” 
Challenged in his conclusion, the professor who had led the
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study said that his evaluations had been based on “ empirical 
findings” from the states themselves, checked by a “ content 
analysis of the publications . . .  of the official state planning 
agencies.” 41 Clearly Hawaii’s state planners had done a bet­
ter job of self-serving publication than others had: DPED’s 
list of publications issued as part of its “ dynamic planning 
process” is indeed impressive.
Those who came to see for themselves were not taken in 
so easily. While making his open-space study, Stewart Udall 
found a “ fragmentation” of the planning process and little 
evidence of planning results. A study group from the na­
tional office of the American Institute of Architects, spon­
sored by the Ford Foundation, reported back that it had 
discovered “ lack of coordinated State-wide land-use plan­
ning” and “ conflicts between Counties and the State” result­
ing in “ piecemeal” actions. This group saw great planning 
opportunities in Hawaii, as Lewis Mumford had thirty-five 
years earlier. The state’s “ frontier status” in land manage­
ment, its report said, “ will raise the kinds of problems and 
create prototypical opportunities for furthering the state of 
the art and advancing the impact of planning upon develop­
ment that we are unlikely to find anywhere else.” 42
Another task force from the AIA a few years later, how­
ever, found no evidence that the opportunities had been 
recognized. Its members still saw distressing gaps in the plan­
ning process, this time in the City and County of Honolulu 
as well as in the state itself, and they discovered that the lack 
of state-county coordination their earlier confreres had noted 
had in no way been corrected. In their turn they reported an 
“ absence of public guidelines” and inadequate planning 
procedures—in short, “ a climate of confusion . . . and inac­
tion.” 43
The Matter of Transit
There was no lack of professional planning expertise in 
Hawaii to do the job that was necessary in public land 
planning. Half a dozen firms of planners, several of them
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branches of mainland organizations, were as proficient in 
analysis of land use programs, study of the feasibility of in­
tended land uses, and arrangement of land use development 
and its supporting services as anyone could hope for in a 
competent practitioner. Among the islands’ planners, several 
went beyond mere competence and could provide a client 
with imaginative and innovative land management advice. In 
addition to the trained planners, at least one landscape archi­
tect and a number of architectural firms furnished planning 
services. In the late 1960s an excellent planning curriculum 
was established at the University of Hawaii and helped raise 
local standards appreciably.44 In 1965 only a half dozen 
names were listed in the yellow pages of the Honolulu tele­
phone book under City and Regional Planners; by 1977 there 
were forty-four names there.
The most important planning activity in Hawaii in the 
decade after achievement of statehood, public or private, was 
the Oahu Transportation Study.45 With all its faults, the 
Federal Highways Act accomplished more in the way of 
overall planning, including land use planning, than any other 
federal program of that period. In a remarkable way, the 
highway lobby wrote its own death sentence when it worked 
for passage of a transportation planning measure in 1962, in­
tending it to justify more urban freeways. The thoroughness 
that the act required in the studies it called for led inevitably 
to the inclusion of mass transit modes in transportation plans 
for many cities—and ultimately to federal funding of rapid 
transit routes as well as highways. As soon as it became 
possible, Hawaii secured money for study of a “ continuing, 
comprehensive urban transportation planning process on an 
intergovernmental basis” for the island of Oahu. Funds were 
supplied by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development and the U.S. Bureau of Roads; the project was 
administered jointly by the State Department of Planning 
and Economic Development and the Department of Trans­
portation, with services furnished also by the City and Coun­
ty of Honolulu. Thus it was a joint and truly comprehensive
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effort carried out by a specially organized staff that delved 
into data about population, economics, land uses, and all 
modes and methods of transportation.
Out of the OTS, as it became known, came a great deal of 
useful information (unfortunately not later kept up to date), 
a decision to build a freeway system that would include an­
other trans-Koolau link (the controversial H3 route, ultimate­
ly), and a recommendation that a sophisticated rapid transit 
system be built to carry the people whom Oahu would con­
tain by the 1980s.
Although the OTS was supposed originally to be a continu­
ing activity, its staff was disbanded and its director released 
after the first study was completed. Nothing more was done 
in the way of transportation planning until the 1970s, when 
the city of Honolulu retained the firm of Daniel, Mann, 
Johnson & Mendenhall to study in more detail the need, 
character, and cost of a mass transit system.46 This firm’s 
contract called for another comprehensive look at transporta­
tion needs for the entire island, but in fact its studies dealt 
mainly with details of a fixed-rail guided train system along 
Honolulu’s central corridor. In early stages of the work there 
were some inconclusive and unconvincing stabs at suggesting 
alternative long-range routes beyond the train line, but ob­
viously no transportation planner could foretell what travel 
might be necessary toward the leeward coast, the north 
shore, the central plains, or the windward side of the island 
when there were no clear policies and certainly no plans to 
indicate what might happen there.
Although the OTS had recommended a combined rapid- 
transit and freeway arterial plan, as time went on controversy 
developed between advocates of the two modes of travel. 
Some form of fixed-guideway train system seemed a reason­
able way to accommodate the heavy traffic along the quite 
contained corridor that formed central Honolulu, from Pearl 
City to Hawaii Kai. In fact, as a number of people have 
pointed out, this lineal urban form seems most suited for 
rapid transit service. Hawaii continued to benefit from the 90
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percent federal handouts for freeways provided by the High­
ways Act, however, and that was hard to forgo. A network 
of freeways—HI along the central corridor, H2 extending up 
into the central plains, and H3 crossing the Koolaus to the 
windward side—had already been planned, was well under 
way in construction, and was included in the OTS recommen­
dations.
What consensus there had been on the total system began 
to fall apart, however: opposition developed to the rapid 
transit route because of its cost and its rigidity, while argu­
ments were vehemently voiced against H3 because of its 
threatened impact on the environment and the generative ef­
fect it was certain to have on development of the windward 
Oahu valleys.47 Both these links in the proposed chain of 
travel on the island became political issues. The H3 ro u te -  
changed in name by the Department of Transportation to 
TH3 as an attempt to appease mass transit proponents, in­
dicating that a bus transit lane (T) could be added to the 
highway (H)—planned through a lovely historic valley, was 
seriously challenged by environmental groups. Taken to court 
on several charges, it met mixed legal reactions which had 
the effect of holding up construction through a decade of 
controversy. The environmental impact statement which had 
justified the project was challenged, but a judge ruled that it 
seemed to follow the federal requirements.48 The history of 
Moanalua Valley, through which it would pass, with its still 
visible artifacts, was called to the court’s attention (the valley 
was being seriously considered by the Interior Department 
for classification as a national landmark) and a federal judge 
ruled that the highway people must prove that no other route 
was feasible—thus raising highly arguable questions that 
caused further delays.49
By 1976, it had become clear that H3 was an outdated 
concept if not a lost cause. Doubts about the rapid transit 
scheme had dwindled to demands that costs be kept as low 
as possible. Proponents of the trans-Koolau freeway were 
reduced to those suburbanites who found the two existing
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routes between Kailua-Kaneohe and downtown Honolulu 
congested at rush hours. Still, Hawaii’s transportation 
department planners continued to insist that an additional 
freeway was essential, defending with almost religious fervor 
the righteousness of highway travel. The politics of the issue 
divided state and county, since none of Honolulu’s general 
plan revisions called for great growth across the mountains.
It was clear that if H3 did go ahead, finally, it would func­
tion not so much as a traffic artery but as a planning device, 
working to contravene the only policy-plan decision that the 
city fathers, administrative and legislative, had so far been 
able to reach in agreement.
Then in late 1976, after years of vacillation, the U.S. 
Highway Administration was finally convinced that Moana­
lua Valley should remain inviolate. The agency ruled, in ef­
fect, that that route must not be used. Since any other would 
be much more expensive and probably even more controver­
sial, the community, even including the highway planners at 
first, seemed ready to accept the demise of TH3. But then in 
April 1977, the state administration announced that it was 
making one more, possibly final, appeal to Washington 
before it gave up the federal largesse. The last judgment was 
not yet at hand.
Highway construction was not the only substitute for plan­
ning that Hawaii found. The environmental impact state­
ment, an excellent tool for guarding a plan’s provisions, was 
too often used in place of planning. Zoning, a way of imple­
menting a plan, was confused with planning itself. Several 
new concepts that were being tried on the mainland—ranging 
from transfer of development rights (a useful way to make 
a plan more flexible) to shoreline protection legislation 
(grasped as a substitute for total planning rather than consid­
ered as one of its parts)—were explained by their advocates 
to public officials in Hawaii as well as to the general public 
and were seriously considered in lieu of the missing general 
plan.
The most ambitious move that the state government made
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in its search for planning substitutes was institution of the 
technique known as PPBS—programming, planning, budget­
ing system. Adopted in the early 1970s as the State Executive 
Budget Act,50 this quasi-planning process (developed by 
Robert McNamara and the aggregation of “ whiz kids” 
around him in his position as Secretary of Defense from 
1961-1968) is intended to relate budgets, and therefore 
expenditures, to plans for specific programs for action.
As a means of implementing planning and forcing agencies 
to be realistic about their requests for funds, PPBS, as a 
report to the legislature said, “ can be an invaluable tool.” 51 
Lacking overall planning, however, the demand that each 
agency justify its budget request through programs and plans 
of its own has simply led, in Hawaii, to further fragmenta­
tion of what planning does take place. The act establishing 
PPBS as state policy makes no reference to any general plan 
or planning agency. As a further disadvantage, the emphasis 
is on the budgetary outcome of planning. When alternative 
courses of action are considered under PPBS, the choice is 
based on costs and benefits—and economic costs are likely to 
outweigh social or even physical benefits.52
Another federal government concept, the environmental 
impact statement, assumed importance in Hawaii and else­
where in America as a major replacement for comprehensive 
planning in the 1970s, The EIS has become a valuable instru­
ment in national land management precisely because there is 
no national land-planning legislation, despite hopes that have 
been held out from time to time. If there is no plan for the 
use of a certain land area, say the shoreline of the Hudson 
River in New York, or the estuary of the Potomac River in 
Virginia, or the Moanalua Valley of the Koolau Mountains 
in Oahu, then when someone wants to build a freeway or an 
apartment complex or whatever on those lands, the require­
ment for an environmental impact assessment forces every­
one to wonder whether those are really good land uses and 
what other uses might be better. Thus to some extent it fills 
the need for land planning.
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The reason EISs have proved to be weak substitutes for 
planning, however, is that when there is no effective land­
planning process the proposed action must prove that it is 
superior to all conceivable alternative land uses—to the 
universe of alternatives—and no one is wise enough to judge 
that. When there is a land use plan for the area, though, the 
EIS for a specific project has a much more feasible and 
useful role. Its job then is to show whether the proposed ac­
tion is consistent with the objectives of the plan and would 
not conflict with the environmental policies on which the 
plan was based. A city with a well-formulated plan for 
development can accomplish much more when it requires a 
state or federal highway department to submit a statement of 
the environmental impact of a proposed highway before it is 
built through the municipality than can a city with vague, un­
formulated plans for its future growth. In the first case, the 
city’s people can evaluate the answers they get to their ques­
tions about the construction’s impact; in the second instance, 
they do not even know what questions to ask. The validity of 
H3’s impact statement has been successively upheld and 
struck down by the courts. Never have they addressed the 
question of whether H3 is a good urban transportation plan.
More Substitutes for Planning
Zoning is another instrument which serves well to carry out 
plans but is often used as a replacement for planning. Zon­
ing, in fact, preceded general planning as a method for con­
trolling and protecting real estate values, and the two have 
often been used independently of one another.53 Houston, 
Texas, touted as the city without a zoning ordinance, having 
defeated at the polls several attempts to impose one, is 
actually pretty well planned, in fact and in the minds of its 
people. It just is not zoned. The plot-by-plot division into 
rigidly defined zoning classifications is the element that is 
absent—and is not too badly missed.
On the other hand, Honolulu has thoroughly detailed zon­
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ing maps for all its districts, even though development plans 
have been prepared for only some of them and a meaningful 
general plan is still lacking. Thus zoning maps, which were 
intended to be drawn from land use maps, which were sup­
posed to be extracted from the policies of a general plan, ex­
ist by themselves as a planning proxy. In somewhat the same 
way, Hawaii’s classification of state land into four categories 
of use, which is in effect the zoning stage, has long been ac­
cepted as a substitute for state land planning. Honolulu has a 
fairly new “ comprehensive zoning ordinance,” which the 
council finds too inflexible (that is, too detailed in its land 
use, height, setback, and other requirements for each type of 
zone to allow for variations that might be politically useful). 
The council’s solution to this problem for a long time was 
not to insist on a revised plan but to move to make the exis­
ting zoning regulations more malleable.
Several techniques that would relate zoning more closely to 
land use planning had already been tried on the mainland 
with some success. For instance, there had been experiments 
in “ impact zoning” —a proposed development’s environmen­
tal effects were analyzed and weighted and the project per­
mitted only when the impact count was low enough. Another 
approach was “ timed zoning” —development could proceed 
only at the time municipal services were supposed to be avail­
able. 5,1 Ramapo, New York, became the model for this kind 
of zoning-cum-planning by adopting a “ controlled growth” 
ordinance in 1969. Developers (even when they complied with 
the zoning code) were required to obtain a permit indicating 
that utilities and other services (planned in controlled-growth 
stages by the city) would be ready when construction started. 
The Ramapo plan avoided the charge of having a social seg­
regation purpose in its limits to growth by adopting a care­
fully drawn, long-range, nonexclusionary plan that has been 
upheld by the courts.55
Another way to make the usual broad restrictions of a zon­
ing code more adaptable to changing land uses is to attach 
conditions to the permission to build, even when the zoning,
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in general terms, allows it. To make conditional zoning rea­
sonable, not a capricious political agent, a project has to be 
analyzed more deeply than building permit departments 
usually do. And to accomplish that, environmental impact 
statements are often required. If it is shown that an apart­
ment house might bring too many vehicles to adjacent 
streets, for instance, permission to build might be granted on 
the condition that more off-street parking be provided than 
demanded by the zoning code. Conditional zoning might 
limit the number of units in an apartment house or require 
more open space around a hotel than the code specified.
The Honolulu city council took these ideas sufficiently 
seriously to call to Hawaii Robert Freilich, one of the design­
ers of the Ramapo plan, to advise on what to do about 
Waikiki. Freilich recommended a number of innovative 
moves, which Robert Way, the chief planning officer, resent­
fully opposed.56 Ultimately, the council changed Waikiki’s 
traditional zoning status to that of a “ special design” zoning 
district. By removing it from the standard zoning restrictions, 
the council gained more flexibility in the permissions that 
might be granted.57
A number of other planning implementation devices were 
taken to Hawaii hopefully by their inventors or supporters 
and examined as substitutes for planning. In 1972, Daniel 
Mandelker introduced the idea that “ areas of critical con­
cern” should be the state’s responsibility. About the same 
time, Paul Ylvisaker, educator and adviser to the Rockefeller 
brothers’ study on land, convinced the Temporary Commis­
sion on Environmental Planning of the validity of the envi­
ronmental “ carrying capacity” concept. The author of the 
notion of transferable development rights (known as TDR), 
land law expert John Costonis, taught at the University of 
Hawaii for a semester in 1974 and explained his idea to a 
number of local groups and individuals: that there will 
always be some property owners, in some locations, who for 
some reason should not (or might not want to) develop their 
land as intensively as the law would allow and others who
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would have good reasons for wanting to do more than the 
zoning code permitted.58
If it could be proved that the swap would not harm anyone 
and would not be environmentally disadvantageous, Costonis 
suggested that a transfer of the “ rights” to develop which 
the code conveyed might be permitted, with equitable finan­
cial arrangements and under careful government control. 
Costonis had helped work out a successful plan in Chicago 
for transferring development rights from historic structures 
to other sites as a means of allowing landmark buildings to 
remain.59 A graduate student at the University of Hawaii 
studied the potential of a similar use of TDR in downtown 
Honolulu and found that it could save a dozen or so early 
landmarks that were threatened with removal.60
The council, however, began to eye the principle of trans­
ferring development rights as another way of getting around 
the lack of planning in Waikiki. Costonis himself recognized 
Hawaii’s lack of planning and insisted that TDR was not a 
planning substitute. Robert Way again protested, writing 
angrily to a newspaper about this “ instant expert” who “ ap­
pears to be an attorney seeking credentials as a planner.” 61 
The idea was dropped.
Shoreline protection, a valid enough idea for strengthening 
an overall land-use plan, became another back-door planning 
approach that was presented to Hawaii’s legislators in the 
mid-1970s, this time by conservationists. The national gov­
ernment had passed a Coastal Zone Management Act in 
1972, which required cooperation from the state. Federal 
funds were available for the development of plans imple­
menting local legislation on shoreline management. Most 
states, including Hawaii, rushed to adopt them. California 
had led the way with an implementation law (known as Prop­
osition 20) forced through by popular referendum vote after 
two defeats in that state’s legislature. That law was con­
sidered a successful prototype, and a group of Hawaii’s com­
munity council leaders (banded together as the Council of 
Presidents) drew up a similar measure and lobbied for its
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passage as an interim measure until the state should adopt a 
full-blown, federally satisfactory coastal zone management 
program. There did not seem much likelihood that shoreline 
planning could succeed in Hawaii without an overall land-use 
plan to relate to, but the community groups felt that it was 
worth trying to get some planning done, even if the whole 
job seemed unlikely.
There are great physical differences between California and 
the Hawaiian islands that were bound to make the effects of 
such legislation quite dissimilar. The biggest difference is that 
the California shoreline (about the same total length as 
Hawaii’s) lies along the edge of a great continent, while 
Hawaii’s shore is the entire surrounding circumference of 
each island. The inland, mauka, direction, once one crosses 
the central mountains, points oceanward, makai. Thus 
California was protecting a strip of land along one of its 
edges; Hawaii’s legislation could affect most of its usable 
territory.
Another important distinction is that California’s coastal 
counties are contiguous along the shore: jurisdictions over­
lap; actions in one affect others neighboring; for coordina­
tion a central state authority is essential. In Hawaii the 
coastlines of the island-counties are separated by expanses of 
water, and in many cases they are more jealously guarded at 
home than they are by the central state government. As an 
instance, for many years the state Department of Transporta­
tion has tried to forward plans to build a shoreline highway 
around the rugged northeast Kaena Point of Oahu, where the 
county’s general plan showed instead an undisturbed preser­
vation district.
A somewhat weakened shoreline protection act, passed by 
the 1974 legislature, required most development along the 
coast to prove it would not do any great environmental 
harm—not asking, however, whether it should be there at all, 
which would have been a planning question.62 By 1977 the 
state’s coastal zone management program seemed quite well 
along and in its preliminary scope appeared to include prac­
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tically all land in the islands as “ coastal” —in effect becom­
ing a statewide land management plan.
In most cases, then, substitutes for planning were proposed 
simply to keep control over the uses of land in the hands of 
political agencies, but sometimes as a way to sneak a more 
considered and conscious procedure into the whimsy of gov­
ernment agency decision making. None of the new ideas, 
homegrown or imported, received any support from the local 
business community or from the cohort of malihini develop­
er-builders. The local populace was either disinterested or 
disenchanted at these covert tries at planning. The islands’ 
planners themselves were outspokenly skeptical, but with no 
effect. The mood was for action, the wish was for growth. 
There was no desire to suffer the restrictions that might be 
imposed by the making of plans, whether by conventional 
methods or by proxy.
Hawaii was not alone in this temper in the mid-1970s.
Much of the advance in environmental protection that had 
been gained in the 1960s—highlighted by passage of NEPA, 
the National Environmental Protection Act—had been lost as 
the threatening energy crisis and the economic recession pro­
vided excuses for backtracking. The surge forward that had 
been made in land management legislation slackened off too.
At the federal level, land management legislation which 
had seemed close to adoption at the start of the decade was 
now all but forgotten. At state levels, the “ Quiet Revolu­
tion” that had been hailed in earlier studies gave way to 
more moderated moves. Florida’s acclaimed advance, for 
instance, was described in a later analysis as a “ Slow Start in 
Paradise.” 63 Only at the home-town level was advance in 
land planning being made. A number of mainland cities 
seemed to have tired of the indecision and ambiguity of pro­
posals which vacillated between policies and plans. Chicago 
instituted a preliminary general-policy stage before drafting 
its general plan in order to keep the two separate. San Fran­
cisco included specific physical-plan elements in its overall 
policy plan. A new breed of social-environmental designer-
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planners moved into the city planning ranks to fill the role 
which the dynamic-process policy planners had left vacant.
In Hawaii, at the state level moves were being made 
toward a more definitive kind of planning, one which prom­
ised even to indicate land uses (if only because the Land Use 
Commission so obviously required guidance). The results 
might well be worth waiting for. At Honolulu’s city level, 
however, there seemed to be an unsolvable impasse. The 
administration’s plan, in many respects, was too precise; 
the council’s, in most respects, was too vague. Neither was 
usable as a guide to Oahu’s social, economic, and physical 
development.
There appeared to be only one way out of Honolulu’s 
problem: to reach outside the official city agencies and seek 
informed, experienced, professional assistance from among 
those who were successfully helping other cities with their 
master plans. That solution was suggested from time to time, 
but the community seemed reluctant to press for it.64 The 
data that had been accumulated by the administration’s plan­
ners would be valuable to a consultant, and the reactions 
which the council’s planners had gotten in their public hear­
ings would also be helpful. A competent professional should 
be able to do in a brief time the job that had not been 
accomplished in five years in-house. Only one thing more 
would be needed: willingness to make planning a social 
rather than a political act.
chapter
Reshaping Urban Space
IN the early 1970s a practice known as urban design became 
a popular conception for sophisticated professional and lay 
groups and, to a limited degree, came into political favor. 
The move started among the architects, where it was seen as 
an aspect of city planning that gave them a chance to utilize 
their particular metier, design, in the increasingly com­
plicated problems of urbanization. For members of the 
general public concerned with improvement of their cities it 
seemed to provide a goal more tangible than “ beautifica­
tion” without requiring too deep an involvement in the in­
tricacies of the planning process. For politicians it furnished 
a platform with high-sounding principles that should appeal 
to any constituent. On the mainland, urban design became 
a requisite element in an increasing number of municipal 
general planning efforts, and word of the trend traveled to 
Hawaii through reports by several local planning writers and 
visits of mainland architect-planners who were sold on the 
subject.
Not only did urban design become a stylish concept in 
Hawaii: there was an attempt to make it officially man­
datory. Understanding vaguely that it promised more attrac-
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tive city spaces, the legislature in 1973 adopted a resolution 
telling the counties to include an urban design element in 
their general plans (some completed by that time, some still 
in preparation).1 Realizing more clearly that a great deal of 
work was involved and believing that other tasks had higher 
priorities, the county planning directors for some time quietly 
ignored the order. Honolulu’s city council began to talk 
about urban design as a desirable ingredient of the planning 
substitutes it was considering; it seemed to be a modish trend 
that should be examined. San Francisco’s planning director 
visited Honolulu to describe that city’s well-thought-of urban 
design studies, incorporated in its general plan. Some council 
members felt that even if their town did not at present have a 
plan, perhaps it should have a design.
A Honolulu newspaper story in 1974 noted that urban 
design had become an “ in” concept, even though few people 
seemed to know what the phrase meant.2 Articles appeared 
even in professional journals seeking answers to the question 
“ what is urban design?” and wondering what the county 
planning departments would do once they did something 
about the legislative mandate.3
The newspaper piece also described conflicts that were 
developing between local architects and city planners over 
the subject. Architects, by and large, look on urban design 
as large-scale architecture (The Architecture o f  Towns and 
Cities, as a 1965 book sponsored by the American Institute 
of Architects had been titled),4 and they considered it an 
essential part of the city planning process. Planners, on the 
other hand, are inclined to feel that design considerations are 
irrelevant to a policy-oriented general planning procedure 
and should come, if at all, only deep in the development-plan 
stage. Neither, during the argument in Hawaii, seemed will­
ing to agree that design (whether or not especially identified 
as urban design) is a means of giving form and structure to 
a plan (an urban plan or any other kind). That is, a design 
arranges all the actions a plan describes.
There was quite obviously a fear on the part of Honolulu’s
28 5
2 8 6 THE FATE OF HAWAII’S LANDS
city planners that concern with design matters would inter­
fere with attainment of the social and economic goals they 
were trying to achieve. When a writer for one of the newspa­
pers chided the planning department for sloughing off the 
design element in its general-plan revision program, a func­
tionary with the title of Deputy Planning Officer, Donald 
Clegg, replied in inquisitional rhetoric: “ Where in the urban 
design is the plan for how housing will be financed? Where 
in the urban design is the means by which the community 
will receive police and fire protection? Where in the urban 
design is the plan for getting houses built?” Those functions, 
he maintained, are “ what planning is all about today.” He 
agreed that ultimately a design for all those planning goals 
would be needed. But to the argument that plans and designs 
interact and should be considered together (as in the plan­
ning and design of a school, or a space missile, or a suit of 
clothes) the planning official replied: “ Absolute nonsense.” 
Whatever it might be, he insisted, urban design “ is not the 
glue that holds the plan together.” 5 
Although laymen may understand only vaguely the func­
tion of design, when it is lacking they often miss it. Without 
giving it a name, they need a sense of structure in their own 
life, in their home, in the community where they live. Behav­
ioral studies have shown that city dwellers know  their own 
cities and can describe them by their physical organization— 
their “ design” —no matter how haphazard it may be.6 In 
Honolulu there was evidence that opposition to the general­
planning department’s recommendation that the city grow on 
out toward Ewa and beyond began to appear and increased 
in vehemence, to a large degree, because the public (includ­
ing, in this case, the council members) could not visualize 
an attractive, well-designed urban expansion when it was 
described only in the cold, policy-planning words “ directed 
growth.” Some well-read, well-traveled citizens suggested on 
their own that if the proposed growth plan were adopted a 
“Stockholm solution” might be hoped for: attractive new 
communities of controlled size and density, separated by
green spaces, extending out from central Honolulu somewhat 
as new towns like Vallingsby complement Stockholm. Yet 
these optimists knew in their hearts that never, in Sweden or 
anywhere else, had such a desirable result been achieved 
without careful, constant coordination of planning and 
design by planners and architects. Without the benefit of 
such coordination Honolulu’s expansion would be directed 
only in its course, not in its form. Undesigned, it would 
allow the city to “ drag its slow growth along,” in Alexander 
Pope’s phrase, as more tracts, on past the point where cane 
fields had so far stopped it.
Honolulu was not the only Hawaiian city with design 
problems, and the other islands as well as Oahu had been 
told to prepare urban design plans. The island of Hawaii 
seemed to take the charge most seriously (and receive it most 
willingly). Along with regional development plans, with 
which its planning department followed up approval of its 
general plan, urban design plans were commissioned and 
often, as in the town of Kailua, stirred considerable public 
discussion.7 Most of Hawaii’s urban spaces could have bene­
fited from some design effort. The city of Hilo had been 
through several planning design studies but remained stub­
bornly unorganized. Lihue on Kauai and Wailuku-Kahului 
on Maui had grown through the years with no incentive to 
design themselves. In some places where development seemed 
to induce a natural, logical town arrangement, a naive kind 
of organic design had resulted, achieved by circumstances 
rather than plan. Lahaina on Maui, formed by the whaling 
industry after Polynesian times, and Waimea on the Big 
Island, growing to serve the cattle ranches, were of this sort.
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The RUDAT Affair
It was on Oahu, however, where the problems produced 
by urban growth were the greatest, that resistance to urban 
design was most apparent. A remarkable illustration of the 
fear of commitment to designed urban spaces was the area
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known as Kakaako, a poorly utilized 1,200 acres of land in 
the heart of Honolulu’s core between downtown and Waiki­
ki, stretching from the sea to the hills of Punchbowl and 
Makiki, crossed by Ala Moana Boulevard and all the other 
east-west roads running through the urban corridor. A few 
families remained from an earlier disintegrated neighbor­
hood, but Kakaako was mainly, in the 1970s, a jumble of 
small businesses and marginal industries scattered along 
narrow, rutted streets and alleys, clogged with vehicles but 
somehow finding room, here and there, for a fine tree or a 
bright spot of garden that gave color and character to the 
surroundings. The state-city capitol district was almost next 
door on one side; the highly successful Ala Moana shopping 
center was a neighbor on the other. Remarkably, the city that 
was presumably wondering where and how to expand, that 
was considering growth into fresh farmlands, persisted in 
ignoring this valuable, underdeveloped territory in its own 
heart.
The local chapter of the American Institute of Architects, 
spurred by several of its planning/design-conscious members, 
saw this ill-used part of the central city as a remarkable 
opportunity to make a telling point about urban design. On 
the mainland, the national body of AIA had developed a 
program called RUDAT (regional urban design team), based 
on a conviction that many cities throughout the land had 
unresolved design problems that might be moved toward 
some solution by fresh expert advice. On invitation, then, 
AIA offered to provide a team of professionals who would 
visit a city for a brief time (four, five, six days) to analyze 
efforts being made locally or to suggest some answers that 
might have been overlooked. Remarkably, this process had 
worked well in a number of places. Even a short visit (with 
sufficient preparation in the background of the situation, 
after questioning talks with a number of knowledgeable local 
people, and then a thorough on-site study of the area in 
question) often made it possible for a team of informed per­
sons, experienced in similar situations but perceptive enough
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to appreciate local differences, to suggest fresh solutions to 
old problems.
In 1974 the Hawaii AIA, backed by a number of con­
cerned local citizens and several civic groups, with encourage­
ment from the state administration and halfhearted support 
from the city, raised the necessary funds, made the essential 
technical preparations, and requested a visit from a RUDAT 
team. The subject assigned to the experts for study was the 
urban design potential of the central Honolulu/Kakaako 
area. The team that visited Hawaii was of unquestioned 
expertise: it was composed of seven well-known, nationally 
respected architects, planners, government officials, and 
economists.
At the conclusion of their study, the team members posi­
tively and explicitly suggested a renewal scheme for Kakaako 
that could make it, they believed, an attractively functioning 
new community in town.8 Their proposal was to begin care­
ful, coordinated planning and design of a neighborhood of 
some twenty thousand new homes that might be built at 
prices all income groups could afford, where new businesses 
and many of those presently there would provide local work 
for local people, and where large amounts of open space and 
an expanded waterfront park could be provided. This could 
be urban design at its best. The plan could be structured to 
allow the saving of view planes from Punchbowl to the sea, 
with high buildings kept on the periphery and mauka-makai 
vistas protected throughout the body of the developed area.
The whole idea was “ blue sky,” said a spokesman for the 
planning department.9 But if any part of the suggested solu­
tion was speculative it was the assumption of planning goals 
for that part of the city. Since neither city nor state had 
development policies or plans for the Kakaako area, the 
RUDAT team had to devise its own program for design. 
Although this was clearly the wrong sequence in the policy- 
plan-design process, the problem was of the city’s making, 
and the visiting group was experienced and capable enough 
to feel that it could accept and overcome the handicap. The
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assumption it made for its study was basically a goal to rede­
velop Kakaako for high-density but low-rise residential uses, 
integrated with certain light industries and businesses and a 
maximum of open and recreational spaces. The experts on 
the team understood the difficulties that would lie in the way 
of implementing such a designed plan. There were three prin­
cipal landowners in the area—the Bishop and Victoria Ward 
Estates and the Dillingham Corporation—each with its own 
long-range plan for development. (At one time they had tried 
to cooperate in formulating a joint plan and had been re­
pulsed by the city planning department.)10 For the rest land 
ownerships were a patchwork, sites were confusingly leased 
for varying terms, property was absurdly overpriced, and 
the present tenants and residents would need protection if 
changes were to be made.
The social scramble and economic confusion in the area 
had worked to discourage public and private efforts at 
planning and development for decades. The RUDAT team 
proposed to cut through the tangled urban knot by the for­
mation of the Central Honolulu Development Corporation, a 
quasi-public body which would be given unusual powers to 
produce the essential public results without denying private 
profits. Development corporations such as the one outlined 
had succeeded in other places, notably, at that time, in New 
York State, and Edward J. Logue, president and executive 
officer of New York’s UDC, as it had become known, was a 
member of Honolulu’s RUDAT team. Even though Logue’s 
ambitious efforts in New York later ran into both political 
and fiscal difficulties, the development-corporation sugges­
tion as a method for coordinating Kakaako’s scattered own­
erships and interests remained one of Honolulu RUDAT’s 
most acceptable recommendations. It was clearly the only 
way to achieve integrated rather than spotty renewal.
For some time there did not seem to be any tangible effects 
from the hardworking team’s efforts, although it was clear 
that attention had been called to Kakaako’s problems and 
potentials. The immediate result seemed to be political con­
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troversy rather than urban improvement. The city, through 
its planning officers, expressed stiff-backed rejection of the 
new community-in-town concept, poking all manner of fun 
at the visiting “ instant experts.” Its own general-plan revi­
sion documents, when they appeared, made only the vacuous 
recommendation that “ the Kakaako area retain its orienta­
tion toward accommodating economic activities.” 11 Sensibly, 
sanguinely, the local AIA chapter turned to the public for 
support and a Citizens Group for Design of Central Hono­
lulu was formed.12 Attempts were made to stimulate the 
interest of both small and large landowners in a cooperative 
move forward, but without much success. The Victoria Ward 
Estate went ahead with construction of a low-rise, good- 
looking, temporary timber shopping-center structure in the 
heart of the area on Ala Moana Boulevard, and the Dill­
ingham Corporation nurtured its own development plans.
Then suddenly a number of public figures seemed to see 
Kakaako’s possibilities as a sizable political plum. Governor 
Ariyoshi had long been interested in the area (more than any 
other public official, he had supported RUDAT’s activities), 
and soon the state’s planners came up with a 300-page urban 
design “ demonstration” study of the district. This study 
presented alternative proposals for land use (one in par­
ticular very similar to the RUDAT scheme) and analyzed im­
plementation possibilities (including use of a development 
corporation like the one RUDAT had suggested). Then the 
state legislature decided that it should make a proposal for 
the area, too, and in 1975 it set up a Hawaii Community 
Development Authority, an entity similar to the one RUDAT 
had recommended, but as an “ authority” without much 
authority—and no fund-raising power. (Until 1977, no mem­
bers were even appointed to this body.) In 1976, the city’s 
planning department reexamined its policy for Kakaako and 
issued still another study, suggesting that Oahu’s increasing 
numbers of tourists, rather than its own residents, might be 
the best occupants of this urban land.13 With irrefutable logic 
the report found, as others had, that a great number of new
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hotels would be needed to accommodate the growth in visitor 
traffic that would be required to provide the public revenues 
and private jobs that would be needed to support the state as 
its population grew. What would be a more reasonable spot 
for resort proliferation, the planners asked, than Kakaako, 
as a spillover from already crowded Waikiki? The local peo­
ple would simply have to go somewhere else to build their 
homes, establish their businesses, and find their recreation.
After all this boiling up of interest had simmered down, 
however, Kakaako remained just as it had been when the 
RUDAT team arrived. An attempt to demonstrate the value 
of designing the use of prime urban land had resulted only 
in stirring interest in its economic worth. That Kakaako 
would in time be developed, now that its value had been so 
thoroughly explored, seemed inevitable. Whether its develop­
ment would be carefully conceived, planned, and designed 
did not seem so sure.
There were piany other parts of Honolulu that suffered 
from lack of design attention. One of the city’s most attrac­
tive open spaces is Thomas Square, where in 1843 Rear Ad­
miral Richard Thomas restored the independence of Hawaii 
after five months under the British flag. The handsome Ho­
nolulu Academy of Arts faces the square, as does a dignified 
old one-story stone school and an agreeable civic theater set 
back in congenial landscaping. A well-designed Methodist 
church abuts one corner. The square is nicely planted and 
has a comfortable, intimate scale. In the mid-1970s its quiet 
environment was shattered by construction of a bulky 
medical building facing one corner and further threatened by 
plans to build a 350-foot-high apartment complex on the pro­
perty of the Methodist c h u rch .T h is  latter move, made to 
assure the congregation’s financial future, seemed a par­
ticularly sacrilegious act: it was disrespectful, that is, to a 
part of Hawaii held sacred by many, and it was vigorously 
protested. The city council considered various actions to pro­
tect the square, and the church’s developers agreed to lower
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their development goals by some stories. But blasphemy was 
achieved in late 1977 when the Council approved the church’s 
scheme in an area for which a design, based on a plan that 
implemented an adopted policy, had never been made.
Downtown Honolulu’s central business district was a ma­
jor area ripe for design care as new buildings proliferated, 
creating new urban spaces and filling older ones, with no 
thought of forming a cohesive whole. As contemporary malls 
and plazas were being formed, there remained some of the 
city’s earlier wide streets and a few attractive structures from 
former times. In many places these individual elements of an 
urban design almost reached one another and seemed on the 
verge of mutual acknowledgment and respect, but no effort 
had been made to help them coalesce. Parking lots surround­
ed and nearly concealed some of the finest, most usable older 
sites (like the one where the early Hawaii Hotel had been 
built and a YMCA now stood) and tasteless new development 
turned its back on historic neighborhoods like Queen Emma 
Square, with the St. Andrew’s Cathedral which that queen 
had built to recall Kamehameha IV’s Anglican Catholicism, 
and the Washington Place governor’s residence which Queen 
Liliuokalani’s husband John Dominis had put up for his bride.
For a molder of urban form, the sculpting of downtown 
Honolulu would have been a great opportunity: spaces 
seemed straining to bring themselves together visually and 
functionally—with no one bothering to help unify them. The 
Downtown Improvement Association was truly anxious for 
its bailiwick to present a decent appearance and had made a 
number of efforts to bring about development of an overall 
designed plan. At one time the DIA had retained the services 
of a local architect-planner;15 at another time, with the city’s 
cooperation, it had called in a mainland planning firm to 
study downtown’s urban design possibilities.16 In their times 
these studies had been tacitly accepted as official plans, with­
out much comment or amendment from the city’s official 
planners, but little implementation resulted. In 1975 the DIA
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itself, through capable staff effort, produced another quite 
feasible design study for the business district and its water­
front, based on the concept of tying together existing open 
spaces and adding to them as necessary to form east-west 
and mauka-makai green corridors through the area.17 The 
effort drew wide favorable commentary from the public— 
and no official reaction from the city. After all, there was 
no adopted general plan yet. How could there possibly be 
a design?
The Trouble with Waikiki
No part of Honolulu has been planned more often without 
ever having been designed than Waikiki. Since the time when 
the Hawaiian people, even before the Kamehamehas, enjoyed 
surfing off that sunny, sandy stretch it has increased in pop­
ularity and population although, despite endless studies, its 
growth has been haphazard and indiscriminate. Hotels have 
been built along the beach and inward toward the Ala Wai 
Canal with no relation to one another or to the environs. In 
recent years an indiscriminate surge of costly apartment- 
house condominium construction has choked the inner streets 
and rimmed the canal-side Ala Wai Boulevard (witlessly 
overreaching its own semispeculative market by 1976, so that 
thousands of units were unoccupied, waiting for population 
to catch up with production). The city’s codes for many 
years divided the 14-square-mile area into sections separately 
designated for resort, business, and residential purposes—in 
the nature of conventional, use-segregating zoning—with 
densities that would allow more than triple the 21,000 hotel 
rooms that were already there in 1974 and a large increase in 
residential units. Under two mayors, citizen advisory commit­
tees drew plans for more orderly growth, the Honolulu 
Redevelopment Agency proposed an urban renewal plan for 
part of the district, and the Waikiki Improvement Associa­
tion (with a professional planner as its executive head) spent 
a great deal of time over its own scheme for development.
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With none of these plans getting further than the drawing 
board (federal, state, and municipal governments agreed in 
seeing no reason to interfere with a growing, financially suc­
cessful, revenue-producing tourist quarter), Waikiki had 
become a deteriorated part of Honolulu by the 1970s despite 
its new construction—with inadequate sewerage and drainage 
systems, narrow streets that were a dangerous maze for 
autos, taxis, and, most frightening, fire trucks, and plenty of 
cover for the prostitutes, dope peddlers, petty thieves, and 
more serious criminals any careless resort town attracts.
Yet new hotels continued to rise. And remarkably, with all 
its faults, Waikiki could still have become an exceptional 
urban resort. Although the possibility of recalling the quiet, 
low, quasi-colonial, quasi-Polynesian character that the ka­
maainas nostalgically remembered had long since been lost, 
Waikiki still had a unique character. For one thing, earlier 
landmarks continued to hold precarious leases on a mort­
gaged life; for awhile yet there remained the Moana, Haleku- 
lani, and Royal Hawaiian Hotels—the earliest, original 
three—a stretch of pleasant, low-rise shops along Kalakaua 
Avenue, the main street, the building still called Gumps, de­
signed for that San Francisco merchant in the 1920s by island 
architect Hart Wood, and others. They continued to contrast 
with the new modern structures in a naive, quite charming 
manner that could not be counted on to remain much longer 
without some conscious effort at assistance.
More important to Waikiki’s urban character were the 
physical characteristics: qualities that could be used or 
ignored but could never be eliminated or basically changed. 
There was the sea on one side and the mountains on another, 
of course, but in addition Waikiki has the great advantage of 
being physically bounded and contained. On its mauka bor­
der and its Ewa edge facing downtown, the Ala Wai Canal 
separates it from the rest of the city; on the Diamond Head 
side there are the great open spaces of Kapiolani Park; and 
makai lies the ocean. This meant that Waikiki could not 
dribble off in ragged outlines as many tourist places do.
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Along Waikiki’s borders, actually, some attractive edge areas 
have developed. One of the most pleasant is an excellent, 
unexpected bit of design detail at the Diamond Head end, 
where Kapiolani Park begins. A broad plaza and wide steps 
lead down to the sand, shaded by tall palm trees and several 
hau tree terraces. Buildings, beach, and people meld there in 
a way that few oceanside resort towns have succeeded in 
achieving. Buses stop at that point and there are open 
showers on the beach, used by young locals as well as 
middle-aged tourists. The hotels opposite spew pink-skinned 
American and camera-snapping Japanese visitors onto the 
plaza and altogether there is a happy compound of colors 
and countenances in a setting that mingles ocean shore and 
city strand.
Other parts of Waikiki are not so pleasant and some are 
downright dangerous. The state, some time ago, appropriated 
funds for physical improvements which the city administra­
tion for a long while refused to spend. It said there was no 
development plan to guide the work (its own planning job, 
undone). The state proposed that it spend its own money and 
go ahead with the essential work. Robert Way called a press 
conference to declare that suggestion “ irresponsible.” 18 And 
the years went by with nothing being accomplished save the 
granting of more permits for more hotel construction. It 
would have been possible at any point, granted cooperative 
action, to make a choice among the many Waikiki plans that 
had already been prepared. A final urban solution could have 
been designed to govern the physical improvements that were 
so badly needed, but the city council, the decision-making 
body, seemed satisfied to play its own game of searching for 
planning substitutes.
In 1975 the council’s members came to their own resolu­
tion of the riddle of Waikiki—by passing a bill declaring the 
area a “ special design district.” This was another substitute, 
not only for planning but for urban design as well, with 
broader implications than any of the others being considered. 
It was distortion of another concept that had been used well
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in several mainland jurisdictions as an attempt to improve on 
conventional zoning in districts where unusual design consid­
erations prevailed—around university or hospital complexes, 
near specially designed cultural centers, and so on. Hono­
lulu’s council, however, saw it as a means of removing 
zoning restrictions and placing land use decisions in its own 
hands wherever problems of planning and design were unre­
solved. Waikiki seemed one such area. Kakaako was an ob­
vious candidate. Thomas Square, it was suggested, might be 
another, the slopes of Mt. Tantalus a third. Now that the 
council had taken over the function of general planning, why 
should it not also assume the rights and responsibilites that 
went with urban design?19
The pageant continued, however. The council adopted a 
resolution calling for a statement of urban design principles 
and controls to be incorporated in each of the development 
plans which would follow its general plan—still without de­
fining the term urban design. In 1977, with the advice of a 
large citizen advisory group, the council mounted a program 
to teach the public what the words meant. Experts from the 
mainland were invited as lecturers. Few seemed to find ironi­
cal the fact that one of them, Rai Okamoto, San Francisco’s 
planning director, had been a member of the RUDAT team 
whose urban design concept for Kakaako had been ignored.
If urban design problems seemed particularly acute on 
Oahu, where the great majority of Hawaii’s population had 
gathered, they were certainly not restricted to that island. 
During the later 1960s, an ambitious attempt was made to 
demonstrate the broad need for urban design and illustrate 
its potential value for all the islands. A five-part research and 
study project on the subject was initiated in 1968 by the State 
Foundation on Culture and the Arts, financed largely by the 
National Foundation on the Arts.20 The meaning of urban 
design was widened, in these studies, to include the design 
problems faced anywhere, even in open country, where urban 
expansion impends, and the term “ environmental design’’ 
was added to enlarge the definition.
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Conflicts seem inevitable between the forces of conserva­
tion and those of development. Can they be resolved by 
careful planning? The physical arrangements of nature and 
those imposed by urban man seem irreconcilable. Can they 
be conformed through thoughtful urban design? Will social 
disagreements and political arrangements permit careful plan­
ning and thoughtful design to be accomplished? And if 
they are completed, will they have any effect on the ways 
resources are used? These are basic questions that face 
the lands of Hawaii from now on, after the many uses and 
misuses they have suffered. The fate of the five projects 
sponsored by the state foundation in 1968 and 1969 may 
suggest answers to them.
chapter
To Preserve and Enhance
THE State Foundation on Culture and the Arts secured 
funds in 1968 which allowed it to commission five studies in 
the urban, environmental stage of land planning in Hawaii. 
There were three broadly stated purposes of the project (offi­
cially called Environmental and Urban Design Proposals and 
abridged to EUDP).' One objective was to discover ways to 
“ preserve and enhance” Hawaii’s natural qualities as urban 
growth continued; another was to see whether carefully 
researched planning and design could “ reconcile conflicting 
influences” on the environment (primarily the pressure for 
development vis-a-vis the urgency of conservation); and a 
third was to seek ways to “ correlate effectively” the man­
made environment and nature’s own. In short, the five 
consultants were asked to demonstrate, through the planning 
and design process, how urban development might continue 
in Hawaii without destroying the islands’ natural qualities.
The firms who received the commissions consisted of two 
considered primarily land planners (Walter K. Collins & 
Associates and Donald Wolbrink & Associates), one primarily 
architectural (John Carl Warnecke & Associates), another en­
gaged mostly in landscape architecture (the office of George 
S. Walters), and, for the fifth, the technical staff of the
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Oahu Development Conference, consisting of a planner 
(Aaron Levine) and an architect (William A. Grant). What­
ever their individual backgrounds, the principals who worked 
on the EUDP assignments for these firms were well based 
in all the planning and design disciplines. The director and 
coordinator of the entire project was architect Alfred Preis, 
executive director of the state foundation, who had conceived 
the idea for the studies, arranged for the financing, devel­
oped the procedures and proposed a coordinating method for 
the work, and organized and correlated the commissions as 
they proceeded. In addition to funding from the National 
Foundation on the Arts, financial help was secured from the 
four counties, several state agencies, and the Oahu Develop­
ment Conference. Several “ special consultants” were ap­
pointed, three drawn from the mainland (architect Robert L. 
Geddes, landscape architect and educator Garrett Eckbo, and 
historian-critic Alan Temko) and others (including this 
writer) chosen locally. Their task was to help guide the proj­
ects as they progressed and judge them analytically, even 
critically, when they were completed.
Few exercises in urban design have ever had more generous 
goals, broader sponsorship, or better-qualified participants. 
Care was taken that there be no professional conflict between 
the consultants and the county planning departments; advice 
was sought from the islands’ planning directors throughout 
the progress of the work; and high hope was held that the 
results of the studies would be directly useful in the urban 
design programs of the individual counties. Beyond that feel­
ing of local responsibility, EUDP set itself a mission to 
discover “ key design issues,” as the project’s program 
phrased it, that might arise in any place where nature is be­
ing disturbed by human activity. One intent of the project 
(particularly as it had the backing of a national foundation) 
was to let others, in different locations, profit from the find­
ings and conclusions. The consultants and their critics had in 
mind, then, that the issues they uncovered and the solutions 
they proposed could have wider than Hawaiian significance.
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Fifty Miles of Design
An adviser to the project, Robert Geddes, noted that the 
assignments illustrated an extreme “ diversity of scales.” 2 One 
of the studies with tremendous scale in physical magnitude 
and potential impact was the task given to the Collins office: 
to analyze the environmental effects of a highway the state 
proposed to build along the Kona coast of the Big Island 
and design the best corridor for it.3 The road to be studied 
would go from Kawaihae, an ancient settlement located on a 
deep-water harbor near the northern tip of the island, to 
Hookena, another historic spot, now a sleepy village on a 
quiet beach cove below a cliff pocked with old burial caves. 
The road would be part of a belt highway encircling the 
island, but this fifty to sixty-miles stretch needed special 
design care—precisely because of the “ conflicting interests” 
that EUDP hoped to reconcile.
One interest clearly lay in preserving scenic beauty. The 
coast is uniquely picturesque. Along its northern half it rises 
fairly gradually from a shoreline dotted with secluded white 
beaches toward the lower slopes of one of the island’s two 
great mountains, Mauna Kea (the white mountain, its tips 
covered with snow in some months). Here the road would 
cross many miles of lava, in some places bare from recent 
flows, in others old enough to be covered with sufficient 
earth to support low vegetation, but not populated anywhere. 
Further inland along this part of the coast, the land is used 
for ranching (the great Parker Ranch is located here) and 
there are several small towns.
For its southern half, the highway would have to find a 
corridor along steeper cliffs below Mauna Loa (the long 
mountain, encompassing in its span a number of still-active 
volcanic craters). Some of the richly vegetated slopes bear 
crops of coffee and macadamia nuts and support a number 
of small settlements (mauka agricultural communities,
Collins’ report called them), peopled mainly by a mixed 
Hawaiian and Japanese stock. Obviously, then, the road
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would have the opportunity to demonstrate dramatic scenery 
to its travelers and the responsibility to respect, not scar, the 
landscape.
The historic background of the area was another factor 
that both provided design restraints and promised travel ad­
vantage. Kamehameha the Great was born on the northern 
part of this coast and his first great military success was at 
Mokuohai, further south along the route being studied. Cap­
tain Cook had been welcomed and then killed at Kealakekua 
Bay, along the same stretch of shore. During the later Poly­
nesian period, the Kona coast was the most heavily populated 
part of the islands. A tremendous inventory of artifacts 
remains, some restored and accessible, most concealed by 
modern undergrowth, scattered along the shoreline and dug 
into the cliffs. Heiaus, petroglyphs, trails, burial caves, and 
salt ponds abound. Any road carved through the area would 
have to respect this display of stone-age history yard by yard 
and make possible reconstructions and exhibits where they 
could be seen and appreciated.
Past history, then, would have to be preserved, as well as 
present beauty respected. And, in addition, the road corridor 
must be designed to serve a reasonable future. Those who 
held Kona lands were anxious by now to profit from them, 
and the list of owners, headed by the Bishop Estate and the 
Parker Ranch, was a roster of Big Five companies and ka­
maaina trusts. Governor Burns had said repeatedly that he 
envisioned the area’s future as a “ Gold Coast” of resort ex­
pansion and retirement home development. Collins and his 
associates realized fully that the highway they were to locate 
and design could either act as servant to this growth, merely 
providing access to developments as they occurred, or as 
master of a consciously conceived plan to “ preserve and 
enhance” those qualities the coast possessed.
Unfortunately, there was no plan for the Kona coast to 
serve as basis for a road’s design; there was, in fact, no poli­
cy on which a plan could be based. In its foreword Collins’ 
report said: “ It is urgent that a firm policy for the future of
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West Hawaii be established. Public decisions must be made 
in the near future if the present quality of the environment is 
to be preserved and enhanced.” 4 Lacking a policy to guide 
their assignment, the planner-designers developed their 
own program (as Honolulu’s RUDAT team had had to do), 
intended hopefully to be ‘‘directed toward assisting public 
officials and others in making these decisions.”
The strongest policy recommendation the report made was 
that urban development along the coast—whether in the form 
of resorts or residential communities—should be limited in 
amount, focused in location, and controlled in design. The 
consultants took the position that “ the concept of urbaniza­
tion of all West Hawaii is not warranted.” 5 They argued for 
preservation of agriculture and ranching in many areas. For 
others they pointed to the practical difficulties of lava- 
covered land not suitable for development, climate along 
parts of the shore too hot and dry to please tourists and 
retired mainlanders, and an inadequate water supply for 
extensive population growth.
Critic Alan Temko had a somewhat different reaction to 
the likelihood of intensive development along the coast. 
Although he agreed that the ecology of the study area was 
“ deeply unfavorable” for unreserved urbanization, he be­
lieved that fate to be inevitable—in time large-scale invest­
ment would be made in a water supply system and the 
highway itself would open up previously inaccessible lands 
for speculative development. “ It will be California and 
Arizona all over again,” he predicted, “ water and the 
freeway leading to almost incredible increases in land 
values.” 6
Temko urged Collins to propose a means of public benefit 
from this “ unearned increment of private landowners 
through public investment” in the road. The legislature in 
Hawaii had often toyed with the possibility of taxing in some 
way the “ unearned increment” when agricultural or conser­
vation land was zoned for urban uses and became suddenly 
worth thousands instead of tens of dollars an acre. But this
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would be a different kind of private benefit: enhancement of 
private lands by public works. Hence Temko felt it called for 
a new, even “ revolutionary,” kind of compensation,7 one 
which might, on the Kona coast, provide low-cost housing or 
pay for building a university campus or a much-needed hos­
pital. The report, however, recommended that development 
on this coast should be strictly limited and carefully located, 
rather than thankfully accepted for its tax returns.
The selection and design of a highway corridor was, after 
all, the basic assignment given the consultants, important as 
analysis of its impact was, and Temko agreed with the other 
consultants that the design itself was “ attacked with sensitivi­
ty and responsibility.” The great environmental differences 
between the northern and the southern halves, and the 
several purposes the highway would serve along its route, 
made necessary different design approaches in different sec­
tions of the corridor. The report stressed the differences. The 
“ vast, strong, raw, almost scaleless” quality of the northern 
part would call on the highway to make a “ bold statement.” 
The steeply sylvan character of the southern portion, “ more 
intimate in scale,” suggested that the highway respect the 
woodland and “ blend into the landscape.”
In addition to passing through different kinds of environ­
ments, the road was planned to serve several different func­
tions along its length. In the Kawaihae area and again in its 
center portion, at the older town of Kailua and at a newer 
development on Keauhou Bay, it would provide access to 
resort districts. In between, across the rugged lava fields and 
along the often rocky coast, it would be a multipurpose 
facility: capturing sweeping views of the shoreline, reaching 
some developed locations, and allowing efficient, com­
fortable passage. South of Kailua, edging the cliffs and then 
looping down to the waterfront, it would be primarily a 
scenic route, opening access to places of visual beauty and 
historic significance. Each kind of road required a different 
design. The planners carefully specified grades, widths, sorts 
of access, rights of way, intended speeds, and relations of
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lanes to one another and to the land they lay on. All these 
factors would help determine the best general location—the 
broad corridor—within which the highway would be built.
Realizing that they themselves, in this study, could not 
attack all the specific urban design problems for particular 
places along the route (even if there had been policies on 
which such design might be based), the consultants over 
and over pointed to the additional work that was necessary. 
“Waimea needs a plan for its future growth and urbaniza­
tion,” the report said. It urged the state to prepare ‘‘a defini­
tive recreation plan” for the area of Kiholo. It reminded 
the county that ‘‘an updated and expanded plan for Kailua- 
Keauhou needs to be prepared.” A “ specific plan should be 
prepared for conservation” of the Kealakekua historic area, 
it pointed out, and it proposed that “ an effort should be 
made toward further planning of the small communities” 
shelved on the hills south of Kailiia.
Some important accomplishments were achieved by this 
careful study, even though many of its recommendations 
were ignored. The state’s highway engineers took advantage 
of the Collins analysis of alignment for part of the road’s 
corridor when actual design was started a few years later.
But when it came to nuances and details of the road’s design, 
the careful specifications of the Collins study were disregard­
ed. The route that was opened in March 1975 as the Queen 
Kaahumanu Highway turned out to be another standard­
ized, straightaway turnpike stretched between Kailua and 
Kawaihae. The county’s Planning Department recognized 
some of the report’s suggestions for concentration of resort 
areas in its general planning, and Collins’ emphasis on the 
need for retaining the shoreline’s scenic and historic qualities 
influenced later planning. Urban design studies were begun 
for a number of the larger towns. The historic-scenic area 
around Kealakekua and Honaunau Bays, with its proposed 
loop to the coast (planned in considerable detail in a commis­
sion given later to this writer and landscape architect George 
Walters),8 stirred the opposition of some local landowners.9
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It went forward, in the following years, only to the extent of 
state acquisition of a few historic sites.
The county’s general plan, in its generalized policy state­
ments, undoubtedly drew some benefit from the Collins 
study, as its designers had hoped. Two planning and design 
assignments that followed the EUDP project were given to 
the office of Donald Wolbrink & Associates in 1975: a 
“ Kona community” development plan, intended to apply the 
broad policies of the county’s general plan to this coastal 
area, and an urban design study for Kailua village.10 
Wolbrink was familiar with Collins’ work (the EUDP consul­
tants met in joint session regularly) and shared the desire to 
keep farming and ranching alive on the Kona coast (while 
recognizing that “ the immediate potential for particular 
crops is uncertain” ). He too proposed a planned concentra­
tion of resort development rather than willful dispersal. For 
Kailua, where random construction and haphazard design 
had spoiled the town’s pleasant qualities, he presented an 
urban design that, if it were followed, could make further 
growth more orderly.
Even with this additional planning and design work, the 
future of the Kona coast is still uncertain. Influences con­
tinue to conflict. When the overall economy faltered in the 
mid-1970s, the pressures for additional development in the 
north slackened (although, as tourism resumed its growth, 
and other industries to replace the Kohala sugar plantation 
seemed hard to find, servicing visitors became an ever more 
attractive option to the local people). The residents of Kailua 
argued the merits of urban design versus its restraints to indi­
vidual business. On the old belt road to the south, Captain 
Cook, Kealakekua, and other towns remain sleepy communi­
ties dependent on crops with limited marketability.
There was no question in anyone’s mind that in time the 
new highway, hopefully designed to guide growth, would 
generate growth. Wolbrink in 1975, like Collins, Temko, and 
others in 1968, recognized that inevitably “ the resort and vis­
itor industry will play a more and more dominant role in the
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future of Kona” —but with what speed and in what direction 
remained undetermined. Some critics feel today that the Col­
lins office should have concentrated more sharply on details 
of road design and less on land use impact. But the planner- 
designers who worked on the EUDP study still insist, even 
more strongly than they did in their 1968 report, that no 
details of urban design for the Kona coast, whether for high­
ways or hamlets, can have much meaning until the state and 
county together decide what overall design the future of the 
great shoreline should have.
The Reshaping of Honolulu
Another assignment of sizable scale was given to the Oahu 
Development Conference professionals: an urban design 
study of the central Honolulu waterfront.11 It was a project 
which raised interesting questions about urban design as a 
pragmatic process, because the report that was produced in­
clined toward the practical, the possible, in the hope that it 
might have some real, immediate influence on decisions 
about to be made. The design that was proposed (beautifully 
presented) would unquestionably have improved existing con­
ditions on the waterfront greatly. It shied away from the 
ideal, even the innovative, to avoid being considered unreal­
istic. And yet a decade after the study was made few of its 
recommendations have been adopted. One wonders: Would 
more radical proposals have had greater impact? Was the 
report too “ bland,” as one of the critics suggested, to stir 
popular imagination and stimulate political action?
The shoreline to be studied measured seven miles in length, 
extending from the airport that lies about three miles east of 
the city’s central business district to Diamond Head, rising 
from the shoreline some four miles west of downtown. 
Because of its lineal extent, Levine and Grant divided their 
study area into five sections. After a review of current devel­
opment intentions and a search for public policies that might 
affect design proposals, alternative plans were indicated for
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each of the five sections. Some of the alternatives shown 
were developed by the consultants themselves; more were 
drawn from proposals that had already been made by others. 
Finally an overall design plan was constructed, representing 
“ the preferences of the consultant staff in the fall of 1968” 
from among the alternative choices.
The first section of the study went from the airport to the 
western part of the harbor. The principal proposals were for 
a new road from the air terminal toward Waikiki, bypassing 
downtown by tunneling under the harbor; development of a 
flat, sandy-fringed, unused island lying in the harbor’s 
mouth (prosaically known as Sand Island) as an industrial 
park related to air and sea port activities; and provision of 
a maritime museum and a basin for historic ships at the 
harbor entrance.
To some critics of the study, sinking under the harbor a 
part of the road from the airport to downtown (which is just 
as ugly in Honolulu as in any other American city) did not 
seem to be enough betterment of its design. As Garrett 
Eckbo commented, the eager tourist’s inevitable reaction 
must be: “ Is this the tropical paradise I dreamed of?” 12 The 
use of Sand Island became a controversial issue soon after 
the report was issued—residents in nearby Kalihi and Palama 
(localities short of recreational facilities, among other depri­
vations) demanded that it be made a peoples’ park rather 
than an industrial park (“ a euphemism for a row of factories 
with landscaped front yards,” said Eckbo of that term).13 
Ultimately, some years after the EUDP study, a compromise 
was reached: beach park, industrial buildings, and a 
municipal sewage disposal plant now share the land. Plans 
for the highway under the harbor, which had long been con­
sidered, were dropped when fixed-rail rapid transit was 
seriously deliberated.
For the next section of the design, the downtown area and 
the stretch of harbor bordering it, three alternative plans 
were drawn. One showed high-rise apartments on the water 
below Chinatown, as several developers were planning; the
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others would keep buildings along the waterfront low. Sever­
al downtown urban configurations (building “ envelopes” ) 
were suggested. The strongest feature proposed, all critics 
agreed, was a tree-lined waterfront promenade that would 
relate facilities along the harbor and link them to downtown 
pedestrian malls by footbridges across the waterfront high­
way. This proposal continued to surface from time to time 
and was part of the Downtown Improvement Association’s 
1975 urban design. But, along with the rest of downtown’s 
potential, it remains a design only on paper.
The third section that was studied, past the harbor, was 
the Kakaako-Ala Moana area, including the 1,200 acres 
which the AIA’s RUDAT team analyzed some six years later. 
Three alternative design plans were drawn for this part of the 
waterfront also. None would change its existing primary use 
as a center for small industries (“ occupied by activities that 
traditionally seek inexpensive land,” as the report noted) but 
simply suggested that the automobile circulation pattern and 
the district’s general appearance be enhanced by “ street 
improvement and tree planting.” For the Fort Armstrong 
shoreline area where the RUDAT study later proposed a new 
in-town waterfront park, the EUDP report suggested only 
that the edges be developed as park-promenade.
Several alternatives were shown for improvement of the 
present Ala Moana Park: a popular place, overcrowded on 
holidays and weekends, focus of many of the “ conflicting 
influences” that EUDP hoped to reconcile. There had once 
been ambitious plans to enlarge the park at both ends, in 
crescent form, and add an islet in its embrace—the whole to 
be known as Magic Island. The Dillingham Corporation had 
wanted at one time to create additional land there for hotel 
sites, and together with the Bishop and Victoria Ward Estates 
at another time made plans for an apartment-resort complex 
on adjacent lands facing the park. The Oahu Development 
Conference’s EUDP study illustrated all these design possibil­
ities and favored, in its final plan, expansion of the park at 
its Waikiki end onto one arc of the Magic Island crescent
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that had already been built. Another design suggestion the 
report made for this stretch of the waterfront was widening 
Ala Moana Boulevard itself to make it a landscaped freeway 
at grade (rather than an elevated highway, a possibility which 
had previously been considered).
To some of the critic-commentators, retaining the auto- 
oriented character of the neighborhood, with a freeway and 
an improved secondary-street system, was a disappointing 
proposal. Historian-critic Temko regretted that no more had 
been suggested for the shorefront than an extension of the 
beach park at one end. Concepts of recreation have changed, 
he pointed out, and such places as Copenhagen’s Tivoli Gar­
dens make passive parks seem “ inadequate and obsolete.” '4
For Waikiki’s problems, the study did suggest more “ bold 
and imaginative” designs, the critics felt, although the design 
concentrated on improvement of the beach and amelioration 
of traffic problems. For the beach, the consultants recom­
mended widening of the sandy area, providing a continuous 
waterfront promenade past the proliferating hotels, and 
maintaining the few low-density and open-space spots that 
remained along the shore. To lessen traffic tangles and de- 
congest central Waikiki it was proposed that Kuhio Avenue, 
the central longitudinal street, be converted to a mall and 
widened in some places to form “ vest-pocket” parks. And 
then, to care for the traffic flow, it was suggested that a new 
boulevard be built on the mauka side of the Ala Wai canal, 
parallel with the one on the makai Waikiki side. In addition 
to these physical changes, several public policies were recom­
mended, from institution of a one-way street system to some 
form of architectural and landscape design control.
At the eastern end of their study area the consultants pro­
posed a grand climax for this part of Oahu’s coast. They 
urged that there be no hesitation about making the water­
front at Diamond Head public property conserved for park 
use. Their design showed it as a continuation of Kapiolani 
Park along the shore, respecting the “ craggy character” of 
the great cone and providing additional beachfront recrea­
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tional space. From the critics there was nothing but applause 
for this recommendation, which has also appealed to the 
general public. Prodded by community insistence, the city 
council has declared Diamond Head a special scenic-cultural- 
historic district and has taken steps to limit further construc­
tion along the shore,15 although acquisition of land to make 
the area of a public park has lagged, hampered by costs and 
hindered by landowners’ opposition.
All in all, ODC’s part of the EUDP project was “ neat and 
concise,” as one of the consultants put it. The report was 
handsomely illustrated, well organized, and highly readable; 
in fact, Eckbo said, it was a primer for the accepted urban 
design process. It began with a description of the “ three 
available devices” by which development can be governed— 
land use control, architectural control, and a public works 
program geared to the design’s objectives—and an assurance 
that “ when these three devices are combined and applied 
properly they can achieve any reasonable design objective” (a 
belief that critic Temko found “ not convincing” ). Certainly 
the absence of action since the report was issued has not 
given comfort to the argument; few of the twenty-two 
specific proposals in the report have been carried out. Exten­
sion of Ala Moana Park, improvement at one end of the 
Waikiki beach, institution of a one-way street system in 
Waikiki, and moves to protect the Diamond Head shore can 
be counted as accomplishments, offset by such decrements as 
loss of shoreline open space to the Waikiki Sheraton Hotel 
and continued deterioration of the harbor shore. The record 
is particularly disappointing since, as one commentator said, 
the study seemed modestly to say “ this is what may hap­
pen,” rather than “ this is what could happen” or even “ this 
is what should happen.” 16
It must be granted that the three devices ODC considered 
essential have not been used: land use controls have not been 
applied to further any agreed-upon design; architectural con­
trols have not existed; the city’s public works program, espe­
cially in Waikiki, has become a political instrument rather
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than a design tool. But in addition another essential factor 
has been missing: community objectives have never been 
determined. Levine and Grant noted the lack of clear-cut 
policy goals along the Honolulu waterfront, as Collins had 
on the Kona coast, but they felt that they recognized “ in­
formal” development policies, expressed in capital budget 
programs and the city’s zoning code, which would only need 
additions and modifications to encompass their design propo­
sals and make them work. This never happened.
“To Direct Hilo’s Growth . . . ”
The EUDP study with the most creative vision of Hawaii in 
the years ahead, inevitably urbanized but developed in a 
manner that suited its tropical setting, came from the office 
of George Walters, landscape architect.17 He was assigned 
the task of creating an overall urban design for the city of 
Hilo, on the island of Hawaii, a study area stretching about 
three miles along the Hilo Bay shoreline between two penin­
sular terminals at either end of the city. The project’s stated 
objective was “ to direct Hilo’s growth . . .  in a manner har­
monious with the city’s natural environment and with its 
economic and cultural objectives.” Walters too had to face 
the fact that there were no clear-cut objectives—economic, 
cultural, social, or physical—to design for. He had to assume 
them or interpret them as best he could from scarce, sketchy 
data. The task required great imagination: this second largest 
city in the Hawaiian Islands has a proud, lingering past but 
no clear future at all.
A substantial native settlement before the white man’s arri­
val, the scene of an important battle in Kamehameha I ’s rise 
to power on his home island, chosen early as a mission sta­
tion when the churchmen came, Hilo developed rapidly in the 
nineteenth century as a commercial center. During the whal­
ing period its protected harbor welcomed ships putting in for 
supplies, and when coffee and then sugarcane plantations 
were established nearby, it became a busy shipping port. It 
was a stable community through the intervening years,
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Walters’ report noted, until its airport was enlarged in 1967, 
allowing it to receive trans-Pacific planes from the mainland. 
Then the town caught tourist fever and began expanding 
rapidly. Hotels were built in quick succession, most of them 
along the Waiakea peninsula that marks the southeastern end 
of Hilo Bay.
At the time of the EUDP study, Hilo still depended largely 
on sugar as its economic base (Hilo Sugar Company, a sub­
sidiary of Big Five member C. Brewer & Co., was operating 
a sugar mill in the city and processing some thirty thousand 
tons a year), but it was looking more and more to tourism 
for its stake in Hawaii’s future. The only trouble was that no 
city in the state had less to offer the tourists who were taken 
there as part of package tour itineraries. There was nothing 
to do in Hilo, and very little to see, visitors discovered, and 
they seldom stayed more than one night on their way to some 
more interesting and attractive place.
The city’s climate typically ranges from cloudy to rainy; 
showers fall on the average of three hundred days a year. 
Physically, Hilo is unattractive. It rests on a flat plane tilting 
five hundred feet from the lower slopes of Mauna Loa to the 
bay, crossed by several rivers flowing from the mountains 
but with few distinguishing surface landmarks. As the report 
noted expressively, it is “ under constant threat of destruction 
from the very environmental forces that created it—the 
mountains and the sea.” Both tsunamis (seismic tidal waves) 
and lava flows from volcanic eruptions have battered the 
area numerous times, and as late as 1960 swells triggered by 
an earthquake in Chile wiped out some parts of the town and 
seriously damaged others. The downtown area, already quite 
shabby, decayed further in discouragement after that, and a 
great swath of desolated land south of the business district 
was cleared and left unused. Further back from the water the 
city’s streets, largely lined with shops, form what Walters 
called a “ loosely woven urban fabric.” On beyond that, sub­
divisions (some divided but never developed) meander toward 
the foothills to form a ragged urban edge.
With no policy guidelines from state or county and no
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design objectives from the city itself, the EUDP study set its 
own program. It was a landscape architect’s vision: to 
change Hilo into a tropical botanic paradise, to make its 
climate an advantage rather than a handicap, to turn its need 
for new commercial activities to account, to utilize its great 
expanse of wasted urban land—by making of Hilo a City of 
Flowers. Whereas Honolulu had grown past the point where 
any dream of tropical garden-city planning could be realized, 
Hilo, Hawaii’s next sizable city, arced around the islands’ 
second busiest harbor, still had that opportunity. Hilo 
already had a flourishing business activity in raising and sell­
ing tropical plants. Walters proposed to expand it, organize 
it, display it, and utilize it to give the city the character it 
had always lacked.
Because of the underlying City of Flowers theme, the Hilo 
study, more than any other EUDP report, was able to unify 
individual parts of its design in an integrated concept—an 
image that was based on a sensitive visual perception of the 
area being studied. The “ surround” elements, as Walters 
called them, were examined first: the cloud cover, so con­
stant that “ there are no strong contrasts of light and shadow 
. . . edges of objects are less distinct and perceptions of 
depth become limited” ; the gray “ vertical backdrop” of the 
two great mountains; even the shape of the city itself, “ low 
in texture and irregular in pattern.”
Specific design proposals were made in six key areas within 
this surround and then synthesized in urban patterns of 
movement and form (circulation, lighting, building masses) 
within the flowered-city theme. There were some doubts ex­
pressed about this design process by the project’s advisory 
consultants. It was the approach of an artist, an architect as 
sculptor, a landscaper as painter. The toughest critic, Alan 
Temko, was not convinced that visual, floriate distinction 
was enough for an urban design concept. Perhaps “ the whole 
cultural development of the area” would be a better objective 
to reach for.
Walters knew, however, that it would have been presump­
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tuous and somewhat ridiculous for an urban designer to try 
to map the cultural future of Hilo’s mixed population: about 
15 percent haole, somewhat less than that with Hawaiian 
blood, and more than half of Japanese descent, one genera­
tion removed from plantation life. What he did instead 
seemed to him and to others of his critics to be a potentially 
more productive process: he suggested a design that would 
give visual structure to a town that was socially and physical­
ly confused, as a frame on which could be constructed any 
ultimately desirable future.
Walters’ detailed design proposals covered a wide range of 
issues, from better location of the airport to improvement of 
appearance and use of the hotel strip. The City of Flowers 
theme would reach its apogee in the part of Hilo that had 
been most ravaged by the 1960 tsunami: a hundred acres of 
land mostly lying well-nigh bare, some used as parkland and 
some loosely occupied by random commercial-industrial 
structures.
Much of this land was state-owned. Some had been ac­
quired by the city for redevelopment, and the Bishop Estate 
and C. Brewer held sizable pieces. Through the flat terrain 
flowed two rivers and a drainage canal, joining at the bay as 
a narrow harbor for sampans, small commercial fishing 
craft. On the inland side of this extensive open space a 
federally supported redevelopment activity, known as the 
Kaiko'o project, had built a ten-foot bank (as protection 
against future tidal waves) and created an earth-fill platform 
on which state and county office buildings had been built 
and a hotel and shopping center were planned.
For the lower open spaces Walters planned a coordinated 
series of active, usably scaled parks and a system of contin­
uous paths that could connect the resorts on the Waiakea 
peninsula with the downtown area. Private landowners’ plans 
for resort development along the rivers would be related to 
the parkway system, and a hostel and convention center were 
proposed as a focus for visitor activities.
On the level above this park-resort-promenade develop­
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ment, Walters urged careful architectural and landscape 
control for the redevelopment activities that were planned. 
(The proposed hotel, for instance, should be low in sil­
houette, he said, set in gardens, blended with the parklands 
below it.) Toward downtown on this terrace, a great tropical 
plant display space was proposed—a Kaiko'o Floral C en ter- 
retained above the park below by a lava-rock wall.
The concept of a “ city existing on two horizontal planes” 
was extended to the old downtown area, where the lower 
level would be a prolongation of the bayfront parks. Parking 
areas would be depressed and planted out of view, and the 
upper terrace would be a continuance of more structured 
urban spaces. Here, above the threat of new tsunamis, pro­
tected by an undulating lava-rock wall that could drip with 
flowering plants, parts of the old government center would 
be preserved and new buildings would be planned on a mod­
est scale.
The ways in'which all these individual design areas would 
be merged in the City of Flowers theme were described in 
detail. Tree lines, tree masses, shrubbery, and ground cover 
were to be used as design tools. Tree-lined boulevards would 
“ define the urban center and establish the character of the 
city from all approaches.” Intensity of planting and kinds 
of plant material were to vary as purposes and functions 
changed. Nonflowering trees would be massed in open parts 
of the city and along the waterfront to act as a visual foil to 
the blossoming trees.
How did this creative design for Plilo’s future—“ orderly, 
convincing, comprehensive, sensitive and imaginative,” as 
Garrett Eckbo described it;18 “ based on consistent methodol­
ogy,” 19 Temko felt—fare in the years that followed? In 1968 
Hilo seemed to have the opportunity and the reason to grasp 
at such a concept. The redevelopment agency was completing 
the Kaiko’o development and anticipated federal support for 
a downtown renewal project; the county planning department 
was completing its general plan study, conscious of urban 
design needs; the tourist industry was seriously worried about
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Hilo’s lack of visual attraction. Yet ten years later Hilo was 
the same city Walters had described so well. Some new 
studies were being made, this time by Collins’ planning firm, 
and many of Walters’ ideas were being proposed anew (with 
full friendly credit)—but none had been implemented. A few 
improvements had been carried out along the bay. Small 
gestures had been made toward better use of the beach. Some 
suggestions for simplifying waterfront traffic were being 
restudied, and a well-designed, low-profiled, but not too 
successful resort had been built on C. Brewer’s land (hiding 
itself with its own lush landscaping from the broad wasteland 
that still lay around it). Walters himself had been retained by 
the state to make further park plans for that unused land, 
but none had been carried out. On the Kaiko’o terrace 
above, a tall, broad, ugly hotel had stubbornly been con­
structed with redevelopment agency blessing.
The basic design ideas in the report—the City of Flowers 
concept, with its great floral display, and the idea for a city 
on two levels to step the sloped plane visually and supply 
protection from tsunamis functionally—“ never caught on,” 
as George Walters ruefully admitted some years later. The 
city still could not make up its mind about its future.
Design Problems on Maui
Three separate design problems on the island of Maui, 
posing three quite different problems in Hawaii’s develop­
ment, were assigned to the architectural and planning firm of 
John Carl Warnecke & Associates.20 They involved the towns 
of Lahaina, Wailuku, and Makena—all scenes of ancient 
Polynesian settlements, each of which had played a role in 
Hawaii’s ninteenth-century social and economic changes. In 
territorial times and since then, however, the three locales 
had fared very differently and now faced dissimilar futures.
The island of Maui is divided into two parts by a narrow 
neck which starts between Lahaina and Makena on one side 
and reaches Wailuku on the other. One of the assignments
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was to design the future of a four-mile coastal strip on east 
Maui from Makena Bay, around which clustered the houses 
remaining from what had been one of Maui’s busiest port 
towns, to La Perouse Bay, named for the French explorer 
who, searching for the elusive Northwest Passage, took on 
provisions there in 1786. The Hawaiian settlements that had 
once surrounded the two bays and stretched between them 
were gone without replacement; cattle and produce from the 
slopes of Haleakala were no longer shipped from Makena 
but now went through Wailuku. (Even to call Makena a vil­
lage anymore, as the Warnecke report said, “ is to exaggerate 
its size.” ) Back from the coast, grazing lands of the Ulupala- 
kua Ranch covered the volcano’s foothills. The shore itself 
was a forest of tangled kiawe growth interrupted by wastes 
of lava and separated strands of black and white beach.
This was easily the least urbanized site of any of the EUDP 
projects.
The Warnecke report called it a wilderness coast, but it 
evinced an odd sort of wildness, dotted with remnants from 
many ages. Flows from Haleakala’s many eruptions covered 
much of the land, some grown over and some still bare, 
forming a desolate protuberance into the sea at one point 
and shaped into cinder cones at other places. House plat­
forms and oddments from Polynesian times remain in abun­
dance, close by ruins of a military radio-range station and 
not far from an open dump of discarded washing machines, 
stoves, and oil drums. An abandoned quarry dates one 
period of coastal activity, a fishing-boat ramp another, and a 
few shanties and shacks remain from a different time. Access 
to this almost deserted shore is by a road best traveled on 
foot or by four-wheel drive.
Two landowners in the area (Ulupalakua Ranch and the 
Matson Company) anticipate extensive development. The 
state’s own plans for the region have included from time to 
time a park at Makena, a scenic road along the coast, and a 
small boat harbor at La Perouse Bay.
The Warnecke designer-planners suggested instead that the
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four-miles strip be kept as a “ genuine wilderness area.”  Im­
possible as this would have been (people had already intruded 
too many times), the hyperbole was useful, because many 
natural forms and colors and textures remained that were 
worth preserving. Specifically the report proposed that 
Makena town grow as a low-density, marine-oriented, 
residential-resort community, that the cinder cones and a 
fine stretch of white-sand beach be declared beach-reserve 
conservation areas, that a rustic park be built, a simple 
camping ground be planned at La Perouse Bay, and a trail 
lead on to campsites in the hills beyond.
The Warnecke planners advised, in sum, that “ the most 
important commitment that can be taken with regard to this 
area is to leave it alone.” They cautioned that “ even plan­
ners must sometimes learn not to ‘improve’ on nature.”  The 
dictum thus laid down is accepted by many conservationists 
and environmental planners, but not by all. Its contrary—a 
belief that raw nature can often, by human standards, be 
enhanced—was in fact the guiding principle in most of the 
EUDP designs. In any event, none of the careful work the 
Warnecke study proposed, intended to touch the wilderness 
lightly, has been accomplished, and at least the Makena end 
of the study area seems about to receive a heavy development 
hand. A thousand-acre development of luxury residential and 
resort facilities is proposed by Seiku Fudusan Co. of Japan, 
which, because it promises to provide jobs, includes among 
its advocates a number of Makena residents and the ILWU.
The second point of the triangle of studies on Maui was in 
the town of Wailuku—aimed specifically at the county’s civic 
center, which is located there. The Wailuku area had 
developed as the center of commercial activity on Maui after 
the decline of the whaling industry and the increase in planta­
tion agriculture. The adjacent community of Kahului, origi­
nally a settlement on the breakwater of Wailuku’s harbor, 
had outstripped its sister town in the later years of the nine­
teenth century, controlling as it did the seaport (and, in time, 
the airport). Wailuku thus was a rather quiet county seat
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and adjunct to a growing business community at the time the 
EUDP studies were made. It was, moreover, repository of 
several historic structures and residence of some seven thou­
sand people, in itself facing growth as the public service 
center of an expanding island economy.
For some decades Maui had lost population as agriculture 
became mechanized. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the 
increase in tourist activities brought people and prosperity 
back to the island. Government’s duties (and payroll) began 
to increase. The first public building in Wailuku had been a 
courthouse built in the early years of this century (still stand­
ing), and others had been added through the years until seven 
government structures were spread out along the town’s cen­
tral High Street. Now a new county office building was being 
planned—with no urban design in mind.
High Street is the Wailuku end of the road that crosses the 
island’s neck from the other coast. In the town, all the public 
structures are on the north side of the street. On its south 
side are several well-preserved older buildings: a coral-block 
church built in 1835 and named for Kaahumanu, two early 
mission houses, and a large plantation manager’s home put 
up before the end of the century. Past this cluster of land­
marks High Street stops and one must choose to go to the 
right, toward Kahului, or to the left, toward the spectacular 
needle peak of lao (“ cloud supreme” ) where a park now 
provides a flowery viewpoint for the green-covered punctua­
tion at the rise of the mountains.
The design that the Warnecke planners proposed had two 
main objectives. One was to give a sense of cohesiveness to 
the community as a whole—integrating government, commer­
cial, and residential areas while keeping for each a sense of 
identity and specifically improving circulation through the 
town so that island traffic would not have to split the com­
munity core in two. The other aim was simply to suggest a 
better grouping for the civic center buildings. A design was 
proposed, then, bringing together the disparate landmarks 
around a series of plazas, some green, some paved, planned 
for their visual as well as their functional impact. High Street
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was to be closed for vehicular traffic at the town center and 
planted for pedestrian movement. Traffic would be bypassed 
around an enlarged civic-cultural nucleus.
Details of the design are not important now. None of it 
was ever adopted. Neither the town’s residents nor their offi­
cials were interested in the least with planning principles or 
nuances of design. The county building went ahead as origi­
nally intended. The “ special committee of interested citizens” 
the report suggested be formed to oversee future development 
was never organized. Wailuku’s people were satisfied to 
let things happen as they would outside their own homes, 
screened from each other and the rest of the community by 
Hawaii’s lush verdure.
The third attempt of the Warnecke planners to suggest pre­
servation and enhancement of a Maui environment was in the 
town of Lahaina. Favorite residence of Kamehameha I, early 
missionary settlement, capital of the kingdom from 1820 to 
1845, popular port for shore-hungry crews of whaling ships, 
later lying outside the path of new development, Lahaina 
remained far into the twentieth century a quiet, unspoiled 
shelter for native traditions. Then in the 1960s Amfac, Inc., 
descendant of the Big Five firm of American Factors, Ltd., 
began development just north of the town at Kaanapali 
Beach, a magnificent broad span of white sand sloping gently 
into clear azure waters.
As Amfac’s modest early plans expanded to a long strip of 
large hotels at Kaanapali and as other beaches farther on 
began to be built up, the fate of Lahaina was sealed. Inevita­
bly its streets were overrun with boutiques and restaurants. 
The broad-verandaed Pioneer Inn on the harbor, built in 
1912, was “ improved” by an imitative addition; plans were 
drawn for a new twelve-story hotel on the waterfront close 
by; a large shopping center laid down its asphalt parking 
spaces as condominiums began to appear on the fringes of 
town and subdivisions sprouted on the hills behind.
There was no lack of effort to restore and preserve the 
many structures of earlier periods—churches, schools and 
homes of the missions, a fort, a printing press, a courthouse,
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numerous plantation buildings. A historic district was set 
aside, piecemeal restoration of a number of places was 
begun, and the county made use of a federal grant to study 
future development. Yet rapid expansion and modern 
“ progress” were inevitable. As the EUDP report pointed 
out, property values were rising in close ratio to the volume 
of new nearby construction and landowners were itching to 
realize the gains that more intensive development in the town 
itself would bring.
The Warnecke firm made no attempt to design Lahaina, as 
George Walters had tried to design Hilo. Its aims were more 
modest: simply to study what made the old community tick, 
to analyze its characteristics and qualities so as to provide a 
design guide for future growth. It was concerned with “ pre­
servation and evolution of traditional elements peculiar to 
Lahaina” (roofs, facades, verandas, balconies, door and 
window types). Thus another of Hawaii’s perennial problems 
was added to the many being considered in the EUDP 
studies: whether respected traditions of the past could be 
preserved as values changed in the present.
It may be unfair to say that this study had no long-range 
benefits. Perhaps some of the shop-owners along Front 
Street, modernizing their old false-gable roofs, battened 
facades, and overhanging balconies, gained design inspiration 
from the Warnecke researchers. None of the proposals for 
circulation through the town or for terraces, parks, and 
plazas have been used, however. Lahaina is still fighting 
growth’s manifestations in greater population and taller 
buildings, each year with a bit less success. The lesson seems 
to be that conservation of a culture and its physical tokens, if 
it is at all possible in the face of change, must come from 
values still deeply held, not through imposed details of 
design.
Invitations to Design Kauai
The planning firm of Donald Wolbrink & Associates was 
given the assignment to make design studies of two different
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environments on the island of Kauai, quite separate in char­
acter although closely related in distance.21 One was the town 
of Koloa, where Ladd & Company had started Hawaii’s 
earliest sugarcane plantation, located several miles inland 
from the other part of the study, Poipu Beach, where two 
miles of sandy shore stretch along the coast. Koloa is still a 
plantation town. Occupied mostly by descendants of the 
workers who were located there in the nineteenth century, it 
struggles to keep its identity in the face of declining economic 
support from the cane fields. Poipu Beach is a popular 
tourist attraction. Reached through Koloa, it tries to main­
tain its attractiveness in the face of diffusive development. 
Each was bound to interact on the other and any design plan 
for the area would have to include both.
Koloa had reached its low point about 1960, after Grove 
Farm Company, the present owner-operator of the planta­
tion, made clear its decision to plan for development of its 
lands. Younger people were leaving, jobs were in jeopardy, 
local stores were losing business to more distant but more 
modern shopping centers, the movie house was closed from 
lack of patronage—and the discouraged residents watched 
increasing numbers of strangers drive past to Poipu Beach 
hotels. But the fruits of tourism soon spread, and some of 
Poipu’s new prosperity reached Koloa. Home building 
perked up. Townspeople got jobs in the new waterfront 
resorts. A bank and a new grocery store opened. It was an 
ambiguous future, though, that Koloa was facing at the time 
the Wolbrink firm undertook to study its design potentials. 
Just two things seemed certain: the growing of sugarcane 
in the area would decrease and the construction of hotels 
would accelerate: all three of the large local landowners had 
prepared plans making that future obvious. What would 
happen to the old town of Koloa and its people was not at 
all clear in any of those plans, however.
Poipu, as a town, is a small settlement; only its beach 
gives it importance. A small stream coming down from the 
slopes of the island’s largest peak, Waialeale, empties into 
the sea there, and during early plantation days its estuary
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provided the only “ harbor” along this coast. A boat landing, 
long ago cut into the rocks at the stream’s mouth, is used to­
day only by pleasure craft. For rest and recreation the beach 
is perfect: it has an almost ideal climate, protected from the 
trade winds, with little rainfall; it enjoys a romantic, scenic 
mountain backdrop. Until a few years before the EUDP 
studies the only buildings in Poipu were a few old homes 
from earlier times and some scattered beach houses belonging 
to Koloa people.
During the 1960s, however, tourism discovered Poipu’s 
charms. Several small hotels were placed along the rocky 
coast to the west of the stream and a very pleasant cottage- 
type resort was built on Poipu Beach itself. Then one after 
another new hotels of various sizes and differing quality 
began to appear. The Sheraton chain put up a rambling com­
plex (later sold to Japanese interests) and the boom was on. 
By 1968, when Wolbrink began his study, there were about 
five hundred hotel rooms in or around Poipu. At least that 
many more were planned.
The Koloa-Poipu district, including the two target areas, 
offered many invitations for design. The Wolbrink firm 
thoroughly inventoried the region and listed seventy-two 
items that called for design attention—ranging from a care­
less county dump to unattended Polynesian artifacts, includ­
ing cinder cones, sand dunes, the bay and its beaches, not 
too well tended, as well as a pleasant stream almost unno­
ticed in Koloa, the mill, a white church, and two brightly 
hued temples. Some situations needed correction, some 
resources required protection, some assets wanted improve­
ment.
How to turn this inventory into a unified design? Other 
plans, public and private, had been inclined to ignore older 
values that remained and had concentrated on future poten­
tial. The state’s general plan encouraged further hotel devel­
opment in the Koloa-Poipu area generally; its land use plan 
classified the pahoehoe lava stretch between Koloa and Poipu 
as urban land, ready to be built upon. On the other hand,
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the county’s general plan showed considerable public park 
space along the shore and suggested a policy of slowed 
growth for the entire region. The plans that had been 
prepared by private landowners (Grove Farm Company, 
McBride Sugar Company, the Knudson Trust Estate) had no 
relation to one another but in combination would pretty 
well develop the whole Koloa-Poipu region.
Three designs were drawn by the Wolbrink firm, in broad 
general form but with careful heed paid to all seventy-two of 
the inventoried items. One, an overall plan for the region, 
concentrated first on access to the area and circulation 
through it, proposing to make the main road a truly scenic 
corridor from which the landmarks, improved where neces­
sary, would be visible and accessible to the traveler. Between 
Koloa and Poipu the road would pass through open lands, 
developed only for outdoor recreation, so that both town and 
beach might retain the qualities that distinguish them.
A design plan for Poipu aimed to provide for both local 
people and visitors “ a pleasant, comfortable, and intimate 
environment in scale with its small beaches and gentle 
topographic change.” Its character was recognized to be that 
of a seaside resort, but it would be carefully designed as a 
linear community that would include hotels, apartments, and 
individual homes.
Koloa, in the center of the study area, would remain ‘‘sur­
rounded by green . . . the visual and functional core for the 
people who call the region ‘home’,” the third plan indicated. 
The character of the town would be kept rural by retaining 
its broadly open central space, preserving the church and 
temples, finding green patches along the shores of the 
stream, and surrounding all this with well-defined, carefully 
limited residential neighborhoods.
The EUDP critic-commentators rather liked this project 
and had high hopes for its success. It was unquestionably the 
most conscientiously detailed of all the studies. Temko com­
mented on the fact that the ‘‘many relatively small-scaled 
problems” were ‘‘seen always within a larger context,” 22 al­
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though Eckbo worried that the solutions for so many issues 
“might not add up to a cohesive design.” 23 Temko won­
dered, as he had with regard to other reports, whether socio­
cultural problems had been sufficiently considered. He asked: 
“Who are the people in these communities . . .  in what ways 
are they and their communities changing . . . what are now 
(and what will be in the future) their cultural relations to one 
another and to visitors from the mainland?” 24 The question 
he raised was essentially whether a “ rural” or a “ Hawaiian” 
way of life can continue to exist within a tourist destination 
area.
Both critics were particularly impressed with the conclud­
ing sections of the report, which tabulated and characterized 
the “ key design issues” the study had uncovered and then 
went on to discuss possible resolutions of these problems. 
Like most of the other reports, this one insisted that any 
design, to be successfully implemented, “ must begin with a 
basic understanding and agreement on the program objec­
tives.” 25 Knowing seventy-two specific problems, the plan­
ners admitted, is not enough.
In Koloa-Poipu, as in the other areas studied, very little of 
the proposed design was carried out. Additional hotels have 
been built haphazardly along the shore (the county planning 
commission recommended reducing the height of one pro­
posed waterfront hotel but voiced no opinion on the wisdom 
of building at any height on that site), public parks and pub­
lic beach access are still missing, and most of the landmarks 
remain inaccessible and unseen. Grove Farm is “ out of the 
sugar business,” as an economic report put it, and Koloa has 
passed from despondency to depression. The landowners are 
slowly beginning to implement their own unrelated develop­
ment plans.
The Lesson of EUDP
The EUDP program accomplished two important things. 
First, it showed skillfully that it was possible in Hawaii in
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1968, on all the islands, at various scales, to design well a fu­
sion of man-made and natural environments, to preserve and 
enhance, to reconcile, to correlate. But then it showed that 
under existing conditions it was not probable that such de­
signs could be realized. From these two conclusions it seems 
as though a third judgment should result: how the possible 
designs could have become probable. The successes of EUDP 
should be helpful as a means of understanding its failures so 
as to increase its value.
Wolbrink’s tabulation of the key issues in his report 
served a useful purpose by indicating the cardinal questions 
for which public policies were needed. In his study and the 
others, three basic design issues had arisen continually: 
they were questions of best land uses (design of purpose), 
questions of best urban arrangement (design of form ), and 
questions about the relationship and the junction of natural 
and man-made elements (design of contact). At building- 
design scale these are familiar problems to an architect: best 
use of site qualities, best ordering of building functions, best 
union of place and purpose, site and structure. In the course 
of their studies it had become clear to the EUDP designers 
that at urban-design scale these issues can be met only when 
firm public policies are supported by effective legislation. 
Hence they tended to conclude, perhaps too quickly, that 
more “ controls” were needed.
Wolbrink, for one, listed a number of kinds of legislated 
control that seemed necessary, and his tabulation was not 
greatly different from those of the others who undertook 
similar reviews. It ranged from stricter land use designations 
to the governance of building heights, develpment densities, 
land coverage, and landscaping to setbacks on sites and even 
to signs on structures. But asking simply for legal sanctions 
to support a proposed design is not enough, as these design­
ers knew. Hawaii’s state and county governments already 
have legislation giving them considerable control over the 
way land is used. If more decrees were the only need, they 
could easily enough be attained; handbooks of rules and
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regulations clutter the desks of government administrators. 
Regulatory policies—statutes which place under the aegis of a 
government agency decisions that would otherwise be made 
by individual citizens—are effective only when they result 
from broad popular demand or, at the least, find wide 
public concurrence. Even then, legislated controls may be 
ineffective—and are always revocable.
At any rate, the basic design problems these designers were 
trying to solve—problems of land use, development design, 
circulation through and connections between the varying 
environments—were made difficult by two characteristics of 
Hawaii’s lands which no additional controls were likely to 
change. One of these conditions was individuality of land 
ownership; the other was fluctuation of land use. The deci­
sion made way back in the 1840s that anyone could own, 
sell, and buy land in Hawaii had so splintered the guardian­
ship of land and so disunited decisions about its best uses 
that coordinated planning and design faced tremendous odds. 
And then the 1964 Land Use Law had clearly not succeeded 
in stabilizing broad land uses according to suitability, as it 
had intended. Whether the design problem was that of a 
road, a city, or a wilderness beach, the designer knew that 
farmland might unpredictably become a suburb or a resort 
and a conservation reserve might arbitrarily be turned to 
some active urban purpose. Under these circumstances, land 
use planning is uncertain and environmental design is vain.
If this were a how-to-do-it essay rather than a how-it-was- 
done critique, it might prescribe a procedure for successful 
urban design by drawing lessons from the difficulties that 
EUDP encountered. The first admonition to future designers 
would probably be to help persuade the general populace to 
concern itself about planning and design, for its own good, 
for the public benefit, as policy guide to its political leaders. 
For architects and planners this would mean involvement in 
community activities to a greater degree than many of them 
want—to an extent that might seem to distract them from 
their true professional functions. For the public, it would
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mean new attention to problems usually ignored or con­
sidered only subjectively.
The second counsel might also be unpalatable to design- 
centered architects and plan-oriented planners: it would be to 
help public administrators look beyond the wishes of those 
supporters with the greatest financial and political clout, help 
them find out their total constituency’s desires about land 
uses, and then help them form these desires into public 
policies. Repellent as many planners and designers find such 
political activism, some have tackled it willingly and at times 
effectively. Disinclined as most politicians are to set policies 
in the public interest, some of them, these days, are finding 
the task intriguing and rewarding.
A third suggestion would be that both professional advice 
and public care should be given to the drafting of those 
controls—rules and regulations resulting from such policies as 
might be adopted—which designers consider so essential. If 
poorly drawn, they can be more detrimental than helpful. A 
further bit of advice in this regard might be: Never count on 
controls to produce good design. Like zoning ordinances, 
design controls are at best negatively useful; they explain 
what must not be done and leave it up to designer and client 
to suggest what should be done.
The final lesson from EUDP, then, is that effective urban 
design is produced by effective urban designers. If effective­
ness includes participation in public affairs and involvement 
in political action, it also calls for technical competence and 
informed judgment. For the professional, there is a large 
how-to literature on urban design; for the public and those it 
elects to office, there is a growing body of information and 
advice on the subject.
In a professional sense, production of a satisfactory com­
prehensive design for Honolulu’s ragged waterfront or Hilo’s 
random urban form requires special skills—wider in scope 
than the design of a building, but more particularized than 
the general planning of a city. Some of the EUDP projects 
suffered from too broad a vision (Collins’ study of the Kona
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coast, perhaps) while others lost their full value by too close 
attention to details (Wolbrink, possibly, with Poipu-Koloa’s 
seventy-two pinpointed design issues).
Scale is an ever-present problem in urban design. A con­
cerned citizen, whether a designer-planner or a layman in 
that field, must decide at what scale of activity involvement 
is likely to have some success. Does a city’s design improve 
when small advances are made (human-scale achievements, 
some call them)—like the construction of a public building or 
the setting aside of some well-arranged public space? Or 
must one wait for the larger advance—the improvement of a 
whole waterfront, the design of an entire town, even the 
finding of better form and function in a downtown, a Kaka­
ako, a Waikiki—before one can be sure that something 
worthwhile has been accomplished?
The EUDP project seems to give us conflicting testimony 
in this respect. It can be argued that it was better to try for 
the big benefit, as Walters did in urging that Hilo become a 
flowered city, but it can also be claimed that dividing Hono­
lulu’s waterfront into five shorter, almost unrelated parts 
with many minor problems made some smaller achievements 
more possible. The larger aims were seldom realized, but 
then neither were many of the less ambitious objectives 
reached. Probably the most useful advice is to be happy with 
small profits when they can be made but to relate them al­
ways to a larger context—perhaps a lot of them can be added 
up to greater gains. Maybe, in that way, the system of unre­
lated, inconsistent land use decisions can be cheated for a 
time while the public and its designers wait for firm public 
policies. If a decent design for a building in Honolulu’s civic 
center, an extension of Ala Moana Park, a lower-rise hotel 
on the Poipu shore, a preserved landmark at Lahaina can be 
achieved, these benefits should not be declined. Because no 
one, just now, even with national, state, and county spon­
sorship, seems to be able to improve the overall design of 
Honolulu or Hilo or Wailuku or Makena. The achievement 
of satisfactory environmental and urban designs, as well as
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success in drawing and following satisfactory environmental 
and urban plans, will require radical revisions, once again, in 
our attitudes toward the land. What those revisions might 
involve is the subject of the next chapter.
chapter
Closing the Options
AT the conclusion of this investigation into the treatment of 
the lands of Hawaii, some supposition about their future 
seems called for. Hawaii has not lacked forecasts of what 
might come—from devotees of conservation and from advo­
cates of growth. Most of it has been extravagant guesswork, 
in the interest of one prejudice or another, because few 
techniques have been developed for visualizing far-distant 
goals and laying plans to reach them. If there is confusion 
about methods of short-range planning, there is complete 
confoundment about long-long-range future planning.
Nonetheless, prognostications into the future became 
fashionable in the 1960s and 1970s, as scholars in many 
fields started to study the implications of two directions 
humankind was taking: the frightening prospects of con­
tinued exponential growth, on the one hand, and the enticing 
possibilities of greater mastery of technology, on the other. 
As the literature of futurism mounted, as study of the future 
rose in stature to the rank of a recognized discipline, as con­
ferences and commissions on The Year 2000 met in many 
places from Washington to Oslo to Tokyo, Hawaii was 
caught up in the movement. In 1969 funds were appropriated 
for a governor’s conference on The Year 2000 in Honolulu
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also. After a great deal of preliminary work and talk, the 
conference was held the following year, attended by several 
hundred people willing to spend three days discussing alter­
native possibilities for the future of the islands—alternatives, 
not absolutes, because positing alternative futures is the only 
method that has so far been devised for planning thirty years 
or so ahead.'
In fact, very little “ planning” of future destinies has been 
attempted in the field of futuristics; most of the work has 
been prognostication of several separate fates that may lie 
before us, assuming that one or another is likely. The two 
techniques that most futurist studies employ are assumption 
of alternative futures and construction of scenarios. Their 
use has seemed necessary because of the evident difficulty in 
fixing positive goals and objectives for any point in time 
more than fifteen or twenty years forward. (Some students 
of the subject think ten or twelve years is the limit.) Human 
values have changed from age to age in the past, in some­
what unpredictable ways. Now values, and therefore 
social goals, are changing at ever-increasing rates, in ever- 
shortening time spans—no longer in eras or centuries, but by 
generations. Scientific knowledge, inventions and discoveries 
of major significance, even the application of innovative 
technologies, also come faster and faster.
Alternative futures are guesses at objectives that may be 
valid later in time, as distinguished from the targets that a 
short-range planner sets up with some certainty. They may be 
informed guesses with differing degrees of information, and 
they may be creative guesses with varying amounts of imagi­
nation, but they are never sure—they are not plans. Scenarios 
are hypothetical stories about the sequence of events that 
may lead to those alternative futures. It is a fascinating game 
that the futurists play. And it has important potentials. It 
could help us prepare for change by having some foreknowl­
edge of what the future may hold, and it should help us 
control the process of change to our advantage. However, 
the game is usually played as a test of skill in forecasting.
One early work in the field, Herman Kahn and Anthony J.
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Weiner’s The Year 2000, prided itself in developing “ sur­
prise-free” projections (with certain “ canonical variations” 
as escape valves) from a study of the way things have been 
going for a long time—what they called “ long-term multifold 
trends.” Interest in their methodology waned some years 
later when it was realized they had overlooked depletion of 
resources—energy sources as well as arable land—in their cal­
culation of long-term trends. Other futurists of that period 
speculated on the speed of change rather than its nature. Lit­
erature in the field was replete with charts and graphs show­
ing upward-swooping elliptical curves, and Alvin Toffler 
wrote of impending social impacts in his best-selling Future 
Shock.
Later prognosticators began paying more attention to the 
possibility of choice among future alternatives. Socioecono­
mist Robert Theobold wrote and taught a hortatory thesis 
that a revolutionary “ alternative future for America” could 
be “ the new society we must create.” 2 John McHale, who 
spoke in Hawaii on several occasions, was articulate in his 
Future o f the Future about “ the potential capacity of human 
beings to determine their own futures.” 3 Yehezkel Dror, poli­
tical scientist, wrote about the “ tension and even contradic­
tion” between prophecy and planning, but he offered little in 
the way of solutions.4 Rene Dubos, research biologist, spoke 
of “ willed futures” ; yet willing a future is not charting a way 
to reach it.
Difficult as the process of long-long-range planning is, dif­
ferent as it may be from conventional planning methods, it 
need not be an impossible technique. The first step, clearly, 
is to make a tentative selection among the alternative goals 
that have been imagined. Moves can then be made toward 
the chosen objective until changing values or other unpredict­
able events (perhaps diminishing resources) require a change 
in direction. Then new alternatives can be considered and a 
new course set. Some futurists compare the process to climb­
ing to a plateau, resting, assessing where one is and where 
one is heading, and then starting on again, perhaps toward a
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changed objective.5 It is a precarious process, to be sure, one 
requiring flexibility of mind and of movement and great care 
not to block, by present action, a future direction that might 
become desirable.
Some of these problems were explained to the attendants 
at the conference in Honolulu, who were indoctrinated in the 
ongoing techniques of futuristics by local doctrinaires and a 
battery of invited speakers. But in the end prophecy was 
more appealing than planning. Alternative isolated futures 
dreamed for Hawaii and scenarios imagined to reach them 
were by and large the content of the meetings. The editors of 
a book titled Hawaii 2000, based on the proceedings of the 
conference, recognized that what had emerged was a “ frag­
mented picture of Hawaii’s future” lacking any “ precisely 
planned forward-action programs.” 6
The conference was by no means fruitless, however. A 
continuing state commission on futures was established as 
a sort of watchdog for long-range implications in current 
events. Several excellent papers were prepared by task forces 
during the preconference and final meetings. (Some ignored 
the mandate to seek “ alternative holistic scenarios,” 7 as John 
McHale put it in a triple-barreled cliche, enjoying instead 
some old-fashioned exhortation.)
The future of Hawaii’s lands was discussed in a number of 
the sessions, including those on the economy, housing and 
transportation, and science and technology, but most impor­
tantly by the task force assigned the subject of the natural 
environment. Headed by planner Walter Collins, the group 
speculated on alternative ways the land surface of the islands 
might be treated in the far future.8 There was agreement on 
the newly learned truths of futurism: that values were chang­
ing rapidly, that future options should not be blocked by 
present actions, that imagination must be given full play in 
dreaming of futures. (It was fancied, for instance, that 
existing urban concentrations, even Honolulu, might be 
relocated away from the shores to “ selected valleys, where 
self-contained communities in compact vertical structures
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would line the sides” and “ the valley floors would remain as 
great natural parks.” )9
It was the scenario game, played with zeal by task force 
members who included land estate trustees, developers, and 
other businessmen as well as architects and planners. No 
commitments needed to be made; these were prognoses, not 
plans. But quite surprisingly, out of the task force meetings 
came a reasoned bit of futures planning to which all seemed 
to subscribe. It was a farsighted scheme for public control 
and management of the physical environment: “ pooling of 
private and public lands, together with offshore waters and 
air rights, into custody of a central trust.” 10 The pragmatic 
members of the task force still felt safe, even as they gave 
birth to this creative idea; they were writing a scenario, 
composing fiction. Since even preparation of a long-range 
statewide land use plan was unlikely, they could be confident 
that schemes for ways to make it work were but pleasant 
fantasies. Yet somehow there was a real ring to the words 
describing this possible alternative, which one senses today in 
reading them.
Disappointed that the task forces at the conference had 
tended toward single-aimed recommendations rather than 
alternative-goaled speculations, the editors of Hawaii 2000— 
George Chaplin, editor of the Honolulu Advertiser and chair­
man of the conference, and Glenn Paige, political science 
professor—included some alternative-futures dreams of their 
own in the book: a restored Hawaii based on principles and 
precepts of the early Hawaiian people; a “ coconut republic” 
where all could bask in the tropical sun; an “ ecological 
commonwealth” centered around “ experimental environmen­
tal symbiosis” ; an Ideal American State where all the tradi­
tional dreams come true, from liberty to lavish living; 
a battlefield for struggle of the oppressed against the 
entrenched, with the scenario describing final victory for an 
enlightened “ collective leadership” ; an experimental society 
where all kinds of innovative, even revolutionary, social, 
political, technical ideas would be “ nurtured and tested.” 11
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Many fancied futures have been suggested for Hawaii since 
that time. John McHale, in a later talk added his story line: 
a “ Pacific Geneva” which would be a research and com­
munication center attracting “ a new kind of tourism.” 12 
John Young, a management consultant, saw along with Fred 
Smith that Hawaii could become “ the locus of the Pacific” 
in commerce, finance, and communication.13 Yet half a 
dozen years after Governor Burns’ conference, the several 
study groups appointed by his successor, Governor Ariyoshi, 
had a more mundane vision of a future Hawaii: it would 
remain a haven for land developers, these pragmatists 
predicted, bolstered by outside capital, with tourism of the 
traditional type its top industry.
Several lessons had been learned, though, from the pro­
fessional futurists who had guided the 1969 conference— 
primarily the idea of developing alternatives in planning or 
even in looking ahead. From that time on, scarcely any kind 
of report called for by the state or the counties or, for that 
matter, by private organizations dared appear without 
describing alternative choices. Stewart Udall’s open-space 
plan began by hypothesizing two possible Year 2000 futures 
for Hawaii’s lands: Hawaii I, which would result from con­
tinuation of long-term trends, and Hawaii II, which would 
come about if an open-space plan were adopted. The state’s 
general-plan revision program included four growth alter­
natives to choose from. The Honolulu City and County 
general-plan revision program produced several alternative 
development plans for Oahu. At about the same time the 
Oahu Development Conference analyzed four alternative 
urban growth “ strategies.” 14 The Honolulu Chamber of 
Commerce and the state cosponsored a study of alternative 
economic futures. The state’s Department of Planning and 
Economic Development studied the comparative environmen­
tal and economic effects of three alternative development 
patterns for the central agricultural plains of Oahu, and the 
Hawaii Environmental Simulation Laboratory at the state 
university analyzed the long-term effects of three alternative
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futures for the Kaneohe Bay area on Oahu’s windward 
coast.15
The list could go on and on. A mass of comparative data 
was thus collected which could have guided administrative 
heads and legislators at state and county levels in their deci­
sion making. It did not. The game of constructing scenarios 
into the future ended when a printed document was sub­
mitted. The idea of analyzing alternatives was not at all new 
to the planning profession: every planner knows that even to 
achieve short-term objectives it is wise to examine different 
ways to reach them—but every planner also knows that 
choices must be made among the possible routes and some 
incremental forward movement begun. Now, however, there 
was an avid wish in the community to see alternatives but an 
unwillingness to choose among them.
One reason for inaction could have been another lesson 
learned from futurism: that distant goals may not remain the 
same and that care must be taken not to block future choices 
of other options. This stricture is easy to twist into a reason 
to protect the status quo, to let current trends continue until 
an inevitable change in values corrects things. No present 
move will block future options if no move is made. And with 
no effort on our part, everyone has been told by the futur­
ists, change is sure to be soon and sharp.
The game of alternative futures gives another excuse for 
inaction. One alternative offered in all the many reports 
called for in Hawaii in the 1960s and 1970s was to let present 
practices continue. Udall called his Hawaii I scenario “ con­
tinuation of present trends.” Shelley Mark, in the Growth 
Policies Plan he prepared for the state, described his Plan I 
as “ continuation of existing policies.” Intended as a kind of 
control factor, from which other options differ in some man­
ner, this in itself becomes an alternative future—invariably 
the one which those who dread change will choose. And 
when no other choice is formally made, when inaction con­
tinues in the community as all the alternatives are studied 
without any apparent selection, a decision is in fact being
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made: the alternative to “ continue existing policies” has 
ineluctably been chosen.
As successive sessions of the state legislature passed time in 
the new capitol building in the 1970s without any conclusive 
action being taken to mend flaws in the Land Use Law, to 
curb the arbitrary reclassifications of the Land Use Commis­
sion, to give teeth to the environmental protection policies 
that had been adopted, to set up an effective planning pro­
cess, it became clear that this was a conscious choice among 
alternatives. Hawaii’s indecision makers were not stupid.
They knew perfectly well which future for Hawaii’s lands 
they were selecting: the one that present trends would pro­
duce.
An Ecosystem under Pressure
It seems, then, that two questions have to be posed about the 
future of Hawaii’s lands. One would ask: what will be their 
probable fate? The answer would be in the nature of predic­
tion or prognostication, based largely on extrapolation of 
past and present trends into the times ahead. Since there is 
no indication that any alternative future except continuation 
of present trends will be chosen (by the elected officials who 
form government’s administration, by the legislature or 
county councils where policies are formed and laws enacted, 
or by a large enough proportion of the electorate which 
places these political figures in office and since those trends, 
as the reading of any daily newspaper attests, are a prolonga­
tion of the building on open land which brought about the 
Land Use Law in 1964 and continued after the law was 
passed (immediately with Mililani Town on Oahu, later with 
Kaanapali Beach on Maui, a few years ago at Princeville on 
Kauai’s Hanalei Bay, day after tomorrow at some sunny spot 
on the Big Island’s south Kohala coast), the prediction seems 
obvious. It is for more of the same.
Yet there are many people living in the islands who are not 
ready to accept that apparent inevitability. It is not, to them,
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a reasonable lot for the lands of Hawaii, which they love for 
qualities far greater, they think, than sales and rental value. 
They continue to look for answers to the second question: 
what could be the destiny of Hawaii’s lands? What they want 
is not a prediction, but something more in the nature of a 
prescription. To prescribe is to advise, and advice in land 
matters is not welcome. Prescriptions offered by respectable 
professionals like medical doctors are generally followed, but 
very few persons in the newer professional field of land man­
agement are that highly regarded. Certainly the injunctions 
of those experts who have traveled to Hawaii to advise its 
people and their political leaders have not been observed.
And yet, having reviewed the story of the lands of Hawaii 
from Polynesian times until now, having seen how their 
ownership has changed hands, having examined the various 
ways those lands have been used and the several ways they 
have been valued, having considered the occasional attempts, 
usually unsuccessful, to set policies, draw plans, and devise 
designs for their handling, one should have learned some­
thing. One should be able to offer advice. Perhaps the ques­
tion should not be what could happen (that still seems to call 
for alternatives, with all their indecision) but what should 
happen. Better to ask for a definite remedy.
More than one medication may be needed to cure a mala­
dy, however. In this case, first, there is a quantitative ques­
tion: in what degree, to what extent, should Hawaii’s land 
surface be subjected to human encroachment? The matter of 
how heavily Hawaii’s lands should be loaded is being studied 
with deliberation, and without much public or political atten­
tion, as a result of the environmental policy act passed by the 
state legislature in 1974. Obviously, each different microenvi­
ronment has its own “ carrying capacity,” which it is possible 
but not easy to determine. Certainly the investigations under 
way by state agencies, the work of the university’s Environ­
mental Simulation Laboratory, and continuance by a number 
of people of the efforts to quantify costs and benefits of ur­
banization (begun in the state’s Central Oahu Planning Study
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and discussed in a larger context in the university’s confer­
ence on Public Costs of Private Development) must be taken 
seriously, encouraged, directed firmly, and pursued with 
vigor.
Environmental overloads in a human society are caused 
by one major factor: uncontrolled population. The state 
of Hawaii—through its people, in its politics, with its 
policies—will have to stop pussyfooting on this issue. No 
prognostication can foresee and no scenario can invent a 
future where land is handled with respect if the number of 
people who must use it is not limited. Limited, not slowed. 
To slow population growth is merely to moderate its continu­
ing increase. To limit it, on the other hand, is to set bounds 
to its final measure. Hawaii’s land surface is limited in a 
degree which can be determined; the population that the state 
can care for, then, must have a limit which can also be com­
puted.
These statements can be qualified, of course. Calculations 
of the extent of the islands’ lands include valleys and moun­
tains; arable stretches and arid; sandy beaches and rocky 
coasts; green swards and black crusts. Thus there can be end­
less arguments over the limits to usable land for its many 
uses. Further, an environment’s point of overload can arbi­
trarily be placed high or low by changing certain factors in 
the equation. For instance, the current disputes among be­
havioral scientists about desirable urban densities'6 have 
made it fashionable to point to Hong Kong (the example 
used to be the city of New York) as an environment which 
carries a weight of human habitation far in excess of 
Hawaii’s likelihood for many years. The fact that Hong 
Kong, a continental island quite close to a large land mass, is 
quite different in character from Hawaii’s mid-ocean islands 
is conveniently forgotten.
Too often, unfortunately, these qualifications are quibbles. 
They are evasions of important issues, cavils over essential 
truths, of the kind that are common whenever hard decisions 
have to be made. The most bothersome of these purposeful
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equivocations should be, really, the easiest to overcome. It is 
the one that pokes fun at the idea of “ ecological damage” 
occurring as population increases. This is supposed to be an 
argument by long-haired naturalists and of no real concern 
to practical businessmen. The jibes are weaker, however, as 
ecology becomes a better-understood word in quite common 
parlance. Recently the study of particular problems within 
island ecologies has come to be an important field in itself, 
and a special concern is now being manifested for Pacific 
island ecosystems. That this aspect of the future of the Ha­
waiian island group has been overlooked locally, except by a 
few scholars, that it has not been an integral part of commis­
sion studies and legislative discussions about problems of the 
land of Hawaii (and the sea and the air), is quite incredible.
It may be (one can charitably assume) that commissioners 
and legislators, by and large, do not understand the impact 
of any ecosystem. Perhaps they do not realize that it means 
the interactions of all individual things within an environ­
ment, living and not living, and that it should, therefore, be 
our most important consideration.17 Perhaps they do not 
much care that there are stable ecosystems, firm and steady, 
and unstable ones, likely to deteriorate—with the unstable 
instances (increasing, these days) being “ at the root of most 
of the economic loss, political disturbance, and social unrest 
in the world,” as one scholar has put it. They should worry, 
however, at the disturbing fact that in island economies like 
Hawaii’s, ecosystems are more easily upset than they are on 
the major continents. The reasons are not difficult to under­
stand.
The ecosystems of the various Pacific islands—quite dif­
ferent from one another in many ways (as are the high- 
mountain, low-atoll, and reef-lagoon islands themselves in 
physical character)—are alike in that they have a reasonably 
common history of major disturbances to their stability 
through intrusions from outside the Pacific regions. These in­
terferences have been harmful in several ways. For one, until 
very recently most of the contacts have been between native
CLOSING THE OPTIONS 343
ecosystems depending on elementary technologies and im­
ported systems based on sophisticated technologies: “ societies 
that only yesterday were in the Stone Age precipitously cata­
pulted into the Nuclear Age.” 18 Certain islands seem to have 
adapted to this violent change more easily than others; to 
some it has been disastrous. The reasons for the violence of 
the impacts are apparently many. At times the major factor 
has been importation of flora and fauna: cattle trampling in­
digenous herbs and shrubs, for instance. At other times peo­
ple have been the force of drastic physical change, destroying 
forests and letting shorelands erode.19 And then there were 
the violent human contacts between natives and newcomers— 
interactions within the ecosystems at the highest level of liv­
ing things—resulting in the kinds of shock that decimated the 
Hawaiian people. Some scientists explain this as importation 
of a continental economy and ecology familiar with world­
wide horizons to a small group of midocean lands with 
insular horizons. Island ecologies are “ circumscribed and 
circular,” as one says;20 and the importers, in many cases 
still based back home, are apt to be “ far removed from the 
consequences” of their imports.21 The fact that this charac­
terization applies so aptly to the invasion of the billion-dollar 
tourist industry to Hawaii and, less eagerly so far, to other 
Pacific island groups has not escaped the attention of experts 
at environmental protection.
Beyond the historic results of rapid change, however, the 
present effects on island ecologies of current development 
and the foreseeable impact of likely future trends are worri­
some to serious scholars of the subject. Islands are micro­
scopic land globs, different from continents in many 
respects—some of their qualities, such as equable climate, 
very easy to take, as any tourist knows. The major physical 
characteristics, of course, are separation from other land 
areas and limitation in size. These qualities affect the diversi­
ty of elements within the ecosystem, resulting in fewer species 
and less rivalry among them—until conditions are disturbed 
and exotics introduced—and limit the availability of natural
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resources—land, primarily, but also those resources on it and 
below it.
Most important, however, and most seldom recognized, is 
the tendency of an island ecology to become unstable when 
its accustomed isolation is destroyed.22 Along with that char­
acteristic there is a tendency to react to change more quickly, 
more violently, than is the case with a continental ecosystem. 
Limitation in dimension, quantity of resource, and specie 
stock apparently results in an island experiencing major reac­
tions from even minor changes. “ The buffering effects of 
great size and diversity are lacking,” explains one authori­
ty.23 Hence islands’ microecological relationships must be 
guarded with particular care and the loads they are asked to 
carry must be strictly restricted. “ Only so many people can 
find support on a given island,” says anthropologist Roland 
Force, drawing a conclusion which would seem obvious if it 
were not so generally ignored.24 In recent conferences this 
point has received especial attention, with Hawaii’s Oahu 
held as the unwholesome example. It is, of course, the pri­
mary reason why densities which places like Hong Kong or 
New York City allow themselves could be totally destructive 
to the Bahamas or Tahiti or Hawaii. Yet on many ocean 
islands today the ecosystems are no longer stabilized but are 
in a process of continued growth—a growth in no way relat­
ed to availability of resources. It is not difficult to arrive at 
the manifest answer to this part of the question. As a federal 
government demographer says: “ No elaborate theoretical 
formulations are required to document the statement that 
rates of growth such as those that are now occurring cannot 
long continue in the finite worlds of island ecosystems.” 25
Necessarily, then, any responsible prescription for a 
healthy continuing life for the lands of Hawaii has to include 
the bitter pill that the state must set specific, strict limits to 
its population by every effective means, including control of 
inmigration. If it is unconstitutional, now, to prevent free 
movement of free people, then the Constitution will have to 
be changed. As there were once kapus forbidding certain per­
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sonal associations among the Polynesian Hawaiians, there 
were social taboos and constitutional prohibitions preventing 
full civil rights for the later Americans. In law, at least, they 
have been removed. A short time ago it seemed impossible to 
attain completely equal rights for women in America; now 
no one is so sure. Social changes and shifts in values come 
on quite quickly these days, as the futurists warn. “ The trend 
of modern court decisions shows a continuing enlargement of 
the scope of public purposes to meet the needs of a growing 
nation,” writes a land law expert.26 Those public purposes, 
one Supreme Court decision affirmed, include the making of 
a community “ beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well 
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.” 27 
When it is working toward a planned objective, a local socie­
ty can fix bounds for its physical expansion, the courts have 
ruled. Governor Ariyoshi’s argument for population control 
in his State of the State message—that newcomers are taking 
jobs from locals and adding to the relief rolls—is one that 
the courts are not likely to support in today’s antidiscrimina­
tion mood (that, in fact, they have rejected in other in­
stances). On the other hand, setting limits to population 
growth under a planned, nondiscriminatory program is no 
longer an inconceivable accomplishment.28 Rather, in today’s 
temper, misuse and possible destruction of natural resources 
is the unforgivable sin. What is inconceivable now is that the 
Supreme Court of the United States of America will rule, 
when the issue is properly raised, that its country’s Pacific- 
archipelago state must commit ecological suicide.
There is also a qualitative aspect to the question: what 
should be the destiny of Hawaii’s lands? It asks how this 
finite, ecologically fragile resource should be governed 
(managed, planned, designed) so that the islands will not 
form a dangerously unstable eco/economo/sociosystem. 
Assume that overload has been prevented. In what ways, 
then, can the people of Hawaii arrange for the use (or 
nonuse) of their lands to their (the people’s and the lands’) 
best advantage? This part of the question has been pretty
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well answered, at least by implication, in the preceding 
chapters.
First of all, it is essential to have, and utilize, an en­
vironmental plan—by definition, a plan for managing those 
conditions, circumstances, and physical surrounds that affect 
the members of Hawaii’s ecosystem. Hawaii must stop play­
ing political games with the planning process. No longer 
must planning be used as a means of granting favors, exert­
ing power, and enjoying jobbery. Other states are guilty of 
this mischief, too, but somehow the island state, entering the 
union late, was quicker at adapting the tricks of political 
patronage (which many of the other states have outgrown) 
than learning the lessons of democratic leadership (which 
many of the other states are freshly undertaking).
As part of its move to develop a plan for guarding its envi­
ronment, Hawaii should again take an advance position on 
land use planning. Instead of pretending confusion about the 
essential steps in what is known as general planning—that is, 
setting goals and determining ways to reach them in a 
defined jurisdiction—in order to avoid making a plan which 
might restrict profitable maneuvers, as the state legislature is 
doing, or in order to gain political power by controlling the 
making of plans, as Honolulu’s city council has done, law­
makers must state clearly what has to be done, in sequence, 
and then do it. That would be a bold move only because it 
would be so easy. The bill that could have but never did 
become an act would only have to be retrieved from the 
capitol’s trash baskets.29 It says simply that the state will 
determine policies which its people want, the counties will 
develop plans which apply those policies to themselves, and 
then the state will bring the county plans together in a com­
prehensive plan for the entire state.
The physician making this prescription would have to 
assume, of course, that the patient had the common sense to 
care for his general health. The state would have to have an 
office of planning within the office of the governor; profes­
sional contact between state and county planning offices
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would have to be established; the state’s Land Use Commis­
sion would have to be restricted to the function the law origi­
nally intended—a review of land classifications every five 
years, with the interim applications for self-serving changes 
eliminated.
Environmental planning embraces much more than physi­
cal arrangement. Important as it would be to have a land 
use plan emerge from the simplified planning process, an 
economic plan would also be essential. A plan for Hawaii’s 
socioeconomic future would be quite different from the 
assumptions which have so far been made. It has been 
assumed that although the military and at least the remnants 
of a plantation agriculture would continue as important pro­
ducers of revenues and jobs, tourism would grow until it 
became the main support for life on the islands. Beyond 
these easy assumptions, several tantalizing hopes have been 
held out from time to time for additional activities which 
might provide energy, locally, for a stable island ecosystem: 
oceanography, volcanology, forestry, and the raising of 
exportable plants among them. If carrying capacities are to 
be respected, however, the assumptions must be reexamined 
and the hopes must be made into plans.
Hawaii has, indeed, remarkable opportunities to advance 
the science and develop the practical potentials of oceanog­
raphy: physical opportunities, obviously, through its 
location, and financial as well, with the federal government 
avid to excel internationally in this new field. It has a great 
chance to advance development as well as research in new 
energy sources. It has the best likelihood of any place to lead 
in the advancement of tropical agriculture. And there is 
always the possiblity of making the state a mid-Pacific 
communications center, as so many very intelligent people 
have suggested.
These occasions come to Hawaii precisely because of its 
ocean-island ecological characteristics. The sea, with so much 
to be drawn from it, surrounds the islands’ sharp reefs deep­
ly; the mountains still hold vital volcanic heat and power; the
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very qualities of weather have their practical uses. Nutrients 
and minerals from the ocean, energy from deep-water and 
thermal tapping, from movement of the constant winds, and 
from the perpetual sun, foods from the rich soil to guide 
others toward tropical growths which, some say, may be the 
salvation of a hungry world—many people in still-developing 
countries would consider these potentials alone a great boon, 
a god-given base on which to build a stable society. They 
would react in amazement to Hawaii’s bland acceptance of 
easy answers—such as the state’s ever greater dependence on 
the most recent foreign intrusion on its fragile ecology, the 
demonstrably destructive international tourist industry.
The way to handle the what of environmental load on the 
lands of Hawaii, then, is to make careful plans. Nothing very 
revolutionary about that, surely. No amendments to a 
national constitution are needed, simply changes in local 
political attitudes.
The Matter of Ownership
There would still be no assurance, however, that the new 
program would work well. Even with a limit set to the 
number of people who might make use of the islands’ envi­
ronments, in ways that were planned, there would remain the 
problem of making sure that the plans were carried out. The 
power lying in ownership of land, we have seen, can render 
the best-intentioned administrative controls useless. There 
must be, then, a human aspect to the remedy as well as the 
impersonal quantitative and qualitative components. It seems 
as though ways to manage land in the future must include 
proposals for change in land tenure. Hawaii has seen land 
ownership pass from king to monarchy, from Hawaiians to 
haoles, from government to individuals, from many to few.
It has seen power over land’s uses pass from single masters 
to many owners, to buyers and leasers, to statesmen and 
politicians, to speculators and developers. Which system has 
been best? Is there a better one?
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The clear alternative to private ownership would seem to 
be public ownership. Through the largest part of human his­
tory land has not been a private commodity (not until Brit­
ain’s Tenures Abolition Act of 1660, insofar as the western 
world is concerned),30 but has been held by a group, family, 
tribe, or ruling authority. In the modern era, however, fee- 
simple private tenure has become so firmly entrenched in 
western mores, so completely accepted as part of capitalist 
values, even so thoroughly rooted in democratic principles 
(man, his property, his homely castle), that its rightfulness 
dare not be questioned. For centuries any alternative has 
been considered unrealistic, even radical.
So impressed were the early lawmakers in America with 
the sanctity of private ownership that they followed the lead 
of England’s Magna Charta and in 1789 wrote its guarantee 
into the United States Constitution as the Fifth Amend­
ment.31 Since then, what has become known as the “ taking 
clause” (“ nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation” ) has frightened most public poli­
cy planners away not only from any consideration of actual 
seizure but, until recently, even from public control of land- 
property’s uses, in the fear that that too might be considered 
a kind of taking.32 England some time ago resolved the issue 
of controls, at least, by legislation which set clear guidelines 
for determining when regulation becomes confiscation requir­
ing payment. In the United States the solving of the taking 
issue has waited, rather, for the courts of law to face up to 
the economic, social, and, of course, legal problems involved 
in interpretation of the constitutional clause.
Liberalization of provisions for public acquisition of pri­
vate land when a public need was indicated began as early as 
the passage in 1868 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution. This amendment reiterated the prohibition 
against the government’s taking anyone’s property “ without 
due process of law,” but it made no mention of compensa­
tion. The Supreme Court corrected that omission in a subse­
quent decision, however, and the issue lay quiet until the
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middle of the twentieth century. During the 1950s two kinds 
of government land acquisition, under new legislative pro­
grams, raised the question sharply and required the courts to 
define more clearly the term “ public use.” First, expanded 
public works activity (including, importantly, the federal 
highway program) required a tremendous amount of urban, 
suburban, and rural land for its implementation. Then the 
federal urban renewal program, incepted in the Housing Act 
of 1949, was based on public acquisition for redevelopment, 
of degraded urban land.
The courts’ decisions have been increasingly liberal in 
tolerance of the public use justification of such taking. In 
1952, Florida’s Supreme Court said that it was “ inconceiv­
able that anyone would seriously contend that the acquisition 
of real estate,” for uses set forth in a redevelopment plan, 
was for a “ public use or purpose.” 33 But in 1969 a Puerto 
Rico court (upheld later by the U.S. Supreme Court) ruled 
that private property could be taken—even for future, 
unidentified public uses—if the acquisition was part of a 
long-range planned program.34 Obviously the change in atti­
tudes that had taken place in that time was opening up even 
further possibilities for public control over land’s uses.
The most far-reaching expansion of the public-taking, 
public-planning, public-use principle up to this time has been 
a program known as land banking. A land bank, in these 
terms, is a reserve of land acquired and held by a public 
entity for future public use. (It was protest over such an ac­
quisition that led to the 1969 Puerto Rico court decision.)
The purposes of land banking as it has been used are several. 
Often the land has been held for a later public works pro­
gram, when its price might have greatly increased. In many 
cases land has been banked to check speculation and unrea­
sonable increases in the cost of a community’s urban real 
estate. Increasingly, land banking is being used to control the 
direction, rapidity, and quality of urban growth. If zoning 
and subdivision regulation have failed to halt sprawl, public 
securement of lands lying in the path of anticipated develop­
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ment—with their gradual re-release into private hands condi­
tioned on observance of a communitywide land use plan—is 
a drastic alternative which has often proved successful.
The ingredients of a successful land-banking program, 
then, have been preparation of a plan with sufficient validity 
to foresee directions of growth (so that the right land can be 
banked), consistent implementation of the plan (so that the 
banked land can be released for development at the right 
times, in the right places), and mandated observance of the 
plan (so that the land, when it is released, will be developed 
in the public interest).
The idea of banking land to assure its best future use goes 
back to the early years of the century, in some western coun­
tries, and at least to the 1940s in the United States.35 The 
Netherlands started land banking in 1901, and now almost 
all its communities have land-bank programs of some sort. 
Israel has had a land-bank program for many years. Sweden 
and Denmark are no strangers to the concept; the eighteen 
fine towns surrounding Stockholm were planned and built on 
publicly banked land. England’s new towns that ring London 
could not have been carried through without a long-time 
public holding of the essential lands.
In the United States there have been a number of minor 
instances of land banking: in Philadelphia for an industrial 
development program, in California for a long-range high­
way construction plan, in many cities, by now, for urban 
renewal purposes. So far there has been only one instance in 
American territory of a major banking program for the con­
trol of overall community development. In Puerto Rico, 
in 1961, a study made to analyze urban growth problems 
resulted in the establishment of the Puerto Rico Land 
Administration and the inception of a land acquisition, bank­
ing, and development program which has been operating with 
considerable success since.36 At the least, a wild inflation in 
land costs has been drastically curbed and fervent urban 
sprawl which was filtering into San Juan’s fringes has been 
led on more orderly courses. Its most ardent advocates
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regard Puerto Rico’s experiment as a major breakthrough in 
land management techniques.37
It has taken a while for the idea of land banking to lose 
the somewhat startling aspect it had to Americans when their 
West Indian commonwealth, Puerto Rico, adopted it as poli­
cy, but now the concept has become quite respectable. The 
National Commission on Urban Problems in 1968 recom­
mended that states acquire land in advance of development, 
with federal assistance, “ to control the timing, location, type 
and scale of development.” 38 The American Institute of Ar­
chitects in 1972 issued a report urging the federal government 
to acquire immediately a million acres of land for future 
community development.39 The Urban Land Growth and 
New Community Development Act of 1970, had it come to a 
vote and passed Congress, would have authorized a major 
government program of prior public land purchase.
There is nothing really radical about the way land banking 
is now conceived and has been used. It constitutes guardian­
ship rather than confiscation; in time, under certain condi­
tions, the land returns to private ownership. Almost always 
its ultimate use is for development; it is a means of directing 
growth, not preventing it. Legally, constitutionally, it is a 
sound practice; the criterion of public use is observed and 
just compensation is paid. “ Within the traditions of prop­
erty law,” says one writer on land laws, “ there is nothing 
particularly radical in visualizing land being owned by the 
sovereign and being channelled out to persons who would 
hold it only as long as they performed the requisite duties 
that went with the lands.” 40 In feudal times, he points out, 
these duties were allegiance to the lord; in early Hawaii, he 
might have noted, they were support of the king; in modern 
America, they could perfectly well be observance of a com­
munity development plan.
Should the banking of at least parts of Hawaii’s lands, to 
assure their best use in the public interest, become part of the 
prescription for their optimum future? Certainly the idea 
ought to be carefully considered. This is one of the most in­
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novative directions that has yet developed for statewide land 
management. Hawaii, in its present predicament, would be 
very foolish to turn its back on land banking as a solution 
to the problems of preserving its islands’ ecosystems. But 
Hawaii has special opportunities, which no other state has, 
to achieve a special kind of “ public” control over its lands’ 
treatment—at a greater scale of usage than even Stockholm 
achieved, for broader purposes than even Puerto Rico found. 
The policy that Hawaii might pursue, which has already 
seemed to a number of its people a worthy proposal, has 
been called land pooling rather than banking.
The procedure for pooling land in the public interest (and 
for the private benefit of most landowners) would begin with 
the formation of a public trust. This foundation would be 
governed by an elected board of trustees (quite separate from 
the government) nominated “ from a cross section of the 
community . . . reflecting a broad range of skills,” as some 
supporters of the concept have suggested.41 If it was success­
ful, the end result would the assemblage of all Hawaii’s lands 
once again under singular control—to be used in the ways 
and for the purposes to which they are best suited. The 
moves to accomplish this end and the structure of its admin­
istration could take any one of many forms. To begin with, 
the one suggested in 1968 by the task force on the environ­
ment during the Governor’s Conference on the Year 2000 
might be reexamined. A good deal of careful thought was 
given to its composition, and it is a provocative scenario 
which could still be rewritten in a number of ways.
What was proposed by Walter Collins and his task force 
associates was that all land in the islands be consolidated into 
a publicly controlled foundation by various means, “ with 
shares held proportionally by the contributing members, sim­
ilar in manner to a mutual fund investment or a condomin­
ium.” The land that had been pooled could be leased back to 
its original owners (or, presumably, to others, if prior owners 
did not wish to reassume it) for varying periods, with the 
leases requiring adherence to a state land-use plan. Income
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from the leases would form an investment pool which would 
provide dividends to the shareholders.
There will be enough arguments brought forward to show 
why this simple, direct idea would never work, so let us con­
sider its advantages and the reasons why it could be made to 
work. First, as the task force pointed out, the very fact 
that land ownership is concentrated in Hawaii would be an 
advantage. The government-owned land and that held by the 
handful of principal landowners, including the trusts and 
estates (over 90 percent of the total) could be brought into 
the pool first—hopefully on a voluntary basis—immediately, 
if the will was there. Smaller holdings and the individual fee- 
simple parcels could be added later, when the scheme was 
working smoothly, by the process of eminent domain when 
that was necessary.
The big trusts would no longer have to worry about ways 
to get the most out of their holdings, as they do now (even 
foolishly putting good agricultural land into urban uses or 
searching for sometimes marginal production): the dividends 
produced for them by their former lands could continue to 
fulfill their commitments to beneficiaries. Land which the 
foundation determined should best be left undeveloped could 
remain that way. No one owner would suffer the financial 
consequences. Leasehold, with which Hawaii has long been 
familiar, not always happily, would become the only method 
to secure private land use. The leasing of land, however, 
would not work just to the advantage of the large landown­
ers but would become an instrument for the use of land in 
the public interest. No longer would the thrust be toward 
“breaking up” the large estates, as it is now and has long 
been. It would be toward their further consolidation for the 
public good.
The land trust idea did not make much of a splash at the 
Year 2000 conference; speculative generalities were more 
comfortable to contemplate than a specific possible plan.
One lengthy review of the book which the conference pro­
duced praised most of the other panel reports but did not
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mention that of the task force on the environment. Five years 
later, however, Senator John J. Hulten (land economist by 
profession) introduced a bill in the legislature which would 
have authorized the first step toward the first plateau: it 
called for a study of the economic potentials of land pooling 
under government administration.42 Other legislators were 
not interested, but a tinge of reality had been added to the 
future-planners’ dreams. Reading of Hulten’s bill, Walter 
Collins dropped a note to this writer from a South Pacific 
island which had asked his land planning advice (counsel of 
the kind his home island so badly needed and did not re­
quest). The note simply said “Aha!”
Other land management experts have revived the scheme 
from time to time. Fred Smith, the Rockefeller adviser, sug­
gested in a talk in Honolulu in 1974 that “ a public-benefit 
corporation” might be formed in Honolulu to buy up private 
lands and lease them out for development according to an 
islandwide land use plan. Smith was not thinking in such 
broad terms as the Year 2000 group had been; he spoke only 
of large landowners with adjacent holdings pooling their land 
(in a way “ similar to New York’s Urban Development Cor­
poration” )43 and of their “ working with” the city and state 
governments, not of their forming a common trust. The 
reason he gave for thinking a land pool essential was his 
reiterated belief that a rapidly growing population would 
require much additional housing in new communities, not 
that he considered it a means of refining land management 
procedures for a stabilized population. Nevertheless, the 
general idea was there. Smith had to be added to those whose 
scenarios for the future were some form of “ taking” for the 
public good.
Walter Collins had estimated that it would require seventy- 
five years to gather all the lands of Hawaii into a public 
trust. That length of time might indeed be needed for the 
modern industrial society that Hawaii has become to relin­
quish its dependence on the doctrine of private land owner­
ship, for the private trusts to discover the advantages of
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public trusteeship, and for the people of the state to convince 
themselves that they should assume control of their common 
heritage.
Of the inheritors of the land, the native Hawaiians might 
benefit most from placing their heirdom under control of a 
public of which they form, now, only a part. It may even be 
that they could soon move to make the idea possible. Their 
native rights claim now includes a demand for the return of 
21/2 million acres to descendants of the aborigines. No indica­
tion has yet been given of any intended use of this land, be­
yond gaining the most profit from it for the greatest number 
of those with Hawaiian blood. If the grant, assuming that it 
will be awarded under those conditions, is to have any lasting 
benefits to the Hawaiians, it will have to avoid the probable 
fate that has been sketched as answer to question number 
one—continuation of present development trends. That land 
will have to be handled as well as the remaining million and 
a half acres, and if the best method for handling it is to pool 
it under a public trust, then the native Hawaiians should 
welcome the proposal. Even if monetary return from their 
lands remains a dominant concern, that need could be 
satisfied by the dividends from the major investment they 
would have made in Hawaii’s future.
The Ultimate Variable: Time
There is the prescription, then: set limits to the population, 
allow this populace to plan the best ways to use its lands, 
then give it the power to carry out its plan through its own 
trust. It is a perfectly feasible program. It could be adopted 
at any time by those who govern public policies. Will it ever 
be undertaken, though? It would be opposed, by every means 
possible, by those who have the power to make political deci­
sions or the power to influence them. All the straw-man 
arguments would be used against it: that “ no growth” is 
economically impossible, that land planning is socially 
inflexible, that government control is constitutionally 
confiscatory, that public power is politically dangerous.
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Nevertheless, to someone who has examined a number of 
other alternative futures, it seems the most likely of them all 
to come about in time—if by then there will be enough time 
left to allow it to come about. It seems the most plausible 
answer to today’s problems that can be devised today, since 
private control of land is so generally found to work against 
the public interest and government control is so easily 
subverted for private aims. Its acceptance, in time, will be 
historically phenomenal: Hawaii, moving from a land system 
tightly controlled in the public interest (life would have been 
intolerable otherwise), will have moved back to a land system 
tightly controlled in the public interest (life will, again, have 
become intolerable otherwise). The control, however, will 
have changed from one absolute kingly hand to many, com­
monly joined. Time would have stood fast in Hawaii, in that 
one respect, even as times had changed.
Time, in truth, has become the ultimate variable in any 
futures plan for Hawaii, the key character in any forward- 
looking scenario. As alternatives are being debated, time is 
running out. Soon the choices will no longer lie within the 
subtle grays of enhancement or preservation of the environ­
ment, of improving the quality or changing the direction of 
expansion—they will be between the blacks and whites of 
growth or stabilization, of agriculture or subdivisions, of sav­
ing or losing green valleys and white beaches. Now the press 
of time supports the leveling of the land, because that is how 
our time is being spent—and later will be too late for change.
The early Hawaiians had a remarkable perception of time, 
its periods and its passage, the cycle of the seasons and of 
life itself, which the modern people of Hawaii have lost. The 
sense of time has been supplanted with a sense of hurry. The 
pleasure of doing things has been replaced by a need to get 
things done. The fusion of the present with the past, as pre­
cursor, and with the future, as successor, in a continuous 
flux where time just now is formed by times earlier as it 
molds time to come—this is a concept little understood in 
modern Hawaii. There is only a sketchy knowledge of the 
islands’ past in the present state. History, for most, is a
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pleasant fiction written by nostalgic kamaaina haole ladies 
and popularized by James Michener. There is no care, even, 
to pronounce the mellifluous place names properly, and little 
curiosity about their origins.
If there is no interest in a real past, neither is there much 
concern about an actual future. For many, today, Hawaii is 
only a temporary business stop anyway. Money from other 
places, along with the people who manage it, comes and 
goes quickly. Time in Hawaii, for them, is the moment of 
building, developing, selling.
Even to the kamaainas and long-time residents time seems 
unimportant in Hawaii. The days are successively pleasant. 
Vistas still stretch across vast open spaces. Plantations con­
tinue to cover much of the low country and huge ranches still 
roll across the foothills. Until now, one can walk long 
lengths of empty beach and hike far distances into the moun­
tains. What is there to worry about? In time, solutions will 
be found for all the problems of growth and expansion. 
Changes will come, of course, but change is an inevitable, 
even welcome, partner of the passage of time. All of that 
might be true if time would only move leisurely—but time in 
Hawaii moves more rapidly than time in most other places. 
There, a mere two hundred years have spanned the full story 
of lands’ significance to man.
It is not what the land looks like today or any other day 
that will matter in the long run; what we see just now is a 
scratch of time in a sequence that stretches far back and will 
extend far forward. Today is quickly gone, but there is still 
time, barely, to make present performance respect past 
tradition and leave open future choices. But the options are 
closing, rapidly.
Epilogue: Scenario for the Future
THIS book began by telling about the past of Makaha Valley 
on Oahu’s leeward side. It is going to close by wondering 
about the future of the Waiahole and Waikane valleys direct­
ly across that island on its windward side. No place in the 
Hawaiian islands could provide a more representative setting 
or cast of characters for playing out the next scene in the 
drama of those islands’ lands. Here the capsule chronicle of 
land and people which Hawaii tells is even further con­
densed. Here the future alternatives of differing scenarios 
are most clearly seen.
The depth of background the setting provides is evident 
from the names these valleys carry. Waters (kai) dedicated to 
Kane, dominant male in the Hawaiian pantheon, lay at the 
foot of one, and so it was known earlier as Wai-a-Kane. 
Waters where the magic ahole fish lived (foe to evil spirits 
and protector of lovers) lay below the other, which was 
called Wai-ahole. The valleys lie between ridges leading down 
from the peaks of the Koolau range—rugged with rifts from 
Pleistocene eruptions, smoothed as dikes were filled with lava 
and covered with ash, finally carpeted with sufficient soil to 
make their floors softly green and richly fertile. They support
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a self-sufficient population of mixed ethnic heritage with a 
large, proud share of Hawaiian blood.
The principal characters in the current stage of the story of 
those lands symbolize several periods in Hawaii’s modern 
history. One is Elizabeth Loy Marks, daughter of Lincoln L. 
McCandless, one of three brothers who arrived in Honolulu 
in the 1880s to start a long and profitable career of drilling 
artesian wells. Brother John was active in the political move­
ments which led to the overthrow of the monarchy; Lincoln, 
for a term, was the territory’s delegate to Congress. No small 
part of the profits from their essential business was the ac­
quisition of land in various places in the islands, so that the 
McCandless heirs inherited some 36,000 acres of desirable 
Hawaiian soil. Lincoln’s daughter Elizabeth, principal heir to 
the landholdings, married attorney Lester Marks and became 
a respected horticulturist, collector of Hawaiiana, member 
of protectionist societies, and generally, for many years, a 
good and kindly konohiki to the native tenants of her lands. 
The principal properties owned by the McCandless heirs 
(Elizabeth Marks et al., as they are recorded on tax maps) 
were an extensive ranching acreage on the Big Island and on 
Oahu the western tip and the Waiahole-Waikane valleys, 
where income to the estate came primarily from leases to 
small farmers.
Another character in the story, who represented a different 
phase in Hawaii’s history, was Joe Pao, born a “ poor boy” 
in Kauai, as he liked to say, who went to work after grade 
school as apprentice blacksmith for the Inter-Island Steam­
ship and Navigation Company and in 1946 began selling real 
estate. Soon he was buying raw land himself and before long 
he was developing it into residential subdivisions. Pao was an 
optimist about the future, from his point of view. He pre­
dicted that within twenty-five or thirty years there will be no 
pineapple or sugarcane growing on Oahu. “ There shouldn’t 
be,” he said. “ We haven’t even scratched the surface of 
home building.” 1 Through his career Pao (whose name 
means, in Hawaiian, to scoop out) was careless about per­
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missions and regulations; among the many complaints and 
sometimes suits brought against him were two cases of dis­
turbed boulders falling on houses he had built, one of sand 
pumped from the mouth of a public stream in Kailua to 
use on a project of his called Enchanted Lakes (an action 
defended by city officials who soon owned homes there), 
and another of cutting an illegal slice from a Manoa Valley 
hillside which remained visibly raw for a long time and 
became known as Pao’s Cut.
In December 1974, representing Elizabeth Marks et al.,
Joe Pao requested the State Land Use Commission to reclass­
ify from agricultural to urban use a thousand acres of 
McCandless land in the Waiahole and Waikane valleys. He 
was refused. Yet in June 1975, Pao bought some of the land 
from Mrs. Marks (who had shifted it to her sole ownership 
through internal negotiations with the other heirs) and op­
tioned more. He announced publicly that he was making 
plans to build 7,000 homes there, over a ten-year period, for
22,000 people.2 In the meantime, he and Mrs. Marks told the 
people in the valleys that they must move from their farms 
and their homes or be evicted, even though they were using 
the land in the way the law specified. (Pao died of leukemia 
two years later, leaving his role in the final scenes of the 
story to a hui he had formed, called Windward Partners.)
The script now brings in a group of characters who repre­
sent a stiffening of attitudes toward indiscriminate develop­
ment: they oppose the Pao-McCandless schemes. Some are 
visibly and audibly on stage, like the governor (“ The State is 
not going to compromise . . .  I am very angry and upset” ) 
and the mayor (“ I oppose any development in that area” ).3 
Others, such as the State Land Use Commission, which 
would have to change its mind about rezoning if the develop­
ment were to go ahead, and the State Department of Health, 
which would have to approve changes in stream flows and 
provisions for sewerage treatment, the Department of Land 
and Natural Resources, the State Agricultural Department, 
the State Transportation Department, the Office of Environ­
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mental Quality Control, and a number of city agencies, all 
involved in one way or another, are offstage voices often 
heard repeating the words of the governor and the mayor.
Then finally there are the people who live in the valleys. 
They have formed into several huis, some broadly composed 
of residents, some representing farmers and lessees of the 
land, some organized from Hawaiian families who have been 
there since the Great Mahele. They claim that land titles, at 
least in the ahupuaa of Waikane, are not clear. A voice occa­
sionally breaks from the chorus claiming a kuleana for itself; 
the overall harmony is an insistence that they will not move 
from their homes and their farms—except through the use of 
force.4
It seemed as though there could be no ending to this 
scenario for many, many years. Joe Pao and his partners, 
along with Mrs. Marks, appeared willing to bide their time 
(and while Pao lived, at least, to compromise in the end, as 
he had done before). None of the other actors were moving 
from their positions. Then unexpectedly, in early 1977, 
things seemed to reach a climax. Elizabeth Marks secured a 
court order allowing her to evict some eighty tenants in 
Waiahole valley, and served the necessary papers. The plot 
drew tense as many of the residents publicly burned their 
notices.5 At the common request of the adversaries, the gov­
ernor searched for a way to prevent a nasty confrontation.
Three days before the deadline for eviction Governor 
Ariyoshi announced his solution to the impasse—a shocker, 
as the headlines said.6 The state would buy from Mrs. Marks 
600 acres of Waiahole land, for $6 million. The land, which 
housed most of those threatened with eviction, would be 
leased back to the resident farmers—and to others—whose 
holdings would be reformed in village clusters.
Was this a finale for the drama, or just a pause between 
scenes? Was it only a compromise adopted under pressure?
Or would it prove to be a step toward public ownership and 
control of land to be leased out for planned uses? Certainly 
many problems remained unsolved. There was no assurance
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that homestead farming would work any better than it had 
through Hawaii’s modern history. Piece-meal land acquisi­
tion by the state, as particular issues arose, could not answer 
the broad need for using all the islands’ lands in the public 
good. These acres would now be under the jurisdiction of 
state agencies with no great record of land planning and land 
management. In fact, although the State Land Use Commis­
sion, shortly after the governor’s move, rejected again a 
request from Pao’s partners for reclassification of lands in 
Waikane Valley to urban uses, there was no long-term assur­
ance that any of the local residents except those living on the 
600 acres acquired by the state would be any better off than 
before the purchase.
Quite clearly the end of the story of the valleys of 
Waiahole and Waikane has not yet been told. The conclusion 
will depend on the course Hawaii’s people adopt. If they are 
willing to accept the probable future of the islands’ lands 
then the farms in the valleys will some day be replaced by 
subdivisions. There may be some suspenseful moments as the 
story unfolds further, when codes and regulations—and pub­
lic purchases—prove effective in some instances, but in the 
end these restraints and respites will not stop development. 
They never have. But if the people of Hawaii should opt for 
the possible course, should elect to limit developmental 
growth and lay plans for public trusteeship of their lands, 
then the mountain shoresides like Waikane and Waiahole 
could be preserved for the uses they deserve.
!
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Authors referred to in these notes will be found in alphabetical order in 
the bibliography along with titles of their works consulted. If that listing 
shows more than one work by an author, its title is given here in abbre­
viated form; otherwise only the author’s name is given. Two frequently 
quoted sources are further abbreviated; HA for Honolulu Advertiser and 
HSB for Honolulu Star-Bulletin.
PREFACE
1. Spelling, pronunciation, and basic meanings are drawn from Pukui 
and Elbert, Hawaiian-English Dictionary.
2. Spelling, pronunciation, and probable meanings are drawn from 
Pukui et al., Place Names of Hawaii.
PROLOGUE
1. Makaha several hundred years ago is described in Ii, p. 97.
2. Present ethnic and occupational characteristics of Makaha area are 
drawn from University of Hawaii, Atlas, pp. 104 ff. and 145 ff.
3. Chinn Ho’s architect for Makaha Inn and surrounds was William 
Pereira & Associates of Los Angeles.
4. For ages of the islands in the Hawaiian archipelago see Stearns, pp. 
74-78.
5. Poems (meles) about Kauai and Hanalei are quoted in Ancient 
Hawaiian Civilization, chap. 17 by E. R. Plews, pp. 188, 190.
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6. Population figures are from Schmitt. Missionaries made unofficial 
census counts from 1831 on; first government census was in 1850. Earlier 
statistics are reviewed and somewhat altered in State of Hawaii, Data 
Book, 1975, table 1.
7. Ancient Hawaiian Civilization, chap. 25 by E. H. Bryan, Jr., p.
274.
8. Hawaiians’ cultivation of land is noted in Cook and King, Ledyard, 
and Vancouver (who is quoted), among others.
9. Villages are described by Ledyard, pp. 128, 129; those formed by 
kinship are discussed by Handy and Pukui, Polynesian Family, chap. 1, p. 
3 ff., in relation to extended family; for those near chiefs’ courts, see 
Malo, pp. 63, 64.
10. For ancient land divisions and tenure system, see W. D. Alexander, 
Brief History; Chinen, Original Land; Ancient Hawaiian Civilization, 
chap. 7 by J. H. Wise, with comments by M. Kelly, p. 321. The land sys­
tem was well described in Principles of the Land Commission of 1845 
(given in Thurston, Fundamental Laws, p. 137 ff.).
11. Hobbs, “The Land Title,” says that nowhere in Polynesia was there 
a system “quite like” the Hawaiian; W. D. Alexander, Brief History, 
notes that the Hawaiian system differed from the tribal system (as in New 
Zealand) and the communal system (as in Samoa).
12. The trail at Halawa is described in li, p. 95.
13. For story of the stadium curse, see HA (24 November 1973 and 27 
November 1973) and HSB (3 December 1973).
CHAPTER 1
1. Mumford, Myth, contains a discussion of our early, compatible re­
lation to the earth and its products, especially on pp. 99-135. For a more 
thorough treatment of the subject, see Oparin, generally.
2. McHarg, particularly on p. 156 ff., discusses disastrous results of ig­
noring ecological balances. See also Commoner, especially chap. 7.
3. For speculation on future dangers of worsening man-nature relation­
ship, see McHale, pp. 66 ff. and 208 ff., and Hardin, overall.
4. Stearns, McDonald, and Kyselka, and Carlquist all tell of the geo­
logical origins and formation of the Hawaiian archipelago. See especially 
Stearns, chap. 4.
5. See Fornander for early speculations on Polynesian movements and 
origins of Hawaiian peoples. For brief, more contemporary discussion, see 
P. H. Buck, chap. 2 in Ancient Hawaiian Civilization, with comments by 
Emory, p. 319. Studies and formulation of new theories continue even to­
day.
6. For further knowledge of the general history of each of the five
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periods defined here, without consulting original sources, much readable 
secondary material is available. For the first period see especially 
Kamakau, Ii, and Malo. For the second period add Kuykendall, vol. 1 (for 
his account of the land reform movement see chap. 15), and for the third 
period include Kuykendall, vols. 2 and 3. Daws, Shoal, provides additional 
researched material and fresh insights for all these periods and continues 
on into the fourth, territorial period, which Fuchs also documents, exhaus­
tively. The fifth, post-Pearl Harbor period awaits its historian.
7. On postwar Americanization see Daws, Shoal, chap. 9; Coffman, p. 
8 ff.; Lind, Hawaii’s People, chap. 5; Simpich, especially chap. 5.
8. Cook’s death and events leading to it are described in numerous per­
sonal journals of the time. For secondhand account by a Hawaiian, see 
Kamakau, pp. 102, 103. For a haole’s personal story, not too favorable to 
Cook, see Ledyard, pp. 146, 147.
9. Kamehameha’s campaigns and conquests were described in detail, 
early, by Kamakau; later, from hearsay, by Fornander; and still later, 
through research, by Kuykendall, vol. 1, pp. 29-51, and Daws, Shoal, pp. 
29-44.
10. Haole supply of firearms and ships is noted by Kamakau, particu­
larly on pp. 147-153. Kuykendall, vol. 1, pp. 40, 42, 46-48, cites addition­
al instances.
11. Lind, Hawaii’s People, p. 19.
12. Campbell, pp. 126-128.
13. Kamakau, pp. 146, 147; also Ii, pp. 69, 70.
14. See Brennan for story of Parker Ranch.
15. The Robert Kilday story: Kingdom of Hawaii, Land Commission, 
Foreign Register Testimony, vol. 1, no. 2.
16. For discussion of ecological effects of early importations, see E. H. 
Bryan, Jr., in Ancient Hawaiian Civilization, chap. 25; also R. A. Rap- 
paport, p. 155 ff., in Fosberg (ed.), Man's Place.
17. Ii, pp. 94, 120.
18. Stokes, “New Speculative Phases.”
19. Ii, pp. 55, 56.
20. Chinen, Original Land, notes that early land transactions were con­
sidered binding “excepting only such claims as the government of the 
Sandwich Islands may make on the land.” All land ownership documents 
taken before the Land Commission, recorded in Foreign Register 
Testimony volumes, contained similar provisos.
21. For brief accounts of the careers of individual missionaries see 
Hawaii Mission Children’s Society, Missionary Album.
22. The cession of Hawaii to Great Britain is described in Kamakau, pp. 
350-355. The king’s speech (which Kuykendall, vol. 1, p. 216 n., says 
“gave great offense to the British officers present”) is reported by Kama-
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kau, p. 364. Much of the Kamakau volume was drawn from his articles 
published in the Hawaiian-language paper Ke Au ‘Oko'a, of which the 
issues carrying his story of the return of sovereignty by Admiral Thomas 
are missing. Kuykendall, vol. 1, chap. 13, and Daws, Shoal, pp. 114-119, 
document the episode from other researched sources.
23. Continuation of Charlton’s land claim is reflected in Kingdom of 
Hawaii, Privy Council Records, through 1845 and 1846 and in Land Com­
mission Foreign Register Testimony.
24. Foreign Register Testimony, vol. 1, no. 75.
25. Ibid., no. 4.
26. Proclamation of 1841 was reported in Polynesian, 10 June 1841.
27. Kingdom of Hawaii, Privy Council Records, 15 June 1846.
28. Ibid., 25 July 1846.
29. Much of the evidence presented in testimony recorded in Land Com­
mission hearings is supported by bills of sale or evidence of inheritance.
30. Robinson sale to Ridley to Pelly: op. cit., vol. 1, no. 3. Blanchard 
claim, ibid., no. 17.
31. Hobbs, Hawaii: A Pageant, contains much documentary material 
tending to show missionaries’ innocence of land speculation intent.
32. A. C. Alexander, Koloa Plantation, recounts events in Ladd & 
Company story. Joesting, p. 98 ff., adds interesting material. Kingdom of 
Hawaii, Privy Council Records, 11 November 1846 and succeeding weeks, 
cover phases of the negotiations and suit from the government’s point of 
view. Ii’s remark—“that might deceive . . . is from meeting of 6 
January 1847.
33. For economics of early farming ventures, see Morgan, pp. 96-98.
34. Ellis, p. 18.
35. American capital in Hawaiian land: Hobbs, Hawaii: A Pageant, 
quotes J. R. Belsher’s Around the World in 1840. Daws, “ Honolulu, First 
Century,” p. 216, uses similar figures.
36. Kamehameha Ill’s sympathy with his people in this regard is indi­
cated in comments in Kingdom of Hawaii, Privy Council Records, 15 June 
1846 and 8 January 1847.
37. Petition and reply were translated in Friend, 12 June 1845 and 1 
August 1845.
38. Translated in Hawaiian Spectator, July 1839, pp. 347-348.
39. Thurston, Fundamental Laws, p. 1 ff.
40. Ibid., under heading “Principles Adopted,” p. 137 ff.
41. The Mahele Book is in Archives of Hawaii. Chinen, Great Mahele, 
describes the division process and reproduces sample mahele pages as well 
as royal patents and land awards.
42. See Kingdom of Hawaii, Registers of testimony and Index of 
awards, in Archives of Hawaii.
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43. Kingdom of Hawaii, Laws of 1850, pp. 146, 147.
44. S. B. Dillingham, “Evolution of Hawaiian Land Tenures.”
45. Kingdom of Hawaii, Laws of 1850, p. 202.
46. For description of Honolulu in 1820 see Ellis, p. 11 ff.; Kamakau, 
pp. 272 and 277; and numerous comments in Judd and in Bingham.
47. For Honolulu in the early 1840s, see Polynesian, 1840 through 1842, 
particularly issue of 17 October 1840 (from which come quotes herein).
48. Polynesian, 17 October 1840.
49. Kingdom of Hawaii, Laws of 1842, chap. 8, given in Thurston, 
Fundamental Laws, p. 43.
50. Polynesian, 5 September 1840.
51. Hawaiians’ difficulties with city life are discussed in Daws, “ First 
Century,” pp. 495-519. Hobbs, Hawaii: A Pageant, and Lind, Hawaii’s 
People, also comment on this phenomenon. Kuykendall, vol. 1, p. 272 n., 
writes of the “ floating population.” Polynesian, 6 March 1841, had 
editorial on economic problems involved, which were also discussed some 
years later in Privy Council (Kingdom of Hawaii, Privy Council Records,
8 June 1847).
52. Castle & Cooke cash book for 1866, in Hawaiian Mission Children’s 
Society Library: Cooke Papers (hereafter called simply Papers).
53. Friend, 1 August 1845.
CHAPTER 2
1. For study of continually increasing influence of Americans in 
Hawaii, see Tate.
2. General histories commonly comment on this characteristic. Mark 
Twain wrote of Lunalilo that he had “an intellect that shines radiantly 
through floods of whisky.” Paradise of the Pacific, January 1910. Steven­
son, p. 93, in letter to Charles Baxter, described Kalakaua as “a very fine 
fellow, but . . . what a crop for the drink!”
3. Haole consolidation of controls was achieved partly through recipro­
city among themselves. The Castle & Cooke firm helped the C. Brewer 
Company get started. They bought shares in one anothers’ ventures “to 
see them prosper” (or to secure their business; e.g., “ to sell them 
lumber”). All cooperated when Dillingham started a railroad to Ewa. See 
various Cooke and Castle Papers, particularly CMC to GHC (11 January 
1890) and to JAH (11 December 1889).
4. Charles Montague Cooke wrote to Paul Isenberg (Cooke Papers, 27 
March 1893): “ It would be an advantage to have a Republican form of 
government if the natives did not outnumber the white vote . . . and will 
not Japan step in and demand the franchise for her 20,000 subjects . . . ?”
5. Tate writes: “ the underlying cause of the coup d ’etat was the deter-
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mination of the propertied class . . .  to direct and control government • 
policy.”
6. On the revolution, from different points of view, see Blount; 
Thurston, Memoirs; Liliuokalani. Kuykendall, vol. 3, chap. 21, provides a 
carefully researched, dispassionate account.
7. For social history of plantation-worker groups, see Fuchs, pt. 1.
8. Records of owners and factors indicate that the discipline main­
tained on plantations made normal Hawaiian life-styles impossible. Castle 
Papers contain letter from E. Bond, former missionary, later manager at 
Koloa, to S. N. Castle, 3 July 1874, reporting “scenes” when dancing was 
one time permitted: “men and women excited with liquor, dancing late in­
to the night and exhibiting the lowest, vilest brutality and beastliness.”
9. One manager complained (ibid., letter PBC to STA, 17 April 1890) 
that a shipload of Chinese “are to have $15.00 [a month] and not $13.00 
as was reported.” The low wage scale bothered the consciences of some, 
but a manager at Lihue wrote his superiors (Cooke Papers, PEB to CMC, 
25 June 1891) urging that “ all interested should join to find cheaper and 
more laborers” and also that “all should join in procuring cheaper food 
for the laborers,”
10. For Spreckels’ biography, see Adler.
11. For agriculture in second half of nineteenth century, much material 
is in Hawaiian Annual, Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Polynesian, and 
other periodicals of that period. Kuykendall summarizes all this in vol. 2, 
chap. 5. See also Morgan, pp. 159-173. Regarding crops other than sugar­
cane, Cooke Papers contain references to investments in tea, coffee, fruit, 
cotton—even an ostrich farm. Polynesian, 29 August 1840, reported a silk 
farm of 100,000 trees on Kauai, promising to be “one of the most impor­
tant branches of domestic industry.”
12. For reviews of nineteenth-century architecture, see Neil (pp. 7-15; 
Fairfax, pp. 7-9; Flistoric Buildings Task Force, Old Honolulu, for photo­
graphs); article by Hawaii Chapter, AIA, in Hawaiian Annual, 1968, pp. 
161-182. Neil has bibliography of material on this subject.
13. Transportation: for general discussion, see Kuykendall, vol. 3, pp. 
95-97; for tramways: Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 15 January 1889; for 
railroads: Hungerford.
14. For review of early utility construction, see Kuykendall, vol. 3, p. 94 
ff. Developing use of artesian water is documented in McCandless. Cooke 
Papers, journal entry of 16 July 1889, notes an early order for telephone 
poles.
15. See Hawaiian Annual, 1915, pp. 103-109, article by J. M. Lydgate 
entitled “The Vanishing Kuleanas.” For comments on this and other data, 
see Levy, pp. 851, 866, 867.
16. Editorial was in Made Quarterly, September 1865; response, in 
March 1866 issue.
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17. Lydgate, op. cit.
18. Levy, p. 86.
19. History of the Makalupu Hui is covered in A. C. Alexander, Koloa 
Plantation. Cooke, Papers, PCB to WHR, 6 March 1888, notes instruction 
to plantation manager to “buy up as many shares of Makalupu Hui as he 
can from the natives,” believing that “he can secure enough shares to give 
[Koloa Sugar Company] almost the majority.”
20. Land as the king’s personal property: Kuykendall, vol. 1, p. 288 n., 
comments that “the king could (and did) own other land as a private indi­
vidual, but the crown lands had a different status.”
21. For historical review of crown lands, see Spaulding. As for their dis­
position, Horwitz et al. (p. 110 and table 14) calculate that 750,000 acres 
of crown and government lands were under lease by 1890.
22. Spaulding estimates that Liliuokalani lost $50,000 annual income 
from crown-land leases when she was overthrown. Thurston, Memoirs, 
suggests between $50,000 and $100,000. The ex-queen sued the govern­
ment, unsuccessfully, over this presumed loss.
23. On transfer of crown lands after the revolution, the Constitution of 
the Republic, Article 99 (Thurston, Fundamental Laws, p. 198), provided: 
“That portion of the public domain heretofore known as Crown Land is 
hereby declared to have been heretofore and now to be the property of the 
Hawaiian government.” The Treaty of Annexation (ibid., p. 243) with the 
United States provided that “the Republic of Hawaii also cedes and hereby 
transfers to the United States of America the absolute fee and ownership 
of all public government or crown lands.” The Organic Act (ibid., p. 257) 
contained a similar provision.
24. Horwitz et al., app. 1, p. 186 ff., list sales from 1846 to 1893, with 
average prices per acre by years.
25. Ibid., table 24.
26. Hawaiian commoners’ difficulties in adjusting are noted in Lind, 
Hawaii’s People, pp. 102, 103. Pockets of Hawaiian life (specifically Kau) 
are described in Handy and Pukui, Polynesian Family, and more generally 
in Lind, Island Community. Fuchs, p. 71, comments on the phenomenon.
27. For thorough documentation of social-political developments in first 
half of twentieth century, see Fuchs.
28. Lind, Hawaii’s People, table 8, p. 28. Schmitt and also Gardner and 
Nordyke use similar data, with slight divergences.
29. Fuchs, p. 259, gives instances of income returns of 40 to 60 percent 
in territorial period, drawn from Honolulu Stock Exchange data. Cooke 
and Castle Papers indicate huge dividend rates even before turn of century: 
Haiku Plantation stock paid 53 percent in 1890, C. Brewer & Co. showed 
return on capital of 40 percent in 1897, Hawaiian Argicultural Co. paid 
dividends of 35 percent in 1899.
30. A year after passage of Act 44 of 1903, a 913-acre reserve was
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established at Kaipapau on Oahu, followed by an 18,940-acre reserve at 
the Hamakua Pali on Big Island. Today such reserves amount to more 
than a million acres (State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1976, table 87).
31. Land owned and controlled by principal landowners is tabulated in 
Woodrum, tables 28 and 29. For informed and entertaining account of 
landed trusts and estates, see Simpich, p. 128 ff.
32. For formation of Bishop Estate, see Bishop, Journal, For researched 
contemporary account, not friendly to trustees, see four articles by B. Sul- 
lam in Hawaii Observer, September and October 1975.
33. Lands set aside for U.S. defense agencies are listed in Horwitz et 
al., pp. 61-107, in text, figures, and tables.
34. For excellent collection of photographs of Honolulu at various 
stages in its development, see Scott.
35. Urban growth, architecture, and building construction in first half 
of twentieth century are documented in many articles listed in Neil’s 
bibliography. His introductory text, Fairfax, and the Historic Building 
Task Force’s Old Honolulu give additional data. Hawaiian Annual has 
useful source material, especially in editions for 1899, 1901, and 1925.
36. That Alexander Young Building was considered large at the time of 
its construction is indicated by comment in Cooke Papers (letter to FJC,
16 March 1901): “The glass for the Young Building is a big proposition, 
as of course we knew it would be.”
CHAPTER 3
1. For a short, readable account of the World War II years in Hawaii, 
see Joesting, chap. 16. For more detailed reviews, see Allen and Anthony.
2. Lind, Japanese, written during the war years, tells of the condition 
and reactions of AJAs and the attitudes of other residents.
3. Fuchs, chap. 16, documents postwar business changes.
4. For a breezy but informed account of postwar politics, see Coff­
man, especially first five chapters.
5. Governor Burns appointed his brother Edward state tax director in 
1962, and they announced a new policy for real-estate assessment, reflect­
ing the highest and best use of land “ to aid small businesses” and “ force 
development of idle land.” See HA, 17 December 1962.
6. Hawaii’s housing deficiency in 1960 was shown in U.S. Census 
Bureau statistics and a survey by Federal Housing Administration, 
reported in HA, 2 December 1961 and 28 December 1961.
7. HSB, 27 February 1961.
8. In his address to the 1961 session of the legislature, Governor Quinn 
said, “agriculture is, and must remain, an important element of the 
economy of Hawaii” (Journal, First Legislature of the State of Hawaii, 
pp. 19, 20). In that year direct income and revenues to the state from
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agriculture were much greater than those from tourism although consid­
erably less than those from the military. See State of Hawaii, Data Book, 
1976, table 166.
9. Horwitz et al., p. 54, quoting state interdepartmental memos, 
describe Quinn’s land policy as including (1) widespread ownership of land 
and (2) conservation of land resources.
10. Horowitz and Meller, p. 2. Land and politics in Hawaii are dis­
cussed for periods before 1960 in Fuchs, especially chaps. 14 and 15; for 
the 1960s, in Horowitz and Meller.
11. See Horowitz and Meller, pp. 49, 50. HSB, 13 February 1961, gave 
full page to Democrat and Republican party positions during 1961 
legislative session, indicating minor variances on basic issues.
12. HSB, 23 July 1959. Policy is analyzed in Horwitz et al., p. 53. 
Horbwitz and Meller, p. 6, explain use of phrase “Great Hoax” during 
1961 session.
13. Democrat’s land policy: HA, 18 February 1959 and 6 May 1959; 
HSB, 27 February 1961.
14. Horowitz and Meller, from privileged observation granted them, 
fluently tell of party policies in 1961 legislature.
15. State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1975, table 92, shows “major private 
owners” holding 1,917,560 acres in 1968, while “ other owners” had only 
270,219 acres.
16. Governor’s message to the 1961 state legislature; State of Hawaii, 
Journal of legislature, 1961, pp. 19, 20.
17. HA, 2 January 1961.
18. Bartholomew & Associates, An Index.
19. Legislation on land planning in 1957: Act 35, Land Study Bureau; 
Act 234, Water Reserves; Act 150, Territorial Planning Office and General 
Plan. See State of Hawaii, Revised Statutes.
20. Act 187 of 1961, Land Use Law, has been amended a number of 
times: e.g., Act 205 of 1963 added rural district and clarified authorities of 
state and counties; Act 32 of 1965 modified the process of boundary 
changes “to alleviate any hardship imposed on the petitioners” ; Act 182 of
1969 defined “open space” and called for an open-space plan; Act 136 of
1970 ordered the commission to establish shoreline setbacks for develop­
ment. See ibid.
21. In the press, only HSB, 12 July 1961, immediately reported the 
law’s passage, in a small second-page story quoting Governor Quinn as 
saying he had proposed “ the essential features of the Act.” Horowitz and 
Meller noted that H.B. 1279, enacted as Act 187, only as “a measure 
designed to raise taxes on undeveloped land,” did not refer to its land­
zoning provisions.
22. Term “greenbelt” was a misnomer, as many recognized. It intended 
to imply that some land would be kept green, not that defined belts of
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green land would separate distinct urban communities, which is common 
meaning.
23. HA, 8 April 1962.
24. Bartholomew & Associates, Land Use Districts.
25. Eckbo et al., Land Use Districts, p. 8. Effect on conversions is fac­
tually documented ibid, and in Marshall Kaplan et al., Second Five Year, 
is reviewed in Overview Corporation, p. 33 ff., and evaluated in 
Bosselman and Callies, Quiet Revolution, p. 28 ff., and League of Women 
Voters, Land Use Law, p. 5 ff.
26. Act 187 contains generalized statements in its Declaration of Pur­
pose but no further assertion of objectives. Godwin and Shepard, p. 23, 
say “the commission was given no guidance in law on the relative empha­
sis to place on such major controversies as tourist-related development 
versus preservation of natural and scenic attractions, or agricultural land 
conservation versus the supply of land for reasonably priced living accom­
modations.”
27. Eckbo et al., in 1969; Marshall Kaplan et al., in 1974.
28. A number of examples are given in this book: Salt Lake, Mt. 
Olomana, Waipio, Kahuku, Kaluakoi. Overview Corporation, p. 165, 
advised that assessment of State Land Use Commission should not be by 
numbers of applications approved or acres rezoned but by “ the overall im­
pact on Hawaii’s environment.” Overview concluded that “ experience has 
demonstrated” that the Land Use Law “does not contain sufficient 
safeguards to insure fulfillment” of environmental protection.
29. HSB, 10 April 1964.
30. See HSB, 1 January 1964, for application and ibid., 9 April 1964, 
for approval.
31. Conflicts of interest found by Attorney General Kanbara are 
described in HA, 12 October 1970, Same paper, same date, had story say­
ing Kanbara “pulled no punches.”
32. HSB, 29 April 1967.
33. Tangen accused of conflicts of interest; HA, 6 January 1973; court 
says charges unfounded, ibid., 9 December 1973.
34. H.B. 808 in 1973 session.
35. Council of State Governments, Land, p. 3.
36. Act 187 Preamble: State of Hawaii, Revised Statutes.
37. Term “quiet revolution” is title of Bosselman study.
38. In 1962 legislature, bill was introduced to “ postpone” action by the 
commission (HA, 8 April 1962); Commissioner Myron T. Thompson 
witnessed “ fierce pressures” to repeal the law (HSB, 29 July 1965);
“strong attempts” for repeal in 1964 and 1965 were reported in the press 
(HSB, 12 December 1964).
39. Population growth figures are rounded from State of Hawaii, Data
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Book, 1976, table 1. Ethnic population percentages are drawn from Gard­
ner and Nordyke, table 9.
40. For illustration of Oahu’s urban configuration in the 1960s, see City 
and County of Honolulu, General Plan, 1964. Growth of individual subur­
ban areas is described in HA, 3 December 1975 (article by Bob Krauss), 
for Kahala; in Neil, p. 61, for Hawaii Kai; in University of Hawaii, 
Kaneohe Alternatives, for Kaneohe.
41. Number of visitors: State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1976, table 99; 
hotel rooms: ibid., table 297.
42. Contretemps between Luka Nalui and David McClung took place 
during an angrily heated hearing on H3 reported in HSB, 17 April 1974.
CHAPTER 4
1. From talk by Alice Spalding Bowen in series on Design for Living in 
Hawaii, at Honolulu Academy of Arts, January and February 1972, 
transcribed but not published.
2. For Ellis’ trip around Hawaii, see his Journal. For 1974 reenact­
ment, see series of articles by Krauss in HA, 18 July 1973 through 18 
August 1973.
3. Early neglect of heiaus: Ellis, pp. 56, 73. Neglect of Kukaniloko 
birth stones: Sarny Amalu’s column, HA, 15 June 1975.
4. HA, 11 August 1973.
5. Example of tourisms historic restorations: King Kamehameha Hotel 
in Kailua, Kona, island of Hawaii, was built on beach at Kamakahonu, 
residence area of Kamehameha I, neglecting remnants of monarch’s per­
sonal heiau. When hotel was rebuilt in 1976, HA and HSB, 25 April 1976, 
reported “authentic” restoration of the heiau and other structures of the 
original compound, to serve as “ backdrop for commercial luaus and din­
ner time torchlight ceremonies.”
6. HA, 9 November 1975.
7. Of eighty-five historic buildings on Oahu listed by Historic Buildings 
Task Force (Old Honolulu), only twelve are more than one hundred years 
old.
8. Fairfax, p. 53.
9. At meeting attended by writer, held 1 May 1972, reported (without 
this comment) in HSB, 2 May 1973.
10. Protests against highway construction at Kahaluu, Waiahole, and 
Waikane were reported in the press periodically, e.g., in HA, 8 June 1972 
and 12 April 1976; against development at Niumau, Hawaii Observer, 16 
April 1974; at Kalama Valley, HSB, 17 August 1972.
11. See Lind, Island Community, pp. 309-313. A good summary was 
made by Nancy Bannick in her talk for the Design for Living series.
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12. Honolulu Redevelopment Agency in Chinatown: HA, 2 March 1973. 
Washington HUD official said redevelopment would “ insure Chinatown’s 
viability,” HA, 27 March 1973.
13. Indigenous and endemic species in Hawaii: see Carlquist. For brief 
informative reviews, see Ancient Hawaiian Civilization, chap. 26 by A. F. 
Judd and chap. 27 by H. S. Palmer. In 1977, the U.S. Interior Department 
noted that more than half of America’s endangered plant species are 
located in Hawaii. HA, 18 June 1977.
14. Introduction of exotic species: birds, HSB, 6 July 1973; deer, HA, 9 
July 1973; goats and sheep, HA, 25 March 1976.
15. Defacement above Manoa Valley residential area became known as 
Pao’s Cut, was finally replanted by university students (HA, 5 July 1973); 
another cut on Mount Olomana, also made by Pao, while grading without 
a permit (HA, 18 December 1970), remained visible for years.
16. Damage caused by runoffs from construction (algae death, smoth­
ered coral, etc.) was documented in numerous studies by university groups 
and well reported in press: e.g., HSB, 29 August 1973; HA, 12 February 
1974. Floods resulting from development: Hawaii Observer, 12 June 1973.
17. HSB, 20 March 1973 and 21 March 1973.
18. Office of Environmental Quality Control was established in 1970; 
Environmental Quality Commission was appointed in 1974.
19. State of Hawaii, Department of Health, Air Pollution Implementa­
tion Plan, mimeographed, 1973.
20. Babbie, Maximillion Report, was published and promoted by a civic 
group called Citizens for Hawaii.
21. HSB, 6 December 1972.
22. Comment was by Dr. Rudolph Rummel, professor of political 
science, at East-West Center symposium, reported by HA, 23 June 1972. 
Comments by other participants included one by Dr. James Dator that the 
report “ leaves out everything that’s important, as far as I am concerned.”
23. Essay by Dator was stimulated, he wrote, by a column written by 
this writer (HA-HSB, 7 May 1972), who “ for some reason saw fit to refer 
to me as a ‘techno-optimist’.”
24. HSB, 15 November 1973.
25. See Heller and Heller, for reasons, volume, impact.
26. State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1975, table 308 (drawn from Heller 
and Heller), shows that in 1961 just 12 island businesses were owned by 
Japanese interests; by 1972 number had grown to 94. For discussion of 
Japanese investments in Hawaii, see Fortune magazine, September 1975, p. 
42 ff.; see also article in Hawaii Observer, 11 June 1974. Investment in 
Hawaii’s hotels by 1974, reported by U.S. Commerce Department, was 
$350 million (HSB, 4 May 1976), with Kenji Osano owner of most. Angry 
reaction to his purchase of Royal Hawaiian: HSB, 30 July 1974 and 10 
October 1974.
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27. John G. Simpson, president, Hawaii Visitors Bureau, quoted in 
HSB, 20 April 1973.
28. HSB, 29 August 1973.
29. HA, 30 August 1974.
30. Excitement subsided: Japanese government’s advice, HSB, 25 June 
1973; Chinn Ho, HSB, 29 August 1973; Kanahele, HA, 21 April 1973 and 
1 September 1973.
31. Duran’s display of developers’ plans was shown, among other 
places, at Design for Living series.
32. State of Hawaii, Central Oahu Planning Study.
33. State of Hawaii, Hawaii Tourism Impact Plan, vol. 1, tables 3.5, 
3.6, 3.7, indicate plans for resort-residential projects on 96,643 acres.
34. Story was researched by Esterman from files of Land Use Commis­
sion.
35. Land sales to out-of-state investors have been regularly reported in 
the press, too often to make reference listings feasible.
36. Overview Corporation, chap. 3.
37. Figures are rounded from State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1975, table 
1, and Gardner and Nordyke, table 1. Comparative growth rates are given 
in State of Hawaii, Growth Policies Plan, p. 16.
38. Densities on Oahu: University of Hawaii, Atlas, p. 100. Densities in 
U.S. Urban Land Institute, Density, p. 38 ff.
39. Population projections for state; State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1976, 
table 9. For Oahu: City and County of Honolulu, Planning for Oahu: An 
Evaluation, pp. 10, 11.
40. State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1976, table 166.
41. Oahu Development Conference, Report 44, January 1974.
42. Visitor arrivals, average number, expenditures: State of Hawaii, 
Data Book, 1975, table 98.
43. State of Hawaii, Report of Governor’s Economic Advisory Task 
Force, pp. 10, 11. For summary of Report of Tourism Advisory Commit­
tee to Governor, see statement by its chairman, Thomas H. Hamilton, 
HSB, 13 November 1975.
44. Other growth trends are largely taken from State of Hawaii, Data 
Book, 1975: personal income, table 163; bank deposits, table 185; con­
struction, table 264.
45. Craven’s prediction of hordes of refugees was in 1970 talk to Ha­
waii chapter, American Institute of Architects. For description and draw­
ings of arcologies, see Soleri. Craven described his concept of artificial 
islands in HSB: 15, 16, 17 December 1971.
46. Fred Smith’s predictions of great growth were made in talk to Ho­
nolulu Chamber of Commerce, published in part as article, HSB, 22 June 
1973.
47. Hawaii Observer, 28 May 1974, interview.
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48. Hawaii Business, April 1974, interview.
49. Television commercials were used during 1972 by Honolulu realtor 
Jerry Assam.
CHAPTER 5
1. Conflict of development and conservation is described in Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund’s admittedly “ hopeful” report, The Use of Land, especially 
in chaps. 3, 7, 8.
2. HA, 3 April 1976.
3. State of Hawaii, Department of Land and Natural Resources, 
Regulation 4.
4. Administration of conservation lands and establishment of zones 
and subzones, ibid., as well as other DLNR regulations.
5. State of Hawaii, State Land Use Commission, Regulations, say: 
“Land with topography, soils, climate or other related factors that may 
not be normally adapted to or presently needed for urban, rural or 
agricultural uses shall be included in this District” (emphasis added).
6. HA, 13 December 1975.
7. HSB, 22 April 1972.
8. League of Women Voters, Conservation, p. 11, says: “ the uses, 
value, ownership, resource-capacities, etc., of state-owned and Conserva­
tion District lands is not available.”
9. Malo, pp. 16, 17.
10. University of Hawaii, Land Study Bureau, Detailed Land Classifica­
tion; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, Soil 
Surveys; same agency, Soil Survey Interpretations; all of these in volumes 
for each island. University of Hawaii, Atlas, p. 39, discusses use of new 
classification system in Hawaii.
11. Council of State Governments, Data Needs, p. 2: “The collection 
and storage of data represents both an essential activity and a source of 
major problems in land use planning.”
12. H. B. Emerson, Friend, 50, 1892, pp. 55-60, discusses discontinu­
ance of games. Malo, pp. 214-234, describes many Polynesian Hawaiian 
games and sports in detail and notes gambling, especially p. 225. Ellis 
wrote of this “malignant practice,” as did many early chroniclers.
13. See Malo, p. 141 ff. Beckwith, in Kumulipo, p. 18, and Hawaiian 
Mythology, pp. 33-37, relates makahiki to legends of Lono (for whom 
Cook was taken, Kamakau, p. 93).
14. Paradise of the Pacific, January 1888, p. 4.
15. Ibid., July 1899, p. 1, and October 1903, pp. 17, 18.
16. Appel explains Hawaiian trail systems.
17. Development of Moanalua Gardens, Hawaiian Annual, 1914, pp.
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75-84. “Cannibalization” is term used by Neil, p. 9. Liliuokalani Gardens 
are illustrated in Paradise of the Pacific, August 1916, pp. 8, 9; Ala 
Moana Park is pictured, ibid., May 1934. Present-day appeal for preserva­
tion of Moanalua Valley: see Moanalua Gardens Foundation.
18. State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic Develop­
ment, State Comprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plan.
19. Park totals: State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1975, tables 108, 109, 110.
20. Ibid., table 112.
21. HSB, 1 October 1975; HA, 14 October 1975.
22. On Oahu, Planning Commission approved ordinance on 15 
December 1971; council adopted it on 31 January 1972, as reported in HA 
on following days.
23. Pele legend: see under Alia-pa'akai in Pukui et al., Place Names, p.
11.
24. Coffman, p. 84.
25. HA, 13 September 1957.
26. Ibid., 1 November 1957.
27. Planning Commission approval, HSB, 12 August 1966; Tangen’s 
testimony, HA, 15 July 1966; staff recommendation, HSB, 26 August 
1966; approval by Land Board, HSB, 9 September 1966.
28. HSB, 14 March 1974.
29. Article by Tuck Newport in Hawaii Observer, 28 October 1975, 
which reviews Salt Lake’s history.
30. Request for rezoning, HSB, 2 June 1972; local residents’ division, 
ibid.
31. Tom Coffman, HSB, 3 June 1972, wrote that Fasi “ told this 
reporter and others” of Ching’s contribution.
32. HSB, 2 June 1972.
33. Kamm and Etherington.
34. City and County of Honolulu, Department of General Planning, An 
Evaluation, p. 157, notes deficiency in parklands, commenting that in cen­
tral Honolulu land is so costly that meeting standards “is not feasible” 
and satisfying future needs “is simply not possible.”
CHAPTER 6
1. See Meadows et al., pp. 137-141; also, for Hawaii, Chaplin and 
Paige, pp. 285-287.
2. Malo, p. 206.
3. Handy and Pukui, Polynesian Family, p. 3.
4. Beckwith, Hawaiian Mythology, pt. 1, especially chap. 9.
5. Early Hawaiian farming methods: Malo, pp. 201-208; Kamakau, p. 
237; Ancient Hawaiian Civilization, chap. 10 by J. R. Wichman; Handy
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and Pukui, Polynesian Family, p. 176; and Pukui and Elbert, Native 
Planters, throughout.
6. Malo, p. 206, says some improvident farmers “planted all at once,” 
while others would “plant a little at a time during months suitable for 
planting.” Morgan, p. 51, says, however, there was “ an astonishing lack 
of provision against future wants.”
7. Malo, p. 42 ff.
8. Malo, p. 44.
9. Growth of general agriculture in first half of nineteenth century: 
Kuykendall, vol. 1, chap. 9; Morgan, pp. 96-98.
10. Missionaries’appeal for agricultural help was in a “memorial” 
prepared in 1836 and sent to American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Missions. An early missionary group included a farmer (Daniel 
Chamberlain), supposed to teach natives “ agricultural and mechanical 
arts,” who returned home soon, discouraged. See Hawaii Mission 
Children’s Society, Missionary Album.
11. Edward Bailey merged his early sugar cultivation with Wailuku 
Plantation and helped form Haiku Sugar Co. Elias Bond started Kohala 
Plantation (turning dividends for some time over to church). William Har­
rison retired from mission to manage Lihue Plantation. Ibid.
12. R. C. Wyllie wrote in Friend, 2, 1844, p. 61, that islands’ “prosper­
ity [depends] mainly on the whale ships.”
13. Wolbrink, Kona, pp. 81, 82, notes that as late as 1960 Kona had 
twelve coffee mills, but only two by 1970.
14. Kingdom of Hawaii, Laws of 1842, chap. 14, in Thurston, Fun­
damental Laws.
15. Kuykendall, vol. 1, pp. 317-319; State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1975, 
table 249.
16. Polynesian, 20 June 1857; Hawaiian Annual, 1877, pp. 45-49; 
Kuykendall, vol. 2, p. 157.
17. Early sugarcane planting is mentioned by Malo, p. 205. For later 
periods, see Morgan, pp. 173-195; Kuykendall, vol. 1, pp. 314-317, for 
1840-1848; ibid., pp. 323-333, for 1849-1854; vol. 2, pp. 140-149, for 
1855-1874; vol. 3 for 1875-1893; Fuchs, especially chap. 9, for 1900-1960. 
For current statistics, see State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1975, tables 246, 
247, 248.
18. For pineapple production in various periods see Kuykendall, vol. 3; 
Fuchs; Morgan; Data Book, 1975, tables 246, 247.
19. Fuchs, p. 249.
20. State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1976, table 87.
21. University of Hawaii, Atlas, p. 146; Data Book, 1975, table 252.
22. Agricultural export items are summarized in Woodrum, p. 347, 
from U.S. Department of Agriculture data.
23. HA, 21 May 1976.
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24. HA, 23 May 1976: “Ariyoshi backs farming . . . residents want 
tourist push.”
25. HA, 26 October 1975.
26. HSB, 14 August 1975.
27. HA, 8 February 1976, 24 April 1976, 4 May 1976; HSB, 28 April 
1976.
28. HA, 6 June 1975, 24 April 1976.
29. HA, 14 April 1975.
30. HSB, 18 May 1976.
31. HSB, 24 July 1974.
CHAPTER 7
1. Ledyard, pp. 103, 129.
2. Beckwith, Hawaiian Mythology, p. 327, notes that legends of 
Menehune people have them living in caves and in various places describes 
the cave homes of the gods.
3. House construction is described in Kamakau, pp. 237, 238; Malo, p. 
118 ff.; Ancient Hawaiian Civilization, chap. 6 by E. S. C. Handy; Handy 
and Pukui, Polynesian Family, pp. 7, 12-15; Ellis, p. 224. Malo, pp. 119, 
120, gives diagrams of typical framing methods.
4. Ancient Hawaiian Civilization, pp. 70, 71; Handy and Pukui, 
Polynesian Family, p. 8.
5. Ellis, p. 147.
6. See Prologue, n. 9, for references on village groupings.
7. Bingham thought that native houses were “adapted to the taste of a 
dark, rude tribe living on roots, fish and fruit.”
8. Vancouver’s visit to a royal home is discussed by Thomas Many, 
Honolulu Mercury, July and August 1929. Kotzebue told of Namahana’s 
“pretty little house.”
9. See Peterson for imported construction materials. Cooke Papers, in 
early journals of Castle & Cooke, show increasing quantity of such items 
being handled.
10. See Scott for reproductions of early drawings of Honolulu houses.
11. Neil, p. 10.
12. Fuchs, pp. 47, 48.
13. Hawaiian Annual, 1898, p. 12 ff., article by Sanford Dole, 
“Hawaiian Land Policy.”
14. Horwitz et al., p. 37.
15. Ibid., p. 24.
16. Ibid., p. 37. See also Vause and see Humphries, throughout. Failure 
is explained in some detail in Territory of Hawaii, Land Law Revision 
Commission, Report of December 31, 1946.
17. Fuchs, pp. 172, 173.
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18. Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920, as it is often called, is 
officially an act of 9 July 1921, chap. 42, 42 Stat. 108.
19. Vause, p. 131. Horwitz et al., p. 39, write of “ the political-econ­
omic agreement.”
20. Horwitz et al., p. 39: homestead plots “ consisted largely of margin­
al land, the bulk of which was not suitable for agricultural homesteads.” 
Fuchs, pp. 173, 174, quotes a kamaaina remembering it as “rotten” land 
and a director of the Hawaiian Homes Commission reporting that most 
was in remote areas or forest reserve sections.
21. Humphries, p. 98; Fuchs, p. 73.
22. Territory of Hawaii, Commissioners of Public Lands, Report, 1926, 
p. v.
23. HSB, 13 December 1975, story by H. Ashton.
24. HSB, 22 February 1976, in a series of twelve articles on “ Land, 
Hawaii’s Green Gold,” by Bob Krauss.
25. Ibid., particularly articles on 25 and 27 February 1976.
26. Ibid., 27 February 1976, quoting Bob Hill, volunteer for Kalihi- 
Palama Community Association.
27. Acts 184 and 185 of 1975.
28. Estates’ successive reactions: HA, 14, 19, and 29 May 1976, and 31 
December 1976.
29. State of Hawaii, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Hawaii's 
Crisis.
30. Marshall Kaplan, Housing in Hawaii.
31. For a brief, informed look at this problem, see Saturday Review, 12 
February 1972, article by J. P. Fried, “Any Hope for Housing?” Fried 
lists difficulties of construction costs, land costs, costs of financing, prop­
erty taxes and zoning, and he analyzes limited help of government sub­
sidies.
32. Average sales price: HA, 13 June 1976. Median income: State of 
Hawaii, Data Book, 1976, table 172.
33. State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic Develop­
ment, Housing for Hawaii’s People.
34. Overview Corporation, p.
CHAPTER 8
1. Kaiser’s meeting with trustees was witnessed by this writer. The 1965 
plan for Hawaii Kai was prepared by John Carl Warnecke & Associates.
2. The city’s general plan change accommodating Kaiser’s plan was ap­
proved by the City Planning Commission on 11 Feburary 1966.
3. See Rockefeller Brothers Fund, particularly chap. 6 for economic 
arguments (“incentives and opportunities” ) supporting open-space protec- 
don.
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4. See Livingston & Blayney.
5. See State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic 
Development, Central Oahu.
6. University of Hawaii, Center for Engineering Research, Public 
Costs.
7. For methods of quantifying environmental and social costs, ibid., 
especially contributions by Schwind, p. 16, and Holstrom, p. 62.
8. Rose, p. 38.
9. Ibid. “ Retention of land . . . ,” p. 42. “Risk bearing . . . ,” p. 41.
10. HA, 11 March 1972, responding to column by this writer, HA, 21 
February 1972.
11. Memo to Department of Land and Natural Resources from Dr.
R. M. Kamins, 21 April 1975, pointed to a “ considerable area” where 
government in Hawaii had not reserved mineral rights. Reservations were 
applied during Kamehameha Ill’s reign, the memo notes, but later the 
reservation clause was “seemingly dropped,” then was recently reestab­
lished.
12. As on the American mainland. Clawson, p. 72, notes that by 1776 
“the concept of fee-simple ownership of land was firmly established” in 
the colonies. Council of State Governments, Land, p. 3, adds that “as 
population grew, . . . the traditional concepts of land as a commodi­
ty . .  . were not questioned or tested.” Rockefeller Brothers Fund, p. 22, 
speaks of America’s “traditional assumption that urbanization rights arise 
from the land itself.”
13. Kamakau, p. 175, describes Kamehameha I’s traditional redistribu­
tion of land after conquests.
14. Horwitz et al., p. 3, pp. 108-159.
15. Simpich, p. 198.
16. Chinn Ho’s Ilikai story: Hawaii Business, April 1974.
17. Land sales at $2,000 an acre (to Tokyu Corp.) and $3,600 an acre 
(to Kobayashi Development Corp.): Hawaii Observer, 25 June 1974.
18. Or lease the land, as the Sheraton Corp. did with Bishop Estate land 
on which Sheraton Waikiki was built, then sold to Kenji Osana.
19. Advertising ran for several months in 1975.
20. State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1976, table 87, indicates 74,429 acres 
of “undeveloped subdivision” on island of Hawaii.
21. Senator D. G. Anderson, quoted in HSB, 30 July 1974.
22. Princess’ will provided somewhat equivocally that “my said trustees 
shall not sell any real estate . . . unless in their opinion a sale may be 
necessary . . .  for the best interest of my estate.”
23. HSB, 21 July 1973, quotes Rev. Abraham Akaka: “The selling of 
our land for pennies a square foot is shocking to our people.”
24. HA, 21 June 1973.
25. HSB, 25 July 1973.
3§4 NOTES
26. HSB, 25 October 1973.
27. Such as Amfac, on Kauai; Campbell Estate, on Oahu; C. Brewer, 
several places, “ to balance off sales” ; HA-HSB, 9 July 1974; HA, 10 
April 1974 and 5 May 1974; and many other reported instances.
28. Kamakau, pp. 130, 177, 231, 232; Malo, pp. 53, 145.
29. Kingdom of Hawaii, Law of 27 December 1826.
30. Polynesian, 4 March 1841.
31. Polynesian, 12 July 1851.
32. Kingdom of Hawaii, Civil Code and Session Laws of 1858-1859.
33. From Vi percent for wholesaling to 4 percent for retail services and 
businesses.
34. HSB, several 1974 articles by Jerry Tune.
35. HA, 13 September 1967.
36. For critical discussion of this rezoning, see Meckler.
37. Fuchs, pp. 226-241.
38. Kahuku theme park application was by F. R. Schuh, was questioned 
by this writer and F. Sullam on Planning Commission, HSB, 25 November 
1971. This writer received Tangen’s call.
39. Application approved by Planning Commission, HA, 12 January 
1972; by Land Use Commission, HA, 4 February 1972.
40. H.B. 1225 of 1971.
41. Rose, p. 46.
42. State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic Develop­
ment, The Visitor Industry (by Mathematica) and Hawaii Tourism (by 
staff). See also annual research reports and monthly bulletins of Hawaii 
Visitors Bureau.
43. Hawaii Visitors Bureau expenditures were $2.5 million in 1974, with 
75 percent of income from the state. State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1975, 
table 103.
44. Ibid., table 149.
45. See Merrill for treatise on this entire subject.
46. See State of Hawaii, Data Book, 1975, table 98; Temporary Visitor 
Industry Council, Report, p. 6; Hitch, pp. 1-45.
47. Preliminary paper by M. A. Ghali, of the University of Hawaii’s 
Economic Research Center, 1973, reported in State of Hawaii, Temporary 
Visitor Industry Council, p. 19.
48. For analysis of potential effects of tourist tax, see Temporary 
Visitor Industry Council, Report, app. G. Through 1976, the legislature 
avoided imposing such a tax, although newspaper polls indicated voter ap­
proval.
49. State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic Develop­
ment, The Visitor Industry, p. 4.
50. HA, 13 June 1967, article by E. Tanji.
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51. Ibid., quoting T. Ishikawa.
52. Kaanapali Beach master plan was prepared in 1965 for Amfac by 
John Carl Warnecke & Associates, with advice from several hotel-specialist 
architects.
53. State of Hawaii, Temporary Visitor Industry Council, Report, p. 13.
54. Legislators’ tour was reported by both HA and HSB during June 
1975 (editors of both made the trip), using mainly anonymous quotations. 
Newspaper editorial was by George Chaplin, Advertiser editor: HA-HSB,
6 July 1975. A similar trip was made to south Pacific resorts in 1976, 
eliciting similar comments.
CHAPTER 9
1. For discussion of relationship of power and land in early Hawaii, 
see Hobbs, “The Land Title.”
2. Horwitz et al., pt. 2.
3. Marshall Kaplan et al., Technical Report 1, notes: “The absence of 
an overall state land use plan or policy has . . . shifted power over land 
uses to the counties. . . . The influence of private developers is also 
enhanced by the absence of a state strategy.”
4. Malo, p. 58. For laws in ancient Hawaii, see Malo, chap. 38. 
Kamakau, p. 175, describes laws “made” by Kamehameha, proscribing 
evil actions such as murder, theft, and the taking of property.
5. Kuykendall, vol. 1, p. 9.
6. Kamakau, p. 32.
7. Ibid., p. 175.
8. Ibid., p. 229.
9. Letter from William Richards to Charles Wilkes, 15 March 1841, 
cited in Kuykendall, vol. 1, p. 274.
10. Ibid., p. 73, referenced from Missionary Herald, 17, 1821.
11. Hobbs, Hawaii: A Pageant, especially chap. 4, and app. B. Kuyken­
dall, vol. 1, p. 340, cites sources making same point.
12. Gerrit P. Judd’s work and finances are reviewed in Joesting, pp. 
149-151, and Daws, Shoal, pp. 128-131. For formal biography, see Judd, 
Dr. Judd.
13. Kamehameha V’s constitution: Thurston, Fundamental Laws, p. 181 
ff. Kalakaua’s constitution: ibid., p. 181 ff.
14. Ibid., p. 195 ff.
15. Blount, p. 120, quoting Queen Liliuokalani’s protest handed to Dole 
at time of takeover.
16. Blount, pp. 126, 140 ff.
17. See note 4 in chapter 2 regarding Cooke Papers, letter from C. M. 
Cooke to Paul Isenberg, 27 March 1893 on this subject.
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18. Representative H. R. Gibson: “Manifest destiny says, ‘Take them 
in’.” Congressional Record, 3 June 1898.
19. Judd, Informal History, p. 121.
20. Constitution of the Republic of Hawaii, Thurston, Fundamental 
Laws, p. 198.
21. Republic of Hawaii, Civil Laws of 1897. For analysis, see Horwitz 
et al., pp. 5-15.
22. Civil Laws of 1897, sect, 169. Emphasis is added.
23. Horwitz et al., fig. 1, p. 63.
24. Newlands Resolution (Joint Resolution of 7 July 1898) provided that 
“Congress . . . shall enact special legislation” for “management and 
disposition” of Hawaii’s lands and directed the president to appoint a 
commission to administer the arrangement (Thurston, Fundamental Laws, 
p. 243). Organic Act (An Act to Provide a Government for the Territory 
of Hawaii; act of 30 April 1900) had similar provisions (ibid., p. 247).
25. Act of 18 March 1959.
26. Organic Act said: “ no corporation, domestic or foreign, shall 
acquire and hold real estate in Hawaii in excess of 1,000 acres.” Thurston, 
Fundamental Laws, p. 251.
27. Report, made by a Colonel Compton, is in U.S. Archives, Washing­
ton, D.C.
28. Horwitz et al., p. 20 and notes 33 and 34. These writers found the 
procedure marked by “informality” and difficult to research. Other lands 
acquired by the federal government during this period are described, ibid., 
pp. 61-105 and listed in tables 8-13.
29. Construction of military installations is reviewed in Judd, Informal 
History, pp. 125-128.
30. Horwitz et al., p. 20.
31. Fuchs, p. 184, points out that Wilson delayed appointing a governor 
for the territory, being occupied with “more important affairs on the main­
land” and, p. 195, that FDR, visiting the islands in 1934, “ate and drank 
his way through a series of receptions given by the Army and Navy and 
Harvard graduates.” See also Fuchs, chap. 7, on No New Deal for Hawaii.
32. Fuchs, especially chap. 10; Daws, Shoal, chap. 8; Judd, Informal 
History, chap. 14.
33. Fuchs, pp. 249, 250; Daws, Shoal, p. 313.
34. In 1900 there were 37,000 Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians to 29,000 
Caucasians (including Portuguese and Puerto Ricans); in 1940 there were 
50,000 part and full Hawaiians to 112,000 Caucasians. Gardner and Nor- 
dyke, table 9.
35. HA, 4 December 1975, article by Douglas Woo; HA, 14 December 
1975, column by this writer.
36. Fuchs, p. 214 ff.
37. Most thorough study of unionism in Hawaii, to 1960, is Fuchs, pp. 
214 ff. and 354 ff.
38. Hawaii Business, July 1973, pp. 31-40.
39. This writer was consultant in planning to the university during much 
of the early thrust toward a central Oahu campus.
40. Eckbo et al., West Oahu College.
41. Eckbo et al., Land Use Districts, p. 51.
42. State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic Develop­
ment, Central Oahu Planning Study.
43. Policy memoranda were written in preparation of Department of 
Planning and Economic Development’s Growth Policies Plan.
44. Heald, Hobson Associates.
45. HA, 28 January 1976, story was headlined “U.H. May Attempt 
Bypass of LUC Rezoning Refusal.”
46. Planning consultant was this writer.
47. Coffman, chap. 3.
48. Architect introduced to governor and mayor was this writer.
49. Godwin and Shepard, pp. 14-20.
50. Ibid., p. 16.
51. HA, 6 February 1975.
52. HA, 1 July 1970.
53. HA, 2 May 1972.
54. Original board was entirely haole. John Clarke, appointed in 1924, 
was first part-Hawaiian. Today two part-Hawaiians are trustees: Richard 
Lyman, Jr., and Myron Thompson. Strong appeals were made for Hawai­
ian appointee in 1971 when vacancy occurred, but AJA Matsuo Takabuki 
was named. Successful demands were raised in 1974, resulting in Thomp­
son’s selection.
55. For analyses of Hawaiian Native Claims Settlement Act (H.B. 15666 
of 1974), see Jones (prepared for Congressional Research Service) and 
Levy, p. 881 ff.
56. HSB, 15 February 1976 and 11 April 1976.
57. HA, 21 November 1975.
58. HSB, 11 February 1975.
59. HSB, 9 March 1976.
60. Liliuokalani, pp. 273-275.
61. Stokes, who contends that the ancestor from whom Princesses Ruth 
Keelikolani and Bernice Pauahi were descended, Kaoleioku, was not a son 
of Kamehameha I, as he is listed in later genealogies, but of Kalaniopuu, 
king of Hawaii before Kamehameha’s accession, as he is recorded in 
genealogies before 1843, according to Stokes’ sources.
62. HSB-HA, 15 February 1976, quoting Donald Wright, former presi­
dent of Alaska Federation of Natives.
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PART 3 INTRODUCTION
1. For summaries of state land-control measures adopted in 1960s and 
1970s, see Bosselman and Callies, Quiet Revolution; Tager, for American 
Institute of Architects; Council of State Governments, Land Use Puzzle 
and Land; Rockefeller Brothers Fund, especially pp. 55-72. More 
thorough studies of legislation in Oregon, Vermont, Florida, and Hawaii 
are in Conservation Foundation series.
2. Godwin and Shepard, p. 23.
3. Ibid., p. 25, notes “ language that either implies that all objectives 
can be simultaneously achieved or that fails to establish priorities.”
CHAPTER 10
1. Mumford, Culture of Cities, p. 146, writes of “ the suppressed land 
hunger of the Europeans” with its outlet in “opening up of the New 
World.”
2. For land policies in nineteenth-century Europe, particularly England, 
see Haar; in America of that time, see Johnson and Barlowe.
3. Mumford, Culture of Cities, chap. 3.
4. Ibid., especially chap. 6; Giedion, pp. 609-680.
5. When Dr. Judd took office in 1842, he noted this fact as well as 
that the national debt was $60,000 and that the government had no ac­
counting or auditing system—in correspondence annotated by Kuykendall 
vol. 1, p. 233, and noted by Judd, Informal History, p. 71.
6. Chinen, Just Compensation.
7. Islander, 26 May 1875.
8. Morgan, p. 182.
9. Horwitz et al., pp, 45, 46.
10. Council of State Governments, A Legislative Guide, p. 4, notes that 
under President Theodore Roosevelt a White House council was held in 
1906 to consider need for conservation of “ the fundamental sources of 
wealth of this great nation,” inspiring most states to set up conservation 
agencies.
11. Territory of Hawaii, Land Law Revision Commission, Report, 31 
December 1946, p. 55.
12. State of Hawaii, Act 187 of 1961, Declaration of Purpose.
13. Federal Housing Act of 1961 authorized funds for grants to states 
for open-space planning, an action which resulted in many plans of vary­
ing quality. See Scott, p. 569.
14. In Act 182 of 1969.
15. For description of McHarg’s methodology, see Conservation Foun­
dation, Three Approaches; for case studies using the method, see McHarg, 
throughout.
16. Overview Corporation, p. 7.
17. Several times a number of interested persons (including this writer) 
were called together for nonsubstantive briefings, primarily on method­
ology. In talks to citizens groups Udall was even more closemouthed about 
the trend of his studies.
18. Overview Corporation, pp. 167-172, gives an excellent summary of 
common land-conservation methods. For more full discussion, see Whyte, 
chaps. 3-7.
19. State of Hawaii, Temporary Commission on Statewide Environmen­
tal Planning, A Plan, p. 13.
20. Ibid., p. 8 ff.
21. Ibid., pp. 35-42.
22. Environmental Policy Act: Act 247 of 1974. Environmental Impact 
Statement Act: Act 246 of 1974.
23. State of Hawaii, Temporary Visitor Industry Council, Report, pp. i, 
24, 77.
24. Economic plateau was predicted by W. H. Hillendahl, vice-president, 
Bank of Hawaii, HA, 7 July 1976.
25. HA, 16 January 1976.
26. HA, 13 October 1976.
27. City and County of Honolulu, Department of General Planning, An 
Evaluation, p. 7.
28. State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic Develop­
ment, Growth Policies, p. 28 ff.
29. Ibid., pp. 57, 58.
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CHAPTER 11
1. Altshuler, p. 209, defines planning as “ the effort to infuse activity 
with constancy and consistent purpose.”
2. Cook and King, quoted in Ancient Hawaiian Civilization, p. 79.
3. Ledyard, p. 128.
4. Neil, p. 10.
5. Scott, p. 335 ff.
6. Hawaiian Annual, 1907, pp. 97-105, urged “beautifying” of 
Hawaii. Pencil Points, December 1916, contained “Plea for a More 
Tropical Honolulu.” Planner Charles Mulford Robinson was called to 
Honolulu in 1906 by Board of Supervisors to prepare beautification plan. 
Mainland architects Ralph Adams Cram and Bertram Grosvenor Goodhue, 
among others, did work in Honolulu, searching for a “ Hawaiian style” in 
the 1920s. See Neil, pp. 18 ff. and 53 ff.
7. Pencil Points, January 1945, illustrated competition for Honolulu’s 
civic center.
8. See Hawaii Observer, 21 August 1973, article by B. Baker on early 
official planning efforts in Honolulu.
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9. Mumford, Whither Hawaii?
10. Ibid.
11. See Pencil Points, June, July, September 1944; January, July, 
December 1945.
12. For purposes and definitions of city planning, see Altshuler and also 
Schnore and Fagin; for history of city planning in America, see Scott.
13. For philosophical concept of general plan see Kent, pp. 12 ff. For 
history of general planning in America, see Scott, pp. 493, 494 ff.
14. Supreme Court of Hawaii, Dalton et al. vs. City and County of Ho­
nolulu et al., 51 Hawaii, 1969.
15. A. Black, “The Comprehensive Plan.”
16. State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic Develop­
ment, Growth Policies, p. 2.
17. Ibid., p. 3.
18. Letter from Dr. Mark to this writer, 20 May 1974.
19. Act 189 of 1975 called for new state plan.
20. City and County of Honolulu, Department of General Planning, An 
Evaluation, p. 1.
21. Charter Commission’s general-plan position was bolstered by study 
of national trends made by staff aide Phyllis Turnbull. See City and Coun­
ty of Honolulu, Charter Commission, Urban Planning and Policy, 1972.
22. City and County of Honolulu, Department of General Planning, 
Proposed Objectives and An Evaluation.
23. Same source, The Planning Process, 1972.
24. An Evaluation, p. 3.
25. Ibid., p. 144 ff.
26. See, for example, HA, 4 January 1975, and HSB, 8 February 1974,
4 June 1974, and 25 October 1974.
27. State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic Develop­
ment, State Planning, pt. 2, summary, first two pages (unnumbered).
28. Ibid.
29. State of Hawaii, Land Use Commission, Five Year Review, by 
Eckbo et al., p. 118.
30. State of Hawaii, Hawaii Revised Statutes, chap. 201, sect. 23; “the 
Department of Planning and Economic Development shall prepare a gener­
al plan in sections, one for each county.”
31. H.B. 2381, 1975.
32. Star-Bulletin editor called for Way’s removal. This writer, in HSB- 
HA column of 29 June 1975, called for consultant services.
33. HA, 7 June 1975, quoting corporation counsel: “We express grave 
uncertainty as to whether this phase of the revised general plan will survive 
judicial scrutiny.”
34. HA, 13 May 1976.
35. City and County of Honolulu, City Council, New Genera! Plan.
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36. HA, 12 August 1976.
37. See, for example, HSB: 11 October 1974, 23 October 1974, 28 
December 1974.
38. H.B. 808, 1973.
39. When this writer mentioned financial hurts caused by commission’s 
arbitrary decisions (HSB-HA, 5 January 1975), a number of developers 
called and wrote to agree. Most notable unexpected refusal was of Bishop 
Estate’s request for reclassification of Waiawa Ridge in Oahu.
40. Act 193 of 1975.
41. For the study, see Catanese. Letter explaining methodology: 
Catanese to this writer, 20 June 1972.
42. AIA study group financed by Ford Foundation reported to sponsor 
on Some Observations.
43. Later AIA study group made findings known in Honolulu Rudat, 
“Issues and Findings” section (pages not numbered).
44. Pacific Urban Studies and Planning Program, conceived, achieved, 
and headed by Professor Tom Dinell.
45. Oahu Transportation Study was undertaken in 1963 after federal 
funds were requested (Senate Resolution 48, 1961) and granted and City 
and County of Honolulu expressed intention to participate (Council 
Resolution 69, 1962). Study was undertaken in 1963 and completed (issued 
in three volumes) in 1967.
46. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, Preliminary Engineering 
Evaluation Program.
47. Potential effect of H3 on windward communities was studied by 
Eckbo et al., Socio-Economic Study.
48. Court challenges to EISs are almost always on procedural rather 
than substantive matters.
49. Alternative routes would invariably cause damage to existing com­
munities.
50. See Hawaii Revised Statutes, sect. 37-62.
51. State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic Develop­
ment, State Planning, pt. 3.
52. See analysis of effects in League of Women Voters, State Planning,
p. 16.
53. Early zoning in the United States is discussed in Scott, p. 75.
54. Urban Land Institute, Density, pp. 26-32.
55. Potomac Institute, Urban Growth.
56. HA, 26 July 1974.
57. See article by Jerry Tune in HSB, 16 October 1975.
58. Costonis, “Development Rights.”
59. Costonis, “The Chicago Plan.”
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H o r i t a ,  H e r b e r t ,  184 , 213  
H o te ls :  B i l tm o re ,  109; H a le k u l a n i ,  2 9 5 ; 
H i l t o n  H a w a i ia n  V illa g e ,  178 ; H y a t t  
R e g e n c y , 109; K a h a la  H i l t o n ,  191; 
K in g  K a m e h a m e h a ,  3 7 5  n .5 ;  M a k a h a  
I n n ,  2 , 4 , 178 ; M a u n a  K e a  B e a c h ,
19 1 ; M o a n a ,  2 9 5 ; P io n e e r  I n n ,  32 1 ; 
R o y a l  H a w a i i a n ,  9 7 ,  2 9 5 ; S h e r a to n  
K a u a i ,  3 2 4 ; S h e r a to n  W a ik ik i ,  9 7 ,  108 
H o u s in g ,  9 , 6 5 , 6 7 , 1 49 , 150 , 154 , 166 , 
169 , 187; c o s ts  o f ,  187 ; l e g is la t i o n  f o r ,
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163 ; n e e d  f o r ,  6 4 , 1 53 , 162 ; p o lic ie s  
r e g a r d in g ,  2 3 7 ; r e p o r t s ,  o n  162, 163, 
166; s p e c u la t io n  in ,  160 ; ty p e s  o f ,  7 8 , 
8 8 . See also  H o m e s te a d in g  
H 3  F r e e w a y ,  2 2 ,  7 7 , 84 , 2 7 4 ,  275  
H u l te n ,  J o h n  J . ,  355
I a o ,  M a u i ,  124 , 320  
Ii, J o h n  P a p a ,  2 6
IL W U  ( I n t e r n a t io n a !  L o n g s h o r e m e n ’s 
a n d  W a r e h o u s e m e n ’s U n io n ) ,  6 3 , 74 , 
9 3 , 127 , 1 8 4 -1 8 6 , 2 1 4 , 3 1 9  
I n o u y e ,  D a n ie l  K . ,  231 
In v e n to r y  o f  r e s o u rc e s ,  1 1 8 -1 2 0  
lo la n i  P a la c e ,  86
I s la n d s :  c a te g o r ie s  o f ,  3 4 1 -3 4 3 ;  o f  
H a w a i i ,  f o r m a t io n  o f ,  7 , 18
J a p a n e s e  in v e s tm e n ts ,  9 6 , 9 7 , 3 1 8 , 3 24  
J a p a n e s e  p e o p le  in  H a w a i i ,  4 2 ,  5 3 , 87 , 
2 0 8 , 2 0 9 , 3 0 1 . See also  A m e r ic a n s  o f  
J a p a n e s e  a n c e s t ry  
J a r v e s ,  J a m e s  J a c k s o n ,  3 8 , 39 
J u d d ,  G e r r i t  P . ,  2 8 , 3 4 , 199
K a a h u m a n u ,  2 7 ,  30
K a a n a p a l i  B e a c h ,  1 93 , 321
K a e n a ,  O a h u ,  1, 99
K a h n ,  H e r m a n ,  333
K a h o o la w e ,  2 0 4 , 205
K a h u k u ,  p r o p o s e d  “ th e m e  p a r k ”  in ,
185
K a h u lu i ,  M a u i ,  319  
K a ik o o ,  H i lo ,  3 1 5 , 3 1 6 , 317  
K a i lu a ,  H a w a i i ,  2 5 , 2 8 7 , 304  
K a is e r ,  H e n ry ,  1 6 9 -1 7 2 , 178 
K a k a a k o ,  2 8 8 -2 9 2 ,  3 09  
K a la k a u a ,  D a v id ,  43 
K a la n i a n a o le ,  J o n a h  K u h io .  S e e  K u h io ,  
J o n a h
K a lu a k o i ,  100 
K a m a a in a s ,  208
K a m a k a u ,  S a m u e l  N . ,  181 , 198 
K a m e h a m e h a  1, 2 1 - 2 6 ,  1 21 , 152, 181, 
1 97 , 198 , 3 0 2 , 3 1 2 , 321 
K a m e h a m e h a  I I ,  27
K a m e h a m e h a  I I I ,  19 , 2 7 , 2 9 ,  33 , 3 4 , 43 , 
1 87 , 2 00
K a m e h a m e h a  IV , 43 
K a m e h a m e h a  V , 43 
K a m e h a m e h a  S c h o o ls ,  1 69 , 2 1 9  
K a m in s ,  R o b e r t ,  383 n . l l  
K a n a h e le ,  G e o rg e ,  97
K a n e o h e  B ay , 9 0 , 120 
K a p io la n i  P a r k ,  1 22 , 2 5 5 , 2 9 5 , 2 9 6  
K a u a i ,  7 , 2 62 , 3 2 2 -3 2 6  
K a u ik e a o u l i .  S e e  K a m e h a m e h a  111 
K a w a ia h a o ,  p a r i s h  a n d  c h u r c h ,  3 8 , 39  
K a w a ih a e ,  301 
K e a u h o u  B ay , 304  
K e a la k e k u a  B a y , 1 52 , 3 0 2 , 305 
K e a la k e k u a  ( to w n ) ,  306  
K e e l ik o la n i ,  R u th ,  4 5 ,  4 9 ,  56 
K i ld a y ,  R o b e r t ,  24 
K im u r a ,  S h u n ic h i ,  2 2 5 , 2 6 1 ,  2 65  
K in g d o m  o f  H a w a i i ,  2 1 -5 1  
K n u d s e n  T r u s t ,  325 
K o lo a  p l a n t a t i o n ,  3 2 ,  33 , 4 9 . S e e  also 
L a d d  &  C o m p a n y  
K o lo a  ( to w n ) ,  1 92 , 323  
K o n a  c o a s t ,  3 0 1 -3 0 7  
K o o la u  r a n g e ,  3 59  
K ra u s s ,  R o b e r t ,  83 
K u h io ,  J o n a h ,  156 
K u h io  T e r r a c e ,  165 
K u le a n a  G r a n t ,  37 
K u le a n a s ,  x , 10 , 3 3 , 4 8 , 198 , 199
L a d d  &  C o m p a n y ,  3 2 ,  3 3 ,  3 8 , 323 
l a h a i n a ,  4 7 , 9 7 , 2 8 7 , 3 2 1 , 3 22 , 330  
L a n a i ,  5 5 , 5 6 , 139 
L a n d  b a n k in g ,  3 5 0 -3 5 2  
l a n d  (g e n e ra l) ,  17, 18 , 1 1 1 -1 1 3 , 
2 2 8 - 2 3 0 ,  352  
l a n d  p o o l in g ,  3 5 3 -3 5 6  
L a n d  R e v is io n  C o m m is s io n ,  158 
L a n d  S tu d y  B u re a u  (U n iv e r s i ty  o f  
H a w a i i ) ,  68 , 119
L a n d s  o f  H a w a i i ,  3 7 -4 5 ,  6 4 ,  6 5 , 7 6 , 7 7 , 
1 58 , 1 7 9 -1 8 1 , 3 1 1 ; c ro w n ,  4 9 , 50 , 2 0 2 , 
2 2 1 ,  2 2 3 ; f u tu r e  o f ,  3 4 0 , 345 ,
3 5 3 -3 5 8 ;  g o v e r n m e n t ,  4 9 ,  50 , 6 1 , 156 , 
1 96 , 2 0 2 -2 0 4 ,  2 2 2 ; le g is la t io n  r e g a r d ­
in g ,  2 6 , 35 , 6 5 -7 6 ,  155 , 349 ; in  n in e ­
t e e n th  c e n tu ry ,  2 4 ,  26 , 3 1 , 3 3 , 36 , 3 7 , 
6 5 , 1 7 7 , 198, 199, 2 3 6 , 2 3 7 ; p o l i t ic s  
r e g a r d in g ,  1 58 , 1 9 7 , 2 3 3 , 2 3 8 , 25 0 ; 
P o ly n e s ia n  s y s te m  f o r ,  4 , 9 , 10 , 4 9 , 
1 32 , 1 33 , 1 76 , 197 , 198 , 22 7 ; s p e c u la ­
t i o n  in ,  175, 177, 178; t a x a t io n  o f ,  6 3 , 
6 7 ,  1 8 1 -1 8 3 , 186 , 191, 2 3 1 , 2 3 6 , 3 0 3 , 
3 0 4 ; t e n u r e ,  3 4 9 , 3 6 2 . See also 
K u le a n a s ;  L a n d  u s e
L a n d  u s e  (S ta te  o f  H a w a i i ) :  a g r ic u l tu r a l ,  
6 9 ,  1 3 1 -1 4 9 , 182 , 183; c o n s e r v a t io n a l ,  
1 1 6 -1 2 0 ;  a n d  p o w e r ,  1 9 6 -2 2 7 ;  a n d
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p r o f i t ,  1 41 , 1 6 1 -1 9 6 ;  r e c r e a t io n a l ,  
1 2 0 -1 3 0 ;  a n d  u r b a n  g r o w th ,  1 6 6 -2 1 0 . 
See also  K u le a n a s ;  L a n d  b a n k in g ;  
L a n d  p o o l in g ;  S ta te  L a n d  U s e  L a w  
L a  P e r o u s e  B a y , 3 8 , 3 19  
L a v a ,  301
L e a g u e  o f  W o m e n  V o te r s ,  165 , 2 16  
L e a s e h o ld  la n d  s y s te m , 3 0 , 3 1 , 1 5 9 -1 6 1 , 
3 5 3 , 3 54
L e d y a rd ,  J o h n ,  152 , 253  
L e v in e ,  A a r o n ,  2 1 6 , 3 0 0 , 307 
L ib e r ty  H o u s e ,  207  
L ife  o f  th e  L a n d ,  2 1 8 , 2 1 9 , 2 2 4  
L ih o l ih o .  See K a m e h a m e h a  I I  
L ih u e ,  47
L i l iu o k a l a n i ,  Q u e e n ,  3 9 , 5 0 , 5 2 , 2 0 0 , 
2 0 1 , 2 1 3 , 2 2 0 -2 2 2  
L i l iu o k a l a n i  T r u s t ,  55 
L im its to G row th, 9 4 , 95
M a c a d a m ia  n u t s ,  142 , 301 
M a g ic  I s la n d ,  309
M a k a h a  V a lle y ,  1 -3 ,  8 7 , 9 9 , 167 , 359 
M a k a h ik i ,  121 
M a k e n a ,  3 1 8 , 3 1 9
M a lo ,  D a v id ,  3 4 , 121 , 134 , 151 , 152 
M a n d e lk e r ,  D a v id ,  2 7 9  
M a n la p i t ,  P a b l o ,  2 08  
M a r in ,  F r a n c i s c o  d e  P a u la ,  2 4 ,  2 6 ,  134 
M a r k ,  S h e l le y ,  2 4 8 , 338 
M a r k s ,  E l iz a b e th ,  3 6 0 -3 6 2  
M a r s h a l l  K a p la n  G a n s  K a h n  &  
Y a m a m o to ,  163
M a r y la n d  L a w .  See L e a s e h o ld  la n d  
s y s te m
M a ts o n  N a v ig a t io n  C o m p a n y ,  2 0 7 , 318  
M a u i,  2 6 2 , 3 1 7 -3 2 2  
M a u n a  K e a ,  301 
M a u n a  L o a ,  301 
M axim illion R eport, The, 93 
M e a d o w s ,  D e n n is  a n d  D o n e l la ,  9 4  
M e n e h u n e s ,  132 
M ic h e n e r ,  J a m e s ,  358  
M ic r o e n v i r o n m e n t ,  3 4 0 ,  3 4 4 . S e e  also 
E c o s y s te m s
M ili la n i  T o w n ,  7 2 , 7 3 , 100 
M i l i t a r y ,  a s  i n d u s t r y ,  104 
M is s io n a r ie s ,  19 , 2 7 ,  3 2 ,  134 , 135; m is ­
s io n s  e s ta b l i s h e d  b y ,  3 7 , 3 1 2 , 321 
M o f f i t ,  L e o n a r d ,  2 1 6  
M o k u o h a i ,  3 0 2  
M o r g a n ,  J o h n  T y le r ,  201 
M o u n t  O lo m a n a ,  9 1 , 2 1 7 , 241
M o u n t  T a n ta lu s ,  297  
M u m f o r d ,  L e w is ,  2 5 6 , 271
M c B rid e  S u g a r  C o m p a n y ,  325 
M c C a n d le s s  E s ta te ,  9 9 ,  1 02 , 3 6 0  
M c C a n d le s s ,  J o h n ,  3 6 0  
M c C a n d le s s ,  L in c o ln ,  5 5 , 360  
M c C lu n g ,  D a v id ,  6 7 ,  81 
M c H a le ,  J o h n ,  3 3 4 , 3 3 5 , 337 
M c H a r g ,  I a n ,  2 4 0  
M c K in le y ,  W il l ia m ,  2 0 2 , 2 04
N a d e r ,  R a lp h ,  91 
N a p ie r ,  A le x ,  73 
N a p o o p o o ,  152
N a t io n a l  C e m e te ry  o f  th e  P a c i f i c ,  218  
N a t io n a l  E n v i r o n m e n ta l  P r o t e c t io n  
A g e n c y ,  2 82
N a t io n a l  F o u n d a t i o n  o n  th e  A r t s ,  2 9 7 , 
300
N a tu r a l  A re a s  R e s e rv e ,  118 
N ew  D e a l  in  H a w a i i ,  2 06  
N e w  Y o r k  U r b a n  D e v e lo p m e n t  C o r p o r a ­
t i o n ,  165 
N i ih a u ,  7
N is h im u r a ,  S h i r o ,  73
O a h u .  See H o n o lu lu
O a h u  D e v e lo p m e n t  C o n f e r e n c e ,  104,
3 0 0 , 3 0 7 -3 1 3 ,  3 37
O a h u  R a i l r o a d  a n d  L a n d  C o m p a n y ,  213 
O a h u  S u g a r  C o m p a n y ,  1 84 , 2 13  
O c e a n o g r a p h y ,  347  
O k a m o to ,  R a i ,  297  
O n io n s  a n d  f o o d  f a r m i n g ,  147 
O r g a n ic  A c t ,  5 1 , 5 4 , 2 0 3 , 2 2 1 , 2 3 6  
O s a n o ,  K e n j i ,  179 
O u td o o r  C irc le ,  216  
O v e r lo a d ,  e n v i r o n m e n ta l ,  2 4 4 , 2 4 5 . See 
also  D e s ig n ,  e n v i r o n m e n ta l  
O v e rv ie w  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  1 03 , 1 06 , 117, 
120, 166 , 2 4 0 , 337
P a ig e ,  G le n n ,  336  
P a k i ,  L y d ia  K a m a k a e h a .  See 
L i l iu o k a la n i ,  Q u e e n  
P a n io lo s ,  136
P a o ,  J o e ,  9 9 , 102 , 144 , 3 6 0 -3 6 2  
P a p a y a s ,  142
P a r k e r  R a n c h ,  2 4 , 3 0 1 , 3 02  
P a r k s ,  8 5 , 1 2 2 -1 2 5 . See also  K a p io la n i  
P a r k
P a u le t ,  G e o rg e ,  29
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P e a r l  H a r b o r ,  1 , 4 4 ,  6 0 , 196 
P e l ly ,  G e o r g e ,  3 0 ,  31 
P ig  f a r m i n g ,  142 
P in e a p p le ,  4 5 , 4 6 ,  5 4 , 1 39 , 2 0 9  
P i t t s b u r g h  L a w . S e e  T a x a t i o n  
P la n n in g ,  9 , 6 7 ,  6 8 , 2 3 6 , 2 3 7 ,  2 4 1 , 
2 5 1 - 2 8 3 ,  3 2 9 , 3 4 1 , 3 4 4 - 3 4 7 ,  3 5 1 ; in  
a r e a s  o f  c r i t ic a l  c o n c e r n ,  2 6 9 , 2 79 ; 
a n d  c a r r y in g  c a p a c i ty ,  2 4 4 ,  2 4 6 , 3 40 , 
3 4 1 ,  3 4 5 , 3 4 7 ; a n d  c h a n g e ,  2 5 9 , 3 3 4 , 
3 5 8 ; f o r  d e v e lo p m e n t  p la n s ,  2 6 2 , 2 8 5 , 
2 8 6 ; f o r  g e n e r a l  p la n s ,  6 8 , 2 4 7 , 2 5 7 , 
2 5 8 , 2 6 0 -2 6 3 ,  2 6 6 -2 6 9 ,  2 8 3 , 2 8 5 , 2 8 6 , 
3 0 6 ; o p e n  s p a c e ,  2 4 0 -2 4 2 ;  o r g a n iz a ­
t i o n  f o r ,  6 4 , 171 , 2 4 1 , 2 5 8 ,  2 6 3 -2 6 6 ;  
s u b s t i t u t e s  f o r ,  2 7 5 , 2 7 7 - 2 8 1 ;  f o r  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  4 7 ,  2 7 2 - 2 7 7 ,  3 0 1 -3 0 8 , 
3 1 0 ; a n d  z o n in g ,  2 7 5 - 2 7 9 ,  3 2 9 . See 
also  D e s ig n :  e n v i r o n m e n ta l ,  u r b a n ;  
F u t u r e ,  p la n n in g  o f  th e  
P l a n t a t i o n s ,  5 4 , 6 4 , 6 5 , 7 5 , 1 43 , 145,
1 7 7 , 2 3 7 , 3 5 8 ; h o u s in g  o n ,  154; p o w e r  
o f ,  2 0 5 -2 0 7
P o ip u  B e a c h ,  1 8 2 , 3 2 3 -3 2 5 ,  3 30  
P o l i c y ,  p u b l ic ,  7 1 , 2 2 4 , 2 2 5 ,  2 3 3 -2 5 0 , 
3 0 3 , 3 12
P o l i t i c s ,  5 2 , 5 3 , 6 2 , 6 4 , 6 5 - 7 1 ;  o f  la n d ,
9 , 6 5 ,  1 56 , 1 9 7 , 2 0 0 , 2 6 6 - 2 7 0 ,  2 8 3 ,
3 4 6
P o l l u t i o n ,  18 , 2 1 5 , 2 3 9  
Polynesian, 3 8 -4 0
P o p u l a t i o n ,  3 8 , 4 1 ,  5 3 , 7 6 ,  7 7 , 1 03 , 104, 
2 0 7 ,  2 4 8 , 3 4 1 , 3 4 4 , 3 4 5 , 3 5 6  
P o ta to e s ,  1 36 , 1 37 , 142 
P re is ,  A l f r e d ,  x x ,  300  
P r e s e r v a t io n ,  3 5 7 ; o f  a r t i f a c t s ,  8 3 -8 5 ,  
3 0 2 ; o f  b u i ld in g s ,  8 5 , 8 6 , 3 2 0 ; o f  c o m ­
m u n i t i e s ,  8 6 -8 9 ;  n o s ta l g ia  a b o u t ,  82 , 
2 9 5 ,  322
P u b l i c  c o s ts  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  1 73 , 191;
c o n f e r e n c e  a b o u t ,  174 
P u e r to  R ic o ,  3 5 0 -3 5 2  
P u n c h b o w l ,  2 18
Q u e e n  E m m a  S q u a r e ,  2 93
Q u e e n ’s B e a c h ,  268
Q u in n ,  W il l ia m  F „  6 3 , 6 6 ,  6 7 ,  6 9 , 2 38
R a m a p o ,  N e w  Y o r k ,  2 7 9  
R e c r e a t io n ,  1 2 0 -1 3 0 ;  in  H a w a i i ,  2 6 , 121 , 
1 22 . See, also  P a r k s
R e d e v e lo p m e n t  a g e n c ie s :  H a w a i i  ( s ta te ) ,  
164 ; H o n o lu lu ,  8 8 , 164
R e g io n a l  U r b a n  D e s ig n  T e a m ,  A IA .  See 
R U D A T
R e p u b l ic  o f  H a w a i i ,  4 4 , 5 4 , 1 55 , 2 0 2  
R e v o lu t io n  o f  1 8 9 3 , 4 4 ,  2 0 0  
R ic e , 137
R ic e , L o u i s a  K .,  2 2 0 ,  221  
R ic h a r d s ,  W il l ia m ,  2 8 ,  199  
R o b in s o n  E s ta te ,  184  
R o c k e fe l le r  B r o th e r s  F u n d ,  2 7 9  
R o c k e fe l le r ,  L a u r a n c e ,  1 02 , 108 
R o o s e v e l t ,  F r a n k l i n  D .,  2 0 6  
R o s e ,  L o u is  A . ,  175 
R U D A T , 2 8 8 -2 9 2 ,  3 0 3 ,  309  
R u th ,  P r in c e s s .  See K e e l ik o la n i ,  R u th
S a in t  A n d r e w ’s C a t h e d r a l ,  293  
S a lt  L a k e ,  9 1 , 1 01 , 1 2 6 -1 2 9 ,  167 , 2 1 3 , 
241
S a n d  I s la n d ,  308 
S e c o n d  M a h e le ,  6 6 , 67  
S h o re l in e  p r o t e c t io n ,  2 9 0 -2 9 2  
S im p s o n ,  A le x a n d e r ,  29  
S m ith ,  F r e d ,  108 , 3 5 5  
S m y s e r , A d a m  A . ,  243  
S o le r i ,  P a o lo ,  107
S p e c ia l  d e s ig n  d i s t r i c t s ,  2 9 6 , 2 9 7 . See 
also  D e s ig n
S p re c k e ls ,  C la u s ,  4 5 ,  5 0  
S ta in b a c k ,  I n g r a m  M . ,  2 3 7 , 238  
S ta te  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  A g r ic u l tu r e ,  145 
S ta te  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  H e a l t h ,  92  
S ta te  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  L a n d  a n d  N a tu r a l  
R e s o u rc e s ,  116 , 1 1 7 , 128 
S ta te  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  P l a n n in g  a n d  
E c o n o m ic  D e v e lo p m e n t ,  1 03 , 2 1 1 ,
2 4 7 , 2 5 8 , 2 6 4 ; a n d  c e n t r a l  O a h u  
s tu d y ,  1 00 , 101 , 1 7 3 , 3 3 7 , 3 4 0  
S ta te  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  84 
S ta te  E n v i r o n m e n ta l  P o l i c y  A c t ,  85 ,
2 4 5 , 3 40
S ta te  E n v i r o n m e n ta l  Q u a l i ty  C o m m is ­
s io n ,  85 , 92
S ta te  F o u n d a t io n  o n  C u l tu r e  a n d  th e  
A r t s ,  ix , 2 9 7 , 2 9 9
S ta te  L a n d  U se  C o m m is s io n ,  6 8 , 7 0 -7 4 ,  
7 9 , 1 17 , 120 , 1 28 , 1 4 5 , 185 , 2 1 3 , 2 5 8 , 
2 6 9 , 2 7 0 , 3 4 7 , 3 6 1 ,  3 6 3 ;  a n d  c e n t r a l  
O a h u  c a m p u s ,  2 1 1 ,  2 1 2 ;  a n d  g e n e ra l  
p l a n n in g ,  2 6 2 , 2 6 9
S ta te  L a n d  U se  L a w ,  6 8 ,  7 0 - 7 6 ,  9 0 , 116, 
1 77 , 2 3 0 , 2 3 8 , 2 3 9 ,  2 5 8 ,  2 7 0  
S ta te  L e g is la tu r e ,  1 8 7 , 1 94 , 1 95 , 2 1 2 , 
2 6 1 , 2 6 9 , 2 7 0 , 2 8 6 ,  3 4 0 ,  3 4 6
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S ta te h o o d ,  63 
S te v e n s ,  J o h n  L . ,  201 
S to c k h o lm  p la n ,  2 87  
S u e fu j i ,  R a y m o n d ,  261 
S u g a rc a n e ,  3 3 , 4 5 , 53 , 137 , 1 38 , 2 0 9
“ T a k in g  c l a u s e ,”  is s u e  o f ,  3 4 9 , 355  
T a n g e n ,  E d d i e ,  7 4 , 1 2 7 , 145 , 185 , 2 6 9  
T a x a t io n ,  4 0 ,  6 3 , 6 9 , 2 3 5 ; a n d  P i t t s ­
b u r g h  L a w ,  6 9 , 182 . See also  L a n d s  
o f  H a w a i i
T e c h n o lo g ie s ,  d i f f e r in g ,  343 
T e m k o ,  A l la n ,  3 0 0 , 3 0 3 , 3 0 6 , 3 1 1 , 3 1 6 , 
3 2 5 , 3 2 6
T e m p o r a r y  C o m m is s io n  o n  S ta te w id e  
E n v i r o n m e n ta l  P la n n in g ,  2 4 3 -2 4 5 ,  2 7 9  
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